










LITERATURE,MARXISM AND CULTURAL MATERIALISM 
by 
JOHN HIGGINS 
Thesis Presented for the Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
at the Department of English Language and Literature 
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN 
January 1998 










The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 




















1. The Tight Place: Marxism or Literature? 1947-1950 7 
2. Drama and the Structure of Feeling 1947-1954 48 
3. Culture and Communication 1950-1962 98 
4. Cambridge Criticism 1962-1973 149 
5. Marxisms: Contra Caudwell, Against Althusser 226 
6. Towards a Cultural Materialism 1977-1981 312 





'for years he was writing a book he wrote years ago in his head' 
(Tom Raworth) 
Tom Raworth's line, from his poem 'South America', always 
seemed to capture some of the main difficulties I had with writing 
this book. It would never have made it into the page without the 
encouragement of friends and family too numerous to mention. but 
they all know who they are, and what their kind support has meant 
to me over the years. whether in South Africa, Switzerland. the 
USA or Great Britain. 
More formally, though the indebtedness goes beyond formality, I 
would like to take the opportunity to thank those who provided 
concrete occasions for writing or speaking on Williams. For their 
early encouragement to write on Williams. many thanks to Bruce 
Robbins and Jonathan Arac (boundary_2), and to Michael Sprinker 
(the minnesota review): thanks also to Susan van Zyl (JggrD~l of 
Literary Studies), and Christopher Prendergast (5ggi~l I~~! 
Qgll~g!iy~) for later opportunities. 
Peter de Bolla (University of Geneva) 
My thanks are also due to 
P~ter Kohler (University of 
the Western Cape) Reingard Nethersole (University of the 
Witwatersrand); Maud Ellmann (King's College, Cambridge); Stewart 
Crehan (University of Transkei); and Fredric Jameson (Duke 
University) for invitations to speak on Williams at their 
respective institutions. All of these occasions contributed in 
some way to the formulations presented here. 
More specifically, thanks to Tina Barsby, Louise Green and 
David Schalkwyk. who each read parts of the manuscript and gave 
their always welcome and insightful advice. Christopher 
Prendergast read an early draft of the book as a whole, and his 
critical comments were acute and stimulating. Some particular 
conversations with Terry Eagleton. Edward Said. and Gareth Stedman 
Jones were also very valuable. as was the general encouragement of 
Tony Tanner and Gayatri Spivak. My most pervasive debt is to 
Frances Long-Innes. for more than a decade of ever stimulating and 
critical dialogue. 
I benefited enormously in the final stages of writing from the 
very careful readings of the book made by John Coetzee. Anthony 
Morphet. and John Kench: to respond adequately to their probing 
critical concerns would have made it necessary to write a 
different and better book than this. I should also record that 
the late Raymond Williams was kind enough to offer help and 
encouragement at an early stage in the planning of this work. 
My thanks also to the staff at the University Library 1n 
Cambridge. the British Museum Reading Room. and the library of the 
University of Cape Town. who were unfailingly patient and helpful 
with my search for materials and information. My thanks are also 
due to the King's College Research Centre for giving me office 





Raymond Williams died, a full decade ago now, 1n January 1988. 
The immediate response was overwhelming: progressive intellectuals 
throughout the world mourned the passing of one of the foremost 
socialist thinkers. intellectuals and cultural activists of the 
post-war period. In the obituary columns of leading newspapers, 
at conferences and on television. and in the pages of academic 
journals. we saw the public mourning of a figure who was, 1n 
Patrick Parrinder's words, 'father-figure to thousands', who was. 
for Juliet Mitchell and many more like her. 'an intellectual and 
moral touchstone'. 1 Who was this remarkable figure and why 
should his work continue to hold our interest and attention? We 
can begin to answer these questions by looking briefly at the 
background and career of Britain's most distinguished socialist 
thinker on culture of the past forty years. 
Raymond Henry Williams was born 1n the small Welsh village of 
Pand:,.- in 1921, the son of a railway signalman. He won a 
scholarship to Cambridge 1n 1939 where he was active in the 
student branch of the Communist Party and the Cambridge University 
Socialist Club.2 He was called up in 1941 and fought as a tank 
commander in a number of the most bloody battles of the Second 
World War. returning to Cambridge in 1946 to complete his degree 
in English with a powerful dissertation on Ibsen in which some of 
his own sense of vocational cr1s1s came through. For the next 
fourteen years. Williams worked as a tutor in Adult Education.3 
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This move, and the consequent departure from the usual university 
syllabus of English studies. provided some of the ground for the 
writing of two seminal works which challenged the existing 
paradigm of literary studies, and did much to help the emergence 
of the new disciplines of cultural studies. Culture_and_Society 
1780-1950 (1958) and The_Long_Revolution (1961) established 
his reputation as the leading thinker of the New Left, 1n the 
words of the historian Edward Thompson. our best man".4 
In 1961. Williams received a letter from the English Faculty of 
the University of Cambridge informing him that he had been 
appointed Lecturer in English: a few days later. other letters 
arrived. encouraging him to apply for the post!5 Discouraged by 
the shift of emphasis in adult education away from working-class 
education and towards middle-class provision. Williams accepted 
the post and was to spend the rest of his working life at 
Cambridge, first as a lecturer, and then. from 1974. as Professor 
of Drama. It was from here, the centre of Britain's elite 
educational system. that Williams was to produce a body of work 
which challenged many of that elite culture's central assumptions. 
not only hS thev appeared in English studies. but also as they 
informed thµ dominant modes of thinking about politics and 
society. and as they swayed assessments of the very possibility of 
progressive social and political action. As he clarified during 
the exhaustive interviews with the New_Left_Review. published as 
Politics and L~11~rs in 1979. his work was above all the work of 
an oppositional intellectual: If you look at the implied 
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relationships of nearly al] the books I have written. I have been 
arguing with what I take to be official English culture' (Williams 
1979: 316). 
This study takes that argument with ·official culture' as its 
guiding-thread, and follows it across the twenty-four or so 
volumes of his academic writing. On the way, it challenges some 
of the received ideas concerning his work. Chapter One examines 
Williams's earliest writings, and particularly the essays written 
for the journals he helped to found 1n the late 1940s, £Qliiig~ 
~gd_L~tt~r~ and The Criiig, as well as his first major study. 
Drawing attention to the pervasive 
influence of Eliot (rather than Leavis. as is commonly assumed). 
it argues that the tensions between literary and Marxist analysis 
which Williams found so crippling in this early period in fact 
provided the motor of his development as a whole. Chapter Two 
argues for the formative (rather than marginal) role usually 
assigned to Williams's early thinking on drama, and examines 
neglected works such as Drama_from_Ibsen_to_Eliot (1952). the 
first ,·ersion of Drama_in_Performance (1954). and the book co-
written with Michael Orrom. Preface_to_Film (1954). The third 
chapter focuses on the largely neglected context of cultural. 
educational and political debate from which Qyl1Yr~ ~Dct ~Q~i~1Y 
and Tb~ LQDg B~YQlY!iQD emerged. while Chapter Four concentrates 
on the significant detail of Williams·s oppositional relation to 
'Cambridge English· in his books Mg~~rD Ir~g~cty (1969), Ib~ 
Engli~b_Ngy~l_f1·9m DickeD~_t9_L~~r~Dg~ (1970). and Tb~_ggyntry_~Dct 
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the~City 11973), and the way these studies also carried on his 
critical dialogue with Marxism. Chapter Six investigates the ways 
in which cultural materialism is offered as the theoretical 
alternative to existing formations of English studies, while 
Chapter Seven examines the final. interrupted. stage of Williams's 
argument with ·official culture' through his renewed attention to 
the ideological and disciplinary forces at work in the related 
formations of modernism and English studies. both in their 
historical trajectory and 1n terms of their contemporary 
theoretical assessment and practice. 
The guiding principle of this study is that Williams's 
engagement with English studies cannot be undersiood 1n terms 
purely interna1 to the discipline of English. As well as writing 
against the official culture of liberal and conservative lii.erar:,· 
studies. Williams also wrote in opposition to what he read RS the 
ortl,odr,:>-:ie~~ of Marxist thinking on literature. culture and 
po} j i. i CS . Arguing first against Marxist literary criticism as he 
knew it [rom the 1930s, he maintained an ever sceptical and ever 
critica: stance towards the later trends of Althusserian and post-
structurc11ist theory, v,·hi1e at the same time continuing his a1wavs 
defining commitment to socialist politics. While the terms of 
this larger argument are necessarily present throughout. Chapier 
Five focuses on them more narro¥.1y. and traces their development 
1n i\ilLiarns·s thinking from the late 1950s through to .,_' Lfie 
de,-elopment of the concept of cultural materialism 1n M~r~J~m~a~~ 
Lit~r~turf 111 1977. 
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Similarly, no one can read Williams's work without becoming 
aware just how far its concerns reach beyond the bounds of the 
academy and extend the usual confines of a professional acad~mic 
identity. The single most striking characteristic of his work is 
its commitment to the connection of literary argument and debate 
with the broader issues of politics and society. This account 
seeks to foreground some of the ways in which it always interacted 
with the cultural and political debates of his day. Williams was 
never just an academic. but always. to borrow Edward Said's terms. 
a public and fully secular intellectual.6 The study closes with 
an examination of the difficult dynamics of settling Williams's 
intellectual legacy 1n the decade since his death.7 The 
Conclusion argues that the striking fact of his joint commitment 
to academic work and cultural politics was the ground for the 
production of the cent1·al concept urged and embodied by his work 
ac a whole. though nowhere named as such. the concept of a 
critical literacy' 
1 make no claim to cover every aspect of the extraordinary 
range of Williams·s writing and thinking. Conspicuously absent: 
any assessment of his own fictional and dramatic writing. any 
substantial account of his specifically political ideas and 
acti,·ities. or even a full engagement with his important work on 
tele,·ision and mass communication.8 The focus 1s narrow. but. I 
hope. productive. While this study 1s not intended ac a final 
word or judgement on Williams's work as a whole. it 1s intended as 
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a counter to some of the 'final words' that have been offered, to 
my mind prematurely. For there seems to be an implicit (and at 
times explicit) judgement in some recent accounts that we can now 
only read Williams's work historically', as if its relevance has 
dissipated.9 My own feeling is that reading Williams 
historically - as 1s attempted here - can be a salutary challenge 
to any tendency on our own parts to either theoretical or 
political complacency. This study therefore presents an account 
and anal~-sis of the interaction in Williams's thinking between his 
principled opposition to and questioning of both Marxist cultural 
theory and Cambridge literary criticism across some forty years of 
academic writing and debate. 
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Chapter_One The_Tight_Place:_Marxism_or_Literature_1947-1950 
Raymond Williams's first critical writings - from, say, the 
essays and reviews in Politics_and_Letters (1947-48) to Preface_to 
Eil~ (1954) - have been powerfully characterized as 'Left-
Leavisi te'. Perhaps in consequence, they have been too little 
read. For, as Williams himself noted, in The_Long_Revolution, 
sometimes the very availability of a description and the 
ascription of a name can work to block fully historical 
analysis (Williams [1961a]: 89-90). The aim of the first two 
chapters of this study is to prize open some of the internal 
complexities and contradictions that the label 'Left-Leavisite' 
works to contain, and to provide a more historically nuanced 
account and assessment of Williams's early criticism than is 
generally available.l In so doing, I shall challenge the 
dominant view that this early period is best viewed as a merely 
probationary, and easily superseded, moment in Williams's 
formation. I argue that, duly considered, the early work presents 
us with the constitutive dynamic of Williams's intellectual 
identity. This first chapter examines the uneasy development of 
Williams's thought from the autumn of 1939, when he began his 
undergraduate studies in English at Cambridge University, through 
the first years of his work as Staff Tutor for the Workers' 
Educational Association in the Extra-Mural Delegacy at Oxford 
University, to the publication of his first book, Reading_and 
Criticism, in 1950. 
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Terry Eagleton, probably Williams's single most extensive 
critic, proposed the term 'Left-Leavisite' in his provocative and 
polemical assessment of Williams's work, first published as an 
essay in New_Left_Review, and then as the opening chapter of his 
Criticism_and_Ideologx, both in 1976.2 Of course, others had 
remarked on the importance to Williams of his formation in the 
discipline of English. But no one had done it with as much vigour 
as the self-consciously iconoclastic Eagleton.3 In Criticism 
and_Ideologx, 'Left-Leavisism' figures as the first of the three 
main stages in Williams's incomplete move towards a genuinely 
Marxist criticism. What I wish to examine here, in the first 
instance, is the enabling rhetoric behind Eagleton's description -
one which makes it less a description of Williams's work, and more 
an interested representation of it. 
In the essay, Eagleton pays tribute to his former teacher as 
someone who produced 'the most suggestive and intricate body of 
socialist criticism in English history', and argues that 'any 
Marxist criticism in England which has shirked taking the pressure 
of Williams's work will find itself seriously crippled and 
~ 
truncated' (Eagleton 1976: 24). 
~ 
Williams has been 'the English 
pioneer asserts Eagleton; 'but like every pioneer must now 
submit to criticism from those he has enabled to speak'. 
follows are the 'necessarily astringent criticisms' made 
What 
nonetheless in a 'spirit of comradeship and good faith' asserts 
Eagleton; though what comes through, in a language fraught with 
some Oedipal angst or rivalry, is a desire to supersede Williams, 
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a desire implicit in the very placing of him as a 'pioneer'. 
For what 'taking the pressure of Williams's work amounts to in 
practice is turning the pressure back on him, subjecting him to 
criticisms whose bitter necessity lies in making it possible for 
Marxist criticism not to be crippled, not to be truncated, but to 
be finally and more fully articulated by Eagleton himself. 
It is worth quoting Eagleton's description in full in order to 
grasp the implications of the story it tells: 
Williams's intuitive knack of pre-empting intellectual 
positions is nowhere more apparent than in his development 
since 1968. The work of this period can be seen as 
constituting a definite phase of his production, just as the 
period from Culture_and_Societ~ to Modern_Traged~ represents a 
partial but significant break with the early literary-critical 
writings. That early phase, characterised by such works as 
Reading_and_Criticism and Drama_from_Ibsen_to_Eliot, is most 
aptly describable as 'Left-Leavisite': at this probationary 
point, Williams still has to discover the idiom which will 
allow him to extend 'practical criticism' and organicist social 
positions into fully socialist analysis. It is this task which 
is undertaken in the work of the 'middle' period, in which the 
concept of 'culture' becomes a crucial mediation between 
literary analysis and social enquiry, and the socialist 
orientation of Williams's enterprise receives increasingly 
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explicit, if gradualist, formulation ... Williams is now closer 
to Marxism than at any stage in his career - an evolution which 
seems logically continuous, yet which has come about precisely 
at the point where the Marxist challenge to his early positions 
is gathering strength. (ibid., p. 39) 
What is the logic behind this story? What are its rhetorical 
effects? First, note how Williams's work is represented as almost 
but not quite achieving the Marxism of a 'fully socialist 
position'. This comes through most strongly in the emphasis on 
the evolutionary aspects of Williams's development: Eagleton's 
emphasis on 'Left-Leavisism' as a 'probationary point', and the 
related assumption that there is a Marxist 'idiom' out there to be 
discovered, though Williams never did quite get to it ... The 
implication is that the author who is able to state that 'Williams 
is now closer to Marxism than at any stage in his career', must 
himself occupy that 'fully socialist position', must of necessity 
be in full possession of just that Marxism. Indeed, the reference 
to 'the point where the Marxist challenge to his [Williams's] 
early positions is gathering strength' is puzzlingly vague until 
we realize that this point is precisely the one we have reached in 
Eagleton's own text - a moment where the pressure of Williams's 
work is being taken, or rather taken on. In other words, the 
substance of Eagleton's criticisms of Williams depends in large 
part on the self-generated authority of the writing, a writing in 
which Eagleton attributes to himself the position of secure 
knowledge associated with the Althusserian Marxism just then 
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coming into vogue in Britain. The natural evolution of Williams's 
work must lead beyond Williams; beyond Williams to Marxism, and, 
it is implied, to the Althusserian Marxism now embodied in 
Eagleton's own work. 
For beneath the surface of Eagleton's nuanced description of 
Williams's work, there is a structurally familiar story, one in 
which Eagleton plays Althusser to Williams's Marx. As with Marx 
in Althusser's account, to be properly understood, Williams's work 
needs to be divided into three distinct phases.4 First, there 
is the early humanist phase from which there must be an absolute 
break in order for there to be 'fully socialist analysis'. For 
Althusser, this is represented by the works of the 'Young Marx' 
early writings such as 'On the Jewish Question' and the 1844 
Manuscripts, with their intrusive Feuerbachian elements. For 
Eagleton, there is Williams's 'Left-Leavisite' phase, and all its 
corresponding humanism. Then there are the 'works of the break' 
corresponding for Eagleton to Williams's 'work of the "middle" 
period' And this is followed by the truly scientific works. 
rather, those works in which the truly scientific can be 
discerned, but only through the process of a 'symptomatic 
Or 
reading' . This corresponds in Williams to then recent works (such 
as The_Country_and_the_City, and the essay 'Base and 
Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory') in which traces of 
'fully socialist analysis' can be discerned, and where 'Williams 
is now closer to Marxism than at any stage in his career' - but 
where the interpreter is even closer still, by virtue of the fact 
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that he is able to judge the degree of closeness that Williams has 
attained. 
It was just this rhetorically generated assumption by the 
interpreter of a position of easy and automatic authority which 
most troubled Williams in his first public response to Eagleton's 
essay.5 In an important but little-known interview with the 
Cambridge journal R~Q ~hif! in 1977, Williams said that though he 
'would accept much of [Eagleton's] account', he was disturbed by 
some aspects of it. Questioned about the contradictions of his 
own position and intellectual history, Williams responded wryly 
with 'What I want to ask is who Eagleton is?'; and went on to 
argue vigorously that the 'basic fault of the kind of formalist 
Marxism which Eagleton is now in is that it assumes that by an act 
of intellectual abstraction you can place yourself above the lived 
contradictions both of the society and of any individual you 
choose to analyse, and that you are not yourself in question' 
Against this, Williams asserted that 'the belief that one is above 
that deeply contradictory situation is a fantasy ... There is no 
position except in fantasy where one can merely examine what 
others are inscribing' (Williams 1977b: 12, 15). 
A year later, in a discussion with New_Left_Review which was in 
part prompted by Eagleton's essay, Williams had sharpened his 
response, and now rejected 'the general label Left-Leavisism' 
because it implied far too unified and far too comfortable a 
position. Except in fantasy, 'Left-Leavisism' could only be an 
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'inherently unstable' position (Williams 1979: 195). As we shall 
see, what troubled Williams was the way in which Eagleton's 
confidently theoretical description glossed over instabilities and 
contradictions which had been felt very deeply and very painfully. 
The Tight Place 
'The tight place, where you stick fast; there is no going 
forwards or backwards.' Ibsen's words - from When_we_dead_awaken 
- held a particular resonance for Raymond Williams as he completed 
his undergraduate studies in Cambridge in 1946.6 He quoted them 
in his final year dissertation on Ibsen (an essay which later 
formed the basis for the first chapter of Drama_from_Ibsen_to 
~liQi); and some thirty years later, he recalled how that sense of 
being unable to move, of being trapped, which he had found in 
Ibsen, seemed to sum up his own intellectual and political 
predicament, his own troubled sense of self and vocation. 'That 
was exactly my sensation. The theme of my analysis of Ibsen is 
that although everybody is defeated in his work, the defeat never 
cancels the validity of the impulse that moved him; yet that the 
defeat has occurred is also crucial' (Williams 1979: 62-3). 
What were the terms of this defeat? Why did the young Williams 
suffer from such a sense of failure when, by all ordinary 
standards, he already appeared to be an achiever, indeed a 
success? He had, after all, survived the war and come through 
some of its bloodiest fighting in the Normandy and Ardennes 
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offensives. He had married in 1942; and he and his wife Joy had 
their first child in 1944. He graduated from Cambridge with a 
first class degree in English, was offered a place to do research, 
but chose instead to become a tutor in the burgeoning Adult 
Education movement. Between 1946 and 1953 he completed three 
books, wrote most of a fourth, collaborated as editor of and 
contributor to two new (though short-lived) journals, and at the 
same time worked through the preliminary drafts and versions of 
his first novel. On the surface, Raymond Williams in the late 
forties and early fifties was already a successful academic and 
intellectual. 
failure? 
Why then this troubled sense of blockage and of 
To understand this, we need to grasp something of the depth of 
Williams's commitment, one which we can read in the terms he 
appropriated from Ibsen as commitment to a vocation, and as a 
commitment always under threat of failure. If we see Williams's 
vocation as, in the first instance, that of a socialist literary 
critic, then we can read that commitment as riven by a conflict 
between its two main components. Literary criticism provided 
Williams with both something of an intellectual base and the 
superstructure of a professional identity; but its generally 
apolitical or even conservative stance was deeply unattractive to 
him, as were its usually apolitical and ahistorical modes of 
analysis. In a sense, the discourse of literary criticism was the 
'tight place' in which Williams felt so trapped. At this point, 
as we shall see, he was unable either to go back to the Marxist 
15 
literary criticism which he decisively abandoned - on professional 
grounds - in the course of his undergraduate studies; but neither 
was he able to move forwards beyond the terms of existing literary 
studies. 
And at the same time we need to understand that it was just 
this sense of being stuck which proved to be the necessary ground 
for Williams's major work. For the deep feelings of failure and 
defeat which dogged him in this early period provided the 
necessary dynamic for a reworking not only of the possible 
relationships between Marxism and literary studies, but for a 
significant revision and recasting of both. This first chapter 
examines the constitutive tensions of that 'tight place', of the 
young Williams caught unhappily between a literary criticism he 
couldn't accept politically and a Marxism he couldn't reproduce 
professionally. It was the extreme discomfort of Williams's 
'position' in this period that proved to be the very motor and 
motive of his intellectual development. 
Beginnings 
In the autumn of 1939, Raymond Williams arrived at Trinity 
College Cambridge to begin his studies for a BA degree in English 
Jiterature. It was the beginning of a combative relationship with 
'Cambridge English' which was to structure and define the main 
contours of Williams's intellectual identity. It was to shape 
both the nature of his particular contribution to Marxism and to 
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literary studies that together form the focus of this account: 
that attention to the politics of culture, and to the primacy of 
culture in politics, which he finally came to name a 'cultural 
materialism'. 
Unlike most students at Trinity, and indeed in the university 
as a whole, Williams did not belong to the privileged elite who 
had received their secondary education in one of Britain's 
'public' schools. For these, three years study at 'Oxbridge' was 
simply a stepping stone to an already established place in the 
natural hierarchy of British society.? Instead Williams 'came 
up to Cambridge as what was to become a familiar icon of 1950s 
culture: as a 'scholarship boy', that is to say, as one of a 
number of students from working-class families who won a place in 
one of the prestige universities through the highly competitive 
Entrance Examinations.8 
Born in the Welsh village of Pandy, and educated first at the 
local primary school, and then at King Henry VIII Grammar School 
for Boys four miles away in Abergavenny, Williams arrived at 
Cambridge unwilling to be intimidated, and, initially at least, 
full of the brash self-confidence characteristic of first year 
students.9 Trinity had no Fellow responsible for teaching 
English, so in the first year, Williams worked with Lionel Elvin 
and had his weekly tutorials on Shakespeare and the literature of 
the Renaissance at Trinity Hall. As a member of the Communist 
Party - which he joined in December - he devoted a great deal of 
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his time to the Cambridge Socialist Club, writing for the Club 
Bulletin, participating in debates at the Cambridge Union, and, at 
the urging of the CP, as editor for the Cambridge_Universit~ 
As a member of the ironically named Aesthetes, Williams 
also showed a keen interest in film. Far from being the alienated 
figure suggested by critics such as Jan Gorak, the young Williams 
found a ready place in the active socialist life of the 
university: as he was later to put it, 'I had to dine in Hall and 
the class stamp of Trinity at that time was not difficult to spot. 
But it did not have to be negotiated as the only context at 
Cambridge. The Socialist Club was a home from home.' (Williams 
1979: 40)10 
Certainly the details of an average week's activities in the 
Club show the fullness of its timetable. We might take the week 
beginning March 6 1940 as presenting an average week's activities 
in the Club: Wednesday March 6 - Hand's Off Russia - Lobbying and 
Poster Parade 12.30; Friday Hand's Off Russia - Meeting in The 
Dorothy; Saturday 2-30 Film Club - Pabst's Westfront; 8.00 pm 
Social; Sunday 2.00 Film Show; 4.30 Tea; 8.00 Film; Monday 8.00 pm 
Business Meeting; Tuesday Union Debate - Intervention against the 
USSR; Wednesday 8.00 pm - 1.30 am Dance. In addition, there were 
three Faculty Group meetings for students in History, Physics, and 
English.11 Williams gave a short paper 'Culture and the People' 
on Friday 1 November 1940 which QQ~BQ reports was 'followed by 
keen discussion providing enough questions to keep the group going 
for the rest of the year.' 12 
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And yet a notable feature of the later Culture_and_Societ~ was 
its hostile chapter on the Marxist literary criticism which was 
the staple diet of young socialists like the undergraduate 
Williams. The 'home from home' was to be repudiated. Chapter 
Five of Part Three - 'Marxism and Culture' - is the only place in 
Culture_and_Societ~ where the famously balanced and objective tone 
of Williams's assessment breaks down, most obviously in its 
notorious judgement on Caudwell whose writing is described with 
contempt as 'not even specific enough to be wrong' (Williams 
[1958) 1967: 277). The thirties had seen the publication of a 
number of works which became standard reading for socialist 
students of literature: Alick West's Crisis_and_Criticism (1937), 
Ralph Fox's The_Novel_and_the_Peo~le (1937), Christopher 
Caudwell's Illusion and R~~li!~, and the Day-Lewis collection, Ih~ 
Mind_in_Chains (1937). All of these are the targets of Williams's 
sharpest criticism. What it is important to recognise, and what 
is in any case evident from the angry tone of the account, is that 
it was just these works which formed the initial basis of 
Williams's literary analysis as he worked for Part One of the 
English Tripos. The savageness of Williams's later criticism 
should alert us to the existence of what he was later to 
acknowledge as a painful - and determinant - break with these 
available forms of Marxist literary analysis under the pressures 
of the availability of the techniques and skills of Cambridge 
English. That this break was to be the very condition for the 
formation of Williams's own distinctive version of literary and 
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cultural studies is relatively easy to see in hindsight. It did 
not and could not appear to be anything so promising at the time. 
Impasse 
The first cracks began to appear in the second year of 
Williams's studies at Cambridge, when he moved from Elvin's 
sympathetic supervision to a more challenging encounter with 
E.M.W. Tillyard at Jesus College.13 For Tillyard - one of the 
first lecturers to be appointed to teach the new Cambridge degree 
in the 1920s, and the pioneer of studies in the historical 
'background' of English literature that Williams was later to 
attack with regularity - raised a number of questions which the 
young Williams was unable to answer. 
The second year of the English Tripos focused on the history of 
the novel and Romantic poetry. In his tutorials with Tillyard, 
Willams sought to apply the stock-responses of thirties' Marxist 
criticism. In this 'proleptic criticism'. the literature of the 
present and of the past is read and evaluated in terms of future 
needs. In his introduction to The_Mind_in_Chains (1937), the poet 
C.Day-Lewis repeated with approval Edward Upward's contention that 
'the most enduring books are those in which the writer has seen so 
deeply into contemporary reality that he has exposed "the shape of 
things to come" latent there' (Day-Lewis 1937: 16). Upward 
himself argued that for the Marxist a good book is one that is 
true to life ... For the Marxist critic, therefore, a good book is 
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one that is true not merely to temporary existing situations but 
also to the future conditions which are developing within that 
situation' (ibid., p.46). In the same vein, Ralph Fox, in his Ih~ 
Novel_and_the_Peo~le, also stresses the need for a new Marxist 
realism: 'The new realism it is our task to create must take up 
the task where bourgeois realism laid it down. It must show man 
not merely critical, or man at hopeless war with a society he 
cannot fit into as an individual, but man in action to change his 
conditions, to master life, man in harmony with the course of 
history and able to become the lord of his own destiny' (Fox 1937: 
100) . Christopher Caudwell could write 1n all brash confidence 
that in 'bourgeois art man is conscious of the necessity of outer 
reality but not of his own, because he is unconscious of the 
society that makes him what he is. He is only a half-man. 
Communist poetry will be complete, because it will be man 
conscious of his own necessity as well as that of outer reality' 
(Caudwell 1937: 298). In this view, novels of the past should be 
judged in terms of how novels should be written in the present; 
Romantic poetry represented an unfinished project of human 
liberation.14 Tillyard's reply to this was apparently blunt and 
forceful: '[he] told me this was not a tenable procedure; it was a 
fantasy' 
The truth is that for the first time in my life, long after it 
should have been, I looked at myself with a radical doubt. I 
did not feel very pleased. Nobody could construe from reading 
my published works the sort of person I then was. I was very 
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hostile and angry in immediate ways with Tillyard, and very 
rude to him. The aggression was all from my side. Tillyard 
was not an aggressive man, and he did absolutely nothing 
against me, which he could easily have done. I just met with a 
total sense of incomprehension and sense of put-down. There 
was no one in the faculty then who could have spoken to my 
problems. Leavis would probably have responded much more 
angrily to my notion of how novels should be judged, although 
he might have answered in terms nearer to the language of 
objection. (Williams 1979: 52) 
Williams found the encounter very stressfull: 'I was engaged in 
having to satisfy somebody who was professionally teaching a 
subject that my ideas were tenable and reasonable, and I could 
not. I was continually found out in ignorance, found out in 
confusion ... You must remember that a hell of a lot of my self-
image was devoted to the notion that I could handle academic work. 
It now became clear to me that I could not' {Williams 1979: 51). 
What was at stake were the very terms of Williams's developing 
sense of self and vocation, and it is significant that Williams 
later remembered his callup and entry into the army in July of 
1941 as something of a relief, as a temporary way out of the tight 
place he had found himself in. 
But only temporary. Williams spent the next four years in the 
army, but was given the early release available to university 
students who had interrupted their studies to take part in the 
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war. He returned to Cambridge in the autumn of 1945 and went on 
to to complete the third year of the Tripos with a special paper 
on George Eliot and a 15,000 word essay on Ibsen. In both of 
these areas of work, Williams found himself troubled by the 
arguments raised by Tillyard, arguments he still felt unable to 
resolve. He felt he had reached an impasse, one in which a major 
part of his own sense of self-identity and self-esteem was at 
stake: his professional identity as a literary scholar. In this 
crisis, we can recognise what was to become a central and defining 
characteristic of his work: its unusual biographical impetus, its 
powerful sense of an integrity and focus located in the personal 
voicing of the academic. 
The feeling of impasse is crucial to an understanding of the 
forces which drove Williams in his attempt to forge a new way of 
doing literary studies. By his return to Cambridge in 1945, 
Williams had rejected the available forms of Marxist literary 
criticism. At the university, the energies of the Socialist Club 
had waned, though Williams found society and stimulus with two new 
friends, Henry Collins and Wolf Mankowitz, both enthusiastic 
Leavisites. Together, the three were keen to promote left-wing 
literary and cultural criticism which, while it accepted the 
Leavisite criticism of Marxist literary analysis, refused the 
Leavisite rejection of politics. 
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Politics and Letters 
In an early review, Williams repeats the standard Leavisite 
line, and writes of the failure of Marxist literary criticism to 
'emerge from theory into respectable practice' (1947b: 52). The 
practice in question was literary criticism, and the first attempt 
to force such an emergence came with the founding of the journal 
~Ql!i!Q§ and Letters in 1947. Williams put the journal together 
with the help of his two Cambridge friends, Wolf Mankowitz and 
Henry Collins. Its contributors, over its short lifespan, 
included Jean-Paul Sartre, George Orwell, Christopher Hill and 
F.R. Leavis. A 'complementary' journal - one more purely 
concerned with the 'literary', The Critic - also began at the same 
time, but was amalgamated with Politics_and_Letters after the 
second issue. Politics_and_Letters itself ran for four issues 
before it collapsed in 1948. 
As Williams was later to put it, the journal signalled an 
attempt to 'unite a radical left politics with Leavisite literary 
criticism. We were to be to the left of the Labour Party, but at 
a distance from the CP. Our affiliation to §gr~ii~~ was guarded, 
but it was nonetheless quite a strong one' (Williams 1979: 65) 
This is the position now generally known as 'left-leavisism', 
though rejected by Williams for implying too unitary and too 
static a position. 
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Politics_and_Letters defined itself in opposition to three 
currents of thought. First of all, it was directed against the 
failed Marxist literary theory of the thirties; secondly, it 
rejected the (a)political stance of Leavis's ~Q~~!irr~. by now the 
key journal in literary studies; and thirdly, it was set against 
what Williams saw as the self-conscious metropolitanism and self-
indulgent aestheticicsm of Cyril Connelly's HQ~!~Q~. (1940-49). 
It was here that, in April 1947, Connolly saw fit to declare that 
"the honeymoon between literature and action ... is over ... the left-
wing literary movement has petered out. '15 In positive terms, 
PQli!iQe and Letters was intended as the spearhead of political 
activism in the Adult Education movement and sought to ensure that 
the Labour government did not ignore the importance of cultural 
politics in the struggle for working class emancipation and the 
achievement of (in Williams's phrase) a participatory democracy. 
The very title of its first editorial - "For Continuity in 
Change' - embodied the difficult reliance on and yet combative 
relation to Leavisism in its repetition and adjustment to the 
title of Leavis's most polemical collection of essays, tQr 
Continuity (first published by the Minority Press in Cambridge in 
1933). The editorial chose the literary scandal of 1946 known as 
the Zoschenko debate as the grounds of the journal's first public 
intervention. The central argument was that the usual "dichotomy 
between politics and letters' - exemplified in Leavis's writing of 
the period, and in the pro- and anti-Marxist stances of MQQ~~D 
Quarterly and Horizon respectively - needs to be challenged. A 
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proper understanding of the issues involved in the Soviet literary 
debate shows why this challenge is necessary: 
In our opinion, both sides in this debate neglect evidence 
which is important in resolving the essential difficulty. On 
the one hand, the 'moralists' [i.e. Cyril Connolly and HQr!~QQ] 
too often rest their case on a parade of abstract values which 
they rarely seem concerned to relate to any detailed experience 
of living. Morality, in such cases, is merely a theoretical, 
at times a personal, indulgence. Yet, on the other hand, the 
'political' group, [i.e. John Lewis and the Modern_Quarterly] 
which centres around the English Marxists, rarely misses an 
opportunity to attack, often gratuitously, a position (under 
the heading of 'literary decadence', 'idealism', 'absolutism', 
etc. , ) of the real nature of which they are demonstrably 
unaware. {Williams et !!l, 1947a: 3 
For Williams and his co-editors, both Marxists and anti-Marxists 
miss what Leavis had grasped: the 'real nature' of literature. 
The figri~QD moralists miss the 'detailed experience of living' 
which literature embodies, and are therefore unable to prevent 
their 'values' from being too abstract, or worse, too self-
indulgent. The ideologues of the Modern Quarterly are blind to 
the very existence of a professional literary criticism whose 
tools and methods should be brought to bear in any cultural 
debate. Against these positions, the editors suggest the 
following: 
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What is valid, and in our opinion supremely important, is that 
the structure of society, its institutions and directions, 
should be constantly assessed by standards resting on certain 
immediate qualities of living, qualities which social history 
scarcely records, but which, 'for continuity', our cultural 
tradition embodies. (3-4) 
'Embodies' is the key term. It articulates the journal's debt 
to the 'Cambridge English' of the §gr~i!Q~ school, where 
literature is not merely a record of past experience; it ie the 
still living embodiment of that experience. According to the 
metaphysics of this school, the literary critic enjoys a highly 
privileged relation to history. For somehow through the 
experience of reading literary texts, the critic can re-experiencE~ 
the structure and specificity of any historical moment. And hence 
the idea - first put forward by I.A. Richards, and later taken up 
by F.R. Leavis, was the idea that the 'standard of living' of a 
society could best be judged - indeed, could only be judged - by 
the literary critic.16 The editors of_Politics_and_Letters 
allowed this same centrality to the critic; but went on to point 
out that the critic needs to be concerned with more than the 
understanding of literature alone. 
In short, we must ensure that critical activity continually 
draws attention to 'the best that is thought and known in the 
world', while at the same time we must recognise that the 
of 
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mechanisms of society, acting by their own laws, must also be 
examined and reckoned with. No backwater social group can hope 
to preserve the human values of the arts merely by 
concentrating on personal cultivation and personal 
commmunication. But, on the other hand, the usual 
progressive, scientific' assessment leaves no room for 
anything but the satisfaction of routine appetites in group 
activity. It is not sufficient to label the significance 
attached to inwardness as 'morbid introspection'. Nor, on the 
other hand, can active social participation be dismissed as a 
mere escape from the deeper problems of personality and 
tradition. There is a 'self' to be reckoned with at the level 
at which it finally comes to rest, a level which can have the 
sanction of our main literary tradition. But at the same time 
this self remains not only impotent but unexpressed unless it 
continually interacts with the group. For the survival of the 
group, diagnosis at every level is needed. (4) 
There are then two primary tasks for the journal: the creation 
an intelligent reading public' and secondly, the creation of 
a group which could and would intervene politically. The problem 
was, of course, that there was no necessary connection between the 
two groups, any more than there was a necessary connection between 
the two journals originally imagined as 'complementary'. Despite 
the desire to go beyond Qgr~1iny's apolitical stance, Politics_and 
Lg11gre remained, in the end, trapped by its inadequate 
conceptualisation of politics. As the second editorial, 'Culture 
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and Crisis', put it, in the rather desperate terms which signalled 
the journal's imminent collapse: 
The critic stands subject to two autonomies: that of planning 
for material survival and prosperity (it is an estimate we must 
make objectively and with the methods of science);and that of 
allowing for and fostering responsibilit~ in society, an effort 
in which we are supported by that evidence there is of human 
maturity, by tradition evidenced by literature and social 
history, by experience. We have at present to make separate 
estimates of these problems remembering that as literary 
critics we have training to aid us in the latter, while in 
politics we are undoubtedly naive. (Williams ~!-~l. 1947b: 7) 
Subject to two autonomies, trained in one and yet naive in the 
other: it is hardly surprising that Politics_and_Letters could 
only reproduce in the end the tight place of Williams's 
frustrations. 
Williams contributed some thirteen essays and reviews to the 
two journals and these reflect his interests and preoccupations of 
the time.17 His single most important essay was 'Soviet Literary 
Controversy in Retrospect', published in the first issue of 
Pgli!ig~ and Letters (Summer 1947). Many of the principles 
outlined in the 'For Continuity in Change' editorial are here put 
into practice (the editorial itself states that it 'brings our 
outlined preoccupation to bear on current disagreement in this 
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country, as well as in the Soviet Union' (op. cit., p. 4). The 
essay is worth some detailed attention as it marks Williams's 
definitive and public break with Communist Party orthodoxy as well 
as representing the first of Williams's attempts to move beyond 
that orthodoxy through the practice of literary analysis. 
Soviet Literary Controversy 
1946 had seen an intensification of repression 1n the Soviet 
Union as Stalin responded to the pressures of a disastrous harvest 
and the beginnings of Cold War attitudes in Britain and the 
USA.18 As a part of a renewed drive to discipline and cow the 
intelligentsia, Andrei A. Zhdanov, a key figure in the elaboration 
of Socialist Realism in the 1930s, and now Secretary of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party, launched an attack on 
two avant-garde Leningrad journals, Zvezda and Leningrad. He was 
particularly scathing about the work of the modernist poet Anna 
Akhmatova, and a short story - 'Adventures of an Ape' - by the 
satirical writer Mikhail Zoschenko.19 At a meeting of the 
Leningrad Party Committee Zhdanov declared: 'Why should we 
provide a literary platform for all these decadent literary 
tendencies so completely alien to us?' His criticisms were picked 
up by Cyril Connolly in the October issue of ljQri~QQ and read as a 
warning of what socialism could mean in Britain.20 The Soviet 
position was defended in turn by John Lewis in Editorial to the 
Winter 1946 issue of the Communist Party journal, the MQ9~rQ 
Q~~r1~rl~. as an exemplary instance of democratic self-criticism: 
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'what we witness is not the spectacle of cowed and intimidated 
writers reluctantly toeing the Party line, but writers, readers 
and critics everywhere in the Union overhauling their 
work ... Nothing can be done in the Soviet Union that is dictated 
from above'. 21 
Williams saw the debate itself as symptomatic of the emerging 
Cold War. How else explain the attention paid to it in a press 
usually hostile to literary discussion? Nonetheless it was useful 
in revealing the 'prevailing muddle about the relation of politics 
and letters' (Williams 1947c: 21), and particularly so in regard 
to two topical questions - 'the place of literature in the modern, 
centralised state, and ... the obligation of such a state towards 
literature' (21) .22 For Connolly, the stakes were 'the principle 
and practice of state interference in cultural affairs'; while for 
John Lewis, Zhdanov's intervention was a prime example 'not of 
interference, but of healthy self-criticism, [one] which might be 
expected to arise 1n a country where human values are assured by a 
rational social organisation' ( 22). 
According to Williams, Lewis's editorial is 'typical of the 
popular Marxist writing on culture' (ibid: 22) in that it simply 
fails to understand anything about the 'the nature of literature 
itself' (23). Drawing on Leavis's literary empiricism to argue 
his case, Williams insists that 'the practice of literary 
criticism, and of creative literature, is bound to be different 
from the administrative self-criticism to which he has attempted 
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to relate it' (23). It is bound to be so because above all 
literature is concerned with 'realised immediate experience' and 
not the dry abstractions which form social theory. 'The function 
of literature in keeping society healthy', concludes Williams, in 
full Leavisite tones, 'is that it injects realised immediate 
experience, personal and traditional, into the abstractions which 
inevitably form the body of social thinking' ( 23). All in all, 
Lewis can do nothing to prove his central assertion that the 
Soviet literary controversy is a good example of how self-
criticism works in a socialist society. On the contrary, writes 
Williams: 'Criticism from below is the essence of the democratic 
safeguard in Soviet society. The way this business has gone does 
nothing, in itself, to disprove allegations that Soviet government 
is based on decision from the top, followed by organized and 
manipulated public approval' (23). Small wonder that Williams had 
allowed his membership of the CP to lapse in 1941. Williams later 
did not recall or choose to recall and was not asked the precise 
circumstances of this. Certainly his assertion of the necessity 
for 'criticism from below' ran directly counter to the prevaling 
Communist Party practice of 'democratic centralism', in which, 
according to Raphael Samuel in a fine historical and 
autobiographical account, the 'Party allowed no conceptual 
space ... for dissent. '23 
As far as Hg~i~QD is concerned, Williams cannot agree with 
Connolly's complacent suggestion that judgement of art should 
always be left to the 'Reading Public'. How could Connolly not be 
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aware that such a cohesive 'Reading Public' no longer existed? 
After all, this had been the burden of Q.D. Leavis's Fiction_and 
the_Reading_Public as well as Leavis and Thompson's Culture and 
Environment, the very centre of Scrutin~'s whole intervention. 
'It is no use saying' argued Williams 
that state interference with art, or the suppression of non-
conforming writers which may be involved in state patronage, is 
worse than the effects of commercialism or of advertising 
manipulation. Both are bad; neither is admissible ... to ignore 
the destructive elements in our own society, and to concentrate 
on them in another (a society moreover which can hardly be 
criticised without large political repercussions) - surely 
that is not a defence of culture but rather political 
opportunism in the real sense of that abused term?' ( 25) 
Williams continued his attack on Connolly in the following issue 
of Politics_and_Letters, where he defied him to write about the 
American Congress Committee on UnAmerican Activities with as much 
passion as he had about Russia (Williams 1947d: 105-6). For 
Williams, as he was later to record, Connolly represented 'a self-
indulgent decadence' which he attacked 'with ferocity' (Williams 
1979: 72). 
Williams then turns to examine Zhdanov's criticisms. 
disturbing thing', he writes, 'is the exclusiveness, the 
'The 
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narrowness, of the role which literature is called upon to play' 
(1947c: 27) Against this, it is urged that 
We must, then, retain the right to judge a civilization by its 
culture. For culture is the embodiment of the quality of 
living of a society; it is the 'standard of living' with which 
the critic is concerned. Assessment of it is the social 
function of the critic and the creative writer ... Our precept is 
clear: we must, negatively, by the application of the strictest 
critical standards, ensure that inwardness is neither abused 
(becoming 'profitable introspection') nor set up for sale in 
the commercial market; and positively, we must attempt, however 
often we fail, to ensure that in our own inevitable development 
towards a planned, rational, society, the distinctive values of 
living embodied in our literary tradition are preserved, 
re-created, expanded, so that ultimately with material may grow 
human richness. 
(1947c: 30-31) 
The 'standard of living argument' had become a commonplace of 
literary studies, adequate testimony to the strength of I.A. 
Richards's founding rhetoric of the 1920s. Williams sees little 
chance of the raising of this standard in the Soviet Union where 
he fears that 'Soviet Man' will become a comparably caricatural 
figure to the West's 'Average Man', or the 'Successful Man' of the 
advertising world. Both East and West show signs of failing to 
understand the nature and importance of culture and the literary 
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In the end, the Politics and Letters project proved (to borrow - -
Williams's own later terms) to be emergent rather than - as Jan 
Gorak suggests - residual. For Gorak, 'Williams and his fellow-
editors ventured into the postwar world with the prejudices of 
prewar intellectuals. A new cultural politics could hardly be 
constructed from materials such as these' (Gorak 1988: 47). But 
Politics_and_Letters is better understood as challenging rather 
than confirming the prewar attitudes to be found in §Qr~1iD~. 
HQri~QD, and the Modern Quarter!~. Though Williams's two journals 
only survived for two years, and though they owed something to the 
Leavisite orthodoxy, they did nonetheless signal an important 
challenge to it.24 
Reading and Criticism Revalued 
When Reading_and_Criticism, Williams's first published book, 1s 
mentioned, it is usually in dismissive terms. Reading_and 
Criticism is treated as the expression of Williams's most complete 
accommodation to orthodox literary studies, and, as such, 
something better left alone. Terry Eagleton, 1n his still 
influential account, writes of 'the techniques of textual analysis 
which Williams inherits from §Qr~1iD~ and reproduces without 
question in Reading_and_Criticism' (Eagleton 1976: 38). Jan Gorak 
sees the book as an act of significant intellectual dishonesty on 
Williams's part, accusing him of employing in it a style of 
literary criticism he had intellectually repudiated' (Gorak 1988: 
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47). Fred Inglis asserts that it 'came directly out of his 
teaching, and that teaching was in the direct line of Leavis's 
famous journal ~Qr~iiny' (Inglis 1995: 126). All agree on the 
identification of Reading_and_Criticism with the practical 
criticism of the ~Qr~iinY school. Even Williams's most respectful 
interrogators, the New_Left_Review team, seem to support this 
identification when they conclude that Reading_and_Criticism not 
only reproduces'the classic Leavisite argument', but reproduces it 
'at its most circular' (Williams 1979: 238). Nonetheless they 
feel obliged to give Williams a chance to defend himself, and ask 
whether he was aware of 'any substantive divergences ... [any] 
unexpressed differences' (237) between the positions advocated in 
Reading_and_Criticism and the work of the ~Q~~1inY tradition; 
whether, in other words, Eagleton was correct in suggesting that 
Williams had simply reproduced that position 'without question'. 
We need to examine both Williams's reply in the late seventies 
- that he took a distance from ~Qr~iinY through his criticism of 
the method of evaluating an author by extract only - and the 
evidence offered by a closer examination of Reading and Criticism. 
For Reading_and_Criticism deserves more careful attention than it 
has hitherto been given: it needs to be read as a formative work 
in his intellectual and theoretical development, rather than left 
largely unread, and avoided as an embarrassment to the usual image 
of him. Once this is done, we see that it helps to throw some 
light on the development of one of Williams's most central and 
l 
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most problematic ideas, that of the 'structure of feeling'. 
Reading_and_Criticism was written up in 1948 and can certainly 
be taken as a partial record of Williams's teaching as a Tutor in 
Adult Education. It was published in 1950 in the Man_in_Societ~ 
series, edited by three leading figures in the Adult Education 
movement: Thomas L. Hodgkin, S.G. Raybould, the Director of the 
Leeds branch, and Vice-President of the Association, and Lady 
Simon of Wythenshawe. The books in the series were 'intended for 
the use of studell._ts in adult classes such as those promoted by the 
~ W 1 \.A ~ ~\.·Y,"'I : i 1 ~ 'j () \ ', : ) 
W .E.A.' - just the classes which Williams taught for fully the 
first third of his academic career. The main aim of the series 
was introductory: they were how-to books, designed to help 
students acquire the dominant skills and practices appropriate to 
particular subjects and disciplines. 
In this sense, it is hardly surprising that Reading_and 
Criticism can offer plenty of evidence for Williams's 
accommodation to existing literary studies since the basic purpose 
of the book was to be an introduction to them. However, we should 
also be aware of an important recommendation of the series 
editors, one crucial to the ethos of W.E.A. policy. This is th1:Lt 
even introductory texts should not .:exclude t~pics which are 
.. w:1rn 1.v."'', u; -;) , ,., ) 
matters of current controversy~ Simple reproduction or critical 
distancing? We certainly need to examine Reading_and_Criticism 
with both options in mind, as the expression of Williams's debt to 
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the dominant ~Qr~1iQ~ positions, but also with an awareness of the 
ambivalence inherent in any indebtedness. 
How did Williams - at the age of twenty-eight - see his own 
relation to the literary studies of the late forties? And how do 
we assess that self-image? Perhaps the strongest element in this 
is the assertion, however qualified, of independence. In the 
Preface to the book, he makes three basic moves. First, he 
acknowledges his debts to a whole catalogue of critical 
influences. Eliot, Middleton Murry, I.A. Richards, Empson, L.C. 
Knights are all given honourable mention; F.R. Leavis is singled 
out as being 'largely responsible for the intelligent development 
of critical analysis as an educational discipline.' '[T]o his 
work, and to that of ~Qr~1in~. I am indebted' admits Williams. 
But in the next breath, in what was to become a characteristically 
distancing gesture, he asserts that he has 'never consciously or 
formally belonged to any "school of criticism"'. This assertion 
is then itself qualified by the admission of a common point of 
departure: 'As an independent student I have found the work of 
these critics valuable because it insisted on "the text as the 
starting-point of criticism"' (Williams 1950: ix-x). This 
movement - from indebtedness, to independence, to the acceptance 
of the text as the 'starting-point of criticism' - suggests that 
at this point in his career, Williams was perhaps more able to 
articulate a desire for intellectual autonomy rather than to 
establish it. Nontheless this desire is itself crucial for any 
understanding of his development. It is the source of all his 
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later achievements. We need then to be aware of Williams's desire 
to make Reading_and_Criticism somehow independent of the tradition 
it was its primary task to teach. 
From a first reading, it is clear that the nine chapters of 
Reading_and_Criticism largely reproduce and embody the 
conventional terms and assumptions of literary criticism. I. A. 
Richards's Princi2les_of_Literar~_Criticism (1924) and Science_and 
~Q~!~~ (1926), Leavis's seminal pamphlet 'Mass Civilization and 
Minority Culture' (1930), and Q.D. Leavis's authoritative fig1i2n 
and_the_Reading E~Q!iQ (1932) all leave their traces, and are 
acknowledged in the bibliographies, as are such secondary-school 
text-books as Leavis and Thompson's Culture and Environment (1933) - -
and Thompson's own Reading_and_Discrimination. In a repetition of 
the founding gesture of Cambridge English, the Introduction 
defines criticism as a practice of reading and not just the 
accumulation of the rote-facts of a literary history. In Chapter 
One, criticism is defined as a 'mature reading' to set against 
the reading habits spawned by the mass culture of advertising, 
journalism and popular fiction, that 'mechanization' of reading 
which stems from 'the influence of newspapers and deliberately 
written-down publications' (Williams 1950: 9). Chapter Two of the 
book 'The Way we read now examines, in a way familiar from 
Leavis and Thompson's Culture_and_Environment, an advertisement 
for tea, a newspaper report, and some examples of 'popular' 
fiction in order to argue that the 'last thing which writing of 
this kind encourages is a conscious and disciplined attention to 
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the words which comprise the statement' ( 14). Chapter Three 
locates the position of the critic as the 'mediator between the 
artist and the serious reading-public', a position all the more 
necessary in the fallen world of mass culture where 'the facts of 
our reading being what they are', he has to be 'increasingly 
concerned ... with the extension of literacy in the fullest sense' 
( 21 ) . Chapters Four, Five and Six show analysis at work in a 
number of comparative passages of verse and prose while Chapter 
Seven seeks to show what an analysis of a whole work might look 
like (Conrad's Heart_of_Darkness). The two final chapters offer 
brief discussions of drama, where Williams anticipates the central 
theme of Drama_from_Ibsen to ~l!Qi, the tendency 'to believe that 
the naturalist method is the permanent and universal dramatic 
method' (91); while in 'Literature and Society', Williams argues 
for a distinction between the reductive view of literature as 
evidence and 'the fact of the text', suggesting that literature 
should be read as 'a highly aware and articulate record of 
individual experience' (101). All in all, Williams's 'mature 
reading' is concerned with the three mots_d'ordre of §gr~ii~~ 
criticism, with 'evaluation, with comparison, and with standards' 
Yet though Reading_and_Criticism repeats so many of the 
orthodox pieties of §gr~ii~~ criticism, and reads at times like 
nothing so much as an updated version of Culture_and_Environment 
(1933) or Reading_and_Discrimination the repetitions are not 
complete, and there are numerous points at which Williams seeks to 
give substance to his claims for intellectual autonomy.25 
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In the most general terms, we can cite Williams's concern, 
expressed in self-consciously socialist terms which recall the 
polemics of Politics_and_Letters, to stress the social nature of 
critical judgement against the Horizon and Scrutin~ emphasis on 
criticism as essentally a matter of personal taste or individual 
judgement: 
Criticism ... is essentially a social activity. It begins in 
individual response and judgement ... But its standards of 
value.if it is to acquire meaning, must be ultimately matters 
of agreement between many people: values which are instinct in 
the culture of a society. The doctrine of the self-sufficiency 
of personal taste is hostile to criticism for the same reason 
that the doctrine of individual self-sufficiency is hostile to 
society. (Williams 1950: 29) 
There is also a major difference of attitude towards the very 
idea of a reading public. The Leavisite version worked to 
establish a hierarchy of high and low culture, between minority 
literature and mass culture, one in which the task of the critic 
was to fight for higher standards. 
the argument runs as follows: 
In Leavis's seminal pamphlet, 
In any period it is upon a very small minority that the 
discerning appreciation of art and literature depends: it is 
only a few who are capable of unprompted, first-hand judgement. 
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They are still a small minority, though a larger one, who are 
capable of endorsing such first-hand judgement by genuine 
personal response ... The minority capable not only of 
appreciating Dante, Shakespeare, Donne, Baudelaire, Hardy (to 
take major instances) but of recognising their latest 
successors constitute the consciousness of the race (or of a 
branch of it) at a given time ... Upon this minority depends 
our power of profiting by the finest human experience of the 
past; they keep alive the subtlest and most perishable parts of 
tradition. Upon them depend the implicit standards that order 
the finer living of an age, the sense that this is worth more 
than that, this rather than that is the direction in which to 
go, that the centre is here rather than there. In their 
keeping, to use a metaphor that is metonymy also, and will bear 
a good deal of pondering, is the language, the changing idiom, 
upon which fine living depends, and without which distinction 
of spirit is thwarted and incoherent. 
use of such a language. (Leavis 1933: 
By 'culture' 
13-15) 
I mean the 
Williams takes issue with this representation of those who 
appear to be innately capable of 'unprompted, first-hand 
judgement' in his own emphasis on literary criticism as a training 
in 'mature reading'. Against the implicit emphasis (and 
mystification) surrounding the abilities of the literary critic in 
the ~~r~1igy mode, with its emphasis on the creative and 
reparative powers of the critic himself, Williams offers a down-
to-earth reminder of the fact that skills in literary criticism 
42 
may be acquired - indeed, have to be acquired - just like any 
others, through hard work and practice. 'To be able to read 
serious literature requires training. A "born reader" is just as 
much a fantasy as a "born writer": there are no such persons' 
(Williams 1950: 8). It is hardly then surprising that Williams 
differs from the ~~r~!iQ~ assessment regarding the possible size 
of the 'minority culture' of critically trained readers: 
The public for serious literature, in spite of almost universal 
literacy, remains small. And, while it is possible to argue 
that such publics will always be small, it seems doubtful 
whether the present intelligent reading public in Britain is 
anything like as large as it might reasonably be. There is no 
need to surrender to popular sentimentalities in this matter, 
but the aristocratic converse is no more acceptable. There 
exist what would seem to be remediable reasons for the 
smallness of the serious reading public ... one should remember 
that an increase in the serious reading public by the number of 
students who annually attend formal courses - some 100,000 -
would revolutionise the material situation of literature ... 
(1950: 4,6) 
Against the gifted few of Leavis's account, there are the capable 
many of Williams's adult education experience. 
In response to the ~~E's prompting, Williams himself drew 
attention to another point of difference with Leavis, one 'which 
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may not appear obvious now, but was important then' (Williams 
1979: 237). This was his challenge to the standard ~2~~1i~~ 
practice of assessing the quality of a novel or a novelist through 
the careful analysis of an extract from the work. Williams 
mounted this overt attack in Chapter Four of the book, 'What is 
Analysis?'. 
He begins by quoting Leavis's definition of analysis, from 
Education_and_the Universit~. as 'the process by which we seek to 
attain a complete reading of the poem' (Williams 1950: cit. p. 
31 ) . For Williams, there is a problem whenever this kind of 
analysis 1s applied to a longer work, and particularly to the 
novel. What is at stake is the status of the extract through 
which such analysis then necessarily works, and the principles of 
selectivity which govern the choice of such passages. He easily 
demonstrates, through an examination of two sets of paired 
extracts from George Eliot and D.H. Lawrence, that either can be 
made to appear the better writer depending on the selection of the 
passages. '[W]hen we make a judgement by analysis we commit 
ourselves to a judgment on_that_~iece_of_writing_alone' he 
insists. 'We do not say that the analysis of a short extract is 
sufficient analysis of the work of an author' (Williams 1950: 43). 
At the same time, the aim of the critic must always be to arrive 
at 'a total judgment of a work and of an author' (45). 'A 
writer's work is integral' (74) he urges; and for this reason, the 
question of selection is crucial. Williams foregrounds the 
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practice of selection itself, and argues for it as a fundamental 
feature of interpretation or 'response': 
The structure or pattern of a work is more than the text; it is 
the text ~~Q the response. It goes without saying that such 
response must be everywhere actual, and its elements 
justifiable from the text which is the only fact of the work. 
( 7 3 ) 
Though the elementary rules of textual evidence must always be 
adhered to, Williams recognises something like the agency of 
the critic and of criticism itself, in the fact of the work 
performed on the text. The 'structure or pattern' is at once a 
property of the text, and of the critic's response: 'A critic 
assessing a writer's work as a whole will find that his primary 
task is the perception of this fundamental pattern, and then the 
finding of adequate passages which convey this pattern ... ' (74). 
In the next chapter, we shall see how the 'structure or pattern', 
which the critic finds in the text, is the forerunner of the idea 
of the 'structure of feeling' which, argues Williams, the author 
articulates from the culture and experience of his or her time. 
In the Conclusion to Reading_and_Criticism, Williams seeks to 
sum up his understanding of the importance of literature not just 
for the literary critic, but also for the social critic. It is a 
statement which is torn and tortured by the tensions in his 
attempt to find a position which can supersede - that is, both 
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retain and go beyond - the insights available from either a 
dogmatic Marxism or an orthodox Leavisism: 
What is it that literature represents which has reference to 
our social needs? It is valuable primarily as a record of 
detailed individual experience which has been coherently stated 
and valued. This may be the commentary of a fully intelligent 
mind - informed, detached, emotionally aware - on the society 
and culture of its day. Or it may be the articulate statement 
of a perception of certain individual relationships which set 
the pattern of a culture. Or it may be the coherent evaluation 
of close personal relationships, or the exposition of intense 
and considered personal experience ... Literature is 
communication in written l~~g~~g~. To the language of a 
people, which is perhaps the fundamental texture of its life, 
literature is supremely important as the agent of discovery and 
analysis. (107) 
While Williams accepts the conventional focus on literature as 
valuable 'as a record of detailed individual experience', he is 
keen to twist that expression of individual experience to a social 
end. This record need not then be concerned only with 'close 
personal relationships' or 'intense and considered personal 
experience It may instead be a commentary on contemporary 
'society and culture', the framing of the 'pattern of a culture'. 
In other words, Reading_and_Criticism, just at the moment when it 
looks back to Politics_and_Letters, also looks forward to and 
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anticipates, and not by verbal echo alone, something of the 
project of Culture_and_Societ~. 
What we can see at work in the formulations of Reading_and 
Criticism are Williams's attempts to think for himself, beyond the 
available formulae of literary criticism. For this reason alone, 
Reading and_Criticism needs to be read with more attention than it 
is usually given, and not passed over as quickly as possible, as 
something best forgotten in the Williams canon. With his emphasis 
on criticism as 'mature reading', and his concern with 'the 
extension of literacy in the fullest sense', he is struggling to 
articulate what will become the focus of his later work. For what 
comes into play in the critic's assessment of the 'structure of 
pattern' in a writer's work is no less than the whole of a 
person's experience. Already, mature reading is not only a 
literary critical method; it is an ethical and implicitly 
political practice, a dialectical positioning of both self and 
text. 'Mature reading' is the name he gives at this early moment 
to the practice of a critical literacy which defines much of the 
distinctiveness of his work as a whole - that unusual combination 
of the academic and the autobiographical which is the trademark of 
later works such as Modern_Traged~ and The_Countr~_and_the_Cit~. 
But at this stage, the formulations are often hesitant, often 
awkward. Still in the tight place of contradiction, Williams's 
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resort to the impersonal pronoun is most unlike him at the moment 
he is most like himself: 
one wishes to read adequately, and to set one's reading in 
order with relation to one's personal experience and to the 
experience of the culture to which one belongs. The basic 
standards one seeks are those traditional valuations which have 
been re-created in one's own direct experience (26). 
To describe and then to see these early works as merely 
probationary is to blind oneself to their tortuous internal 
dynamic, and to their significance for any assessment of 
Williams's developing project. For in these early writings we can 
see something of the contradictory dynamic of his thought. This 
is a deeply formative period for Williams, one in which we can see 
the first attempts to bring literary studies and socialist 
cultural criticism together by partially rejecting both. For 
Williams, 'Left-Leavisism' was not simply an assured position he 
held for a while and then quite naturally grew out of: it 
was the tight place in which he felt trapped and unable to move. 
These attempts to get out of that trap can help us to better 
understand the nature, limits and success of his entire Q~~Yr§. 
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Ch_2_Drama_and_the_Structure_of_Feeling_1947-1954. 
Williams's reputation as a public intellectual was formed in 
the late 1950s as the author of Culture_and_Societ~ (1958), ahd 
consolidated by the publication of The_Long_Revolution in 1961. 
This fact has tended to obscure the earlier and formative years of 
his academic and intellectual development. It is the early 
writings on drama which have suffered most from this neglect, and 
many commentators have found it difficult to get his work on drama 
as a whole into proper focus. This chapter examines the writing 
on drama published between 1947 and 1954, but leaves aside the 
later - and better known - recastings of it in order to emphasise 
and understand the contribution this early work made to the 
formation of Williams's distinctive theoretical vocabulary. I 
argue that this writing on drama was the crucible in which he 
forged some of his central theoretical ideas, including that most 
contested and most characteristic item in his conceptual 
repertoire - the idea of the 'structure of feeling'. Properly 
understood, this notion represents Williams's first direct 
conceptual challenge to Marxist literary orthodoxy. 
In fact, a significant portion of Williams's work was devoted 
to the history and analysis of dramatic forms. Cambridge 
University acknowledged and celebrated his scholarly stature by 
appointing him Professor of Drama in 1974. No less than three of 
his first four books were concerned with drama and naturalism, and 
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he retained a consistent interest in the history and dynamics of 
dramatic production, whether on stage, in film, or on television. 
In 1964 and 1968, the early studies Drama_from_Ibsen_to_Eliot and 
Drama_in_Performance were revised, extended and republished; and 
these were joined by a new work, Modern Traged~, in 1966. 
Williams wrote a regular column on television for The Listener 
between 1968 and 1972, and in 1974 published his influential 
study, Television:_Technolog~_and_Cultural_Form. Chapter Six of 
Q~l1~~~ (1981) deploys a 'breathtaking chronological sweep' of the 
history of drama in order to substantiate his claims for what 
'comparative formal analysis' of a cultural form can yield. All 
the essay collections - Problems_in_Materialism_and_Culture 
(1980), Writing_in_Societ~ (1984), and posthuomous collections 
such as What_I_Came_to_Sa~ (1989c) and Ih~ PQli1iQ2 Qf Modernism 
(1989a), contain essays on film and drama, and show his continued 
interest in the history of dramatic forms.1 To the most casual 
eye, it should surely be apparent that drama was one of Williams's 
persistent preoccupations. And yet, for many commentators, the 
considerable bulk of his work on the dramatic forms of theatre, 
film and television is viewed as peripheral to his main interests. 
In this, many students of his thought appear to follow the lead 
given by Terry Eagleton in his powerful 1976 assessment. Here 
Eagleton noted that a volume of dramatic criticism has regularly 
punctuated his production of "social" texts', but wrote that 
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though he found -the place of dramatic criticism within his 
work ... an interesting, even intriguing one', in the end could 
only suggest that -the relations between the two bodies of work 
b 
are not easy to decipher' (Eagleton 1976: 37). J.P. Ward, in the 
~ 
first monograph on Williams, describes drama as the one area of 
his writing that is -insulated, as though an interest that is 
sealed off and self-contained' (Ward 1981: 28). Similarly, for 
Jan Gorak, writing in 1988, Williams's -dramatic interests remain 
difficult to place in the light of his work as a whole' (Gorak 
1988: 15). And even the scrupulously attentive New_Left_Review 
team could only suggest, in the course of their exhaustive 
interrogation of Williams, that his work on drama represents a 
-central paradox' for any of his readers (Williams 1979: 201). In 
the general view, the writings on drama are eccentric to the main 
body of his work, his interest in it, peripheral. This chapter 
takes a contrary view, and argues that Williams's work on drama -
and particularly the early writings - are central to the 
foundation and formation of his whole intellectual project.2 
In this general neglect, the early writings on drama have been 
even less attended to. Few have sought to establish any 
significant distinctions between the early body of writing and 
what came to replace it, or any significant connections between it 
and the rest of Williams's work.3 In part, this may be due to 
its relative inaccessibility, and the fact that two of the three 
early books have been superseded by later versions: commentators 
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focus on the revised editions. Drama_from_Ibsen_to_Eliot, written 
between September 1947 and completed by April 1948, was published 
in November 1952. Dr~~~ in Performance and Preface_to_Film (with 
Cambridge friend Michael Orrom) were both written in 1953 and 
published in 1954. In 1968, Drama_in_Performance was republished 
in an enlarged edition; and Drama_from_Ibsen_to_Eliot was 
similarly revised and enlarged to become Drama_from_Ibsen_to 
Only Preface_to_Film has been out of print since its 
first publication. 
As in some academic version of the mystic writing-pad, this 
early work is hidden beneath layers of subsequent rewriting and 
revision. Drama_from_Ibsen_to_Eliot disappears beneath Drama_from 
Ibsen_to_Brecht. The first version of Drama_in_Performance is 
lost beneath the second. This chapter recovers some of what has 
been lost or hidden in revision and rewriting in order to better 
understand the difficult dynamic of Williams's developing thought. 
One consequence of this is to further challenge the orthodox view 
of Williams's 'left-leavisism' as it becomes clear that the single 
most powerful influence on his thinking about drama was T.S. 
Eliot. That this was an influence he was later to do his best to 
forget perhaps only makes the point more strongly: the most 
positive references to Eliot are silently removed from the later 
versions of Dr~@~ from_Ibsen_to_Eliot and Drama_in_Performance.4 
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Against Naturalism 
The early writings on drama express the sense of commitment 
common to socialist intellectuals of the nineteen-forties and 
fifties. They seek, in the first instance, to intervene in the 
contemporary cultural situation, and to subordinate academic 
analysis to cultural effectivity. The young Williams intended his 
writings on drama to have a practical effect on the dramaturgy of 
his time. In the process of revision, some of the urgency of this 
address has been lost, and these studies have come to be treated 
as textbooks and reference points in the history of 
naturalism.5 
Williams was not alone in perceiving something of a crisis in 
the contemporary theatre. British drama in the late forties and 
early fifties was widely seen to be in the doldrums. That deadly 
calm was not to be broken until the acclaimed first performance of 
John Osborne's Look_Back_in_Anger in May 1956. 
Kenneth Tynan, writing in 1954, gives something of the flavour of 
the pre-Osborne theatrical scene in his essay 'West-End Apathy': 
The bare fact is that, apart from revivals and imports, there 
is nothing in the London theatre that one dares discuss with an 
intelligent man for more than five minutes. Since the great 
Ibsen challenge of the nineties, the English intellectuals have 
been drifting away from drama. (Tynan 1964: 31) 
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Four years later. Tynan offered a succinct and perceptive analysis 
of the power and appeal of John Osborne's work. In his 1958 essay 
'The Angry Young Movement', Tynan describes LQQk Back in Anger as 
a major break-through in British drama in terms very appropriate 
to understanding some of the thrust of Williams's own project: 
The new intelligentsia created by free education and state 
scholarships was making its first sizeable dents in the facade 
of public-school culture .... For the first time the theatre was 
speaking to us in our own language, on our own terms .... For 
too long British culture had languished in a freezing-unit of 
understatement and 'good taste'. In these chill latitudes 
Jimmy Porter flamed like a blowtorch .... The ivory tower has 
collapsed for good. The lofty, lapidary, 'mandarin' style of 
writing has been replaced by a prose that has its feet on the 
ground. And the word 'civilized', which had come to mean 
'detached, polite, above the tumult', is being restored to its 
old etymological meaning: to be civilized nowadays is to care 
about society and to feel oneself a responsible part of it. 
(Tynan 1964: 56, 57, 62) .6 
For Williams, as for Tynan and others, the pre-war dramas had 
no purchase on the new world of the fifties. For a time, the 
appearance of verse-dramas such as Eliot's The_Cocktail_Part~ 
seemed to promise a new vitality, but this was not to last. In 
his writings on drama, Williams sought to help revitalise the 
dramatic scene.7 The first blows were struck in a number of 
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essays and reviews written for The_Critic and Politics_and 
Lg11~:r§. 
Actors 
Williams's first essays on drama were published in 1947, in the 
two journals he helped to edit, The_Critic and Politics_and 
L~11~:r§.8 The most substantial of these was the essay 'A 
Dialogue on Actors' which appeared in the first issue of Ihg 
Here the debt to Eliot is evident throughout. The essay 
is consciously modelled on Eliot's own 'A Dialogue on Dramatic 
Poetry' [1928], and adopts virtually all of E~'s main ideas on 
drama.9 Eliot was keen to stress three main points: first, the 
importance of convention in drama; second, the new possibilities 
and energies offered by the new poetic drama; and third, the 
insistence that good drama had to be good literature as well. All 
of these come through in his influential essay, 'Four Elizabethan 
Dramatists'. 
Eliot argues that Lamb's selections of the Elizabethan 
dramatists set the terms for contemporary attitudes towards drama 
in which the reader is committed 'to the opinion that a play can 
be good literature but a bad play and that it may be a good play 
and bad literature' (Eliot [1934a]: 9); while William Archer's Thg 
Old_Drama_and_the_New fails largely because of Archer's inability 
to see that the 'faults' of Elizabethan drama may be due to simply 
the existence of different and non-naturalistic conventions, or 
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more accurately for Eliot, the unsettledness of Elizabethan 
conventions. Eliot chooses the figure of a great dancer of the 
Russian school as a model for what the actor should be like: a 
true acting play is surely a play which does not depend upon the 
actor for anything but acting, in the sense in which a ballet 
depends upon the dancer for dancing' (14). 
In William's dialogue, all of these points are picked up. 
There are four 'speakers' in the dialogue - L, M, N, and O - but 
these enjoy little characterisation and tend to speak only 
variants of Williams's own ideas. The main problem of the modern 
theatre is identified by N as a problem of acting and actors. 'It 
is the most fashionable current heresy to regard drama and acting 
as one and the same thing ... Because people identify drama with 
acting, because they judge the plays and performances by acting 
standards , real dramatic values are neglected' (Williams 1947a: 
17) he asserts while the current vogue for actor-directors is 
responsible for the 'lie' 'that a play can be a good play without 
at the same time being good literature' (21). 
whole discussion is the problem of naturalism. 
Crucial to the 
N argues that 'You 
cannot condemn contemporary actors without an inclusive 
condemnation of naturalism' (22) and insists that 'A competent 
analysis of naturalism, with the record of its growth, would be 
the most important piece of scholarship our dramatic literature 
could receive.' (22). M sums up the case as a whole : 
56 
Our specific point here is that naturalism involves, 
inevitably, the actor's attitude we have condemned. 
Constructively, we can only say this: that revival in quality 
of drama (quantity can wait) depends on the use of dramatic 
conventions, within which dramatists and actors can 
collaborate; which will enable the dramatist, and the actors 
who complete his work on the stage, to penetrate below the 
superficial verisimilitude which has been the curse of 
naturalism, and to produce work which is likely to remain 
powerful and valid regardless of superficial social changes, 
work which is central in the whole human situation and which 
does not depend on chance audience-identification. (1947a: 
23-24) 
This was the basis of the case which Williams was to argue at 
greater length and with greater detail in his study Drama_from 
Ibsen_to_Eliot. 
From Eliot to Ibsen 
Drama _ from _ Ibsen_ to Eliot is the first of three works which 
will seek to provide that · analysis of naturalism, with the record 
of its growth' that Williams had deemed necessary in his 1947 
essay . It extends Eliot ' s insights into a fully historical and 
academic account , one which can be used to support the 
contemporary argument for the reform of the drama. 
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In the Introduction to Drama_from_Ibsen_to_Eliot, Williams 
writes that the aim of the book is to give ' not so much a history 
of the drama of these hundred years [1850-1950] 
account and revaluation of it' (Williams [1952]: 
as a critical 
11) . As the 
term 'revaluation' suggests, the project is conceived in terms of 
the application of practical criticism to the drama. 'My criticism 
is,' writes Williams 'or is intended to be, literary criticism. 
It is literary criticism, also, which in its major part is of the 
kind based on demonstrated judgements from texts, rather on 
historical survey or generalized impressions' ( 12) . The study is 
a ' working experiment in the application of practical criticism 
methods to modern dramatic literature', and follows the lead given 
by Eliot on Elizabethan drama and L. C. Knights and G. Wilson 
Knight on Shakespeare.10 It is 'practical criticism' in a very 
direct sense: ' not as a part of that process of tidying-up which 
we sometimes call literary history, but as an expression of values 
in the drama, from which we may assess our position, and decide 
upon future directions' (38). 
The first stage 1n this project is to place drama firmly as a 
worthy object of critical scrutiny, to establish the literary 
status of drama . Following Eliot, Williams argues that this 
status is one that has been obscured by the ' popular habit' of 
distinguishing drama sharply off from literature ' while the terms 
"drama" and "acting" are often virtually exchangeable.' - It is 
assumed' writes Williams , in the scornful accents of an Eliot, 
' very widely , that the value of a play has not necessarily 
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anything to do with its literary value; it is held, and firmly 
asserted, that a play can quite commonly be good, without at the 
same time being good literature.' ( 13) For Williams the ' average 
playgoer assumes that the attitudes and practices of the 
contemporary theatre are things necessary and permanent in drama 
itself.' (13) He attributes this prejudice to the dominance of 
theatrical naturalism, which he sees as 'a particular stage in the 
development of the drama' and which, he insists, as a form is 
only a phase in the drama's long and varied history.' Against 
this, Williams submits his own definition of literature, and of 
drama as literature: 
Literature, in its most general definition, is a means of 
communication of imaginative experience through certain written 
organisations of words. And drama, since it has existed in 
written plays, is clearly to be included under this general 
definition. A play, as a means of communication of _imaginative 
experience, is as clearly the controlled product of an author 
the control being exerted in the finalised organisation of 
words -as any other literary form. But, in the drama, when 
the actual and specific means of communication are considered, 
what is essentially a singular literary statement becomes, in 
performance, apparently plural ([1952]: 14). 
We see here Williams's commitment (articulated in Reading_and 
Criticism) to the idea of literature as ' the controlled product of 
the author' - extended to drama. The main problem for drama - and 
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here Williams returns to the themes he had sketched out in his 
' Dialogue on Actors' - is the expectation that drama is primarily 
a vehicle for actors, rather than a means of using actors in a 
certain way. 'All we are obliged to remember, for ordinary 
purposes, is that character and action, in any good play, are 
ordered parts of a controlled expression, and that the author's 
control over their presentation ought to be final . . . the literary 
nature of drama needs re-emphasis' (18). The model of expression 
and artistic control which Williams draws on begins as Eliot's; 
but, as we shall see, Williams was to make it his own through the 
insistence on the possibility of drama - and particularly film -
as a form of Total Expression, the interpretation of the social 
totality at one particular historical moment. 
In the first instance, though, we can read the various 
histories, or moments of history, which Williams discusses in the 
naturalist trilogy as exemplifications of the ideas and insights 
of Eliot's work on drama. In Drama_from_Ibsen_to_Eliot, Williams 
sees Ibsen as the exemplification of the urge towards controlled 
dramatic expression argued for by Eliot. Ibsen's purpose 'was the 
re - establishment of a total dramatic form' (96) in the wake of 
Romantic drama; his failure was largely due to the retention of a 
naturalist ' representational language' (96) . 
play which most successfully realised Ibsen's formal intentions. 
In much the same way Strindberg also hoped to overcome the 
limitations of naturalist drama. Williams sees evidence of this 
in Strindberg ' s attempted distinction between naturalism and 
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realism where 'true naturalism' is that which ·seeks out those 
points in life where the great conflicts occur' (cit. 103), though 
in practice Strindberg is limited by the existing naturalist 
conventions. This limitation, writes Williams ·as in The_Father 
and Lad~_Julie, is in the incongruity between the bared, elemental 
experience of crisis and the covering apparatus of seen and spoken 
normality' (110). Chekhov's use of symbolism signals another 
attempt to escape the confines of naturalist drama; and it too 
fails due to the lack of enough vital language: 'this [the 
seagull] is a poor substitute for the concrete and precise 
realisation of the central experience of the play whic~ is 
achieved in more formal drama by conventionally exact speech' 
argues Williams. · Rejection of convention, in the interest of 
character-drawing and lifelike speech, is the root of the 
difficulty .' (130) 
On the positive side, Synge, Yeats, and Hauptmann all move 
towards the kind of speech necessary to great drama. In the best 
of Synge ' s work, 'language is no longer confined to "flavouring", 
but uses metaphor and verbal symbolism fqr strict dramatic 
ends ... [~gi~g~g] approaches those permanent levels of great drama 
which seem to be accessible only when a major dramatist 
subordinates all else to the exploration of a major experience, 
through a language which the experience alone determines' (168) . 
William Butler Yeats ' first showed poetic drama to be possible 
again in our century' (221): he ' restored to words "their ancient 
sovereignty" in the drama' (222); while Hauptmann's The Weavers is 
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that rare thing, a successful realist play, and this is 'because 
its realism operates at every level of creation - action, persons, 
and speech, instead of being reserved mainly for the convenient 
elements' (178-9). But for all his appreciation of these earlier 
writers, Williams reserves his greatest praise for Eliot's work. 
It is in his writing that such speech is best represented. 
Eliot's plays are 'experiments in a new dramatic form' (223), 
writes Williams, one which is particularly important for its 
' experiments in language' (225), and its move towards ' the 
discovery of a dramatic method which should have the status of 
poetry' (227). In Murder_in_the_Cathedral, Williams writes with 
approval, 'language reasserts control in performance' (229). His 
only criticisms are directed at moments where that control is weak 
and falters. These are usually ~he moments where the acting is 
too apparent, and draws attention to itself. Williams picks out 
Irene Worth's performance as Celia in Eliot's The_Cocktail_Party 
as an example. At a climactic moment, the 'gestures of her hands 
were not controlled by the movement of the words, but by the 
movement of the general emotion. Now this is normal naturalist 
acting, but in this case, when the words were so adequate and so 
final, the essentially separate "acting" not only did not support 
the words, but actually distracted attention from them' (246). 
Though Eliot's experiments are not completely successful, they 
nonetheless represent 'a very considerable achievement, whatever 
the immediate future of the drama may be; and in its nature it is 
beyond the mode of praise' ( 246). ' 
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As it happened, despite such enthusiasm, the 'immediate future 
of drama' did not prove to follow Eliot's lead.11 Nonetheless, 
for the young Williams, Eliot's ideas on drama, and their partial 
realization in his plays, seemed to represent the most promising 
way forward. This judgement is later abandoned and forgotten, and 
is carefully excised in the revision of Drama_from_Ibsen_to_Eliot, 
and its working over into Drama_from_Ibsen_to_Brecht. 
Differences 
Jan Gorak has been one of the few critics to register 
Williams's debt to Eliot; but he underestimates the characteristic 
attempts, even at the early stage, to assert independence. 
According to Gorak, Williams 'remained locked within Eliot's 
guiding assumptions and values' even though he ' signalled his 
partial independance from Eliot by electing to study nineteenth-
century drama' (Gorak 1988: 21). But Williams's attempts to take 
a distance from Eliot go beyond the mere selection of a canon, and 
reveal the processes of a thought in formation. 
First, let us examine the central idea of the place of speech 
in drama. Of course , the emphasis which Williams gives to speech 
in drama connects across Eliot to what were by the forties the 
standard terms of the ~~~~!!D~ critique of modernity. 
from_Ibsen _ to _EliQ! Williams also writes, in the familiar terms 
of Leavisite literary criticism, that ' contemporary spoken English 
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is rarely capable of exact expression of anything in any degiee 
complex' and this is due in large part to 'that pressure of forces 
which we call industrialism' (Williams [1952]: 26) We need only 
compare contemporary with Elizabethan drama to see that 'the 
medium of naturalism - the representation of everyday speech - is 
immeasurably less satisfying in the twentieth century than in the 
sixteenth' (26). For Williams, this decline in the richness of 
dramatic speech is ' related, in fact, not only to the 
impoverishment of language but to changes in feeling' (22-3). As 
the NLR team are quick to observe, 'The set of propositions here 
is quite unlike anything else in your work. 
distillation of Leavis' (Williams 1979: 194). 
It seems to be a pure 
But with that 
single word 'feeling', Williams seeks to give his own twist to the 
orthodox line, and as he does so, he starts the slow elaboration 
of his own distinctive concepts. For, as we shall see, ' feeling' 
will become the key element in the idea of 'structure of feeling' 
Another moment at which Williams seeks to take a distance from 
the existing orthodoxy is with regard to the more authoritarian 
implications at work in the usual representation of Elizabethan 
drama and its society. Yes, Elizabethan drama enjoyed a moment 
where the common language contained all the 'elements of literary 
precision and complexity' ((1952]: 26) necessary to poetic drama. 
Because of the existence of a 'community of expression', the 
limitations of naturalism were invisible: there was an 
indiscernible blending of the ' lowest naturalism' with the 
' highest conventionalism' (26). For Eliot and others, all this 
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was evidence for ' the idea that a fully serious drama is 
impossible in a society where there is no common system of 
belief' (26) . 12 But Williams refuses to accept this implication, 
and turns directly against it. He asserts that ' the condition of 
a fully serious drama is less the existence of a common faith than 
the existence of a common language' (26). The existence of a 
common language does not imply the existence of a unitary moral -
or political - outlook . It is not necessarily authoritarian . 
' Morality in literature is not necessarily the assumption of 
certain ethical conclusions as background against which the 
immediate experience of the drama is paraded and tested ' he 
argues , 
The moral activity of the artist can also be an individual 
perception of pattern, or structure, in experience; a process 
which involves the most intense and conscious response to new 
elements of substantial living, so that by this very 
consciousness new patterns of evaluation are created or former 
patterns reaffirmed. (27) 
Against the authoritarian emphasis of a ' community of belief ', 
Williams calls for a ' community of sensibility ', one which would 
function in the open and democratic fashion he was to make central 
to Culture _and _Societ~ and The _Long _Revolution: 
The artist's sensibility - his capacity for experience, his 
ways of thinking , feeling, and conjunction - will always be 
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finer and more developed than that of the mean of his audience. 
But if his sensibility is at least of the same kind, 
communication is possible. Where his sensibility is of the 
same kind, his language and the language of his audience will 
be closely and organically related; the common language will be 
the expression of the common sensibility. There is no such 
common sensibility today. (26) 
In this 'community of sensibility' somehow the right ideas will 
win the arguments in the end. Though there is no such common 
sensibility today, the implication is that it will come through in 
the end, communication will triumph. It is one of the the weakest 
points of Williams's thought, as critics like Thompson were to 
pick up in relation to The _Long_Revolution. Nonetheless it marks 
an attempt at moving away from the conservative and authoritarian 
i mplications of Eliot ' s general cultural views . 13 
Williams also chooses to disagree explicitly with Eliot over 
one very significant idea . Characteristically, this comes at a 
moment where the flow of argument demands that Williams 
acknowledge his full debt to Eliot . He finds in so doing that he 
wis hes to establish a distance from Eliot. 'Story, character, 
idea, seem to have two related uses to the artist' he writes. ' In 
one sense , 
they serve as a formula for the expression of his experience, 
in the way defined by T . S . Eliot : ' The only way of expressing 
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emotion in the form of art is by finding an "objective 
correlative", in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a 
chain of events which shall be the formula of that particular 
emotion ; such that when the external facts, which must 
terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is 
immediately evoked.' (17) 
The quotation is one of Eliot's most famous formulations, taken 
from his 1919 essay on H~~l~!.14 The formulation - and the essay 
as a whole - powerfully expresses Eliot's own ambivalence with 
regard to the notion of expression. One the one hand, there is 
what was picked up by many ~Q~~!!n~ critics, and by Williams 
himself on the whole: the idea of the ideal of artistic expression 
which lies in the extraordinary ability of the artist to use 
language as an instrument for the expression of his experience. 
Yet at the same time there is some implicit fascination with the 
idea that the very power and appeal of artistic expression may lie 
in what the artist has been unable to master, may be the effect, 
in part , of the breakdown of the artist's control over the 
instrumentality of language . What interests Williams is the 
Eliot's emphasis on the use of language as instrument, its 
ability , when controlled by the artist, to fully express 
experience and emotion . 
view as he writes: 
Williams criticises this instrumental 
In another sense, they may serve as a precipitant to the 
artist, in that through their comprehension the artist is able 
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to find a provisional pattern of experience. By the force of 
his own grasp on their actuality, the artist is able to release 
his own, and their, reality. The only difference in the senses 
here outlined concerns the placing of these stages in the 
artistic process. Mr. Eliot's statement of the matter implies 
an ordered process, in which the particular emotion is first 
understood, and an objective correlative subsequently found for 
it. The second statement suggests that finding the objective 
correlative may often be for the artist the final act of 
evaluation of the particular experience, which will not have 
been completely understood until its mode of expression has 
been found . (17) 
For a moment , but only for this moment in this period of his 
work, Williams questions the view that understanding precedes 
expression, and that language is simply the instrument of 
expression, and argues for the view in which language - figured 
here as the ' finding of an objective correlative' - is necessarily 
prior to the formation of understanding. This is a moment of real 
contradiction. For, as will be clear from the upcoming discussion 
of ' film as total expression', so many of Williams's arguments in 
this early work on literature and drama tend towards just the 
instrumental view which he criticises here.15 It is a moment of 
contradiction, in which Williams contradicts his own most powerful 
influence, and at the same time contradicts a great deal of the 
theoretical structure he has taken as his own. It is a focus on 
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the question of language and expression that will not come into 
its own until the chapter on language in Marxism_and_Literature. 
All in all, Drama_from_Ibsen_to_Eliot is a book deeply 
influenced by Eliot's ideas. Contemporary drama had come to lose 
the power proper to drama because it had forgotten that this power 
was above all generated by a vigorous but controlled use of 
language. The naturalist insistence on preserving the 'illusion 
of reality' is the single factor most responsible for the 
disabling restriction of dramatic speech to everyday prose. 
Though many have tried to get round this through the use of 
symbols, or an elevated language at moments of crisis, the problem 
of speech remains as 'the central one in modern drama' (26). In 
the end, the modes of naturalism are the problem and the 
techniques of Eliot offer the answer: 'The reform of modern 
English drama has two main phases: first, the development of 
naturalism; and, second, the establishment of verse plays in the 
theatre' (269-70). 
In Drama_in_Performance and Preface_to_Film, Williams extends 
and develops the main argument against naturalism. Where Ih:~m~ 
from_Ibsen_to_Eliot emphasised the lack of any fully historical 
grasp of dramatic conventions 1n the available literary criticism, 
Drama_in_Performance sets out to provide at least a few moments 
from such a history, while Preface_to_Film goes on to argue that 
cinema might represent the possibility of a successful new 
convention of dramatic performance. In this new convention, the 
69 
limitations of naturalism would finally be overcome. The new mode 
of Total Expression would return absolute control over expression 
to the author, and so fulfil the ideal of artistic instrumentality 
so dear to Eliot - and, with the exception of that one moment in 
Drama from Ibsen to Eliot, to Williams too. 
Performance and Convention 
In Reading_and_Criticism, Williams had noted the tendency 'to 
believe that the naturalist method is the permanent and universal 
dramatic method' (Williams 1950: 91). At the centre of Qr~m~_in 
Performance is the argument that naturalism is a convention with a 
history, but a history that has been forgotten. The book traces 
the shape and structure of this forgetting. It shows how the 
dominant naturalist attitude has led to an anachronistic reading 
of some of the major texts in the Western dramatic canon. In line 
with the strictures of Drama_from_Ibsen_to_Eliot, the book seeks 
to bridge the gap between theatrical criticism, the criticism of a 
play's performance, and li!~r~r~ criticism, the analysis of a play 
as a written text, though one written for performance. Williams, 
following Eliot, finds the usual separation of these two elements 
' deeply disabling', and he therefore proposes to examine 'as a 
formal point of theory, the relation between text and performance' 
(Williams 1991: 18). This, in turn, can throw light on the nature 
of the contemporary failure of naturalism, and even suggests 
remedy for it, once we realise how the success of these early 
70 
works depends largely on the working of conventions eclipsed by 
the moment of naturalism. 
This is the challenge Williams issues by suggesting that the 
usual response to a play such as Shakespeare's An!Qn~ ~ng 
QlgQ~~!r~ is anachronistic. 'The construction of the play has 
often been condemned,' writes Williams 
on the grounds of its frequent shifts and apparent 
disintegration. But this is to look for integration in the 
wrong place: in the realistic representation of time and place 
which have little to do with this kind of drama. The measure 
of time in the play is the dramatic verse; the reality of place 
is the reality of played action on the stage. (1991: 67) 
The An!igQng of Sophocles and the drama of the Medieval period 
present examples of the successful integration of writing and 
performance: 'Sophocles, working through the known conventions, 
has written the words so that they are necessarily enacted in this 
way, and with this issue. The words are the whole situation, for 
they contain and compel the intense physical realization' (1991: 
31-2); Eygr~~~n is 'not only a masterpiece of literature, but a 
masterpiece of gr~~~!i£ literature ... For a compelling feeling, at 
once individual and general, has been realized in a fully dramatic 
pattern, where speech, action and design are one' (58). For 
Williams, these earlier - and often misunderstood - dramas were 
able to embody in performance a more coherent realization of the 
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dramatic author's intentions than is possible in the conventions 
of contemporary drama. 
Crucial to this success was the availability of coherent 
conventions of performance, conventions which, in turn, were made 
possible by the existence of a certain 'structure of feeling' 
shared by dramatist and audience. The problem for the present is 
that no new conventions have been formed which fully express the 
contemporary structure of feeling. Dramatists and their audiences 
are trapped in the tight place of a transitional moment. Williams 
argues - at least in the 1954 edition of Drama_in_Performance -
that a comparative moment of transition can be found between 1896 
and 1898 - between the disastrous reception given to the first 
production of Chekhov's The Seagull by Karpov at the Alexandrinsky 
Theatre, and the extraordinary success of Stanislavsky's 
production only two years later. For the present , all that can be 
said is that 
many writers no longer conceive their themes in a naturalist 
way. The emphasis has changed, in the mind , from the 
representation of apparent behaviour to a very different 
process: the process of attempting to discover a pattern, a 
structure of feeling , which is adequate to communicate, not 
merely the acknowledged and apparent, but the whole and unified 
life of man. One can see, in certain contemporary novels, and 
in certain plays, that the theme is obviously of this kind . 
(Williams 1954: 116) 
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Not merely 'the acknowledged and apparent, but the whole and 
unified life of man'. The phrase is worth pausing over, as it 
indicates the work to be done by Williams's emerging idea of the 
structure of feeling. To put it in a different theoretical 
idiom, the new drama will have at its core the desire to represent 
a social totality which is otherwise invisible, otherwise 
inaccessible to empirical human scrutiny. This social totality 
can nonetheless be adequately communicated by the structure of 
feeling which the dramatist expresses in his or her work. The 
structure of feeling can somehow represent the inexpressible 
social totality. That is the very promise of representation; that 
is the necessary aporia of what it means for expression to stand 
in for something . 
But, to return to the focus of Williams's own attention, what 
counts is that the naturalist attitude still prevails, despite the 
efforts of dramatists of the past thirty years or so to break with 
it. For Williams, Eliot has been the closest to realising such a 
break; but even he has been unable to overcome the disabling 
contradiction between the naturalist representation of speech and 
the need for a non-naturalist dramatic action. Naturalism has no 
adequate convention for the proper linking of speech and action in 
drama. In the conclusion to the 1954 edition, Williams can only 
offer his argument that 
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certain changes in the minds of writers and others have made 
naturalism outmoded; and that a conscious acceptance of a 
different dramatic intention can be realised, in practical 
terms , by the full use and development of skills that already 
exist in the theatre (Williams 1954: 122) 
But he has to accept that these 'have not been integrated into a 
satisfactory general form' (ibid., p. 122). Drama, then, and even 
Eliot's drama, seemed at a dead end . What was needed was some new 
convention of performance which could break the stranglehold of a 
naturalism which had even repressed the existence of previous 
conventions in the history of drama. It was film, for Williams, 
which seemed to provide exactly the right ground for the emergence 
o f a new convention and a newly realised structure of feeling . 
For film promised to return the dramatic performance to a 
condition of singular utterance, one in which the intentions of 
t he dramatic author could be fully realized without the 
distortions imposed through actual production and direction. 
Film as Total Expression 
Preface _ to_Film is the only one of the three books on 
naturalism which has never been republished, and this may account 
for i ts relative neglect in critical accounts of the Williams 
c anon. Yet the main essay in the book , ' Film and the Dramatic 
Tradition' , is the most powerful version of Williams' s critique of 
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naturalism, and gives the most insight into the development of the 
concept of structure of feeling. 
As an undergraduate at Cambridge, Williams had the opportunity 
to develop an interest in film as a regular spectator at the 
Socialist Film Club's weekend shows. Williams's work on and 
interest in film ran against the grain of Leavisism. Leavis had 
given a notable characterisation of film in his early pamphlet, 
'Mass Civilisation and Minority Culture'. Here, because of its 
greater power and immediacy, the cinema was seen as more of a 
threat to the vitality of culture than even the emergent tabloid 
press pioneered by Lord Northcliffe. 'Films have a so much more 
potent influence' wrote Leavis: 
They provide now the main form of recreation in the civilised 
world; and they involve surrender, under conditions of hypnotic 
receptivity, to the cheapest emotional appeals, appeals the 
more insidious because they are associated with a compellingly 
vivid illusion of actual life. It would be difficult to 
dispute that the result must be serious damage to the 'standard 
of living' ... it will not be disputed that broadcasting, like 
the films, is in practice, mainly a means of passive diversion, 
and that it tends to make active recreation, expecially active 
use of the mind, more difficult. (Leavis 1933a: 20-21) 
In brief, if the purpose of the new literary studies was to 
save the world from mass culture, as it was for Leavis, then film 
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should ~gyg~ receive a place in the curriculum. Implicit in 
Leavis's argument is, of course, the idea of English studies as a 
form of 'active recreation', a training in the 'active use of the 
mind'. Leavis's argument relied upon a claim that literary texts 
were intrinsically capable of generating intellectual activity, 
and refused to see that this activity of the mind might itself be 
simply a product of critical attention and analysis when devoted 
to texts of any kind, whether of high or low culture. There is no 
such prejudice at work in Williams's approach to cinema. In 'Film 
as a Tutorial Subject', Williams had argued against the Leavisite 
line, and for the addition of film to WEA tutorials, insisting 
that film 'provides opportunities for criticism' just as much as 
literature, and promised to extend his arguments in the 
forthcoming Preface_to_Film.16 
The first imperative of Preface_to_Film is to connect cinema to 
the history of the traditional dramatic canon, and this is the aim 
of the first chapter by Williams: 'Film and the Dramatic 
Tradition'. Michael Orrom contributes a chapter, ' Film and its 
Dramatic Techniques', and the book as a whole concludes with a 
Postscript by Williams. 
In ' Film and the Dramatic Tradition', Williams argues that 
criticism to date has been marred by its refusal to understand 
cinema in relation to the history of drama. Properly understood, 
the advent of cinema may represent a shift in the possibilities of 
dramatic expression equivalent to Aeschylus's introduction of the 
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second actor, thus subordinating the words of the chorus to the 
now newly dramatic dialogue. Only when seen in this large 
historical perspective can the essential novelty and importance of 
film be grasped. For Williams, what is most important is 
the fact that the performance which it embodies is recorded and 
final. It is, that is to say, a !Q!~! Eerformance, which 
cannot be distinguished from the work that is being 
performed.(Williams and Orrom 1954: 1) 
Film, in other words, seemed to offer what was most lacking in 
contemporary drama: a convention of performance which would 
guarantee the full and singular communication of the dramatic 
author's intentions, without the distortions characteristic of 
dramatic production in Britain since the advent of the theatre 
director.17 
Once again, Eliot's verse-drama provides the necessary limit-
case of existing naturalist conventions, particularly with regard 
to a naturalist style of speech and movement. Williams sees this 
style as a major drawback, ' the familiar one of naturalism: that 
the concern is to represent "real life", rather than to 
communicate a dramatic emotion' (48) Eliot's verse-drama, which 
tried to break away from this style, could only enjoy partial 
success and this was a symptom of the general crisis of naturalist 
convention. ' What is necessary' argues Williams ' is that 
dramatists, in collaboration with actors, think again in terms of 
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writing for speech ~ng movement, as an integrated dramatic form' 
(49). What is necessary is a convention which would re-establish 
the possibility of 'total expression' which, Williams argued, had 
existed for Sophocles, and for some Medieval drama: 
a play written from this idea of total expression contains, in 
its essential conception, the total performance which is 
necessary to communicate it in the theatre. That is to say, 
not only the speech, but also the movement and design, have 
been devised by the dramatist, in terms of his understanding of 
the appropriate conventions of actions and designers, so that 
the written play contains everything that is to be performed; 
the performance itself is the communication of this. (50) 
At the centre of this theory of Total Expression lies the idea of 
a fully realised authorial intention which Williams had drawn from 
Eliot. It was above all the iterability of film which appealed to 
the young Williams: the pure artistic expression of the 
author/director could never be betrayed by the intermediary figure 
of the actor/director . The new medium of cinema offered 
significant opportunities for the realization of this Total 
Expression. ' The moving - picture camera itself is,' concludes 
Williams , a most effective agent for the kind of controlled total 
effe c t which I have been urging' (51) .18 All in all , cinema 
presents a ' practical alternative' to the problems inherent in 
' the methods of naturalism ' (vii-viii). 
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Tony Pinkney has recently offered a summary of Williams's 
position in his early writings on drama which differs from mine, 
but I think he is only able to justify it by bending his evidence 
a little.19 He emphasises repeatedly the importance of German 
Expressionism to Williams, and concludes that certainly 
Williams had his reservations, about the occasional externality 
of expressionistic devices of spectacle and its relative 
devaluation of dramatic speech, but these are only 
qualifications within a deep overall endorsement. (Pinkney 
1989b : 22) 
As a key piece of evidence he cites Williams's apparent enthusiasm 
and endorsement for German Expressionist cinema in a passage 
towards the end of ' Film and the Dramatic Tradition': Williams ' s 
claim that the German Expressionist film is 'the kind of film 
which has most nearly realized the ideal of a wholly conceived 
drama' (Williams 1954: 52), that is, of the Total Expression which 
so interested Williams. But while he registers that Williams made 
' significant qualifications' to this claim, he does not detail 
them. He does not detail them for the very simple reason that 
Williams's claim for the interest of German expressionist film is 
so limited by Williams ' s reservations that it could never count as 
a ' deep overall endorsement'. The fact is that films like Q~ 
Q~lig~~i were silent films, and most of Williams's interests - as 
we have seen - in going beyond naturalism were concerned with the 
79 
problem of the dramatic and controlled use of speech in drama. As 
Williams goes on to say: 
it has always seemed to me significant that the most successful 
examples were in ~ilg~i film. For, if one looks at 
expressionist drama as a whole, one sees a very exciting new 
convention of movement and design, which has been achieved, 
however, at the cost of a radical neglect of speech .... it is 
clear that the use of sound, particularly for dramatic speech, 
would have presented the expressionists with very difficult 
problems, which might have ruined such conventional 
integrations as they had achieved. (Williams and Orrom 1954: 
52) 
In terms of the general argument which Williams was maintaining, 
and which focuses on the difficulty and importance of dramatic 
speech, this hardly gives expressionism the centrality to 
Williams's thinking that Pinkney lends it. Williams's main point 
is that Expressionist cinema proved to be a dead end, despite its 
early promise . Similarly, Pinkney's claim that Drama_from_Ibsen 
!Q_~liQi (though in a 'displaced way') engages the great 
Expressionism debates of the 1930s' (Pinkney 1989b: 21) is 
exaggerated, and he can only sustain it by selective quotation. 
Though Williams does indeed state that it is ' very common, in 
England, to be patronising about the expressionist experiment', he 
does not go as far as Pinkney suggests, lending it his ' deep 
endorsement'. Once again, Williams's claims for Expressionism are 
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severely limited: when ' expressionist drama is set against the 
poetic drama, or against the very best of the naturalists ... it is 
true that it must be judged inferior' - and the reason for this 
lies with the same fault as he had observed vis-a-vis 
Expressionist cinema - 'it served to confirm the impoverishment of 
dramatic l~~g~~gg' (Williams and Orrom 1954: 184). Each time 
Williams's point is the same: expressionism is only partially 
successful, it suffers too much from impoverished dramatic 
language . In the end it is Eliot's verse-dramas which point the 
way forward - a claim that Pinkney can only ever diminish and read 
anachronistically, from the point of view of Williams's later 
change of heart.20 
Structure of Feeling 
Most commentaries treat 'structure of feeling' as if it were a 
concept which emerged in Williams's work in the late rather than 
the early fifties, and, as such, it has been the object of 
considerable discussion and criticism. But something is lost when 
the history of the emergence of the term is not fully traced. 
Preface _ to_Film is the first work in which Williams deploys the 
term and seeks to establish the distinctive reach and explanatory 
Duly power which made it a 2oint_de_reEere of his later work. 
examined, it becomes clear that he was using the idea of 
' structure of feeling' as a deliberate challenge and alternative 
to the existing explanatory framework of Marxist literary and 
cultural analysis.21 
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By the time of the interviews with the New Left Review team, 
published as ~olitics_and_Letters in 1979, structure of feeling 
had become known as one of Williams's most characteristic 
concepts, a keyword of Williams's own vocabulary, and just as 
shifting and unstable in its conceptual identity as any item in 
David Simpson - though he neglects its emergence 
1n Preface_to_Film - has given an excellent survey of its mutation 
in Williams's thinking from its use in Culture_and_Societ~ (1958) 
where ' it occurs somewhat casually .... [and] seems to define 
something like ideology in its classic and negative sense', across 
'his first sustained account' of it in The_Long_Revolution (1961), 
through to its reappraisal in Marxism_and_Literature (1977), where 
' for all its appearance in a modernized and theoretical format, 
the spirit and most of the letter ... has not much changed' since 
1961 (Simpson 1989: 42).22 
The discussion of 'structure of feeling' in Politics_and 
Lg!!gr~ brings out some major theoretical problems with the term, 
though here again, the NLR team concentrate on the deployment of 
the concept in Ihg bQQg Revolution, ignoring the fact of its first 
appearance in Preface_to_Film until Williams draws their attention 
to it. The interviewers point to difficulties with the point of 
reference for the term - structure of feeling seems to refer to a 
generation, and yet at times to have a longer life span than any 
single generation, it seems far too unitary in its expression of 
social consciousness with its casual reference across classes 
(Williams 1979: 156-162). Nonetheless, for the NLR team, the 
concept of 'structure of feeling' remains one of the most notable 
theoretical innovations of The Long Revolution' (1979: 156). 
In his replies to their various criticisms, Williams accepts 
many of their arguments, and yet manages to defend his basic 
positions in a complex and nuanced defence of his arguments and 
their original context of discussion and debate. He suggests that 
the proper starting-point for any discussion of the idea of the 
structure of feeling is with its first appearance and definition 
in 1954. 'The first time I used it was actually in Preface to 
Eil~' he notes, and insists that 
the key to the notion, both to all it can do and to all the 
difficulties it still leaves, is that it was developed as an 
analytic procedure for actual written works, with a very strong 
stress on forms and conventions. (1979: 159) 
'To this day' he notes 'I find that I keep coming back to this 
notion from the actual experience of literary analysis rather than 
from any theoretical satisfaction with the concept itself' (159). 
In other words, under the pressure of the NLR's probing questions, 
Williams admits that there are problems with the use of the term 
as a concept, but then defends its use pragmatically, as an 
analytic procedure for actual written works' (ibid.). Quite aside 
from the question of whether the two uses can be so easily 
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separated, it is important to ask whether the original use of the 
term was pragmatic or conceptual in the senses at work here. We 
shall see that Williams gives a selective account of its original 
use in Preface_to_Film, one which does its best to conceal the 
term's original ambitious valency. For despite the emphasis on 
the casually pragmatic usefulness of the term for literary 
analysis, it did begin life very much as a direct challenge to the 
existing explanatory orthodoxy of Marxist literary criticism. 
There is a forgetting at work in Williams's own account of the 
term's origin just as important as its neglect in most of the 
existing secondary material. 
This forgetting comes through in a quite literal elision in 
Williams's discussion. In support of this emphasis on the textual 
and pragmatic nature of the idea (that it is an 'analytic 
procedure for actual written works') he quotes the following 
section from Preface_to_Film: 
In the study of a period, we may be able to reconstruct, with 
more or less accuracy, the material life, the social 
organization, and, to a large extent, the dominant ideas. It 
is not necessary to discuss here which, if any, of these 
aspects is, in the whole complex, determining; an important 
institution like the drama will, in all probability, take its 
colour in varying degrees from them all .... To relate a work of 
art to any part of that observed totality may, in varying 
degrees, be useful, but it is a common experience, in analysis, 
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to realize that when one has measured the work against the 
separable parts, there yet remains some element for which there 
is no external counterpart. This element, I believe, is what I 
have named the structure_ of_feeling of a period and it is only 
realizable through experience of the work of art itself, as a 
whole. (1979: cit. pp. 158-9) 
The emphasis here falls on the idea of the structure of feeling as 
the result of a work of textual analysis, ' only realizable through 
experience of the work of art itself'. What is de-emphasised 
through selective quotation - is the larger theoretical point 
Williams was seeking to make in his original formulation . 
Structure of feeling was intended as a direct challenge to the 
Marxist explanation of cultural reproduction. As we shall see , 
the first sentence of the quoted extract reads differently if we 
see it in the context of the whole paragraph from which it is 
e x tracted , and in relation to the flow of argument as a whole. 
But let us first of all relocate this selective quotation in the 
context of argument at work in Preface_to_Film. 
Structure of Feeling as Convention 
In theoretical terms , what interests Williams most in r~~f~9g 
1Q Eil~ is the necessity for understanding dramatic conventions 
not merely as questions of technique and staging but as themselves 
forms of social consciousness. There are in fact two senses at 
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work in the idea of convention, 'convention covers both 1~Qi1 
QQQ§~Q1 and acceEted_standards' (Williams and Orrom 1954: 15). A 
convention is, on the one hand, simply an agreed on standard or 
method of performance. An audience will willingly suspend its 
disbelief, and accept that an actor can put on a grey cloak and 
become 'invisible', though in reality he continues to be seen. 
Spectators agree to believe that they can 'overhear' a soliloquy, 
even at the back of the auditorium, while it goes unnoticed by any 
other actors on stage. The second sense of convention as tacit -
not fully conscious - agreement comes through most clearly when 
the usual conventions are disturbed: 
We will agree that a murderer may hide behind a door (where we 
can still see him), and that he may look down, with an 
expression of agony, at his hands (which we at once agree are 
stained with innocent blood); but if he should come forward to 
the front of the stage, and in twenty lines of verse, or in 
recitative or song, or in dance, express (if more fully and 
intensely) the same emotion, we at once, or many of us, feel 
uneasy, and are likely to say afterwards that it was 'unreal' 
(Williams and Orrom 1954: 18) 
This deeper sense of convention comes through most visibly when 
its sense as agreed standard is challenged. ' A convention, in the 
simplest sense' writes Williams, 
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is only a method, a technical piece of machinery, which 
facilitates the performance. But methods change, and 
techniques change, and while, say, a chorus of dancers, or the 
cloak of invisibility, or a sung soliloquy, are known dramatic 
methods, they cannot be satisfactorily used unless, at the time 
of a performance, they are more than methods; unless, in fact, 
they are conventions. (19) 
Conventions then in the second sense refer to the tacit agreement, 
likely to be unconscious, which yet forms and grounds social 
consciousness. Thus the very existence of dramatic conventions as 
methods always indicates at the same time the existence of a level 
of tacit consent to and understanding of them amongst the 
audience. The question is then how and why do changes in 
convention take place? 
For Williams, the answer is that such changes in convention as 
dramatic method must in some sense reflect or articulate some 
degree of change in the grounds of social consciousness itself. 
According to Williams, it seems likely that 'the effective changes 
took place when there was already a latent willingness to accept 
them, at least among certain groups in society, from whom the 
artist drew his support' (20). And it is precisely this ' latent 
willingness' which most interests Williams. For potentially at 
least, it gives a place for the contemporary artist or critic to 
create something new: 
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It may be possible, eventually, so to understand the relation 
of particular conventions to the life of the time in which they 
flourished, that a reasonable prediction of what is necessary 
in a present situation may be made and argued. I do not think 
that any such understanding at present exists, but certain 
points seem to me to be sufficiently grounded to be put forward 
as tentative argument . (21) 
What Williams returns here to the starting-point of Communist 
Party criticism - that a position exists from which ' a reasonable 
prediction of what is necessary in a present situation may be made 
and argued' . But - doubtless bearing in mind the criticisms he 
had received from Tillyard on just this point - he writes with 
c onsiderable circumspection. No such position or understanding 
e x ists at present; all that Williams can put forward is a 
' tentative argument', though one he thinks is reasonably well 
grounded. What follows is the elaboration of the idea of 
structure of feeling, his recasting or supersession of the Marxist 
i dea of structure and superstructure, in the crucial paragraph 
from which Williams makes his selective quotation in 1979 . 
The paragraph in fact begins with a strong statement which can 
only be understood as being written against the Marxist structure 
and superstructure argument. 'In principle , ' writes Williams: 
it seems clear that the dramatic conventions of any given 
period are fundamentally related to the structure of feeling in 
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that period. I use the phrase structure_of_feeling because it 
seems to me more accurate, in this context, than ig~~§ or 
general life. All the products of a community in a given 
period are, we now commonly believe, essentially related, 
although in practice, in detail, this is not always easy to 
see. (21) 
When Williams writes that the phrase 'structure of feeling' seems 
' more accurate' than 'ideas or general_life', he is arguing 
against the Marxist structure and superstructure paradigm in which 
'The mode of production in material life determines the general 
character of the social, political and spiritual processes of 
life' (in Marx's words, as cited in Culture_and_Societ~ p. 266). 
By eliding the topic sentence of the whole paragraph, Williams 
distorts the thrust of his argument in 1954. Without these 
qualifying sentences, the first sentence which he quotes in 1979 
reads as a partial endorsement of the usual structure and 
superstructure analysis (as it is translated in Culture_and 
~QQ!~1~): 
In the study of a period, we may be able to reconstruct, with 
more or less accuracy, the material life, the social 
organization, and, to a large extent, the dominant ideas. It 
is not necessary to discuss here which, if any, of these 
aspects is, in the whole complex, determining; an important 
institution like the drama will, in all probability, take its 
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colour in varying degrees from them all .... (cited in Williams 
1979: 159; Williams and Orrom 1954: 21) 
But read in context, the 'may' has more of a negative than a 
positive sense, the orthodox Marxist analysis is belittled rather 
than endorsed. In orthodox Marxist analysis, dramatic or literary 
conventions of any kind would be 'fundamentally related' to the 
economic base, not to Williams's 'structure of feeling'. In 
Politics_and_Letters, three more sentences are then cut from the 
original version, and their excision also has the effect of 
blunting the original force and address of Williams's argument. 
They read: 
But while we may, in the study of a past period, separate out 
particular aspects of life, and treat them as if they were 
self-contained, it is obvious that this is only how they may be 
studied, not how they were experienced. We examine each 
element as a precipitate, but in the living experience of the 
time every element was in solution, an inseparable part of a 
complex whole. And it seems to be true, from the nature of 
art, that it is from such a totality that the artist draws; it 
is in art, primarily, that the effect of the totality, the 
dominant structure of feeling, is expressed and embodied. 
(Williams and Orrom 1954: 21) 
No mere practice of textual analysis, what is at work in 
Williams's idea of the structure of feeling is a statement of the 
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fundamental claims of literary criticism: its insistence that 'it 
is in art, primarily, that the effect of the totality, the 
dominant structure of feeling, is expressed and embodied' - and, 
or because, if in art, then in criticism. The function of the 
structure of feeling is then much more important than it appears 
if the final sentences are quoted alone: 
To relate a work of art to any part of that observed totality 
may, in varying degrees, be useful; but it is a common 
experience, in analysis, to realize that when one has measured 
the work against the separable parts, there yet remains some 
element for which there is no external counterpart. This 
element, I believe, 1s what I have named the structure_of 
f~~li~g of a period, and it is only realizable through 
experience of the work of art itself, as a whole. (21-22) 
Williams's original claims, in 1954, for the 'structure of 
feeling' are far stronger than he represents them in 1979. 
Structure of feeling needs to be recognised for what it was - a 
concept deployed as a conscious alternative and direct challenge 
to the available Marxist formula. ·,.· 
Indeed, this comes through, though obliquely, a little later 1n 
the discussion in Politics_and_Letters, where Williams remembers 
the criticisms of a friend or colleague: 'I know what you are 
really doing', he was told, you are writing a socialist history 
of culture, but whenever you see a socialist term coming up you 
( 
~\ 
omit it and put in another term' structure of feeling for 
structure and superstructure. When Williams admits that 'my 
language was very different from that in which I would have 
written between '39 and '41' (1979: 156), we should remember that 
what Williams was arguing against was the Marxist criticism he had 
espoused as an undergraduate, but which he had turned away from 
under the pressure of the discursive constraints of the 
discipline in general and the unanswerable criticisms of 
Tillyard in particular. 
If we examine the actual emergence of the term 'structure of 
feeling', we soon see that it is best understood as Williams's 
most signficant attempt so far to preserve and yet to go beyond 
the Marxist arguments concerning literary and cultural 
reproduction which had been so thoroughly criticized within the 
new literary criticism of Cambridge English. The means of this 
supersession is to be the idea of 'structure of feeling' . Its 
task is then twofold: first, to explain the nature of major 
shifts in dramatic convention, but second, to explain these shifts 
without recourse to the clumsy Marxist metaphor of ' base and 
superstructure ' . As Williams himself put it, though referring to 
the composition of The _Long_Revolution_ : 
the kind of ' relating' I was thinking of .. . was the 
idea that, say, because there was an industrial revolution 
there must have been industrial poetry .... It would seem to be a 
reasonable deduction from a very simple version of economic 
determination, that since the decisive phenonenon was the 
advent of capitalism, there should be capitalist poetry. When 
I was writing The_Long_Revolution I was probably 
over-preoccupied by these one-dimensional sorts of explanation 
and relation. (Williams 1979: 144) 
- just the kind of one-dimensional thinking he had found at work -
as we discussed in Chapter 1 - in writers such as Christopher 
Caudwell in his chapters on the English poets in Illusion and 
R!~li!~.~ ·~ 
Conclusion 
Those critics who have had something to say about Williams's 
early writings on drama have tended to restrict themselves to the 
repetition of a point first made in a review of Drama_from_Ibsen 
Mr. J.R. Williams saw a certain 'extremism' 
at work , ' the kind that says drama consists entirely of words ' , 
and went so far as to accuse Williams of 'fanatical 
overstatement' .2.- ~Jan Gorak turns this observation into yet 
another instance of Williams's fundamental 'alienation'. 
clear', he writes, that Williams 
- [ I ] t i s 
views naturalist drama as a reader . Unable to free himself 
from the limiting assumptions that language provides all 
dramatic life, his commentaries often ignore the substance of 
the action, focusing instead on the inadequacies of the 
playwright's words ... By applying Leavisian criteria to 
literature that will not bear that kind of verbal close 
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scrutiny, Williams alienates himself from the very canon he 
seeks to re-examine . (Gorak 1988: 23-4). 
And, following him, in surely the best single essay on Williams's 
writings on drama to date, Bernard Sharrat articulates the same 
point around a central issue of theory - the emphasis which 
Williams places on the artist's instrumental relation to language. 
Sharratt refers to Williams's empiricism as one which invites us 
to think in terms of a simple empiricist notion, of an 
elementary encounter with some recalcitrant particular, some 
inner 'I' forging a shape for its own localizable and specific 
'experience' prior to the secondary act of writing this down 
in a formal dramatic mode, and subsequently releasing that 
shaped whole for inevitable partial realization in an 
essentially inadequate theatrical performance (Sharrat 1989: 
132). 
Similarly, Graham Holderness, in his fine introduction to the new 
edition of Drama_in_Performance, writes: 
The emphasis on the primacy of the text can lead towards too 
rigid and mechanistic a conception of the control exercised by 
text over performance. If the dramatic text is a completely 
written exposition of all the play ' s potentialities of 
performance, as Williams seems to affirm, then each ' correct' 
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performance should be identical to every other. (Holderness 
1991: 10) 
Just as, in Preface_to_Film, Williams had found the 'performance' 
of cinema to be. In other words, these critics are correct in 
stating that Williams had an overriding interest, in these early 
works on drama, in the idea of what he called 'total expression', 
the iterability of performance. But what they neglect to ask is 
the significance of this interest. If Williams was treating drama 
as a 'kind of reader', what kind of reader was he? The answer -
at least as regards the structure of feeling - is less as a 
Leavisite and more as the non-Marxist Marxist that Williams had 
set himself the task of becoming. 
For the significance of the dramatic text was in the end 
subordinated to the structure of feeling it could - even if only 
partially - express. As Williams put it in Preface_to_Film: 
naturalism was a response to changes in the structure of 
feeling, which, in the event, it could not wholly express. The 
structure of feeling, as I have been calling it, lies deeply 
embedded in our lives; it cannot be merely extracted and 
summarized; it is perhaps only in art - and this is the 
importance of art - that it can be realized, and communicated, 
as a whole experience (Williams and Orrom 1954: 54) 
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In the end, the most serious charge that the NLR interviewers put 
to Williams with regard to the idea of structure of feeling is, in 
fact, its very raison_d'~tre, the ways in which it assures the 
literary or dramatic critic access to a social consciousness 
somehow behind the available evidence. 
Williams guilty of: 
As they put it, isn't 
a silent elision from the texts of the period as privileged 
evidence of the structure of feeling to the structure of 
feeling as privileged evidence of the social structure or 
historical epoch as such? The concept then tends to become an 
epistemology for gaining a comprehension of a whole society. 
(Williams 1979: 164) 
In fact, that was precisely what English studies meant to Williams 
in this early period - an epistemology for gaining a privilfged 
insight into the history of the social totality. And this is why 
the study of drama - properly understood - is central, and not 
peripheral > to Williams's work as a whole. Indeed - as with 
Williams's reply to this question, we can see a part of the 
progress from this early point of Williams's work as a whole lies 
in a relinquishing of this kind of totalising claim. Nonetheless, 
it remains a part of his work through to the end, as a careful 
reading of his inaugural lecture as professor of Drama reveals. 
For let us examine some of Williams's reflections on the place 
of drama in his work in the 1974 inaugural lecture at Cambridge, 
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'Drama in a Dramatized Society'. 'People have often asked me 
why,' said Williams 'trained in literature and expressly in drama, 
making an ordinary career in writing and teaching dramatic history 
and analysis, I turned - !~rngg - to what they would call 
sociology if they were quite sure I wouldn't be offended' 
(Williams 1984: 19). As the emphasis and repetition make clear, 
what the ordinary professional critic might see as some intrusive 
element, as some eccentric or peripheral concern on Williams's 
part in his writings on drama was its 'sociological' bent - the 
Cambridge codeword for anything resembling a Marxist analysis of 
literature. But for Williams the 'sociological' was central. 
a telling aside, which works to locate Williams in the very 
tradition of social criticism he had delineated in Culture_and 
In 
~QQig!~. Williams refers to the example of John Ruskin. 'Ruskin 
didn't turn from architecture to society' he notes; 'he saw 
society in its architecture', and because of this was able to 
'learn to read both architecture and society in new ways' (19-20). 
For Williams, the study of drama has worked in much the same way 
as Ruskin's architecture. 'I learned something from analysing 
drama' he writes, something 
which seemed to me effective not only as a way of seeing 
certain aspects of society but as a way of getting through to 
some of the fundamental conventions which we group as society 
itself. These, in their turn, make some of the problems of 
drama quite newly active. It was by looking both ways, at a 
stage and a text, and at a society active, enacted, in them, 
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that I thought I saw the significance of the enclosed room -
the room on the stage, with its new metaphor of the fourth wall 
lifted - as at once a dramatic and a social fact. (Williams 
1984: 20) 
In the end, Williams's insistence on ' looking both ways' can serve 
to correct both orthodox literary analysis, and the orthodox 
social analysis of Marxist economism. For to be able to 
understand the significance of the lifted fourth wall of the 
naturalist theatre means understanding both the history of the 
conventions of drama, but also the deeper conventions underlying 
that narrowly academic history. It is to see through to ' the 
fundamental conventions which we group as society itself ' , what 
Wi lliams refers to as ' a structure of feeling in a precise 
con temporary world' ( 21) . The analysis and interpretation of 
dramatic form cannot take place, for Williams, outside the 
understanding of the basic structures of a social order. 
that this analysis can help to understand the fundamental 
It is 
conventions of the social order itself . Where techniques become 
methods , ' significant general modes' of consciousness, then the 
analysis of dramatic forms questions and corrects both orthodox 
literary studies and orthodox marxist thinking. This is then the 
ma j or line of theoretical continuity - however revised, improved 
and elaborated - between Williams ' s earliest work on drama and his 
f i nal positions on cultural materialism.2J.§" 
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Cha~ter_Three:_Culture_and_Communication_1950-1962 
Culture_and_Societ~_1780-1950 was first published in September 
1958, and reprinted four months later in January 1959. Since 
then, it has hardly been out of print. Culture_and_Societ~ (as it 
is now usually known) is Williams's best-seller. By 1979, it was 
reckoned to have sold some 160,000 copies world-wide; and had been 
translated into Catalan, Japanese, German and Italian. For 
critics and scholars of Williams's work it is regarded as one of 
the most widely read texts of cultural history ever written', one 
of the 'founding texts of cultural studies', 'probably the most 
formative socialist work of the period', 'a lifechanger for 
youngish readers in 1960', ' foundational', 'probably his most 
famous' book. As one advertisement put it in 1960s, 'Not to know 
about ... Culture_and_Societ~ is to brand oneself the intellectual 
equivalent of a square'. Culture_and_Societ~ is William's 
classic; and, perhaps like all classics, its original 
circumstances and address have been forgotten.1 
Culture _and_Societ~ is that rare thing in academic writing, a 
crossover work, one read by at least two generations of liberal 
and leftist academics, and by an extraordinary number of non-
academics. Most commentators have tended to divide into two 
camps. For the first, the book represents a masterpiece of 
disinterested academic commentary, while the second see it as 
exemplifying the worst of Williams's theoretical and political 
failings. The NLR interviewers, for instance, remark on its 
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's triking tone of equanimity and authority' (Williams 1979: 98), 
while J.P.Ward applauds the ' level reasonableness of the writing ' 
(Ward 1981: 17) . But for the Althusserian theorist of the 
seventies, the book seemed 'an idealist and academicist project', 
too deeply rooted in the ' empiricist' problematic; while from the 
post-structuralist position of the late eighties, it - and 
Williams's related works - demonstrated a commitment to a dated 
and unrealisable 'Enlightenment ideal of culture ' .2 By the late 
seventies, in the NLR interviews, Williams himself seemed tired of 
discussing the book. Culture_and_Societ~ appeared too deeply 
marked by his ' disgusted withdrawal' from all forms of 
collaboration, as well as by the ' intense disappointment that they 
were not available' (Williams 1979: 106). 
What tends to disappear in such readings - including, at 
moments , Williams's own - is any sense of the impact of Q~li~rg 
and _Societ~ on contemporaries. The polemical edge of Culture and 
~QQ!gi~ is forgotten as the context of its production and the 
circumstances of its address disappear over the horizon of the 
present . In this chapter, I seek to revive some of the central 
l ines of argument in Culture_and_Societ~ and the related work , Ihg 
Long_Revolution , and argue that these two books - which represent 
a significant defining phase in Williams ' s work - are best 
understood when placed in the broad context of the cultural 
politics of the time , and , particularly when brought into relation 
with the debates in and around adult education through the late 
1940s and into and across the ' 50s. For Williams's work in this 
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period constitutes what Edward W. Said described as a 
'beginning' when he wrote, in his influential study Beginnings: 
Intention_and_Method, of how in retrospect 'we can regard a 
beginning as the point at which, in a given work, the writer 
departs from all other works; a beginning already establishes 
relationships with works already existing, relationships of either 
continuity or antagonism or some mixture of both' (Said 1975: 3). 
Culture_and_Societ~ embodies just such a set of antagonistic and 
yet continuous relations. 
The starting-point of this massively popular work was 
insistently local, emphatically conjunctural, but belonged in many 
ways more to the late 1940s than the late 1950s. In the Foreword 
to the study, Williams acknowledges that the origins of the 
project go back to the 1940s, anQ to the initiative of the journal 
Politics_and_Letters : 'Our object then was to enquire into and 
where possible reinterpret this tradition which the word ' culture' 
describes in terms of the experience of our own generation.' 
((1958] 19 : vii) . 'Our generation ' : in retrospect, that of The 
Angry Young Men, the Scholarship Boys, and, ultimately, the New 
Left. Perhaps most strikingly, the 1950s sees the first 
appearance of distinctively working-class voices on the cultural 
scene of the new welfare state.3 In drama, John Osborne and 
Arnold Wesker; in fiction, John Wain and Kingsley Amis; and in the 
new form of cultural criticism, Richard Hoggart and Raymond 
Williams. ' I knew perfectly well who I was writing against,' 
remembered Williams in 1979, ' Eliot, Leavis and the whole of the 
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cultural conservatism that had formed around them - the people who 
had pre-empted the culture and literature of this country' 
(Williams 1979: 112). With the publication of The_Long_Revolution 
in 1961 , and the later study, Communications (1962), Williams · 
became the spokesperson of the New Left, and perhaps even the 
first public intellectual of the British working class.4 
Williams's final results in the English Tripos Examinations 
were outstanding, and Trinity College immediately offered him a 
scholarship to stay on as a graduate student . 5 This was usually 
the first step on a relatively easy climb - in that period - to 
tenure as a lecturer in the University. But Williams, as did a 
significant number of his generation, turned away. Like a 
significant number of other leftist intellectuals, he preferred to 
move away from the academy to work in what was perceived as the 
more politically charged and more politically positive environment 
of the Workers' Educational Association.6 He worked as a Staff 
Tutor for the Oxford Delegacy for Extra-Mural Studies, organising 
and teaching classes in collaboration with the Workers' Education 
Institution from 1946 until his appointment as Lecturer in Drama 
1 
and return to Cambridge in 196J . 7 
Despite his academic achievements, and the material security 
afforded by the new job, Williams was still troubled 
intellectually. After the closure of Politics and Letters in 1948 
(a year which had also seen the failure of a projected documentary 
film with Paul Rotha), he felt a sense of depression and isolation 
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settle on him. 'The collapse of the journal' he later related, 
was a personal crisis ... 
So many other initiatives, like the film, had also been blocked 
or failed. The experience confirmed the pattern of feeling I 
had found in Ibsen. For a period I was in such a state of 
failure and withdrawal that I stopped reading the papers or 
listening to the news. At that point, apart from going on with 
the adult education teaching, I felt I could only write myself 
out of this in a non-collaborative way. I pulled back to do my 
own work. 
isolation 
For the next ten years I wrote in nearly complete 
(Williams 1979: 77). 
We need to distinguish here between what Williams experienced or 
remembered as a sense of intellectual isolation - the fact that he 
felt no one was thinking on the same lines as himself - and the 
real resources of sociality, friendship and professional support 
he was able to draw on from his group of colleagues and friends . 
After all, as John Mcllroy has charted, with exemplary precision, 
Williams had good relations and debates with many colleagues and 
friends in the adult education movement and beyond.8 The real 
sense of isolation lay rather in the hostile consensus of 
conservative opinion which he faced and argued against in Q~l!~r~ 
and_Societ~ and The Long Revolution. The task of this chapter is 
to recover something of this context of argument and debate. We 
can better understand that sense of intellectual isolation if we 
see just how different the central and related ideas of Q~l!~rg 
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and_Societ~ - culture and the masses - were in the dominant 
discourses of the period. And we can get some idea of what lay 
behind 'this by examining some of the first responses to Q~1!~£~ 
and_Societ~ by contemporary reviewers, particularly from those who 
were hostile to the very nature of Williams's arguments. 
Reviews and Reviewers 
An early review of Culture_and_Societ~ by Frank Kermode was one 
of the few to take issue with its literary history as such.9 In 
'F rom Burke to Orwell', Kermode found the book to be of 'quite 
radical importance' (Kermode 1959: 86); but found Williams guilty 
of misrepresenting the history of the figure of the Romantic 
Artist, 'perhaps in order to be over-generous to working-class 
culture' (87). For many other reviewers (and this became clearer 
still in responses to The_Long_Revolution in 1961), the political 
agenda which Kermode read in the margins of the work became the 
central focus of attention and argument . Indeed, aside from 
Kermode's essay, most contemporary reviews of the two works saw 
them less as academic contributions to literary and cultural 
history , and more as political polemics. The reviews then fell 
into two broad categories: those which welcomed the books as 
expressions of the ' New Left' sensibility; and those which 
rejected them on just that account. The debate on Culture_and 
§QQ!~i~ in the pages of Bateson's journal, E2 2~~2 _in _Q~i1iQ!§IB may 
serve as an exemplary instance for our analysis of their 
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contemporary impact and resonance.10 
Richard Hoggart's review prompted the debate between Williams 
and some opponents in the Critical Forum section of the journal. 
Hoggart, despite the history of differences with Williams, 
welcomed the book as both a ' a cogent study' of the culture and 
society tradition and as a substantial contribution to it' 
(Hoggart 1959: 171). 
particular praise. 
He singled out its final chapter for 
Culture and QQQi~!~ was 'the most solidly 
based and intelligent' piece of work to come from the 'New Left' 
it captured ' the extraordinary sense of social change in the air' 
(171). This review - from a fellow tutor in the WEA and the 
author of The_Uses_of_Literac~ (1957) - was the occasion for a 
Critical Forum debate in which Ian Gregor, Malcolm Pittock and 
Williams himself took part.11 
For Ian Gregor and Malcolm Pittock, it was precisely that sense 
of social change which posed the main problem, and their negative 
responses may help us grasp the political challenge represented by 
Williams's work . A striking feature of their accounts is a 
certain rhetorical ploy in which the political motivations of 
Williams's arguments are ruled out of court for contravening the 
apparent rules of objective academic criticism, while the 
political motivations of their own arguments are held to be 
irreprochable . 
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Both Gregor and Pittock single out the Conclusion to Qyl!Yr~ 
and_Societ~ as the focal point for their disagreements. Gregor 
goes straight to the point and accuses Williams of being guilty of 
a ' sleight-of-hand' in arguing for a definition of culture as a 
' whole way of life', and consequently as one which can include 
both 'conscious art' and the creation of democratic institutions 
by the working-class as cultural achievements. He therefore 
rejects any definition of culture which might claim that 'the 
National Union of Mineworkers is a creative achievement of the 
~~ 
same kind as Sons_and_Lovers' (Gregor l959: 428). Since such a 
definition is unthinkable in the terms given by Leavisite cultural 
analysis, it is unthinkable tout_court. Williams is guilty of 
advancing arguments 'in general terms' when 'they are in fact 
politically weighed' (425). In a word, Gregor disagrees with 
Williams's cultural politics, but prefers to attribute that 
disagreement, not to the fact of Williams holding different 
political views to his own, but in a daze of conservative 
blindness, to his holding political views at all! 
Similarly, Malcolm Pittock claims he does not want Williams 'to 
show his political colours', only 'to give his ideas a sharper 
kll,w,~J 
. definition' t · ' l959: 431), but he then goes on to offer a 
series of criticisms, which, though they are presented as if they 
were simply neutral, common-sense, or even logical, are clearly 
derived from his own sense of political identity . His concluding 
remark, with its insulting condescension to working-class 
intelligence, does much to explain Williams's later ire in 
106 
recalling the debate. The review closes by quoting from the final 
chapter of Culture_and_Societ~ the phrase 'The human crisis is 
always a crisis of understanding: what we genuinely understand we 
can do' (Williams 1958 : 338), and then querying: ' What we 
genuinely understand we can do ... But what happens if most of us 
are incapable of understanding?' (432). Such a remark embodies 
the conservative consciousness which is the very target of 
the arguments in Culture_and _Societ~. Gregor and Pittock clearly 
belong to that group of people who, in Williams's terms, 'had pre-
empted the culture and literature of this country' (Williams 1979: 
112). 
A later review of The_Long_Revolution, also in Essa~s_in 
Criticism , offers striking confirmation of the reactionary nature 
of Pittock's own conservative agenda.12 Here, in a general 
complaint about the book's ' omissions' and 'wishful-thinking', 
Pittock argues that Williams ' converts what is really only a 
theory of change into a theory of progress' (Pittock 1962: 88), 
and asserts his almost Burkean conservative pessimism against 
Williams's socialist optimism: 
The power over our environment offered by the revolution in 
technology and communications is inseparable from power over 
ourselves: as in the most extreme instance we can use this 
power just as easily to destroy human society as to develop 
it ... . Mr . Williams has, in short, the optimism about human 
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possibility which usually goes with a political commitment to 
Socialism. (90) 
It 1s perhaps difficult now to imagine the depth of opposition 
to these arguments. Another telling account is the essay which 
greeted Williams on his arrival in Cambridge in 1961. Maurice 
Cowling, conservative historian and Fellow of Peterhouse College, 
was the author of the lead article 'Mr Raymond Williams', which 
appeared in the university's major humanities journal, Ih~ 
Cambridge Review of May 27.13 Never in the history of the 
university had a new lecturer been treated to such an unwelcoming 
welcome. 
In this essay, Cowling gives an extraordinarily dismissive and 
yet indignant description of the ·central place' held by Williams 
amongst a whole ' group of English radicals, lapsed Stalinists, 
academic Socialists and intellectual Trotskyites ... with others 
from the extra-mural boards, the community centres and certain 
Northern universities' (Cowling 1961: 546). We can see at work 
here what we may call the rhetoric of the centre. What most 
disturbs Cowling is that someone so determinedly, in Cowling's 
terms, from the periphery of British cultural and academic life 
should come to occupy a central position in national cultural 
life. 'In this movement,' writes Cowling, the movement we we now 
know as the New Left, 
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Mr Williams has a central place - not just because of what he 
is saying, but because he covers his Leavite (sic) refurbishing 
of Marx's and Rousseau's political slogans with an academic 
solemnity which in England the liberal mind can seldom resist 
(547). 
Cowling's review, and its appearance 1n the Cambridge_Review at 
the very moment of Williams's return to Cambridge, signals some of 
the real vehemence with which ' the Establishment' responded both 
to Williams and to the issues raised by the New Left. In 
particular, Cowling remarked on one central aspect of Williams's 
enterprise, rejecting with disdain the very motivation of 
Williams ' s work: '[I]t should not be imagined', he sniffs in 
conclusion, ' that it is the function of an English scholar to 
engage in social criticism.' (548). With this pronouncement, 
Cowling sought to confine literary studies to the very dimension 
of apolitical professionalism from which Williams was trying to 
free it. 
Cowling was not alone in seeing Culture_and_Societ~ as one of 
the first books to articulate the concerns of the New Left . 1956 
is usually seen as the crucial year. The vicious crushing of the 
Hungarian Revolt by Soviet tanks brought an end to hopes of the 
internal transformation of socialism in the East, despite Stalin's 
death in 1953, while the British and French invasion of the Suez 
canal zone similarly tore through any illusions concerning the 
equally implacable rapaciousness of Western capitalist interests, 
despite the much touted ' end of !MPerialism' and the partial 
gains , in Britain, of the Welfare state. Within a year, the 
Communist Party of Great Britain had lost a third of its 
membership and many people on the left felt the need for a new 
direction , one which could reject both the tired dogma of the CP 
and the new liberal rhetoric.14 
The founding of Universities_and_Left _Review and Ihg _ ~g~ 
Rg~~Q~gr, the publication of Norman Mackenzie's Conviction 
revealed the need for a new socialist alignment, one which could 
challenge and go beyond the Stalinist heritage, and at the same 
time question the complacency induced by the new Welfare state 
policies and the extraordinary period of near full employment and 
zero inflation. A new attempt at synthesis was provided by the 
focus on the centre of Williams's concerns since the late forties 
- the idea of culture . In a recent retrospective account, Stuart 
Hall offers three motives for this particular intellectual and 
political investment by the New Left in culture: 
First , because it was in the cultural and ideological domain 
that social change appeared to be making itself most 
dramatically visible. Second , because the cultural dimension 
seemed to us not a secondary, but a constitutive dimension of 
society . (This reflects part of the New Left ' s long-standing 
quarrel with the reductionism and economism of the 
base-superstructure metaphor . ) Third, because the discourse 
of culture seemed to us fundamentally necessary to any language 
in which socialism could be redescribed . The New Left 
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therefore took the first faltering steps of putting questions 
of cultural analysis and cultural politics at the centre of i ts 
politics . (Hall 1989a: 25-6) 
Not surprisingly , Hall picks out Williams as the trailbreaker: ' No 
one expressed the fundamental and constitutive character of this 
argument for and within the New Left more profoundly than Raymond 
Williams' (1989a : 27).15 
Nor is this simply a view afforded by hindsight . The 
publication - and attendant public attention and acclaim - of 
Culture _and _Societ~_ 1780-1950 in 1958 , followed by the related 
essays of The _Long_Revolution in 1961, and of Communications ·in 
1 962 brought an end to at least one dimension of Williams ' s 
isolation . From that point onwards, Williams was not only a 
central figure for Britain ' s New Left, but also that rare figure 
in British intellectua l life: a public intellectual , enjoying a 
wide measure of respect from and access to Britain ' s mass media , 
writing for daily newspapers and broadcasting for the radio . For 
Labour politician Richard Crossman, The _Long_Revolution was ' the 
first theoretical exposition of the new socialism': not to have 
read Culture_and_Societ~ was to brand oneself ' the intellectual 
equivalent of a square. '16 
The Great Debate 
But if Culture _and _Societ~_ 1780 - 1950 should certainly be 
recognised as a manifesto for thilNew Left, and situated as a key 
work of the post '56 realignment, it is still necessary to go a 
step further, and to remember that the book itself began as a 
project as far back as the late 1940s. Culture_and_Societ~ needs 
to be read both in terms of the continuity of Williams's 
intellectual development, his ongoing struggle with literary 
studies and Marxist analysis, as well as his response to specific 
debates . If the New Left found much of interest in his idea of 
culture, we must not forget that this idea was itself the product 
of Williams's own particular interests. One dimension of 
assessment which has been largely neglected is that provided by 
the general conservative backlash against the extension of 
working-class education heralded by the Beveridge Report of 1942 
and inaugurated by the Education Act of 1944. 
According to the terms of this Act, secondary education was now 
extended to cover all children up to the age of fifteen, and each 
child had a chance of going to grammar school and then on to 
university if they passed the crucial hurdle of a general 
examination at the age of eleven. The results of these changes 
were, in fact, to be only a marginal increase in the number of 
working-class children at universities. Nonetheless, the very 
possibility of increased access to higher education was perceived 
by some as threatening. 
T . S . Eliot, the unlikely hero of Drama_from_Ibsen_to_EliQ!, was 
quick to respond to what he and others perceived as a major threat 
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to the status_guo. In a series of essays and lectures composed 
between 1943 and 1948, Eliot weighed in against the egalitarian 
impulse of the Beveridge Report and the new Education Act.17 
'Equality of opportunity' wrote Eliot, 'is "Jacobinism in 
education"'; and went on to assert that: 
the ideal of a uniform system such that no one capable of 
receiving higher education could fail to get it, leads 
imperceptibly to the education of too many people, and 
consequently to the lowering of standards to whatever this 
swollen number of candidates is able to reach. (Eliot [1948 ] : 
100-101) 
The reactionary panic is clear from the confusion of Eliot's 
language. The initial idea is that those 'capable of receiving 
higher education' should have a right to it; but somehow these 
capable students suddenly mutate into 'a swollen number of 
candidates'. Though he is forced to qualify that this ugly 
swelling takes place 'imperceptibly', he insists that this 
unperceivable and unjustified swelling must necessarily lead to a 
'lowering of standards'. With arguments such as these at work, it 
is hardly surprising that Eliot's Notes_towards_the_Definition_of 
Q~li~r~ (1948) figures as the work which provided the 'initial 
impetus' for Culture_and_Societ~. Williams saw it as one of the 
first to articulate the reactionary appropriation of the idea of 
culture as the Cold War settled in (Williams 1979: 97). 
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Williams's careful response to Eliot is fully documented in 
Culture_and_Societ~ - and, less visibly but more acutely, in the 
silent revisions in his studies of drama, with their removal of 
Eliot and promotion of Brecht. At the same time, and of 
particular concern to Williams as a tutor in the WEA, were the 
arguments in and around the related notions of adult and workers' 
education in the post-war period, known by its participants as the 
' Great Debate' .18 
The extraordinary shift in social sensibility as Britain 
recovered from the rigours of the Second World War, moved towards 
almost full employment and zero inflation, and began to feel the 
effects of the implementation of welfare state policy, had the 
paradoxical effect of diluting progressive political thought. 
J.F.C. Harrison, examining the social forces at work in the 
shifts in WEA policy, hit the nail bang on the head: 
The problem for the WEA comes primarily not from within but 
from without - from a new social environment and from new 
developments in the world of adult education. Without 
suggesting that we are now living in a new world, it is 
nevertheless clear that a full employment welfare state has 
begun to create new social attitudes which make obsolete many 
approaches based on pre-war suppositions and data. (Raybould 
1959: 10) 
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In other words, any concern with the politics of class was seen as 
inappropriate in the 'full employment welfare state'. For 
Harrison as for others, the very centre of the WEA movement - the 
figure of the working adult seeking a politically stimulating 
education - was no longer a valid one: 'the whole concept of the 
manual worker,' he argued, and 
the whole approach implied in the idea of the working-class 
movement no longer means what they once did. 
a world which is passing away. (16)19 
They are part of 
S. G. Raybould, Director of Extra Mural Studies at Leeds 
University and Vice-Principal of the WEA from 1949 to 1957 was a 
key figure in the whole debate. In a series of works published 
between 1947 and 1951 Raybould argued - against figures such as 
G . D.H. Cole and Robert Peers - that the crucial question for adult 
education was not that of offering a general cultural and 
political education, but the attainment of 'university standards' 
in adult education classes.20 A central feature of Raybould's 
own arguments for raising the standard of adult education to 
university level was the same apparent disappearance of the worker 
as Harrison had noted. In The_English_Universities_and_Adult 
Education, Raybould argued the 
urgent need for fresh thinking about the nature and purpose of 
adult education . .. It [the impulse to form the WEA] was an 
impulse born of the situation, educational, political, and 
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economic, of working-class people at the beginning of the 
century, and was expressed in the phrase 'education for social 
and industrial emancipation'. That impulse has not spent its 
force, but it is less compelling than it was. (Raybould i951: 
41) 
Certainly less compelling enough for Raybould to argue for the 
redefinition of adult education away from the extra-mural classes 
for working-class students and towards the provision of university 
education for the middle-classes. 
It 1s then in these debates 1n and around adult education that 
one of Williams's central interests - in what has come to be known 
as ' historical semantics' which is so central to the whole method 
and intention of Culture_and_Societ~ - first began to take shape 
as he made his own contributions to the Great Debate about the 
future of Adult Education in a number of essays for Ihg High~~~. 
For Williams and others the Adult Education movement had seemed an 
important opportunity for providing working-class people with the 
elements of a broadly political education. In this, they were 
following the original impetus of the movement. 
Albert Mansbridge, in the inaugural speech of the Institute for 
Adult Education, had, on May 28 1921, asserted that 
[b]y the foundation of the Institute it is hoped to create a 
widespread public o1*J.ion which shall ultimately win for adult 
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education its rightful place in the national 
system ... essentially it will be an instrument of research and 
propaganda. (Cited in Hutchinson 1971: 10) 
Similarly, R.H. Tawney in his address to the WEA, published in Ih~ 
High~~~ in 1934, had argued: 
It is to serve the working class movement in the way proper to 
an educational body, not by propaganda, but by offering its 
members the educational opportunities which are one condition 
of its progress, and by creating a climate of public opinion 
impatient of educational privilege and determined to end it. 
(Tawney 1934: 69) 
It was a harsh historical irony for Williams and at least some 
of his fellows that just at the moment when this climate came into 
existence - with the postwar Labour goverment and the boom 1n 
adult education numbers - that the directly political aims of the 
movement were to be successfully challenged by Raybould and others 
in the name of standards.21 Raybould's reforms threatened to 
remove the very raison-d'~tre for socialists to work at all in 
adult education rather than in the university system. As Williams 
recollected in his Tony Maclean Memorial lecture of 1983: 
the impulse to Adult Education was not only a matter of 
remedying deficit, making up for inadequate educational 
resources in the wider society, nor only a case of meeting new 
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needs of the society, though these things contributed. The 
deepest impulse was the desire to make learning part of the 
process of social change itself (Williams 1989c: 158). 
Nothing better illustrates that impulse to make learning a part of 
the force of social change than the central arguments in, and 
structure of, Culture_and_Societ~ itself, and the related studies 
of The_Long_Revolution. 
In Politics_and_Letters, Williams noted the ways in which he 
was able to move away from traditional canonical concerns of the 
university in his WEA classes: ' There seemed little point in 
teaching the writing of essays' he recollected; ' I taught the 
writing of reports, minutes, memoranda, and committee speaking and 
oral reports - skills relevant to their work' (Williams 1979: 
78). But more important than this simple question of relevant 
skills, was the challenge to the founding notions of culture 
implicit in the usual ideas of the curriculum as a whole. It was 
in one of the essays where Williams argued for a form of what we 
might call a critical literacy that he articulated a question 
which we can now read as absolutely crucial for our understanding 
of the impetus of Culture_and_Societ~. and beyond that, to the 
related emergence of cultural studies. In 'The Teaching of Public 
Expression' , he issued the following challenge: 
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Does one impose on a social class that is growing in power the 
syllabus of an older culture; or does one seek means of 
releasing and enriching the life-experience which the rising 
class brings with it? If the latter, as I choose, then the 
WEA has a lot of its thinking in front of it. (Williams 1953b: 
248) 
With Culture_and_Societ~. Williams sought both to examine that 
' syllabus of an older culture' and the 'life-experience' of the 
' rising class' in an all out attack on the reactionary 
appropriation of the idea of culture as it was being defined by 
the forces for a ' minority civilisation' in the institution of 
academic literary studies, and in the new definitions of adult 
education promulgated by Raybould and his followers. 
In Eagleton's judgement, Culture_and_Societ~ is an ' idealist 
~ 
and academicist project' (1976: 25); but it is important to 
~ 
recognise that this is a political judgement held from a 
distinctive Althusserian position on the meaning of intellectual 
activism . In Williams's terms, Culture_and _Societ~ was certainly 
not to be seen as merely an academic history of cultural thought. 
Culture _and _Societ~ was a strategic response, written from within 
the imperatives of the adult education movement, to the pressing 
debates in what he was beginning to understand not just as the 
politics of culture and education, but as cultural politics !Q~! 
This politics took place at the very level of meaning and 
was embodied in the debates about the continued relevance of words 
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such as ' worker' and 'manual worker', as well as in the very idea 
of culture itself . 
The Idea of Culture 
Culture_and_Societ~ begins with an outline of dates - the years 
in which the writers discussed in the book reached the age of 
twenty five. For Edmund Burke, that was the year 1754; for 
Christopher Caudwell it was 1932 . Many readers would find the 
list more complete if it were to add that Raymond Williams was 
himself twenty-five in 1946. For the purpose in writing the book 
was always to add to the tradition and never simply to describe 
it. So it is that the Conclusion to Culture_and_Societ~_ 1780-1950 
represents Williams's 'own statement ... an attempt to extend [the 
tradition] in the direction of certain meanings and values' 
(Williams 1958: xix); it is a 'personal conclusion' (297). 
1946 had seen the founding of Politics_and_Letters ; while 1950 
- the terminal year of the study - was the year in which Williams 
began work on the book, originally to be called The Idea of 
In the Foreword to Culture and ~Q~igi~. Williams 
de sc ribes the central aim of the journal as the attempt ' to 
enquire into and where possible reinterpret this tradition, which 
the word "culture'' describes in terms of the experience of our 
generation ' (vii) - that is , the generation of those who were in 
their mid-twenties at the end of the war. Though Culture and 
120 
QQ~i~!~ appealed because of its apparently effortless 
contemporaneity, and its articulation of the central concerns of 
the New Left, we need also to recognise the fact that it 
represented the culmination of work begun in the 1940s: it 
represented a breakout from the tight place of Williams's 
intellectual and political predicament. 
The preliminary work for the book was done in the Adult 
Education classes which Williams taught on the idea of culture 
from 1949, and this was prompted in the first instance by the 
publication of Eliot's Notes_Towards_the_Definition_of_Culture in 
1948 . The first writers under discussion were Eliot, Leavis, 
Clive Bell and Matthew Arnold, with Bell's Civilization - just 
republished in 1947 - serving as a particular source of 
aggravation.22 By 1953 he had amassed enough material to publish 
'The Idea of Culture' in F.W. Bateson's new journal Essa~s_in 
Criticism. Under Bateson's editorship, the journal sought to 
integrate more cogently than Q2r~!ig~ had been able historical 
with practical critical analysis. This essay, with its attention 
to and insistence on ' the intimate and complex relations between 
ideas and the other products of man's life in society', clearly 
fitted this general rubric, and Williams's concern to argue 
against the ahistorical abstraction associated with the Q2r~!ig~ 
approach, would have been particularly welcome. ' [W]e need a more 
than ordinary awareness of that pressure of active and general 
life which is misrepresented entirely by description as 
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'background'. There are are no backgrounds in society; there are 
only relations of acts and forces' (Williams 1953a: 245). 
'The Idea of Culture' was originally intended as the 
introduction to the book of the same name, and in a final footnote 
Williams laid out the main themes of what was to become, over the 
next three years, Culture_and_Societ~_l780-1950: 
It 1s argued that in an industrial society the problem 
[theories and ideas of culture] became essentially new, both in 
content and expression, and the consequent revaluation of the 
relevant work of Arnold, Ruskin, Morris, Eliot, Read, the 
English Marxists, and some others, differs from the traditional 
estimate. The book will include also an estimate of the effect 
of the abstract idea of culture on the theory and practice of 
literary criticism, with particular reference to the issue of 
tradition, and to the various ways in which the ' standard of 
perfection' has been critically expressed or assumed. (Williams 
1953a : 266) 
Though the Leavisite keyword ' revaluation' is used here, it 1s 
used to issue a direct challenge to the orthodox view of cultural 
history at work in English studies . The focus is not, as it had 
been ~9 ~~~~~~m since Eliot's famous pronouncement of 1921, the 
'di ssociation of sensibility ' which had somehow ' set in' during 
the seventeenth 
~oc. lQJIW. . .()~ / nineteenth-~;( 
+-33 
century; but the industrial revolution of the 
In so doing, Williams will also address the 
122 
background to the history of literary criticism itself, a history 
whose values underlie the current debates regarding adult 
education In other words, though the book hit the spot as a 
New Left manifesto on its publication in 1958, we should not 
forget that it was some eight years in the making and that 
Williams's starting-points were in the theory and practice of 
literary criticism, and the related debates in adult education 
where the idea of standards had become crucial. 
In the essay, Williams argues that the word culture is taking 
on an important new sense. A more neutral term than civilization, 
it is now used to refer to the ' whole way of life' of a society 
and corresponds to ' the strong tendency to wish to study societies 
as wholes ' characteristic of both Marxism and anthropology. For 
older critics such as Ruskin and Arnold, as well as for 
contemporaries like Eliot and Leavis, the idea of culture enables 
the critic to do more than just make particular judgements of 
individual works of art. It enables and empowers the critic to 
make an evaluation of a society ' s ' whole way of life', producing a 
fully cultural criticism which goes beyond the merely aesthetic . 
This new work forms a ' distinctive tradition of influential social 
thinking, by men who took their experience of the arts as a 
starting point ... the key word in these inquiries . .. 
Q~li~~g· (Williams 1953a: 240) . 
has been 
This idea of culture as a response to and not just a reflection 
of change was also crucial to Williams's own attempt at distancing 
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himself from what he understood as the cruder models of Marxist 
interpretation familiar from his undergraduate years. In this 
developing model of an active, reactive and finally proactive 
culture, the key idea is that of tradition, and tradition is 
deeply bound up with the living language. 
writes Williams 
"The history of a word 1 
is in the series of meanings which a dictionary defines; the 
relevance of a word in in common language. The dictionary 
indicates a contemporary scheme of the past; the active word, 
in speech or in writing, indicates all that has become present. 
To distinguish the interaction is to distinguish a tradition -
a mode of history; and then in experience we set a value on the 
tradition - a mode of criticism. The continuing process, and 
the consequent decisions, are then the matter of action in 
society. (242) 
If the relevance of words like ·worker' and ·manual worker' were 
being challenged in the WEA and beyond, it needed the resources of 
history and criticism to answer that challenge. 
three main areas of investigation: 
He distinguished 
They are, first, the idea of a standard of perfection, ground 
for ultimate valuation; second, the new conceptions of art, and 
of the artist , and the consequent re-definition of their 




development of Cultivation into Culture, with reference to the 
changing relation between social classes. (245) 
He was addressing, in other words, the pressing issues in and 
around the related questions of education and adult education, 1n 
the context of argument provided by English studies and such works 
as Q.D. Leavis's Fiction_and_the_Reading_Public (1932). As 
Patrick Parrinder rightly observed, Culture_and_Societ~ tends to 
be read in a 'highly selective' way, 'the result of its having 
earned a place on so many student booklists'; but it needs to be 
read for the argument it articulates as a whole (Parrinder 1987a: 
58). 
Williams's central aim is to examine the shifts in the word 
culture through the nineteenth to the twentieth century. In so 
doing, he divides his history of the tradition into three periods. 
First, from Burke and Cobbett through Carlyle and the 1840s 
novelists to Ruskin and Morris; second, the period from 1880 to 
1914 which he describes as a kind of interregnum' (Williams 
[1958~ 161); and third, a range of twentieth century 
' opinions' from Lawrence through Tawney, Eliot, Richards and 
Leavis, through the work of the thirties Marxists, and to Orwell, 
and then to Williams's own Conclusion. The purpose of this 
' clarification' of the tradition is to authorise and empower a 
number of arguments concerning the deployment of the idea of 
culture now. The single most important proposition put forward by 
the book as a whole is that most contested by his conservative 
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reviewers: the argument that trade unions are the most important 
cultural creation of the working-classes. In this way, Williams 
answered the profoundly critical implications of his questions in 
his earlier Public Speaking essay. The final end of the culture 
as a whole way of life argument came to no less than refusing the 
centrality of what was structurally an expression of middle or 
upper class culture, culture as art. 
It 1s this provocative redefinition of culture which fitted so 
well with the thinking of the New Left, and explains how Q~li~r~ 
and_Societ~ is often seen as the starting-point for 'cultural 
studies', since cultural studies in one definition at least, find 
their identity in the refusal of the distinction between high and 
low culture which literary studies had established in its founding 
gesture of the 1920s. 
In all of this, Williams saw the historical and critical 
analysis of what he was later to call 'keywords' as crucial. 
history of a word', he writes 
'The 
is in the series of meanings which a dictionary defines; the 
relevance of a word in in common language. The dictionary 
indicates a contemporary scheme of the past; the active word, 
in speech or in writing, indicates all that has become present. 
To distinguish the interaction is to distinguish a tradition -
a mode of history; and then in experience we set a value on the 
tradition - a mode of criticism. The continuing process, and 
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the consequent decisions, are then the matter of action in 
society. (Williams 1953a: 242) 
Language was inherently political, the very stuff of ideology, and 
the promised book was to be a composite work which brought 
together the two modes of history and criticism in order to 
make an ideological response, to particpate in that 'action in 
society.' To write in this composite mode is necessarily to 
participate in the tradition of which one writes, to add oneself 
to the list, to speak for one's own generation. For Williams, 
such a study promised to unite the professional and the political 
impulses whose sundering had so troubled him throughout the 
Politics _ and_Letters period. With Culture_and_Societ~ he at last 
managed to break out of the tight place of the 1940s, and it is 
not surprising that he later recorded the sense of relief with 
which he completed the project in 1956: 
I have never known a book which more completely seemed to close 
itself with the last page that was written. I had the 
strongest sense I have ever experienced that now it was done, I 
was in a quite new position and could move on. (Williams 1979: 
109) 
In this sense, we may wish to read Williams's magisterial and 
even-handed tone as more than the expression of the liberal ideal 
of academic objectivity; it works as a part of the necessary 
machinery for generating the academic authority with which 
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he wished to strengthen his oppositional political objectives, his 
response to the right-wing appropriation of the idea of culture. 
Culture_and_Societ~ is best seen as the polemical and oppositional 
work which it is, the first major expression of Williams's long 
struggle with 'official English culture' (Williams 1979: 316). 
Its very success in founding the 'culture and society tradition' 
has necessarily blinded us to its own real achievements, while 
opening the way to many criticisms of the gaps in the book's idea 
of the 'tradition' ·k ~ 
The Tradition 
Williams's success lies first of all in the establishment of 
the very idea of there being a culture and society tradition, the 
existence of a distinctly British discourse on culture which 
broadly opposed the tendencies of the new industrial society. 
In the Preface, he outlines his main argument as follows: 
The organizing principle of this book is the discovery that the 
idea of culture, and the word itself in its general modern 
uses, came into English thinking in the period which we 
commonly describe as that of the Industrial revolution. The 
book is an attempt to show how and why this happened, and to 
follow the idea through to our own day. It thus becomes an 
account and an interpretation of our responses in thought and 
feeling to the changes in English society since the late 
eighteenth century. Only in such a context can our use of the 
128 
word 'culture ' , and the issues to which the word refers, be 
adequately understood. (Williams [1958, c\J '. iii) 
The word ' culture', then, embodies a whole social and political 
history in terms of a history of the responses, in the changing 
vocabulary of the nation, to the forces of industrialisation and 
democratisation. The history of the complex uses of a word like 
' culture' serves as an index to thinking on these issues, and, 
argues Williams, to thinking of a certain kind: the resistance to 
the forces of capitalism, which he describes in the following 
terms: 
I wish to show the emergence of 9~l!~r~ as an abstraction and 
an absolute: an emergence which, in a very complex way, merges 
two general responses -- first, the recognition of the 
practical separation of certain moral and intellectual 
activities from the driven impetus of a new kind of society ; 
second, the emphasis of these activities, as a court of human 
appeal , to be set over the processes of practical social 
judgement and yet to offer itself as a mitigating and rallying 
', 
alternative. ( [19580-j'. xviii) 
This tradition of thought on and around the word ' culture ' is one 
which resists that ' driven impetus of a new kind of society ' 
which the Marxists would call capitalist ; and one of its major 
means of resistance is through an assessment of society as a 
whole. In a major sense , what Williams is seeking to achieve is a 
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framing of Cambridge English in a wider historical debate. In so 
doing , he is able to empower what is, implicitly at least, his own 
Utopian view of the discipline of literary studies, what it can 
achieve in the present time apart from bemoaning the loss of the 
notorious ' organic society' and the emergence of mass culture. 
In theoretical terms, this is done through an extraordinary 
focus on the history of these ' key words' . 
then the following: 
The central claim is 
There is in fact a general pattern of change in these words, 
and this can be used as a special kind of map by which it is 
possible to look again at those changes in life and thought to 
which the changes in language evidently refer. ( [ 195 €>aj l xiii) 
Words such as industry, democracy, class, art and culture are the 
ke y words for his ' account and interpretation' since the ' changes 
in their use , at this critical period, bear witness to a general 
change in our characteristic ways of thinking about our common 
life ' (xiii) . And ' culture' is the key word of all key words : 
' For what I see in the history of the word, in its structure of 
meanings , is a wide and general movement in thought and feeling' 
(xvii - xviii) . In this semantic history , Williams reveals some of 
the powerful presuppositions underlying his general methodological 
approach : 
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My terms of reference are not only to distinguish the meanings, 
but to relate them to their sources and effects. I shall try 
to do this by examining, not a series of abstracted problems , 
but a series of statements by individuals. It is not only 
that, by temperament and training, I find more meaning in th i s 
kind of personally verified statement than in a system of 
significant abstractions. It is also that , in a theme of this 
kind , I feel myself committed to the study of actual language: 
that is to say, to the words and sequences of words which 
particular men and women have used in trying to give meaning to 
their experience ... The framework of the enquiry is general, 
but the method, in detail , is the study of actual individual 
statements and contributions. (xix) 
The very terms ' statements and contributions' is important here, 
as is the emphasis on the actuality of language. It is as if the 
meaning of language depended in a large part on the experience of 
the individual filling the word with meaning in a ' personally 
verified statement' - of just the kind that this book itself is, 
and as is an often noted characteristic of Williams's work as a 
whole. The book as a whole will not then be just an academic and 
historical survey; the Conclusion will ' offer my own statement on 
an aspect of this common experience: not indeed as a verdict on 
the tradition, but as an attempt to extend it in the direction of 
certain meanings and values' (xix). 
1 3 1 
Indeed, by the end of the book, through the processes of 
argument and persuasion which structure it as a whole, Williams is 
able to sum up his case with convincing authority: 
The development of the idea of culture has, throughout, been a 
criticism of what has been called the bourgeois idea of 
society. The contributors to its meaning have started from 
widely different positions, and have reached widely various 
attachments and loyalties. But they have been alike in this, 
that they have been unable to think of society as a merely 
neutral area, or as an abstract regulating mechanism . The 
stress has fallen on the positive function of society, on the 
fact that the values of individual men are rooted in society, 
and on the need to think and feel in these common terms. 
was , indeed , a profound and necessary response to the 
disintegrating pressures which were faced. (328) 
This 
And this authority is turned to good account in the arguments put 
forward in the Conclusion. But before we examine these, let us 
briefly examine the basic line of argument which the book as a 
whole puts forward . 
With a casual disdain for the usual divisions of cultural 
political analysis, Williams establishes the beginnings of the 
major nineteenth century tradition in the work of two figures 
whose work usually represents the oppositions between conservative 
and radical thinking, Edmund Burke, vociferous opponent of the 
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French Revolution, and William Cobbett, champion of the labouring 
classes . 2 .~ It was they who started ' traditions of criticism of 
the new democracy and the new industrialism ... traditions which in 
the middle of the twentieth century are still active and 
important' (4). This same tradition continued through the 
writings of Robert Southey, Robert Owen and the Romantic poets, 
with Wordsworth providing one of the seminal statements of the new 
idea of culture as the 
"embodied spirit of a People", the true standard of 
excellence . . . the court of appeal in which real values were 
determined, usually in opposition to the "factitious" values 
thrown up by the market and similar operations of society. 
( 34) 
Following Wordsworth, Coleridge, in his On_the_Constitution_of 
Church and State (1830), 'worked out this idea of Culture, the 
court of appeal to which all social arrangements must submit' 
( 61) . Mill, Bentham, Carlyle, Newman, Arnold, and the novelists 
of the 1840s all made their own contribu~ions to the tradition; 
and Pugin, Ruskin and Morris all wrote persuasively in support of 
the central idea that 
the art of a period is closely and necessarily related to the 
generally prevalent 'way of life', and further that, in 
consequence, aesthetic, moral and social judgements are closely 
interrelated. (130) 
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Williams found little of interest in the second phase of the 
tradition (from around 1880 through to 1914). He prefaces Part II 
of the book with the admission that 'we shall not find in [the 
major writers of the period] ... anything very new: a working-out, 
rather, of unfinished lines; a tentative redirection' (161 - 2). 
Consequently he offers only the briefest outlines of work by W.H. 
Mallock; Whistler, Wilde and Pater; or even of Gissing and Shaw. 
Part II closes with a brief assessment of the work of T.E . Hulme, 
whose work ' challenged the tradition at its roots' (190), but 
whose main importance Williams assigns as Hulme's influence on 
T . S. Eliot. Critics of Culture_and_Societ~ are surely right to 
see this as the weakest part of the book as a whole (it is clearly 
the part where Williams himself is least engaged, least 
interested, and least knowledgeable), and point rightly to the 
implications of this blindness to what was , after all, the main 
period of Victorian imperial expansion .. "l,..-S° 
Part III of the study focuses on the real origins of the 
project as it began in 1946 . It examines the work of D . H . 
Lawrence , R.H . Tawney, T.S. Eliot, George Orwell, I.A. Richards 
and F.R. Leavis, as well as the British Marxist writers of the 
1930s. We can see at work just what the project as a whole owed 
to the tradition of literary criticism, as well as to the 
particular debates at work within adult education . A great deal 
of the internal drama of the book is Williams ' s attempt to draw 
some support for his arguments from the leading figures of a 
discipline which in so many ways was actively hostile to the idea 
of the participatory democracy w~i~h he invoked in the name of 
furthering a 'common culture' - itself a phrase used by Eliot to 
describe an antithetical cultural and political order. The 
constitutive tension of the book is its turning of the tradition 
against some of its own preconceptions.2~, As we shall see, the 
pivot of the argument can be found in the idea of the masses. 
It is this tension which explains what otherwise seems an oddly 
unmotivated set of remarks concerning literacy. Williams writes 
with disdain of the 'ready-made historical thesis' (306) which 
argues that the 1870 Education Act brought a new mass-reading 
public into being, and that this public was 'literate but 
untrained in reading, low in taste and habit'. This public was 
then the harbinger of the new crude popular culture of the 
twentieth century, the culture of radio, movies, and the gutter 
press. Against this, the founding rhetoric of Cambridge English, 
Williams argues long and hard. The new institutions of popular 
culture were never produced, he insists, 'by the working people 
themselves', and to identify them with the actual wishes and 
desires of the working class is deeply mistaken. What needs to be 
identified instead are the motives and ideology of the producers 
of the new mass media. In any case, he writes, 'the contemporary 
historians of popular culture have tended to concentrate on what 
is bad and to neglect what is good' (308). This selectivity is in 
turn reinforced by a certain dt'formation professionalle: 'in 
judging a culture, it is not enough to concentrate on habits which 
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coincide with those of the observer ' he argues : 
To the highly literate observer there is always a temptation to 
assume that reading plays as large a part in the lives of most 
people as it does in his own .... To the degree that he acquires 
a substantial proportion of his ideas and feelings from what he 
reads he will assume , again wrongly , that the ideas and 
feelings of the majority will be similarly conditioned . But , 
for good or ill , the majority of people do not yet give reading 
this importance in their lives ; their ideas and feelings are , 
to a large extent , still moulded by a wider and more complex 
pattern of social and family life . There is an evident danger 
of delusion , to the highly literate person , if he supposes that 
he can judge the quality of general living by primary reference 
to the reading artifacts . 
(ibid. : 308 - 9) 
He notes and rejects the contempt which the highly literate tend 
to have for other intelligent creative activities , general skilis 
such as gardening , metalwork and carpentry , and active politics . 
'The contempt for many of these activities , which is always latent 
in the highly literate , is a mark of the observer ' s limits , not 
those of the activities themselves ' he insists (309) . 
It is in these arguments that Williams reveals both his deep 
connection to literary criticism, and the distance he wishes to 
take from it. For at the very moment when he is arguing for the 
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relevance of the culture and society tradition to contemporary 
arguments in favour of democracy , he was arguing against the 
general case put forward by the literary critics , and in 
particular by I . A. Richards and F . R . Leavis , the two literary 
critics covered in the book , and rightly seen as the formative 
figures in the discipline of English studies in Britain ; and 
against , in particular , the implications of Q. D. Leavis ' s study , 
Fiction and the Reading Public , the most sustained attempt to put 
historical flesh on the bones of Leavis ' s assertions . 27 
The Masses 
Central to the urgency of much literary critical thought , was a 
certain representation of 'the masses ' which Williams turns to in 
the Conclusion to the book . 28 Here he argues that all the 
connotations of 'mob ' are to be found at work in most compounds of 
masses: 
masses was a new word for mob , and the traditional 
characteristics of the mob were retained in its significance : 
gullibility , fickleness , herd- prejudice , lowness of taste and 
habit. The masses , on this evidence , formed the perpetual 
threat to culture . Mass - thinking , mass - suggestion , 
mass - prejudice would threaten to swamp considered individual 
thinking and feeling . Even democracy , which had both a 
classical and a liberal reputation , would lose its savour in 
becoming mass - democracy . 
(Williams (1958] : 298) 
137 
He takes a hard line here , and points out that the term mass 
democracy can either be used as ' an observation or a prejudice ' 
(298) . As an observation , it may refer to the fact that the 
complex reality of twentieth century democracy in Britain is very 
different from what its nineteenth century partisans could have 
imagined , and that the new mass media do have a powerful shaping 
effect on that reality. But the everyday use of the term is 
hardly ever in this sense . Instead , it is used in almost all 
cases in the deeply prejudicial way which is articulated in the 
f o llowing terms : 
Democracy , as in England we have interpreted it , is majority 
rule . The means to this , in representation and freedom of 
expression , are generally approved. But , with universal 
suffrage , majority rule will , if we believe in the existence of 
the masses , be mass - rule . Further , if the masses are , 
essentially , the mob , democracy will be mob- rule. This will 
hardly be good government , or a good society ; it will , rather , 
be the rule of lowness or mediocrity. At this point , which it 
is evidentl y very satisfying to some thinkers to reach , it is 
necessary to ask again : who are the masses? 
(ibid. : 298 - 99) 
For Williams , the real answer to this question is that the masses 
are the working people of England : 
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But if this is so , it is clear that what is in question is not 
only gullibility , or lowness of taste and habi t . It is also , 
from the open record , the declared intention of the working 
people to alter society , in many of its aspects , in ways which 
those to whom the franchise was former l y restricted deep l y 
disapprove . It seems to me , when this is consider ed , that what 
is being questioned is not mass - democracy , but democracy . if a 
majority can be achieved in favour of these changes , the 
democratic criterion is satisfied. But if you disapprove of 
the changes you can , it seems , avoid open opposition to 
democracy as such by inventing a new category , mass - democracy , 
which is not such a good thing at all . 
(ibid .: 299) 
'The submerged opposite ', he argues 'is class-democracy , where 
democracy will merely describe the processes by which a ruling 
class conducts its business of ruling ' (299) . 
It is from this discussion - the pivotal argument of the whole 
book - that Williams goes on to make his most celebrated and most 
contentious point : the difficulty he has with 'the whole concept 
of masses ' . ' We have to return the meanings to experi ence ', he 
argues in a characteristic formulation : 
Our normal public conception of an individual person , for 
example , is 'the man in the street ' . But nobody feels himself 
to be only the man in the street ; we all know much more about 
ourselves than that . The man in the street is a collective 
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image, but we know, all the time, our own difference from him. 
It is the same with 'the public', which includes us, but yet is 
not us. 'Masses' is a little more complicated, yet similar. I 
do not think of my relatives, friends, neighbours, colleagues, 
acquaintances, as masses; we none of us can or do. The masses 
are always the others, whom we don't know, and can't know. Yet 
now, in our kind of society, we see these others regularly, in 
their myriad variations; stand, physically, beside them. They 
are here, and we are here with them. And that we are with them 
is of course the whole point. To other people, we also are 
masses. Masses are other people. ( 299-300) 
' There are in fact no masses' he asserts; 'there are only ways of 
seeing people as masses' ( 300). And it is just these ways of 
seeing, the formulae by which we may conveniently interpret 
others, ' for the purposes of cultural or political exploitation' 
that we need to consider in analysis. His central point can be 
understood as the urging of a critical literacy which will untie 
the knots of representation through which the empirical data of 
the facts of the world are put forward for social action. With 
this central point, Williams deconstructed, if we may use one of 
the senses of Derrida's labile term, the dominant system of 
representation which had emerged, perhaps most vividly in the 
..,_Q 
1930s. The isolation experienced by Williams was not a social 
one, but an intellectual one - one described best, perhaps, in 
Althusser's phrase, as a ' theoretical solitude'. And it is this 
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which comes through most strongly in the turn he gives to the idea 
of working class culture. 
For Williams writes against both Marxist and reactionary 
conceptions of culture, which consider it either as 'the 
inheritance of the rising class', or call for its defence 'against 
new and destructive forces' (319) Working-class culture, writes 
Williams, has nothing to do with 'the small amount of 
"proletarian" writing and art which exists' ( 320). It needs to be 
understood in terms of the implications of the idea of culture as 
a 'whole way of life' It then refers not only to intellectual 
and imaginative work, or even to housing, dress, and modes of 
leisure. ' Industrial production tends to produce uniformity in 
such matters , ' he writes 'but the vital distinction lies at 
another level .... The crucial distinction is between alternative 
ideas of the nature of social relationship' ( 325). First, there 
is the bourgeois understanding of social relationship as 
individualism: an idea of society as a neutral area within which 
each individual is free to pursue his own development and his own 
advantage as a natural right', though this idea is modified in 
practice by idea of service to the community. The working class 
idea and practice of social relationship is different. It is 
above all 'an idea which, whether it is called communism, 
socialism or cooperation, regards society neither as a neutral 
area nor as protective, but as a positive means for all kinds of 
development, including individual development' (326). 
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Once this is grasped, it becomes easier to see that working 
c l ass culture is not a matter of proletarian art, but rather the 
practice of ' the collective idea' itself (327). It is the idea of 
solidarity versus the idea of service which, argues Williams, 
al ways serves in pr act ice ' to maintain the status quo ' ( 330) . ' We 
may now see what is properly meant by ' working-class culture ' , he 
writes : 
It is not proletarian art , or council houses, or a particular 
use of languages; it is , rather, the basic collective idea, and 
the institutions, manners , habits of thought and intentions 
which proceed from this .. . . The working class, because of its 
pos i tion , has not, since the Industrial Revolution, produced a 
culture in the narrower sense. The culture which it has 
produced , and which it is important to recognize , is the 
c ollective democratic institution, whether in the trade unions , 
the coperative movement or a political party . Working - class 
culture , in the stage through which it has been passing, is 
primaril y social (in that it has created institutions) rather 
than individual (in particular intellectual or imaginative 
wo r k ) . When it is considered in context, it can be seen as a 
very remarkable creative achievement . (327) 
With this idea of culture as something like a Wittgensteinian 
y _)- .... f.. •• 
andRhe M~r: i .st idea of ideology , rather than a 
matter of aesthetic taste , Williams could do little more than to 
underline the differences which separated him from a Gregor and a 
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Pittock. In fact, there was no common ground between them: 
Culture_and_Societ~ had deconstructed it. In the end he could 
only insist that ' However difficult it may be to understand in 
detail, art is part of the whole way of life, and the individual 
artist has behind him and within him an important body of social 
experience without which he could not even begin'. And he looks 
forward to the central arguments of The_Long_Revolution to further 
substantiate his case: 
Commmunication as a whole is a creative activity, in the sense 
that (as the neurologists are now showing) it is by learning to 
perceive, to describe and to communicate description to others 
that we create the common reality of our lives. Institutions 
are best seen as forms of communication, embodying a particular 
version of reality and a particular response to it. Art is one 
of the most important of these, and its biological, social and 
personal functions can be usefully compared with those of other 
kinds of institution. For there are no 'entirely different 
order(s) , economic, political - what you will'; there is one 
lived reality , within which we respond and act in varying 
forms. (435) 
The Long Revolution 
There is no space here for a thorough consideration of the 
essays which make up The _Long_Revolution, nor for anything like a 
full account of its critical reception.3e In Part One of the 
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book, Williams examines a number of broad theoretical questions 
the nature of creativity, the idea of culture, the relations 
between individuals and societies, and the determining effects on 
our thinking of the images of society we hold. Part Two presents 
in brief a sketch of the social histories of education, the 
reading public, the popular press, Standard English, English 
writers , Dramatic Forms, and an overview of the contemporary 
novel. And the final part of the book presents an analysis of 
' Britain in the 1960s', drawing on the insights generated through 
the theoretical and historical analysis of the previous sections. 
It is nonethless worthwhile, I think, to briefly consider some 
of the ways in which the book as a whole picks up and amplifies 
some of the main arguments underlying Culture_and_Societ~. In 
particular, there is the increasing emphasis on the relations 
between culture and communication. In Culture_and_Societ~. 
it was argued that communication was not to be understood only as 
transmission, as it was understood in the dominative mode of mass-
communication, a minority exploiting a majority' (314); 
"\ \ 
communication was al so - reception and response ' ( 313) . -:,- · If a 
'common culture ' is to be understood as 'a particular form of 
social relationship, at once the idea of natural growth and that 
of its tending' (337), then communication is the medium of that 
growth and tending, the substance of culture, the stake and the 
site of political growth and political conflict. As Williams put 
it, in the formulation to which Pittock for one took such 
exception: 
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In every problem we need hard, detailed inquiry and 
negotiation. Yet we are coming increasingly to realize that 
our vocabulary , the language we use to inquire into and 
negotiate our actions, is no secondary factor, but a practical 
and radical element in itself . To take a meaning from 
experience, and to try to make it active, is in fact our 
process of growth. (Williams [1958 0.)°: 338) 
It was this emphasis on the constitutive, rather than the merely 
reflective , ideas of culture and communication which formed the 
focus of the essays brought together in The_Long_Revolution in 
1961. Looking back in 1980, in the course of a review of Rudolph 
Bahro's The _Alternative_in_Eastern_Europe (London: New Left Books 
1978) , Williams found Bahro's positions on the importance of 
cultural revolution to be very similar to his own arguments in and 
for the ' long revolution': 
Bahro's emphasis is the common factor in the propositions of 
' cultural revolution' Consciousness is no longer the mere 
produ c t of social being but is at once the condition of its 
practical existence and, further , one of its central productive 
forces . (Williams 1980: 256) 
Indeed , the central argument of the essays which make up Ibg 
Long _Re v olut i on as a whole is the insistence on what Williams 
terms the third revolution, the cultural revolution, take its 
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place alongside the more widely recognised democratic and 
industrial revolutions as driving forces in the history of the 
present. '[W]e must certainly see' he writes 
the aspirations to extend the active process of learning, with 
the skills of literary and other advanced communication, to all 
people rather than to limited groups, as comparable in 
importance to the growth of democracy and the rise of 
scientific industry. (Williams (196) ~] : 11) 
In The_Long_Revolution Williams inverts the usual image of a crass 
modernity, and challenges the easy nostalgia for the apparent 
order of pre-democratic society. Williams does not see the 
present as a present decayed from the fullness of a past glory, 
exemplified in T.S. Eliot's writing, and in his assertion ' that 
our own period is one of decline; that the standards of culture 
are lower than they were fifty years ago; and that the evidences 
of this decline are visible in every department of human activity' 
(Eliot 1962: 19). He argues for the real vitality of the present, 
and against the structural distinctions of class, education and 
culture at work in the arguments of Eliot and others. The essays 
mix theory with history and ideological analysis into a complex 
critical literacy which challenges the received assumptions of 
much contemporary opinion. ' We do not solve', he writes, 
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the critical questions by understanding the history, but 
still an adequate sense of the history , as opposed to the 
ordinary functional myths , is the basis of any useful 
approach . (Williams [196 J-~1 -;. 236) 
The essays in Part Two , in particular, question the idees_recues 
at work in the formation of the discipline of English 
studies , and reproduced as the orthodoxy of conservatism . 1~ 
He points out how 'no lion of the new journalism would have had 
anything to teach eighteenth-century journalists in the matter of 
crudeness and vulgarity ' (219) and notes how ironic it is ' to 
consider how many of the works for which we now honour the period 
[the seventeenth century] would have been condemned by substantial 
sections of opinion as evidence of the idleness and vulgarity of 
t he times ' ( 181) . In ' The Growth of the Reading Public ' , in a 
conc lusion drawn from his experiences in adult education, he 
writes how 
the whole argument about ' cheap literature' has been 
compromised by its use as a form of class - distinction, 
whereas the real problem is always the relation between 
inexperience and the way it is met . ( 191) 
In other word s, Williams argues for the full recognition of the 
links between education and democracy , and against those, like 
Eliot , who set themselves against the extension of education . In 
the end , the only real aim for education i s to meet ' what a member 
of an educated and participatory democracy needs' (169). In the 
ideological climate of the 1950s - and even more so in the neo-
liberal nineties - this, in the bitter arguments over 'equal 
opportunity', entails facing 
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the really hard fact that we are now meeting this problem [the 
problem of the extension of education] in a particular way 
which serves in the end to magnify the differences ['in 
learning ability among all children'] and then pass them off as 
a natural order. (168) 
Both The_Long_Revolution and Culture_and_Societ~ were powerful 
respon£es to the post-1945 hardening of attitudes in politics and 
education. To write them, and to make a beginning, Williams had 
to distance himself from his own early influences, and to subject 
the orthodoxy of which they were a part to critical and historical 
analysis. No one summed up the achievement better than Edward 
Thompson in his review of The_Long_Revolution: 
With a compromised tradition at his back, and with a broken 
vocabulary in his hands, he did the only thing that was left 
to him; he took over the vocabulary of his opponents, 
followed them into the heart of their own arguments, · and 




This arqument with - official English culture' wa s to continue 
in the next phase of Williams' s work on his r etur11 to Cambridge as 
a University lecturer in 1861. 
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Cha~ter _Four __ Cambridge_Criticism_1962-1973 
The turbulent decade of the 1960s was an extremely active one 
for Williams, both as a public intellectual and as a professional 
academic. He gave his support to various activist groupings - the 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament , the Cambridge Left Forum, the 
Vietnam Solidarity Campaign, the National Convention of the Left 
and the consequent writing of the Ma~ _Da~_Manifesto , the defence 
of Rudi Dutschke, and even participation in the Arts Council and 
canvassing for the Labour Party . At the same time, he continued 
his non-academic writing with the completion of his novel ~~QQQQ 
Generation in 1962 , and the beginning of The_Fight_for_Manod 
(published in 1979) , plus the writing of three plays: 
performed , but published as the third section of Modern_Traged~ in 
1966 , A_Letter _ from _ the _Countr~ (1966), and Public _Enguir~ (1967 ) , 
both of which were shown on the BBC; as well as a constant flow of 
journalism . reviews , and a regular column on television for Ih~ 
Li~1~D ~ r . 1 And Williams continued his usual process of self-
correction, making significant revisions to his view of the 
history of drama with the revision and republication of Qr~~~ !Q 
f ~ rfQrID~Q Q~ and the retitled Qr~m~ _ frQID _ l~~~Q_!Q _ ~r~£h1 , both in 
1968 , an i mportant reassessment of the appeal and limitations of 
the work of George Orwell (1971) , and edited Volume 2 of Ih~ 
f~l iQ an _ Book _of _ English_Prose: _From _ 1780 _ to _ the Present Da~ 
(1969).2 For the sake of this study, it is necessary to narrow 
the focus of attention and assessment. This chapter concentrates 
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on his oppositional relations with his new institutional setting -
his renewed contact with 'Cambridge English'; and with the 
development of his ongoing debate with Marxism. 
In Williams's recollection of the events, it was on a Spring 
morning in 1961 that he opened a letter from the University of 
Cambridge to find that he had been appointed to a Lectureship in 
the English Faculty.3 Over the next two days other letters 
arrived explaining the situation and asking him whether he would 
accept such an appointment were it to be offered. Tired of the 
losing battles in Adult Education, he was glad to accept, and 
after the obligatory ordeal-by-dinner at High Table, was given a 
Fellowship at Jesus College which he took up in the summer of 
1961. He was to remain a Fellow of the college until his death in 
1988, though he had formally retired as then Professor of Drama in 
1983. This chapter examines the renewal of Williams's contact 
with Cambridge English, and its particular, and particularly 
productive, frictions; as well as the continuation of his troubled 
dialogue with Marxism as he sought to respond to the telling 
criticisms made of Culture_and_Societ~ and The_Long_Revolution by 
Victor Kiernan and E.P. Thompson. 
In one of his two formal retirement lectures in 1983, Williams 
reviewed the history of his relations with Cambridge English. He 
closed the lecture with an emphasis on what he termed his own 
distance from it: 
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What there was not, however, because in any fully worked-out 
sense there never had been, was a ' Cambridge English'; a 
distinctive and_coherent_course and method of study. The 
Golden Age was golden only in its beginnings, its searchings , 
its open and freespeaking and for some years tolerant 
experimentation and enquiry. My own social and intellectual 
distance from it should not need emphasising. Indeed many 
friends have told me that I have never distanced myself enough, 
but they are wrong. 
conflicts absolute . 
The distance is entire, the intellectual 
My only community and inheritance in 
Cambridge is with some of the questions then posed and with the 
campaigning energy and seriousness that were brought to them. 
(Williams 1984: 190) 
But distance and conflict both presuppose some common ground , some 
site of contested perspective. This was to be found in 'some of 
the questions then asked'. What were these questions, what were 
the terms of his renewed professional contact with Cambridge 
English? In Politics_and _Letters, he had claimed ' If you look at 
the implied relationships of nearly all the books I have written , 
I have been arguing with what I take to be official English 
culture' ( 197 9: 316) . For this we can read ' official English 
culture ', in large part at least, as English culture as it was 
defined and disseminated by the Cambridge English Faculty.4 
For, as Williams goes on to say, his Modern Traged~ (1966) was a 
reply to George Steiner's The _Death _of_Traged~ (1961); The _English 
Novel _ from _Dickens _ to _Lawrence (1970) his riposte to Leavis's 
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seminal The Great Tradition (1948); while Ihe _Countr~_and_the_Ci!~ 
(1973) started life as a sharp reaction to a Special Paper in 
Part Two of the English Tripos on the Country House poem.5 
At the same time, Williams's work continued, though somewhat 
obliquely, in its critical dialogue with Marxism. In response to 
a question concerning that obliquity, he gave the following 
response: 
people on the left no longer intervene with the audience, or 
against the thinking, that I was intervening with and against. 
In a sense, the very power of the expanded Marxist tradition 
can supply a reason for renouncing what still seems to me the 
necessary engagement with established English culture. Why do 
I discuss a minor eighteenth-century poet in more detail than I 
do Marx? because this is where a really reactionary social 
consciousness is being continually reproduced, and to till your 
own alternative garden to it is not enough. In fact, it would 
be a trap for me. There would be a good many people in English 
cultural circles who would be delighted if I spent the rest of 
my time clearing up some questions of Marxist literary theory. 
I don't propose to give them the satisfaction . (1979: 317) 
Nonetheless, despite this oblique response to Eagleton's 
criticisms , and the probings of the N~R team, the writings of this 
period continually interact with problems in Marxist theory, 
and Marxism _and_Literature , published in 1977 , is nothing if not a 
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thorough attempt at settling accounts. In this chapter, we shall 
focus on both the oblique oppositional dialogue with Marxism as 
well as with the more direct critique of Cambridge English. 
To be sure, Williams had already formulated some important 
objections to the methodology of Cambridge English, both in the 
early Reading_and_Criticism, where he criticised the foundations 
of Leavisite ' evaluation' through close-reading by attending to 
the pre-selective nature of passage selection, and again , in 
Culture _ and _Societ~ . where he developed this line of argument in 
relation to I.A. Richards. 
He sums up the main elements of Richards's positions as 
follows: ' The experience of literature is thus a kind of training 
for general experience: a training, essentially, in that capacity 
for organization which is man's only profitable response to his 
a l tered and dangerous condition' (Williams [1958): 249) - the new 
and dangerous condition of mass society and mass culture. Above 
all, he is critical of what he sees as the essential passivity 
inherent in Richards's definition of the reading experience . 
' Great literature is indeed enriching , liberating and refining ' he 
writes, 
but man is always and everywhere more than a reader, has indeed 
to be a great deal else before he can even become an adequate 
reader ; unless indeed he can persuade himself that literature, 
as an ideal sphere of heightened living, will under certain 
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cultural circumstances operate as a substitute. ' We shall then 
be thrown back ... upon poetry. It is capable of saving us. 
The very form of these sentences indicates the essential 
passivity which I find disquieting . (Williams [1958]: 251) 
In conclusion , Williams argues that ' All that Richards has taught 
us about language and communication, and for which we acknowledge 
our debt, has to be reviewed' . For in the end, Richards remained 
a captive to the image of 'Aesthetic Man ' which Richards had 
unkowingly inherited from his own opponents and predecessors : 
' alone in a hostile environment, receiving and organizing his 
experience' (252). He was to argue against just this image of 
both reader and writer as passive and isolated in this next stage 
of writing. In particular, he was to question the embodiment of 
these tendencies in the figure of the observer , as exemplified in 
Orwell ' s work as 'the plain man who bumps into experience in an 
unmediated way and is simply telling us the truth about it ' 
( W i 11 i ams 1 9 7 9 : 3 8 5 ) . 6 
Traged~~_Revolution_ and _ the _Modern_World 
Williams sums up the agenda of Modern _Traged~ in the following 
terms : ' We are not looking for a new universal meaning of tragedy. 
We are looking for the structure of tragedy in our own culture' 
(Williams [1966): 62). This was, in fact, to be a double task: 
the criticism both of that ' official English culture' , and its 
relentless search for universal meanings in literature, but also a 
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thinking through of the idea of political revolution itself. The 
two came powerfully together in the ways in which Cold War values 
were embodied in the official view of the ' universal' values of 
Tragedy . 
It was hardly surprising that the English Faculty should expect 
a new lecturer with a recognised expertise in the history of drama 
to make a particular contribution to lecturing and teaching for 
the Tragedy Paper . The Tragedy Paper was taken by all final year 
students in English, who sat a three-hour written examination in 
which their knowledge of the history of tragic drama from the 
Greeks to Ibsen and Chekhov , through Seneca and Shakespeare, 
Medieval , Renaissance and Romantic, and through the nineteenth 
century to the present, was tested. It was and is one of the few 
papers to acknowledge anything like the existence of Comparative 
Literature (Williams ' s own undergraduate dissertation on Ibsen was 
allowed as a stand- in for the exam itself, in terms of the special 
arrangements for students returning from the war); and one of two 
compulsory papers in Finals - the other being , of course , 
Practical Criticism , the testing of skills in textual analysis . 
Modern _Traged~ grew out of the lectures Williams gave for the 
Tragedy Paper. ' It was never a book I had foreseen writing ' he 
averred ; rather it was · a response to the shock of returning to 
Cambridge and encountering the course on tragedy there in a much 
more ideological form than it had been when I was a student ... It 
was as if I went into the lecture room with the text of a chapter 
156 
from Qrama_from_Ibsen_to_EliQt in front of me, and came out with 
the text of a chapter from Modern Traged~.' The main difference 
between the two lay in the shift from the relatively technical 
address of the earlier work, its focus on dramatic convention~ and 
dramatic performance, to something which was 'closer to 
ideological criticism.' (Williams 1979: 211) Modern_Traged~ was 
above all a polemical work, addressed to the dominant ideology 
which Williams saw as produced and reproduced in the Cambridge 
English Tragedy paper. 
Disconcerted to find that teaching for the paper had become, by 
1961, a haven for a style of reactionary thinking and critical 
practice , Williams gave his first reaction in an essay publi~hed 
by New_Left _Review in 1962. In 'A Dialogue on Tragedy', he began 
to articulate the themes and ideas which were to achieve their 
final form with the publication of Modern Traged~ in 1966. 
Dialogue 
The ' Dialogue' brings together six voices, forming a spectrum 
of opinion stretched between the two opposing views of tragedy 
presented by Ridyear and Clark . While Ridyear's views are the 
closest to Williams's own, Clark's bear considerable resemblance 
to those of his Cambridge colleague, George Steiner , whose Ib~ 
Death_of _Traged~ he singled out as the main object of attack in 
his own work . 7 
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The dialogue begins by articulating the differences betwee~ 
Ridyear and Clark. For Ridyear, the recent death of a friend is 
tragic; for Clark, a mere accident. Clark argues that because 
tragedy as a form excludes the category of accident, the use of 
the word ' tragic' to describe such a death is a mistake, a failure 
of discrimination. Ridyear questions this separation between 
literary form and ordinary living. Singer gives a watered down 
version of Clark's views; while Holt speaks more angrily and 
passionately than Ridyear. 
Like Steiner, Clark argues that tragedy is impossible 1n a 
secular society ('When man is his own measure, or, worse, when the 
attributes of God are transferred to man or to life, you simply 
cannot have tragedy' (Williams 1962b: 26)); that modern tragedy is 
no more than ' the dwindling of tragedy to the problem play' (30); 
and holds to a belief in an unchanging human nature 
( ' Contingencies change. Secondary characteristics change. The 
essential human condition does not change' (32)). Central to 
these views is the rejection of the political as proper to 
tragedy. While Ridyear insists that the case of Stalin represents 
an instance of genuine tragedy, Clark replies ' Surely first 
humanism and liberalism, then the whole flood of socialism and 
communism, denied the tragic response altogether. If man can 
change himself and his condition , tragedy is merely irrelevant. 
The conditions that lead to it will simply be altered . ' (31) 
158 
Like Williams , Ridyear is primarily interested in retying the 
links between tragedy and ordinary experience, and refuting the 
idea of the death of tragedy. Such a thesis which would deny the 
possibility of tragic experience - and therefore tragic expression 
- as a real possibility in the modern world. 
Wii..\i tlM'l~ 
One of the benefits of the dialogue form for was that it 
" 
allowed him to express directly some of the anger and passion 
which always motivated his formal academic writing, but tended to 
be contained by it. Thus Holt's response to Clark's assertion -
' [G]enuine tragedy defines itself' - is angry, and threatens to 
break the polite conventions of academic exchange . ' You see. 
Genuine tragedy. 
of a substance. 
You can tell, always, when Clark is on the track 
Down to the capital letters and the jealous zeal 
in routing pretenders, this is merely the cult of a tribal god.' 
Ridyear's response articulates the measured balance and distance 
which had characterised the successful tone of Culture_and_Societ~ 
- ' Leave it though now. Let be for a moment.' (1962b: 26) 
The basic problems and ideas of the Dialogue were taken up in 
the essays which constitute Modern_Traged~. Part One - ' Tragic 
Ideas' - extends and deepens the debate on the meanings of tragedy 
to be found in the Western tradition; while Part Two - ' Modern 
Tragic Literature' - offers specific case studies of a number of 
contemporary dramatists in order to show the different forms of 
tragic expression available in the modern world. And , in the 
first editions of the book , Williams included his own drama 
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'Koba', a dramatic biography of Stalin written in the late 
1950s and loosely based on Isaac Deutscher's classic 
biography.8 
Williams starts by questioning the assumptions which seek to 
separate the tragedy of ordinary life from tragedy as a literary 
form, and which argue that to 'confuse this tradition with other 
kinds of event and response is merely ignorant' (Williams 1966: 
14). This questioning takes two forms: first, whether the 
literary form itself carries 'so clear and single a meaning' as is 
confidently supposed; and second, what are the actual relations 
between the tradition of tragedy and 'what we ordinarily and 
perhaps mistakenly call tragic?' (15). Williams offers first of 
all a historical analysis of the tragic tradition. 
The argument of the book as a whole is best understood in terms 
of Williams's deepening interest in the circulation and 
instability of meanings, and particularly in the relations between 
the meanings associated with tragedy as a dramatic form, and the 
common or everyday uses of the word tragedy. In fact, argues 
Williams, the meanings at work in the formal analysis of tragedy 
can not in the end be separated from the ordinary meanings at work 
in the word tragedy: any assertion of the ' death of tragedy' as a 
form relies upon a wider circulation of the idea of tragedy active 
in everyday discourse. For Williams , there is a significant 
connection between these ordinary meanings and the academic or 
formal meanings of tragedy, and the idea of ' modern tragedy', both 
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as a distinctive form and as a central meaning of twentieth 
century experience. This 1s the wager of the book as a whole. 
The fact of connection is itself grounded in Williams's 
developing notion of a 'structure of feeling', that almost 
Wittgensteinian sense of the deep sociability of language at work 
in Williams's thinking as a whole. 
To this end , the book is divided into three sections. The 
first, ' Tragic Ideas', examines the history of thought on tragedy 
from the Greeks to the present day, concluding with a highly 
original section on tragedy and revolution, 1n which Williams 
states his central claim that the 'structure of feeling' of modern 
tragedy is largely determined by the experience of social 
revolution, and particularly the experience of Stalinism. The 
second section provides some evidence for Williams's theoretical 
analysis in the form of seven essays dealing with variants within 
the ' structure of feeling' of modern tragedy from Ibsen and Henry 
Miller to Camus, Sartre and Brecht. The third section presents 
Williams's own attempt, begun in the fifties, to write a drama 
about the tragedy of Stalinism, ' Koba' . 
What were the main points in this debate? George Steiner's Ih~ 
Death_of _Traged~ . published in 1961, but first given as a series 
of lectures in Cambridge, 1s the locus _ classicus of the ideology 
of tragedy which so appalled Williams (1979 : 243) and put forward 
the case that Williams sought to answer in Modern _Traged~. 
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Steiner's study has all the hallmarks of his peculiar talents. 
Wide-ranging, multi-lingual, enthusiastic and erudite, it is not 
afraid to use a wide range of reading of primary texts as the 
basis to argue a grand thesis. Written in a passionate and 
enthusiastic style, it easily gained a wide readership while 
pernickety scholars were grieved at its lack of secondary 
scholarship, and saw its grand argument achieved at the expense of 
fine detail . The main thesis of the book is easily stated. 
Tragedy has been in decline since the moment of the Greeks; and 
though the causes of this decline are multiple and multi-causal, 
in essence they can be reduced to the fact that real tragedy fits 
neither the Christian worldview nor (and here Steiner joins the 
ranks of Cold War polemicists) the Marxist ideology. 
First , and most important, Steiner saw the history of tragedy 
as the history of the decline of a form which had achieved its 
moment of unparallelled perfection with the Greeks. For Steiner, 
the idea of tragedy 'and the vision of man which it implies are 
Greek. And nearly till the moment of their decline, the tragic 
forms are Hellenic' (Steiner 1961: 3). The death of tragedy ' is 
inseparably related to the decline of the organic world view and 
its attendant context of mythological, symbolic and ritual 
reference . It was on this context that Greek drama was founded, 
and the Elizabethans were still able to give it imaginative 
adherence' ( 292). The history of tragedy is the history of this 
decline , with dramatists like Racine able to rekindle some of the 
fire of the ancient form from the half-extinguished embers of the 
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present. Others were not so fortunate. Ibsen cannot be regarded 
as a tragic dramatist: in his work there is, properly speaking, 
'no tragedy at all, but dramatic rhetoric summoning us to action 
in the conviction that truth of conduct can be defined and that it 
will liberate society' (291). Yeats's work only confirms the 
general case: his ' failure to construct a mythology for the age is 
part of that larger failure or withdrawal from imaginative 
commitment which occurs after the seventeenth century. Greek 
tragedy moved against the background of rich, explicit myth' 
(319). 
But for all the impressionistic passion of its local readings, 
the argument is in the end unable to generate the level of 
conceptual consistency necessary to sustain his thesis. In the 
last chapter, Steiner offers his final conclusion. It is 
significant that this is argued from anecdotal evidence, as 
commentary on a medieval parable overheard in Poland. 'Tragedy is 
that form of art which requires the intolerable burden of God's 
presence asserts Steiner, and after the seventeenth century, God 
is simply not there: ' I would suppose that He turned away during 
the seventeenth century' (353). 
As a whole, the book embodies a distinctive anti-Marxist 
stance.17 Steiner identified three main elements in the death of 
modern tragedy. First , there was the impossibility of reviving 
the original Greek forms themselves; second, the ways in which 
Christianity, with its belief in redemption , spread antipathy to 
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the harshness of Greek tragic values. And finally, there was the 
denial of tragedy by a Marxism which Steiner sees as the twentieth 
century heir to the wilful delusions of Christian belief. For 
Steiner, Marxism is the twentieth century mythology: 
For we have before us now the startling fact of a mythology 
created at a specific time by a particular group of men, yet 
imposed upon the lives of millions. It is that explicit myth 
of the human condition and of the goals of history which we 
call Marxism. Marxism is the third principal mythology to have 
taken root in Western consciousness. (Steiner 1961: 323) 
Steiner repeatedly refers to Marx on necessity as if that term 
were synonymous with the Greek concept of Ananke; and to 
Lunacharsky, first Societ commissar of education, and his views 
that 
one of the defining qualities of a communist society would be 
the absence of tragic drama .... In a communist state, tragedy 
is not only bad art; it is treason calculated to subvert the 
morale of the front lines. (343, 344-5)9 
Against this, what did Williams have to argue? In the first 
instance, he was able to deploy his growing armoury of concepts 
against traditional literary criticism. The most powerful of 
these was his developing sense of ' semantic history', the history 
of cultural struggle in and through language. Tragedy, like 
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culture, like industry, like so many other keywords is admittedly 
'a single and powerful word' (Williams (1966]: 16), but it 1s 
above all a word with a history. And this history is not only 
open to interpretation, but is itself the embodiment of a history 
of interpretation through the mechanisms of the 'selective 
tradition'. It is all too easy, writes Williams, ' to see this 
tradition as a continuity ... so many of the later writers and 
thinkers have been conscious of the earlier, and have seen 
themselves as contributing to a common idea or form' (15); but for 
the cultural historian any tradition ' is not the past, but an 
interpretation of the past: a selection and valuation' (16) . 
That interpretation is shown first of all in the primacy given 
to Greek tragedy, and the many 'attempts to systematise a Greek 
tragic philosophy, and to transmit it as absolute' (17). The 
valuation then lies in the essentialisation of Greek tragedy as a 
form , along with the consequent view of later tragic drama -
exemplified in Steiner's study - as a falling away from the Greek 
achievement, a gradual fading of the form through the ages to its 
eventual demise in the modern world. This essentialising attitude 
is then responsible for a refusal to see and understand the later 
forms of tragedy in and on their own terms. The usual under-
valuation of Medieval tragedy is a case in point: 'Only an 
extraordinary powerful attachment to an absolute meaning of 
tragedy could force us to overlook the use of the word, 1n a quite 
specific sense , in a major historical period' (19). In an almost 
Wittgensteinian way, Williams urges us to seek for the meaning of 
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tragedy in the word's use at a particular moment, a useage 
embodied in social convention and (to borrow Wittgenstein's term) 
in 'forms of life' . Against essence, Williams poses history.10 
For what is necessary is a fully historical understanding of 
tragedy, a history of its forms, and the different social 
conventions underlying those forms. For Williams, the specific 
differences in the idea of tragedy correspond to shifts in the 
basic structures of social organisation. The medieval emphasis on 
' the fall of princes' is comprehensible in a feudal period; while 
Dryden's idea of the necessity for ' decorum' is an aristocratic 
rather than a feudal conception' (25). The ahistorical idea of 
tragedy relies above all on the notion of ' an unchanging human 
nature' (46) , and only if we reject this assumption can we see 
that tragedy : 
is not then a single and permanent kind of fact, but a series 
of experiences and conventions and institutions. It is not a 
case of interpreting this series by reference to a permanent 
and unchanging human nature. Rather, the varieties of tragic 
experience are to be interpreted by reference to the changing 
conventions and institutions. ([1966]: 45-6) 
Central to this historical view is the emphasis placed on the 
historicity of contemporary tragic theory itself. ' The most 
striking fact' he writes, ' about modern tragic theory is that it 
is rooted in very much the same structure of ideas as modern 
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tragedy itself , yet one of its paradoxical effects is its denial 
that modern tragedy is possible, after almost a century of 
important and continuous tragic art' (46). In particular, he 
argues, the ' real key, to the modern separation of tragedy from 
"mere suffering" , is the separation of ethical control and, more 
cr i tically , human agency , from our understanding of social and 
political life ' (48-9). 
Williams isolates three distinctive elements 1n this mode. 
First , the contemporary emphasis on the destruction of the hero, 
and related to this , the focus on the hero at the expense of an 
understanding of the tragic action as a whole (54-5). Second, the 
wa y s in which death is represented as a singular and solitary 
event , ' as a proof of the loss of connection' when it is rather ' a 
theoretical formulation of liberal tragedy, rather than any kind 
of universal principle' (58). And third , the assumption of a 
' transcendent evil ' (58) . Together these form the ideological 
assumptions informing both modern tragedy, and the interpretation 
of the hjstory of tragedy. ' The most common interpretation of 
tragedy' he writes , ' is that it is an action in which the hero is 
destroy ed ' (54) ; but this focus solely on the hero marginalises 
the tragic action as a whole: ' we are taking a part for the whole, 
a hero for an action. We think of tragedy as what happens to the 
hero , but the ordinary tragic action is what happens through the 
hero' (55) . Sim i larly , the real universality of death is shifted , 
in the interpretation of liberal tragedy, to the singular 
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loneliness of death. Since death ' is universal ... the meaning. tied 
to it quickly claims universality' (56). 
To move beyond this ideology, Williams argues that we have to 
make an effort to reconnect our academic thinking and intellectual 
experience with an analysis and understanding of broader 
realities. 'If we find' he writes ·a particular idea of tragedy , 
in our time, we find also a way of interpreting a very wide area 
of our own experience; relevant certainly to literary criticism 
but relevant also to very much else .. . We must try also, 
positively, to understand and describe not only the tragic theory 
but also the tragic experience of our own time' (61). This tragic 
experience is located in the experience of revolution, and 
particularly in the history of the Russian Revolution. The fourth 
section of Part One of the book, 'Tragedy and Revolution ' , turns 
to examine these powerful connections and ideas. 
Tragedy and Revolution 
In this concluding section of Part One, Williams sets out to 
counter and to question the leading ideas of both liberalism and 
Stalinism. For Williams, the most complex effect of any powerful 
ideology , such as that informing the contemporary idea of tragedy, 
is 'that it directs us, even when we think we have rejected it, to 
the same kind of fact' (Williams [1966): 61 - 2) . We find in the 
present the same forms and structures of tragic experience which 
we have already and unknowingly read into the past. A central 
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feature of this constitutive blindness has been the elision of the 
social and political dimensions of tragedy - 'That kind of 
interest is commonly relegated to politics, or, to use the cant 
word, sociology. Tragedy, we say, belongs to deeper and closer 
experience, to man not to society' ( 62). The major aim is 
therefore to refuse such a division and to reintegrate our 
thinking about tragedy, and modern tragedy in particular. For 
modern tragedy, argues Williams, is above all a response to the 
human experience of revolution, an experience which is necessarily 
at once personal and political, public and private. Here the 
links between the two divided realms of experience posited by the 
bourgeois theory of tragedy are in reality ' inescapable and 
urgent' (74). 
To this end, we have to go beyond the usual alternatives of 
either turning a blind eye to the reality of revolutionary 
violence, or , the insistence on seeing only the forces of violence 
and terror at work in revolution, and then wishing to forego 
revolution altogether. 'Revolution' he argues 'asserted the 
possibility of man altering his condition, tragedy showed its 
impossibility, and the consequent spiritual effects' ( 68) . We 
need to get beyond the ' contemporary reflex', which we have seen 
at work in a liberal thinker like Steiner, and which maintains 
that ' the taking of rational control over social destiny is 
defeated or at best deeply stained by our inevitable 
irrationality, and by the violence and cruelty that are so quickly 
released when habitual forms are broken down' (74); but we must 
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also question a number of blind spots in the Marxist tradition 
itself. 
Characteristically, Williams challenges a ' main current' of 
thinking to be found in Marxism, one ' which though Marx may at 
times have opposed it is also profoundly mechanical , in its 
determinism , in its social materialism, and in its characteristic 
abstraction of social classes from human beings' (Williams [1966]: 
75). It is from such a perspective, fears Williams, that it is 
possible ' to interpret revolution not only as constructive and 
liberating', and not to see or to accept or to question its 
violence, its dehumanisation and consequent liquidation of its 
enemies: 
Real suffering is then at once non-human: is a class swept away 
by history, is an error in the working of the machine, or is 
the blood that is not and never can be rosewater . The more 
general and abstract, the more truly mechanical, the process of 
human liberation is ordinarily conceived to be, the less any 
actual suffering really counts, until even death is a paper 
currency. ([1966]: 75) 
He urges a constant resistance to the dehumanising abstraction 
related in most people ' s minds to the excesses of Stalinism, and 
emphasises that the tragic essence of revolution is to be found 
above all in the simple fact that revolution is a struggle not 
only ' against mere institutions and social forms, but against 
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other men' (Williams [1966]: 77). At the same time, he also 
questions the usual liberal response. First, by situating it as a 
product of the ' long revolution' in the West, and second by 
calling attention to everyone's involvement in violence. He 
argues against the ways in which we commonly narrow down the 
meaning of revolution to a moment of violence and terror, rather 
than accepting revolution as a moment of violence in a whole 
history of violence and terror: 
The essential point 1s that violence and disorder are 
institutions as well as acts. When a revolutionary change has 
been lived through, we can usually see this quite clearly. The 
old institutions, now dead, take on their real quality as 
systematic violence and disorder; in that quality, the source 
of the revolutionary action is seen. But while such 
institutions are still effective, they can seem, to an 
extraordinary extent, both settled and innocent. Indeed, they 
constitute, commonly, an order, against which the very protest, 
of the injured and oppressed, seems the source of disturbance 
and violence. (66) 
It is all too easy, from the perspective of a Western democracy, 
committed to the principles of what Williams called the ' long 
revolution', to denounce the obvious violence of other situations, 
while enjoying the fruits of an invisible structural violence in 
the comfort of home. What is finally necessary is the recognition 
of our own involvement in such structural violence, and to see 
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that this must be faced as itself a kind of disorder: ' From the 
experience of this disorder, and through its specific action, 
order is recreated. The process of this action is at times 
remarkably similar to the real action of revolution." ( 66) . He 
locates this as the contradictions engaging 'the identification 
between a permanent order and a social system' ( 6 7) . 'I am 
writing', he notes, to sharpen his general point, on a day when 
British military power is being used against ' dissident tribesmen' 
in South Arabia' (79). 
Part Two of Modern_Traged~. 'Modern Tragic Literature', 
consists of seven essays which may be taken as evidence to support 
the general positions advanced in the first part of the study. 
The works and authors discussed illustrate various constituents of 
the modern structure of tragic feeling. Ibsen anticipates Arthur 
Miller in the way his protagonists are no longer heroes but 
victims, caught and defined in a conflict with a social world 
beyond their control. Lawrence's novel Women_in_Love represents 
a crucial turning away from the social dimension, and the attempt 
' to create the individual person without ~D~ relationships' (138), 
and Williams contrasts this turning away with Tolstoy's emphasis 
on the social understanding of characters in his novel ADD~ 
K~t~Q!Q~.11 The drama of Pirandello, Ionesco and Becket re-
interprets and remoulds the substance of Chekhov's drama, moving 
it away from his emplacement in nineteenth century realism and its 
assumption of a 'total world' (139) to the twentieth-century 
emphasis on the ' general consciousness of illusion' ( 141) . In 
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each essay, Williams pushes his central point - that the 'deepest 
crisis ' in modern thinking ' is the division of experience into 
social and personal categories' (121). This division mars the 
work of even those dramatists like Camus who wish to try and face 
the difficult relations between tragedy and revolt. Only Bertolt 
Brecht, in Williams's view , has some partial success with his 
' recovery of history as a dimension for tragedy ' (202) , and his 
full recognition of the tragic nature of revolution as ' the known 
harshness of the revolutionary struggle ' (203) . 12 
Contemporary reviews of the book were unable to make or accept 
this connection . 13 Two instances can serve as example. The 
fi rst , b y Frank Kermode; the second , anonymous , but likely , from 
the focus of its own interests and knowledge, to have been written 
by George Steiner. Kermode comments on the 'oddness of the book ' ; 
it s structure 'seems finally to be self-indulgent, however 
s t rangely the general tone of sullen , incorrigible intelligence 
may seem to tell against such a judgement' (Kermode 1966: 83) . 
Kermode praises the intentions of the author to make the book 
about ' the connections , in modern tragedy , between event and 
e x perienc e and idea, and its form is designed at once to explore 
and to emphasise these radical connections' ( ' Foreword ' 1966 ed . 
p . 9 ) ; but insists that ' I doubt if it will feel like a work of 
such ambitious unity to anyone but the author ' (84). For Kermode, 
the best are the opening pages where some of those connections are 
made through the writing : ' only here is the word 'I', though 
h eavily muffled , allowed to make its necessary appearance' (84) . 
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On the potted history of tragic ideas, and the supporting essays, 
Kermode is unagressive: 'the surprizing thing is not that it is 
unconvincing but that it is never ridiculous' (84). But, in the 
end, he would be happy to follow Williams's advice about choosing 
which parts of the book to read - but to read none of it: 'there 
are still those earlier works to learn from, books in which the 
equations to be solved were of more general interest, less a 
personally satisfying ' structure of feeling' (85). 
The anonymous reviewer of the Times_Literar~_Su22lement rejects 
the central argument of the book ('the category of Tragedy is no 
longer very useful ... drama after Chekhov and Samuel Becket is a 
mixed open form ' (Anon. 1966: 717)); praises it as a ' deeply 
honest book' and sees 'Koba' as evidence of 'the depth of his 
[Williams's] imaginative involvement' (718); but, in the end, 
judges the book negatively: 'a book on modern tragedy which does 
not touch on the sociology of the audience and of the literary 
act , which hardly alludes to the interactions between stage drama 
and other modes of dramatic performance, must inevitably appear 
somewhat anachronistic and donnish in bias' (718). In the end, it 
is an ' honest, often moving, yet disappointing book' (718). 
But perhaps what counts most - and certainly what counted most 
to Williams - is what is most occluded in these responses: the 
terms of the opposition to the dominant ideology of tragedy at 
work within ' Cambridge English'. In a sense, the substance of the 
book is to be found in its address, its situatedness. It is this 
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which gives this 'donnish book' the paradoxically anti-academic 
force registered by at least one reader, who recorded how MQQ~~~ 
I~~g~Q~ 'changed my life in a way few books have. '14 
The Novel and the Question of Form 
Modern_Traged~ sought to contest the versions of Cold War 
ideology at work in the Cambridge English Tragedy Paper. In part, 
this consciously anti-Marxist discourse had relied for its 
arguments on a massive repression of the historicity of tragic 
forms. In the place of the study and analysis of this real formal 
historicity, a critic like Steiner had promoted the idea of a 
single tragic essence as the measure of all tragic forms, and 
argued from that basis that the modern period was one in which the 
death of tragedy had been accomplished. For Steiner, real tragedy 
was just not possible in an age of secular values and mass 
democracy.15 
In large measure, something of that same ahistorical or even 
anti-historical impulse had long been characteristic of the 
Cambridge English approach to the novel. E.M. Forster, eminent 
novelist and Fellow of King's College from 1946 until his death in 
1970, had struck the decisive note in his Clarke lectures at 
Cambridge in 1927, published as As2ects_of_the _Novel in the same 
year. 'Time' he stressed 'is to be our enemy (Forster [1927): 16) 
and took the slogan 'History develops, Art stands still' as the 
'crude motto' of the study which was to stress what Forster saw as 
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the timeless problems of the novelist's craft, the universal 
struggle with recalcitrant form. 'All through history' he 
asserts, in accents strengthened by his own natural authority as 
novelist, 
writers while writing have felt more or less the same. They 
have entered a common state which it is convenient to call 
inspiration, and, having regard to that state, we may say that 
History develops, Art stands still. (28) 
Forster's concern is with the novelist's craft, his technique, and 
in this sense with the novel as form; and these concerns are 
articulated around T.S.Eliot's idea of tradition: 
We are to visualize the English novelists not as floating down 
that stream which bears all its sons away if they are not 
careful, but as seated together in a room, a circular room, a 
sort of British Museum reading room - all writing their novels 
simultaneously. (16)16 
When novels and novelists are seen in this light, the critic - the 
new critic in the Cambridge English mould - will be able to avoid 
the dangers of pseudo-scholarship characteristic of older forms of 
literary studies. 
a reader : 
He or she will become purely and more actively 
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The reader must sit down alone and struggle with the writer, 
and this the pseudo-scholar will not do. He would rather 
relate a book to the history of its time, to events in the life 
of the author, to the events it describes, above all to some 
tendency. ( 21) 
A part of the task of The_English_Novel_from_Dickens_to_Lawrence 
will be to break out of this circular room, and to reconnect the 
writer's problems with form to the world outside the British 
Museum, to that threatening flow of experience of which Forster 
urges the novelist and the critic to beware. Although Williams's 
central antagonist is F.R.Leavis, and his seminal The_Great 
Tradition (1948), it is as well to remember that Leavis had taken 
Forster at his word, and had elevated the critic to the position 
of judge over that 'common state' of inspiration. 
The Great Tradition 
Structurally, Ih~-E~g1ish_Novel_from_Dickens_to_Lawrence is the 
' symmetrical inversion' of Leavis's The_Great_Tradition (Williams 
1979: 244). Both books begin with Jane Austen, but soon part 
company: Leavis marginalises Dickens, who is central for Williams; 
Leavis prefers George Eliot's later novels, and the Lawrence of 
Women_in_Love, while Williams's preference is for both early Eliot 
and early Lawrence; and while Hardy is a negligible figure for 
Leavis , for Williams he is central to the tradition as a whole. 
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But beyond the mere facts of this inversion, at times 'quite 
deliberate' as Williams informs us, and which has led some to see 
no more than a principle of alternative selection at work in Ihg 
English_Novel, there is in fact a more fundamental disagreement 
being worked out in the book. This concerns the central idea of 
form. Properly considered, The _English_Novel_from _Dickens_to 
L~~~~QQ~ does not merely offer an alternative canon; it is a 
challenge, through the idea of form, to the principles of 
canonical selection itself, and ultimately, to the very idea of 
criticism at work in Leavis's study.17 
' What,' asks Leavis, ' is the "form" from which a "picture of 
life" derives its value?' Leavis's answer comes through in a 
series of largely rhetorical questions: 
Is there any great novelist whose preoccupation with ' form' is 
not a matter of his responsibility towards a rich human 
interest , or complexity of interests, profoundly realized? - a 
responsibility involving , of its very nature, imaginative 
sympathy, moral discrimination, and judgement of relative human 
value? (Leavis [1948] : 41) 
At work here is the inextricable link, for Leavis, between formal 
and moral criteria. Indeed , the link between the two is strong 
enough to be counted as causal and therefore diagnostic: formal 
failure is always the symptom of moral failing. When Eliot, or 
Conrad or James , is writing well , they write with that key but 
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conceptually elusive quality, 'maturity'; and when badly, it is 
always because that 'maturity' has somehow failed. Leavis's 
discussion of George Eliot exemplifies the deep connections 
between formal success and moral maturity which form the basis of 
Leavis's critical judgements. 
In Eliot's writing, Leavis notes 'an alternation between the 
poised impersonal insight of a finely tempered wisdom and 
something like the emotional confusions and self-importances of 
adolescence' (Leavis (1948]: 92). The presentation of Maggie 
Tulliver in The_Mill_on_ the_Floss is exemplary. Her character is 
figured 'too purely from the inside': in the end , Eliot herself 
suffers from the same immaturity as the character she identifies 
with so strongly : 
Maggie ' s emotional and spiritual stresses . exhibit, 
naturally, all the marks of immaturity ... they belong to a 
stage of development at which the capacity to make some 
essential distinctions has not yet been arrived at - at which 
the poised impersonality that is one of the conditions of being 
able to make them can ' t be achieved. (55-56) 
Since it is that 'poised impersonality' which is the sine_gua_non 
of the novelist's art, it is George Eliot's own impersonality 
which has failed her through an over-identification with the 
character. For Leavis, Maggie Tulliver ' represents an immaturity 
that George Eliot can never leave safely behind her' (56); and it 
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even returns to mar the almost perfect achievement of Middlemarch 
in the character of Dorothea, which Leavis reads as similarly 
betraying a failure of impersonality on Eliot's part, an emotional 
flaw in the formal structure of the novel. Thus, in his final 
summing up of Middlemarch, Leavis argues that ' the emotional 
fulness represented by Dorothea depends for its exalting potency 
on an abeyance of intelligence and self-knowledge'. Eliot's own 
emotional maturity has failed her, and consequently we find that 
in the novel 
the situations offered by way of 'objective correlative' have 
the day-dream relation to experience; they are generated by a 
need to soar above the indocile facts and conditions of the 
real world. They don't, indeed, strike us as real in any 
sense; they have no objectivity, no vigour of illusion. In 
this kind of indulgence, complaisantly as she abandons herself 
to the current that is loosed, George Eliot's creative vitality 
has no part. ( [ 1948]: 96) 
And this failure can be measured against what Leavis sees at work 
in Eliot's writing at its best, when 
her sensibility is directed outward, and she responds from deep 
within. At this level, "emotion" is a disinterested response 
defined by its object, and hardly distinguishable from the play 
of intelligence and self-knowledge that gave it impersonality. 
( 96) 
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Such are the key terms of Leavis's mode of evaluation - it is not 
only that great art is mature and impersonal; it is that the one 
is the condition for the other: there can be no great art without 
maturity . The maturity of the author and the formal excellence of 
the novel come together in what might be called the practice of 
impersonality. As far as writing is concerned, this is a state of 
mind which allows the object to be seen exactly for what it is; 
and this state of mind is only accessible to the truly mature for 
it is the 'play of intelligence and self-knowledge' which 
constitutes emotional maturity. This circle of certitude makes it 
impossible for Leavis to spell out any ' theoretical' (a hated 
word) position: everything necessary is embodied in the concrete 
evaluations.18 
So it is that, despite Leavis's claims to the contrary, actual 
novels are valued and judged in relation to some ideal type or 
model of the novel as Leavis himself understands it: the novel as 
' a dramatic poem in prose', novels in which the writer sees 
'clearly and understandingly, sees with a judging vision that 
relates everything to her profoundest moral experience: [Eliot's] 
full living sense of value is engaged, and sensitively responsive' 
(106). In the ideal novel, a mature judgement of life is fully 
embodied in the visionary textuality of the writing. The task of 
the critic is to assess how far particular novels are able to go 
in realising these ideals, and to offer criticism and correction 
where necessary. So that even the novelists of the ' great 
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tradition', though they may enjoy all the necessary attributes of 
the great novelist, might not manage to write the great novel. 
Though all the ingredients may be there in the Qg~y~g as a whole, 
there is no guarantee that they will come together in a single 
text . Hence Leavis's final judgement of Middlemarch: 
only one book can, as a whole (though not without 
qualification), be said to represent her mature genius. 
is, of course, Middlemarch. (76) 
That 
- for, in reality, as Mulhern observes , the definitive Eliot novel 
would in some sense comprise the sub-plot of Felix_Holt, the 'good 
half' of Daniel Deronda and only then almost all of 
Middlemarch ! (Mulhern 1979: 259 . ) 
And as with Forster, time, or rather history, is the enemy if 
any such account of the novel is to be sustained. The aim of the 
critic, in this mode of evaluation, is to discern the line of the 
' great tradition'; but this means in turn, to go back to 
T.S.Eliot's formulation, to attempt to see the history of the 
novel 'nQ! as consecrated by time, but to see it beyond time' 
(Eliot cit . in Forster : 30) . And if, ideally, this means 
imagining the world's authors 'all writing their novels at once' 
(Forster [1927]: 21), then this implies that the critic is able to 
oversee them , can ' look over their shoulders for a moment' ( 2 1 ) 
and either chide them gently, as Forster does, or speak to them a 
little more harshly, as is Leavis ' s tendency . 
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Commentators have only been partly right in seeing Williams's 
study as merely offering some alternative points of interest on 
the same map of the novel. For The_English_Novel_from_Dickens_to 
L~~r~Q~~ is in the end less concerned with the pronouncement of 
local judgements regarding the inclusion or exclusion of 
particular novelists, and more interested in challenging both the 
principles of evaluation at work in the novelistic canon, and in 
the idea of criticism underlying these principles. As Stuart Hall 
astutely remarked , the main interest of the book lies in ' the 
manner in which the term "form" is deployed' (Hall 1990: 63). 
This comes through most strongly in Williams's assessments of 
Dickens, Eliot and Hardy. 
Form and Structure in the Novel 
' By the standards of one kind of novel,' writes Williams ' which 
has been emphasised in England as the great tradition, Dickens's 
faults - what are seen as his faults - are so many and so central 
as to produce embarrassment ' (Williams [1970]: 31). He mentions 
Forster's criticism, in Aspects _ of _ the_Novel, regarding the 
' flatness' of Dickens's characters, and the Leavisite critique of 
Dickens's use of the language of direct persuasion rather than as 
the medium of Jamesian analysis and introspection, acknowledging 
that in Dickens's writing ' Significance is not enacted in mainly 
tacit and intricate ways but is often directly presented in moral 
address and indeed exhortation' ( 31) . But while Williams allows 
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that according to the criteria of 'the fiction of an educated 
minority' Dickens is easily criticised, he insists that ' we get 
nowehere - critically nowhere - if we apply the standards of this 
kind of fiction to another and very different kind' (31). To get 
somewhere, the first step to take is to examine the situatedness 
of Dickens ' s writing, the social context to which his form - or 
even his apparent lack of form - was the embodied response. 
The formal criteria for canonisation in the great tradition are 
ahistorical and ignore the real situatedness of the author who 
uses form , or who experiences, through formal problems, the 
disturbances of social history . To resolutely adopt only formal 
c riteria would lead in the end to patently absurd conclusions, as 
Williams spells out in an imagined formal comparison between 
Trollope and Eliot: 
To read Doctor _Thorne beside Felix_Holt is not only to find 
ease in Trollope, where there is disturbance in George Eliot. 
It is also, quite evidently, to see the source of these 
differences in a real social history. And I think we have to 
remember this when we are asked by several kinds of critic to 
abstract ' construction' , ' organisation', ' thematic unity', 
' unity of tone' and even 'good writing' and judge novels by 
these canons . On these abstract criteria - and especially 
those of unity - we should have to find Trollope a better 
novelist than George Eliot. ([1970]: 84-5) 
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While this is a move which Leavis explicitly rejects, the main 
point certainly holds. Leavis is, in fact, as constant as 
Williams in his insistence on the importance of the novel as an 
almost cognitive representation of a social order, but his 
understanding of form is classically liberal, and individualistic 
to the point of asociality. Formal failure can only and always 
ever be a symptom of failed maturity, of individual moral 
consciousness. Though the novelist may well write about society, 
the novelist at his or her best stands - like the critic - somehow 
outside it, divorced (and this is the very sign of Leavis's idea 
of maturity) from the social reality which he or she is then 
judging. For Williams, it is just this idea of the novelist's -
and the critic's - ideal position of objective · outsiderness' that 
is most troubling, since to understand the constitutive tensions 
of form, it is above all necessary to understand the inescapable 
positionality of the author or critic. 
This comes through most clearly in the consideration of those 
formal or technical problems which Leavis had seen as evidence of 
immaturity or moral failing. Since mature writing implied 
impersonality, anything which detracted from that impersonality 
led to formal failure. Leavis writes of 'the supremely mature 
mind of Middlemarch' (Leavis [1948]: 52); but even Middlemarch 
suffers from George Eliot's inherently dangerous tendency towards 
autobiographic identification. It was precisely this tendency 
which was responsible for the failure of The _Mill_on _ the_Floss. 
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Like Leavis, Williams finds something of a new consciousness at 
work in Middlemarch; but, unlike him, he cannot recommend it. He 
too finds 'elements of Maggie Tulliver' in Dorothea; but insists, 
against Leavis, that 'she is now at arm's length being looked at' 
This, for sure, represents a new 'signifying consciousness' 1n 
Eliot's work; but it is not one Williams can endorse: 
It is a consciousness, a fictional method, that has been widely 
recommended. It is referred back to the cool 'impersonality ' 
of Jane Austen; forward to the wrought observation of Henry 
James and thence to what is often called, in a sweeping indeed 
overbearing dimension, maturity ... . it is a method that when 
abstracted is a cold placing, a critic's fiction. Indeed,· more 
than that, it is a social mode in which the observer, the 
signifier, is not himself at stake but is refined into a 
fictional process, indeed into a fiction. ([1970]: 90-91) 
For Williams, this mode of analysis - the method of Leavis's 
The _Great_Tradition - has both general and highly specific 
components. Generally, it is ' the mode of an anxious society - an 
anxious class preoccupied with placing, grading, defining'. And 
more specifically , it is the critical mode of Cambridge English 
itself, as he emphasises: 
As you'll have gathered, I don't really find it particularly 
mature, though when it bears down on you in a whole place - in 
a university for example - it has an apparent poise that takes 
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some time to live through: a mode in which we are all 
signifiers, all critics and judges, and can somehow afford to 
be because life - given life, creating life - goes on where it 
is supposed to, elsewhere. ( 91) 
There is a false confidence to such maturity, which is only ever 
the brittle maturity of the outsider: to this Williams prefers the 
real uneasiness of the 'participant who is also an observer' 
(110). 
The novelist who exemplifies this position of participant-
observer is Thomas Hardy: the most unjustly neglected author of 
Leavis's account. Leavis can find no better words for Hardy than 
Henry James, in a disparaging moment, found for him: the ' good 
little Thomas Hardy' whose Tess_of_the_D'Urbervilles is 'chock-
full of faults and falsity, and yet has a singular charm' (cit. 
Leavis [1948]: 34) In comparison with George Eliot, Hardy 
' decent as he is' , is no more than ·a provincial manufacturer of 
gauche and heavy fictions that sometimes have corresponding 
virtues' (Leavis [1948]: 146). For Williams, this evaluation, 
made on the apparently formal grounds of technique, though in fact 
on technique confounded with maturity, is unwarranted and 
unhelpful. The real criteria for any meaningful assessment lie 
elsewhere - in the writer's engagement with ' a real social 
history ', in and through the materiality of form. 'What we have 
to emphasise ,' writes Williams , bringing both Hardy and Eliot 
together, is 
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the creative disturbance which is exactly George Eliot's 
importance: the disturbance we shall see also in Hardy. That 
is where the life is, in that disturbed and unprecedented time. 
And those who responded most deeply, who saw most, had no 
unified form, no unity of tone and language, no controlling 
conventions, that really answered their purposes. Their novels 
are the records of struggle and difficulty, as was the life 
they wrote about. (Williams [1970]: 85) 
For Williams, in terms which anticipate his reading of Volosinov, 
the formal problem of expression faced by such writers are not the 
product of some aspect of a private subjectivity - a question of 
self-knowledge or maturity. It is a problem of social 
subjectivity, what Williams calls 'the recurring problem of the 
social consciousness of the writer' ( 77). Hardy is an exemplary 
case, since he was 
neither owner nor tenant, dealer nor labourer, but an observer 
and a chronicler, often again with an uncertainty about his 
actual relation. Moreover his is not writing for them, but 
about them, to a mainly metropolitan and unconnected literary 
public. (101) 
Thus the most significant problem with Hardy's writing is the 
product of that key situation: he was a 'participant who is also 
an observer' ( 110). The phrase provided the key to some of the 
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central arguments of The _Countr~_and_the_Cit~. as we shall see 
below . 
Williams links Leavis's casual disparagement of Hardy to a much 
wider field of force, out of which a British Council critic could 
write of Eliot, Hardy and Lawrence as our three great 
autodidacts' - meaning, as Williams points out, only that they 
happened not to have been educated at a public school and then at 
an Oxbridge college. The conflict between 'customary and educated 
life ' - itself so central to Hardy's own work - continues in and 
through the continuing assessments of Hardy in academia.19 
Alive in Williams ' s assessment of Hardy, and at work in the 
very high value he places on him (he is our flesh and grass'), is 
the very heart of Williams's whole argument, his conception of the 
novel. If, for Leavis, the novel at its best was the ' poem in 
prose ' he had outlined as early as 1933, what was it for Williams? 
The novel , for Williams, was, of course, a major form in English 
literature'; but it was also much more than a literary genre. We 
may better grasp the force of Williams's idea of the novel in 
terms of what we ma y now call the general practice of 
representation. 
The key to this is given in the Conclusion to The_English 
~QY~l. where Williams discusses the ' particular bearing' of his 
st udy , the idea of the ' knowable community' . He writes: 
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When I say that the problems including the formal problems of 
the novel are in the end mainly problems of relationships I am 
pointing to an area where it is still difficult to relate, a 
continuing and more general experience of the educated and the 
customary. ( 188) 
Williams takes Virginia Woolf's writing as an example of how 
deeply this problem has entered the question of form itself. He 
quotes from her famous essay on 'Modern Fiction', and turns to its 
representation of the 'ordinary mind on the ordinary day' and 
argues: 
that ' the ordinary mind on the ordinary day' is social, and 
that it relates us necessarily to others, and that 
consciousness, real consciousness, doesn't come passively like 
that , a receiving of impressions, but is what we learn, what we 
make, in our real relationships, including with fathers and 
mothers and shops. (189) 
For Williams, Woolf ' s brilliant description of the tasks of the 
new modernist and anti-realist novel falls too easily into an 
over - emphasis on the private life in the bourgeois division of 
life into public and private aspects, and ignores the real 
problems to be faced by the novel, 'the problems of knowable 
community', that is, the acceptance of the real indissociability 
of public and private life, not to speak of the divisions of class 
once Woolf's public/private split is accepted.20 
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In the end, the very existence of such a deep division of 
experience is itself a symptom of a complex social history. The 
history of the novel testifies to an 'important split' which takes 
place between 'knowable relationships and an unknown, overwhelming 
society ' (15). This whole history, this whole process is 
exemplifed for Williams in James Joyce's ~lY§§g§, which Williams 
reads as being about 'the loss of a city, the loss of 
relationships' and where the only 'knowable community' exists in 
'the need, the desire, of a racing separated consciousness' (167). 
This is the task and the burden of the novel, the problem of the 
knowable community in the new urban society. Williams sums up his 
case in the following terms, in the Introduction to the book: 
The problem of the knowable community, with its deep 
implications for the novelist, is then clearly a part of the 
social history of early nineteenth-century England and of the 
imaginative penetration and recoil which was the creative 
response. But what is knowable is not only a function of 
objects - of what is there to be known. It is also a function 
of subjects, of observers - of what is desired and what needs 
to be known . A knowable community, that is to say, is a matter 
of consciousness as well as of evident fact. Indeed it is just 
this problem of knowing a community - of finding a position, a 
position convincingly experienced , from which community can 
begin to be known - that one of the major phases in the 
development of the novel must be related . (17) 
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In the end, this is a question of representation. The novel may 
seek to provide a representation of society, in the usual sense of 
a realist representation, the use of language to reflect an 
external world; but what Williams draws constant attention to is 
the sense of representation in its social-political sense, that 
writing is always a writing from a position, a matter of the 
subject and of consciousness, and not only of the object, of the 
external world. In this sense of representation, the role of 
language in writing is constitutive, and not merely instrumental; 
the writer is always a participant and not only an observer, 
marked by the language he or she adopts at the same time as they 
try to get beyond that language, in the move which denies any 
authority not only to the Leavisite formalist model of the novel, 
but also to any Marxist theory of literature as reflection, 
· tendency' or simple product of base and superstructure dynamics . 
As Williams puts it in the Conclusion to the book: 
Much ordinary social experience is of course directly 
reflected, represented, in what is indeed an ideology, what can 
be called a superstructure. But in any society at all like our 
own, and especially in this one in the last hundred and fifty 
years, there 's a very vital area of social experience - ~QQ!~l 
experience - that doesn't get incorporated: that's neglected, 
ignored, certainly at times repressed; that even when it's 
taken up, to be processed or to function as an official 
consciousness , is resistant, lively, still goes on its way, and 
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eventually steps on its shadow - steps, I mean, in such a way 
that we can see which is shadow and which is substance. 
It is from this vital area, from this structure of feeling 
that is lived and experienced but not quite yet arranged as 
institutions and ideas, from this common and inalienable life 
that I think all art is made. (192) 
Williams closes The_English_Novel with this challenge to too 
mechanical and too reductionist accounts of the relations between 
culture and society, between art and economy and anticipates his 
later formulations of dominant, residual and emergent energies 
which were later to be picked up by critics who wished to 
challenge any too reductive formulations of ideology or power.21 
The Country and the City 
Early reviewers were divided in their responses to what is now 
commonly regarded as Williams's greatest oppositional text , Ib~ 
Countr~_and_the _Cit~. published in 1973. Many ignored E.P . 
Thompson's warning that it was 'not a conventional work of 
scholarship , and whoever reads it this way will end up in 
disagreement and irritation.' H . Coombes, for example, could only 
conclude that Williams's ' ig~~ fi~~ [the critique of the organic 
community) inhibits the use of any literary critical powers he may 
have possessed', and Evan Watkins seemed to agree, writing in 
1978, that The _Countr~_and _ the_Cit~ was ' deeply flawed . . . too 
immersed in the analysis of historical detail ... too immediately 
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personal' . Roger Scruton, in his conservative study, Thinkers _of 
the_New_Left, asserted, in 1985, it was ' one of the most two-
dimensional surveys of English literature ever to have retained 
the lineaments of academic respectability'. Others had more 
positive responses . Lawrence Lerner, in Encounter, wrote 
approvingly that he doubted ' if it is possible ... ever again to 
read the country house poems in the same way', and Marshall 
Berman, in what became the standard judgement, wrote that in Ih~ 
Countr~_and _ the _Cit~ ' the intellectual power and the ideologica l 
passion and the personal integrity come together more convincingly 
than ever before.' The _Countr~_and_the_Cit~ is Williams's IB~gQ~IB 
Q2~~ . his ' richest book', ' his greatest book', ' one of the most 
"2. ..,_ 
brilliant and seminal he has produced' his 'necessary book' 
_J 
The _Countr~ _and_the_Cit~ begins with a characteristic 
discussion of the varied historical meanings of 'country' and 
' city' as keywords - 'powerful words ' , writes Williams , and not 
surprisingly so 'when we remember how much they seem to stand for 
in the experience of human communities' (Williams [1973) : 9), and 
moves - long before this kind of situated writing was to become a 
standard ploy in academic identity politics - from this 'general 
'l-'\ 
problem' to its location as a ' personal issue'. Williams had 
not only read the available ' descriptions and interpretations ' of 
moving from country to city , he had in a sense lived them through 
in the move from Wales to England, from Pandy to Cambridge , and 
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lived and thought through them ' as a problem . ' The study is · the 
attempt to resolve that problem, and to better understand the 
relations between the country and the city, so that the study, 
though it often and necessarily follows impersonal procedures, 
in description and analysis, there is behind it, all the time, 
this personal pressure and commitment. (Williams [1973]: 11) 
The_Country_and _ the_City is a magisterial work, and in a strong 
and particular sense. It generates its air of massive authority 
not only through academic knowledge and the deployment of its 
protocols, but through the power and appeal of the 
autobiographical. Surveying with professional expertise and 
personal experience the images of the country and the city 
available across a very broad (though mainly English) range of 
writing, The_Country_and_the_City is by far the most successful 
realisation of the ideal of committed academic writing which 
Williams had learned as a youth. For purposes of discussion, we 
can divide the book into two main sections, dealing respectively 
wi th the country and then with the city, and a two-part conclusion 
in which Williams discusses first a selection of the available 
present writing on country and city, and then , in the two final 
chapters , puts forward the wider political implications of the 
argument as a whole 
The first section deals primarily with the history of pastoral 
writing . Chapters 1 to 14 focus on images of country life, mainly 
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in poetry, from Hesiod's Works_and _Da~s, through Theocritus and 
Virgil to Carew and Jonson, across Pope and Crabbe, up to and as 
far as Clare and Wordsworth. The second, Chapters 14 to 20, 
concentrates on representations of the city and of city life, 
borrowing and at times adapting material from the previously 
published The_English_Novel_from_Dickens_to_Lawrence (1970) . It 
examines the development of ways of seeing and representing the 
city from the eighteenth century, across Dickens, Eliot, and Hardy 
and through Virginia Woolf to James Joyce, whose ~l~§§~~ Williams 
sees as the 'climax' of the tradition, just as Finnegans_Wake 
represents its ' crisis' (294). Chapters 21-23 examine twentieth 
century ' country' writing, including Meredith, Lawrence and 
Grassie Gibbon, the journal The_Countr~man, and some science 
fiction . The two final chapters - 'The New Metropolis' and 
' Cities and Countries' - examine the troping of the country and 
city figure into the contemporary world of imperialism and post-
imperialism, concluding, through an analytic twist which annoyed 
many non-Marxist readers, with a final transformation of the 
country and city opposition into the very idea of capitalism 
itself : 
capitalism, as a mode of production, is the basic process of 
most of what we know as the history of country and city. Its 
abstracted economic desires, its fundamental priorities in 
social relations , its criteria of growth and of profit and 
loss, have over several centuries altered our country and 
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created our kinds of city. In its final forms of imperialism 
it has altered our world. ([1973]: 363) 
There is no space here for a thorough consideration of the many 
analyses and arguments put forward in Williams's rich and varied 
study. I shall rather examine the ways in which the book as a 
whole represented a response to two currents of thought and 
analysis, and how these came together to give The_Country_and_the 
QiiY its distinctive place in his work as a whole. The first of 
these is the continued opposition to the ways in which Cambridge 
English constructed its version of literary history, in this 
instance, around the tradition of the country house poem; and 
second, as a way of replying to some of the substantial criticisms 
put to his earlier work by two Communist Party historians, Edward 
Thompson and Victor Kiernan. These came together in an emphasis 
on the politics of all acts of representation in and through the 
idea of the embodied observer. Let us first examine some of the 
key terms in leftist criticisms of Williams's earlier work. 
Disembodied Voices 
As we saw in Chapter Three , Culture_and_Society and The_LoDg 
Revolution were greeted with some hostility and opposition by 
conservative critics. But the two works were also the focus of 
some challenging and incisive criticisms from the left, and in 
particular from two Communist Party historians, Victor Kiernan and 
Edward Thompson, who wrote perhaps the two most thoughtful 
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reviews . Victor Kiernan's review of Culture and Societ~ appeared 
in the summer 1959 issue of The_New_Reasoner, and Edward P. 
Thompson's assessment of The_Long_Revolution ran across two issues 
of the New_Left_Review in 1961. 
While Kiernan accepts that Williams has written a ' fascinating 
and important book', his final judgement is that the study lacks 
the essential credentials of a properly Marxist study of culture 
and society . For Kiernan, the ' prime requisite for any study of 
cultural history is a firm framework of historical fact -economic , 
social, political . . the one great deficiency of the book is the 
lack of just this' (Kiernan 1959: 75-6). In particular , Kiernan 
criticises Williams for failing to define any precise sense for 
the term ' Industrial Revolution ' , and for neglecting the crucial 
i mportance of class in the ideological debates which he analyses. 
He is also guilty of neglect with regard to what Kiernan 
identifies as the three absolutely essential components of any 
historically based survey of nineteenth century culture - the 
forces of religion , nationalism and imperialism; while the final 
chapter , Williams ' s own ' tract for the times' , omits any 
discussion of the crucial role of the state as an actor essential 
to any account of the political and ideological conflicts involved 
in the book's arguments. 
Kiernan attributes these failures of analysis to Williams's 
entrapment in the discipline and accompanying ideology of literary 
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studies themselves. 'To be seen in the round, and understood in 
its real bearings,' he argues, 
a pattern of ideas must be seen taking shape in the minds of 
members of a determinate social group in a specific epoch. Mr 
Williams's method in this book has been to take a number of 
individual publicists of each generation in turn, extract 
passages from their works, and add his comments . .. a procession 
of individuals does not add up to a class ... As a result these 
writers have somewhat the style of disembodied intelligences, 
spirit-voices addressing us through the lips of a medium . 
(Kiernan 1959: 78) 
In other words, Kiernan argued that Williams's prediliction for 
the formalism of textual analysis hindered or pre-empted the 
p o ssibility of real historical and social analysis afforded by the 
concept of class. 
Thompson ' s review was in broad agreement with many of Kiernan's 
points , and he too located Williams's failings in his training in 
the discipline of English studies. His lengthy review appeared in 
two consecutive issues of the New_Left_Review and it constitutes 
one of the major engagements with Williams's work from a left-wing 
perspective. Thompson is more than willing to acknowledge the 
im portance of Williams's work: ' so far as we can speak of a New 
Left - he is our best man (Thompson 1961: 24) ; but he too was 
disturbed by the ways in which he saw some of Williams ' s project 
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undermined by Williams's own entanglement in the presuppositions 
of English studies. He took issue, in the first instance, with 
what many came to regard as one of the strengths of Williams's 
style. J.P. Ward later described this well as the 
level reasonableness of the writing, the suggestion that 
wholeness and unity were available in a class-divided society 
and the suggestion that it was not just an intellectual's 
abstraction but a cultural discovery, there ready and waiting 
to use, were unquestionably the main reasons for the book's 
huge success and appeal. (Ward 1981: 17) 
But for Thompson, the problem was that this 'reasonableness' 
itself represented what he called a 'concealed preference - in the 
name of genuine communication - for the language of the academy' 
(Thompson 1961: 25). The real violence and the real stakes of the 
whole argument lay concealed and obscured within this academic 
reasonableness and he criticised the ways in which, as he put it, 
a 'sense of extreme fastidiousness enters whenever logic prompts 
us to identify those ' patterns', 'systems' and 'forms' 
precise social forces and particular thinkers' (25). 
with 
How can T.S. 
Eliot be placed in something called the same 'tradition' as D.H . 
Lawrence and Williams Morris, when Eliot writes in opposition to 
everything they stood for? We cannot do so, writes Thompson 
unless we are using 'tradition' in the sense in which we 
describe both Calvin and Ignatius Loyola as belonging to a 
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common ' Christian tradition'. But once we include both 
Reformation and Counter-Reformation within one common 
tradition, we must recognise that we are in danger of becoming 
so aloof that the energies of the disputants cannot be seen 
through the haze. (Thompson 1961: 25-6) 
In fact, a fatal weakness of the whole account 1s the absence 
of the primary conceptual tool of the historian: the idea and 
understanding of context, and implicit in the historian's sense of 
social context, the idea and understanding of ideological 
conflict. The final judgement is damning: 'There are no good or 
bad men in Mr Williams's history, only dominant and subordinate 
's tructures of feeling' (29). What the book's narrative finally 
has to offer is no more than 'a procession of disembodied voices -
Burke, Carlyle, Mill , Arnold - their meanings wrested out of 
their whole social context' (24-5), and consequently, a version of 
history which lacks any properly developed idea of ideological 
struggle : ' What Mr Williams has never come to terms with is the 
pro bl em of iQ~QlQg;y' ( 3 5) . Thompson reads Williams's emphasis on 
communication as value - perhaps the central theme of Ih~ _ iQ~g 
Revolution - as the crucial index of this general theoretical 
failing: 
It is this confusion [value-making= communication] which 
enables him to lose sight of power: and it is only when the 
systems of communication are replaced in the context of power-
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relationships that we can see the problem as it is. 
the problem of ideology. ( 37) 
And it is 
With characteristic adroitness, Thompson insists that Williams is 
wrong to represent culture as a ' whole way of life' 
anything represents a 'whole way of QQQfliQ!' (33). 
culture if 
Anything less 
than this is to depart from ' the main line of the socialist 
tradition' (34). In the end , judged Thompson, the 
aspiration for a common culture in Raymond Williams's sense 
('common meanings, common values ' ) is admirable: but the more 
this aspiration is nourished, the more outrageous the real 
divisions of interest and power in our society will appear. 
The attempt to create a common culture, like that to effect 
common ownership and to build a co-operative community, must be 
content with fragmented success so long as it is contained 
within capitalist society. (36) 
Disembodied intelligences; disembodied voices; an incoherent 
account of tradition; a mistaken aspiration for a common culture . 
There is no doubt that Williams felt the force of these 
criticisms, even if it seemed for quite some time that he could 
only do his best to deflect rather than confront them. Awareness 
of them still pricked his thinking enough for him to begin his 
response to the many points raised about his work at the Slant 
Symposium with a response , if not a reply, to one of Thompson ' s 
points: ' I would therefore agree that in this sense the problem of 
202 
a common culture is the problem of revolutionary politics' 
~ 
(Williams 1968c : 297). But it was only with The_Countr~_and 
ih~ _Qii~ that he sought to refute the criticisms, though this is 
not a dimension of the study that Williams ever foregrounded, or 
that to my knowledge, has been remarked on by other critics . Yet 
it is essential to understanding the argument of the book as a 
whole. 
The Country House Ideology 
Critics have followed Williams in emphasising the institutional 
context of The_Countr~_and_the_Cit~. Like Modern_Traged~. it was 
a very antagonistic book' (1979: 304) , and one whose starting-
point - the 'much discussed question of how to read the English 
c ountry-house poems' (303) - was grounded firmly in Cambridge 
English. The 'Country House Poem' was the topic of one of the 
optional examinations that could be taken in Part Two of the 
English Tripos , and the germs of the book as a whole can be found , 
c.wlu,:-~ 14. ff-"it'ffi 
in the lectures he gave on this topic as early as 1967.~~ We can 
;:. 
take G.R . Hibbard's 1956 essay, 'The Country House Poem of the 
Seventeenth Century ' as an exemplary instance of the ' particular 
literary orthodoxy' Williams set out to challenge (304).25 
Hibbard constructed his argument in terms of the orthodox idea 
of literary history as the formal history of literary genres and 
traditions. The ' country house poem' forms a ' thin but clearly 
defined tradition ' in English literature , a tradition of poems 
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which are written in praise of ' the English country house and of a 
whole way of life of which the country house was the centre'. 
This 'homogenous body of poetry' (Hibbard 1956: 159) extends from 
Ben Jonson through Andrew Marvell and stretches as far as Pope's 
writing. While there is no doubt that this poetry owes a 
' considerable debt to Latin poetry', Hibbard is confident that it 
is a poetry best described in the particular sense of Augustan 
that literary criticism has given to seventeenth and eighteenth 
century English writing. 'It is truly Augustan', writes Hibbard 
in the sense that it voices and defines the value of a society 
conscious of its own achievement of a civilized way of living, 
and conscious also of the forces that threatened to undermine 
and overthrow that achievement. The function of the poet in 
this society was to make it aware of itself; and because the 
poet had a function the relation between poet and patron in 
these poems is sound and wholesome. (Hibbard 1956: 159) 
In this way, the essay repeats and exemplifies the founding 
claims for literature and for literary criticism of the Cambridge 
English project. Leavis had earlier expressed something of this 
same stress on the image of an achieved society with his own view 
of the Common Reader of the eighteenth century. Take, for 
instance, the following passage from his seminal text Education 
and _ the _Universit~ (1943): 
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The acquiring of taste is probably more difficult today than it 
ever was before. Consider for contrast the eighteenth century. 
Not only were there fewer books to read, fewer topics and fewer 
distractions; the century enjoyed the advantages of a 
homogeneous - a real - culture. So Johnson could defer to the 
ultimate authority of the Common Reader. For the Common Reader 
represented, not the great heart of the people, but the 
competent, the cultivated, in general; and these represented 
the cultural tradition and the standards of taste it informed. 
And the competent , with their more-than-individual judgement, 
their better-than-individual taste, were common, for to be born 
into a homogeneous culture is to move among signals of limited 
variety, illustrating one predominant pervasive ethos, grammar 
and idiom and to acquire discrimination as one moves .. 
[Today] There is no Common Reader: 
[Leavis 1943: 106-7]) 
the tradition is dead. 
This representation of the eighteenth century is made for the 
twentieth: IQ~~~ the acquiring of taste is more difficult than it 
was: consider for_contrast the eighteenth century . Within this 
focus of attention and argument, eighteenth century culture is 
e v erything which twentieth century culture is not: ' a homogeneous 
- a real - culture ' . But it is at the point of this assertion 
that we have to begin reading very carefully indeed, and asking 
questions where Leavis appears to be giving the answers . 
does Leavis mean by ' a homogeneous - a real - culture '? 
What 
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On the surface, what he wishes to say is clear enough, and a 
casual reading of the passage might paraphrase as follows. The 
eighteenth century enjoyed a homogenous culture, one in which 
there was enough agreement and consensus to assure to the critic, 
a critic like Johnson, the position of a Common Reader: 'Johnson 
could defer ultimately to the authority of the Common Reader.' 
Now , today, ' there is no Common Reader: the tradition is dead.' 
Of course, in Leavis's more extended argument, the role of the 
twentieth century critic is to work towards that common culture 
again - precisely the point where the contradictions of the 
passage itself emerge. 
For what we can then remark, in a second moment of analysis, is 
some confusion around the critic's position and the question of 
cultural authority. Johnson could ultimately defer to the 
authority of the Common Reader; but, once that is said, the 
question of just who that Common Reader is, and where that 
authority can be said to properly reside, comes to the fore. The 
Common Reader. writes Leavis, ' represented, not the great heart of 
the people , but the competent, the cultivated, in general.' What 
now of the homogeneity - the consensual unity of opinion - of a 
real culture? For this is now a culture divided between ' the 
great heart of the people' and ' the competent, the cultivated, 1n 
general' - between in fact critics (for the terms are the terms of 
Leavis's own critical project of minority culture) and the rest. 
So that Johnson defers to the ultimate authority of the critic, a 
critic who represents himself as representative, as the Common 
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Reader. In other words, in the end, Johnson , the critic, can 
ultimately defer to - himself . The eighteenth century finally 
enjoys a real culture because it somehow embodies the project of 
vanguard minority culture that is Leavis ' s own project in the 
twentieth. 
The work of representation here is to represent the eighteenth 
century as the age of the common reader, the age of a homogeneous, 
a real , culture. Such a representation of the eighteenth century 
ne c essarily involves the elision of social and cultural divisions 
in the name of an impossible homogeneity, whose passing is 
regretted only in the name of seeking to bring it about again. 
There i s no Common Reader: the tradition is dead - but Long live 
the tradition, let us revive the common reader , that is, let us 
revive the culture of criticism which can create critics in the 
image of common readers. For the literary critic of the twenties 
and thirties, and beyond, the eighteenth century represented an 
image of a stable, orderly and harmonious society to set against 
the fragmented world of modern commercial culture, of Leavis ' s 
' techno - Benthamite' civilization . 
Williams set himself clearly against any idea of tradition, and 
any such consequent system of representation. ' When I first went 
to Cambridge, ' he remarked in 1967 , in a lecture which outlines 
the main arguments of the book: 
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I was offered the interpretation I am now rejecting: a 
convention of rural order, of Old England, against industrial 
disorder and the modern world. I had the strongest personal 
reasons for doubting it, but it has taken me many years to 
reach the point where I can try to say, intellectually, 
where it was wrong. (1967a: 632) 
Such a ' convention of rural order' structured Leavis's arguments 
about Augustan culture as it did his broader opposition between 
minority culture and mass civilization; and it also comes through 
very strongly in Hibbard's whole argument, with its casual 
assumption of the ' sound and wholesome relation' between poet and 
patron. 
As Truth will paint it 
Ben Jonson's poem ' Penshurst' presents a useful site for some 
elaboration of Williams's critical relation to orthodox readings 
of rural writing. First published in 1616, the poem is written in 
praise of the great house where Sidney had once lived, and in 
which he had begun to write his Ar2~Qi~ in 1580. In Hibbard's 
reading, Jonson ' s poem ' represents the norm, slightly idealized, 
but still the norm' (Hibbard 1956: 159) of the relations between 
poet and patron, landowner and peasant in the seventeenth century. 
The country house of Penshurst is the ' embodiment of a natural 
bond between lord and tenant' (164), and a poem such as this 
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exemplifies a social and moral order which we, in the mass-
democracy and mass culture of the twentieth century, have lost. 
But to an alert reader, Hibbard's phrase ' slightly idealized' 
gives away the game. 
refusal to read it. 
Such a reading of the poem is actually a 
As Williams notes , the first thing to notice 
about a poem like Jonson's ' Penshurst' (or, for that matter, 
Carew ' s ' To Saxham' (1638)), is that this particular country house 
is not given to represent the norm of available hospitality ; it is 
rather treated as the exception to a general practice of meanness 
and deprivation. He pays particular attention to the role of 
negative identification in the poems Penshurst and Saxham are in 
fact defined against unmentioned other houses and hospitalities. 
' The morality is not, when we look into it, the fruit of the 
e c onomy ; it is a local stand and standard against it ' he argues 
(42), and sums up: 
Any mystification , however, requires effort. The world of 
Penshurst or of Saxham can be seen as a moral economy only by 
conscious selection and emphasis. And this is just what we 
get: not only in the critical reading I have referred to, but 
in Jonson ' s and Carew ' s actual poems . There were of course 
social reasons for that way of seeing : the identification of 
the writers , as guests, with the social position of their 
hosts , consuming what other men had produced. But a 
traditional image, already becoming complicated, was an 
indispensable poetic support . (44) 
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It is precisely the effort involved in mystification which gives 
literary writing its defining textual density. This textual 
density prevents literary writing from holding any secure place in 
any simple category of reflection or presentation, and similarly 
witholds from it any status as direct evidence in historical 
inquiry. Literature belongs in the category of representation, 
and as such, any description which literary writing has to offer 
always needs to be understood in relation to the fact of address, 
and the consequent idealizations and mystifications which are 
likely to accompany this. With his analysis of pastoral writing, 
Williams anticipates the theoretical point he was to find 
expressed with such force and clarity in the writings of 
Volosinov , and which he was to insist on as a central component of 
his own theory of cultural materialism, as we shall see in the 
following chapter . 
A central component of this general mystification - and one 
that has since become the common starting point for a whole 
generation of critics - is quite simply the removal or 
displacement of the fact of labour from the poems in question . 26 
Williams writes of the ' magical extraction of the curse of labour ' 
from the world of the poems, and how this is often achieved by ' a 
simple extraction of the existence of labourers' (45) . Against 
this way of seeing, or better , this refusal to see, he quotes the 
poet-labourer Stephen Duck on ' the cheat' of the whole thing, and 
sums up : 
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It is this way of seeing that really counts. Jonson looks out 
over the fields of Penshurst and sees, not work, but a land 
yielding of itself .... To call this a natural order is then an 
abuse of language. It is what the poems are: not country life 
but social compliment; the familiar hyperboles of the 
aristocracy and its attendants. (46) 
The Revd. George Crabbe - in many ways the point of reference 
and identification for Williams's own account - was right.27 He 
opens Chapter Three with a couplet taken from the second book of 
Crabbe's poem The Village, originally published in May 1783 : 
No longer truth, though shown in verse, disdain, 
But own the Village Life a life of pain. (Crabbe 1851: 118) 
For Williams, Crabbe's work is crucial to any assessment of the 
pastoral tradition, including the Country House poems, because it 
sets out to position itself against the mediating power of 
existing conventions, and refuses to simply repeat the ' Mechanic 
echoes of Mantuan song ' (1851: 114). It thus raises the central 
question: the conflict and opportunity afforded by the inevitable 
d is crepancies between ' experience' and ' conventional seeing', the 
question of ' perspective'. For in order to ' own' - to own up to , 
to be willing to admit, and, crucially, to articulate - that the 
Vi llage Life was, in reality, a ' life of pain' meant challenging 
the poetic conventions which had done their best to disown and 
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disavow that fact. Crabbe takes the first and necessary step in 
grasping the existence and force of literary convention; while 
Williams pursues the second - to see that any convention is itself 
grounded in questions of social positioning and social 
understanding - just the questions of 'mystification' (Williams's 
preferred term) which the book as a whole then goes on to examine. 
The chapter closes - in a pointed alternative to Hibbard's 
reading of Herrick - with an analysis of 'The Hock-Cart'. 
the reality of labour is acknowledged in the 'rough hands' 
Here, 
which 
perform the ' tough labours'. But the centre of the poem lies less 
with the peasant workers than in the recipient of its formal 
address - the Right Honourable Lord Mildmaye, Earl of Westmorland . 
As Williams observes, Herrick 'places himself between the lord and 
the labourers to make explicit (what in Jonson and Carew had been 
implicit and mystified) the governing social relations' (47) . 
While the labourers are allowed the brief respite and pleasure of 
drinking the lord ' s health, it is only to refresh themselves for a 
moment and then, as Herrick emphasizes, to get back to work. ' It 
is perhaps not surprising' notes Williams 
that The _Hock-Cart is less often quoted, as an example of a 
natural and moral economy, than To Penshurst_or To_Saxham. Yet 
all that is in question is the degree of consciousness of real 
processes. What Herrick embarrassingly intones is what Jonson 
and Carew mediate. It is a social order, and a consequent way 
of seeing, which we are not now likely to forget. (47). 
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In many ways, these comments can serve to sum up the whole 
impetus of Ihe_Countr~_and_the_Cit~. At stake is the question of 
'the degree of consciousness of real processes': Williams argues 
against readings like Hibbard's, which, in representing the 
eighteenth century (or any other) as the time of a 'homogeneous -
a real - culture', fail to engage with these processes, and are 
blind to just the kind of social conflicts which Williams's own 
critics had charged him with being blind to. In the chapters 
which follow he deepens and extends his general argument, urging 
the need to understand the historical processes to which the 
literary texts are in part a response, and therefore to grasp the 
ideological force of literary convention. 
The Observer Embodied 
From Chapter 14, ' Change in the City' through to Chapter 20, 
' The Figure in the City', Williams examines the dynamics, 
continuities and shifts 1n the representation of London from the 
early eighteenth and up to the twentieth century. He rejects any 
too easy a contrast between ' the fiction of the city and the 
fiction of the country' in which ' [i]n the city kind, experience 
and community would be essentially opaque; 1n the country kind, 
essentially transparent', arguing that ' in realizing the new fact 
of the city , we must be careful not to idealize the old and new 
facts of the country' (202) . The key point concerns the 
positionality of the writing subject: 
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For what is knowable is not only a function of objects - of 
what is there to be known. It is also a function of subjects, 
of observers - of what is desired and what needs to be known. 
And what we then have to see, as throughout, in the country 
writing, is not only the reality of the rural community; it is 
the observer's position in and towards it; a position which is 
part of the community being known. (202-3) 
In other words, in the village as in the city there is division 
of labour, there is the contrast of social position , and then 
necessarily there are alternate points of view' (203). Williams 
illustrates this through a fine comparison between the work of 
Jane Austen and George Eliot, starting with a characteristically 
wry observation that, for Jane Austen, neighbours · are not the 
people actually living nearby; they are the people living a little 
less nearby who , in social recognition, can be visited' (203) . 
With George Eliot, the matter stands differently. The ' knowable 
community' of Austen's novelistic world is, as Williams notes, 
' socially selected'; but ' what it then lacks in full social 
reference it gains in an available unity of language' (206-7) It 
is just this unity which is lacking in Eliot. ' There is a new 
kind of break in the texture of the novel,' writes Williams, an 
evident failure of continuity between the necessary language of 
the novelist and the recorded language of many of the characters' 
(207) and this, he argues, can be attributed to the very 
recognition of conflict, of the existence of classes , of divisions 
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and contrasts of feeling and speaking [which] makes a unity of 
idiom impossible' ( 207). 
With these and similar observations, Williams sought to 
distance himself from the criticisms of a Thompson or a Kiernan. 
By trying to show and assert the importance of the social 
positionality of the subject, and how this comes through in 
problems of narrative texture and discursive idiom, he 
demonstrated the ways in which a reading and analysis of literary 
tradition could demonstrate the existence, functioning, and 
consequences of a a conflictual and class-differentiated culture. 
This same positionality of the subject, and the related question 
of the observer's perspective, the observer, is similarly crucial 
to representations of the city. 
Williams draws out some of its implications through an analysis 
of marginal and non-canonical writers such as Alexander 
Somerville , Joseph Archer, and Richard Jefferies ( ' no neutral 
observer ... [if] at times the committed writer ... at times the 
class reporter or even the party hack' (235)), as well as the 
better known work of novelists such as Dickens, Hardy and Gissing . 
What is decisive, though, is the development he sketches in 
Chapter 20, ' The Figure in the City', where he argues that 
' Perception of the new qualities of the modern city had been 
associated, from the beginning, with a man walking, as if alone, 
in its streets' (280). 
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In Blake, in Wordsworth, in Dickens, Gaskell, through 
Baudelaire, Balzac and Dostoievsky, we read of this common figure. 
Williams's main focus is on the question raised by his phrase 'as 
if alone', for the city experience can always be read, he affirms, 
in either of two ways: as 
an affirmation of common humanity, past the barriers of crowded 
strangeness; or into an emphasis of isolation, of mystery - an 
ordinary feeling become a terror. (281) 
Though the nineteenth century writers explore both alternatives, 
it is the latter which becomes dominant. As this happens, the 
representation of the city tends to lose the firmness and solidity 
of its empirical and referential qualities, and to assume the 
implications of the symbolic. James Thomson's two poems ' The Doorn 
of the City' (1857) and the more famous ' The City of Dreadful 
Night' (1870-73) exemplify a shift in which 
Struggle, indifference.loss of purpose, loss of meaning -
features of nineteenth-century social experience and of a 
common interpretation of the new scientific world-view - have 
found, in the City, a habitation and a name. For the city is 
not only, in this vision, a form of modern life; it is the 
physical embodiment of a decisive modern consciousness. (287) 
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- a modern consciousness which is traced through Eliot's poetry, 
and across the atomised subjectivities of Virginia Woolf and James 
Joyce.28 In the end, writes Williams, the choice is between this 
atomised subjectivity, which tends to take refuge in myth, and the 
development of a more fully collective consciousness, the 
consciousness which can power social improvement and ultimately 
revolution. 'Out of the cities' he concludes, 
came these two great and transforming modern ideas: myth, in 
its variable forms; revolution, in its variable forms. But 
they are better seen as alternative responses, for in a 
thousand cities, they are in sharp, direct and necessary 
conflict. (296) 
Framed in this way, ' the images of country and city' examined by 
the book (347) , amount to no less than a certain history - a 
literary history - of capitalism itself since 'capitalism, as a 
mode of production, is the basic process of most of what we know 
as the history of country and city' (363). With this assertion, 
Wi lliams seeks to connect the ' limited inquiry' of The _Countr~_and 
1hg_Qi1~ - and even the ' country and the city within a single 
tradition' (368) , largely that of Great Britain - with the 
pressing issues of contemporary politics and the wider forces of 
imperialism and a now global capitalism.29 In so doing, he is 
defending the claims of literary analysis for politics against 
both his apolitical opponents in English studies, and against his 
Marxist critics in the discipline of history, who saw his training 
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in literary studies as the source of his conceptual failings 
(Kiernan 1959: ~e. Thompson 1961: ~S). But not content with 
defence only through defensiveness, he also turns to the attack. 
For this same opposition between country and city has also 
played a role in Marxist theory and analysis. Marxism doesn't 
allow an intellectual vantage point or improved perspective 
outside of the arguments under consideration. It is itself fully 
caught up in the system of representation he describes, and the 
role of the structuring opposition between town and country within 
it has not, he argues, enjoyed sufficient critical attention. I n 
a famous passage in Ih~ Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels wrote 
of how the bourgeoisie 
has subjected the country to ~he rule of the town. It has 
created enormous cities, has greatly increased the urban 
population as compared with the rural, and has thus rescued 
a considerable part of the population from the idiocy of 
rural life. Just as it has made the country dependent on 
the towns, so it has made barbarian and semi-barbarian 
countries dependent on the civilized ones, nations of 
peasants on nations of bourgeois, the East on the West. 
(Marx and Engels ([1888]: 71-2) 
Here , Marx and Engels retain the bourgeois opposition between 
town and country in the contrast between civilization and ' the 
idiocy of rural life' . This opposition is echoed by Trotsky, who 
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saw the history of capitalism as ' the victory of town over 
country' (363); and in the end the structure of this opposition 
enabled 'one of the most terrible phases in the whole history of 
rural society' ( 364): Stalin's programme of modernization and 
industrialization, and his self-styled '"victory" over the 
peasants' (364). Ultimately, argues Williams, this major 
distortion in the history of communism was erected' on just the 
'kind of confidence in the singular values of modernization and 
civilization' that was the yield of the town and country 
opposition.30 
And yet, more recently , in the process of the Cuban and Chinese 
Revolutions, Williams finds that another emphasis is being made, 
one in which ' the exploited rural and colonial populations became 
the main sources of continued revolt' ( 365) . This emphasis 
corresponds to ' a formulation which is at once the most exciting, 
the most relevant and yet the most undeveloped in the whole 
revolutionary argument' (365). Theoretically, in other words, it 
can be stated in the broad terms of Williams's distinctive version 
of the New Left project - at its centre the idea of a common 
culture as the starting-point and rallying call of contemporary 
political action as 'not only analytic but programmatic response: 
on new forms of decision-making, new kinds of education, new 
definitions and practices of work, new kinds of settlement and 
land-use' ( 366) . In the end, he writes, the ' division and 
opposition of city and country' 
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industry and agriculture, in their modern forms, are the 
critical culmination of the division and specialization of 
labour which, though it did not begin with capitalism, was 
developed under it to an extraordinary and transforming degree. 
Other forms of the same fundamental division are the separation 
between mental and manual labour, between administration and 
operation, between politics and social life. The symptoms of 
this division can be found at every point in what 1s now our 
common life: in the idea and practice of social classes; in 
conventional definitions of work and of education; 1n the 
physical distribution of settlements; and 1n temporal 
organization of the day, the week, the year, the lifetime. 
Much of the creative thinking of our time is an attempt to 
re-examine each of these concepts and practices. It is 
based on the conviction that the system which generates and is 
composed by them is intolerable and will not survive. (366) 
As the ~LR team note, seen in these terms the book ' represents a 
progression beyond the characteristic problematic of classical 
Marxism' (1979: 315). And yet, at the same time, they are curious 
as to why this dimension of the book as a ' very powerful, even 
polemical, corrective to a main tradition of revolutionary 
socialism' is down-played. Why is there no 'properly extended 
engagement' with the tradition, why is discussion of it confined 
to only ' a few paragraphs' (316)? Williams replies in terms of 
his particular ' biographical trajectory', and the limitations of 
his ' curious entry ' into Marxist culture as an undergraduate 
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student in the 1940s, a statement which is best understood as at 
least a partial confession of (situated) ignorance. 
think, is a part of the truth. 
This, I 
But what Williams doesn't mention is what I believe is crucial 
to the structuring arguments of The_Countr~_and_the_Cit~: the 
particular ways in which a significant dimension of the book's 
address is determined by the desire to respond at last to the 
earlier Marxist criticisms of his work, the criticisms of Kiernan 
and Thompson. This dimension, his argument with ' official Marxist 
culture', just as much as his opposition to 'official English 
culture' is what drives the writing and arguments of The_Countr~ 
and_the_Cit~. though it is characteristic that the former is done 
so obliquely. Nonetheless it is important to recognize this 
dimension of the study which takes the Marxist criticisms levelled 
at his own earlier work - the charges of analysing literary texts 
without due regard to conflict and context, of presenting them as 
the work of 'disembodied intelligences' - and turns them against 
the orthodox literary historical accounts of rural and 
metropolitan writing. In so doing, Williams replies implicitly to 
the criticisms he never responds to explicitly, in a sense 
insulating himself against these this criticisms by projecting 
them out onto orthodox literary history. And at the same time, 
not content with this purely defensive measure, he goes on the 
attack by criticising Marxist tradition itself by placing it 
within the framework of literary history, the history of 
representations of the country and the city that the book 
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criticises . Just as he had done earlier by placing Marx's 
thinking, or the English appropriation of it, within Romanticism, 
he places Marxism firmly within Literature, and so asserts the 
force of his own thinking and analysis against his leftist 
~\ 
critics. ~ · 
With these three related works - Modern_Traged~. The_English 
Novel _ from _Dickens_to_Lawrence, and especially with The_Countr~ 
and_the _Cit~ . Williams found himself writing a literary criticism 
which was both professional and personal , academic and political, 
scholarly and yet committed. E.P. Thompson's warning that Ih~ 
Countr~ _and _ the _Cit~ was ' not a conventional work of scholarship , 
and whoever reads it this way will end up in disagreement and 
irritation' was correct, though Thompson's insight can be 
extended . The book was deliberately not a conventional work of 
scholarship in two senses. First, it set out to criticise the 
practice and assumptions of conventional criticism, and did so in 
a powerful and revealing way which helped to open the way, 
particularly for an invigorated and more politically and 
historically aware mode of literary stud~es in general, and 
'l'l. 
perhaps of eighteenth century studies in particular . ' Second, 
as its detractors noted, it was only in part a conventional work 
of scholarship : its autobiographical stance challenged the 
position of neutral observer associated with academic criticism, 
and, in this sense. Williams's work anticipates - though in a much 
more historically nuanced mode - some of the contemporary forms of 
~~ 
reader response theory. Thus while some readers did end up in 
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' disagreement and irritation', many more found a strong appeal in 
what Willams had described as the intellectual resolution of an 
experientially generated problem with academic orthodoxy (1967a: 
6 3 2), Finally, here was a criticism which was textual and 
- r 
po l itical at one and the same time, fully able to place and argue 
a political question in the frame of literary history: 
There is only one real question. Where do we stand, with whom 
do we identify , as we read the complaints of disturbance, as 
this order in its turn is broken up? Is it with the serfs, the 
bordars and cotters, the villeins; or with the abstracted order 
to which , through successive generations , many hundreds of 
thousands of men were never more than instrumental ? And 
supposing we could make that choice rightly - though the 
historian who really places himself with the majority of men, 
and tries to see the world as they were experiencing it, i~ 
always improbable - where do we identify, as the order develops 
into new kinds of order? (52 - 3) 
Conclusion 
Called upon to sum up the theoretical impetus of The _Countr~ 
and_the_Cit~. Williams stressed the idea of representation - a 
term which doesn't appear as a term of art in the book itself . 
' The emphasis of the book is certainly not on literary texts as 
re c ords, but as representations of history - including what I am 
st i ll realist enough to call mis-representations ' (Williams 1979a : 
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304). Representation - perhaps the key term in much theoretical 
and political writing of the 1970s, and yet a term never theorised 
as such by Williams, despite being the conceptual centre of his 
~~ 
arguments against the formalisms of Cambridge English. In this 
chapter, we have seen how some of the depth and complexity of this 
sense of representation as it developed through Williams's 
arguments against the reductive senses of tragedy, against 
trivialising ideas of form in the novel, and against shallow 
discussions of the long opposition between town and country. At 
the centre of this is the theory of the embodied observer - his 
argument against the literary formalism of Cambridge English, and 
his response to his Marxist critics. As Stuart Hall later noted, 
with characteristic insight, The _Countr~_and_the_Cit~ represented 
' a different kind of critical practice' for Williams, perhaps ' the 
most challenging of Williams's efforts . .. to put to use his own 
specialized notions of what is involved in seeing literary form 
historically' (Hall 1989b : 64). 
Seeing literary form historically. This meant seeing the 
subject - that key term of seventies' th~ory - as embodied in, but 
not absolutely determined by, the signifying systems through which 
experience was made into active consciousness. Or such was to be 
the theoretical argument around what Williams specified as the 
constitutive force of language which was to be at the centre of 
his next major work, Marxism_ and _Literature - a work in which, as 
he put it , ' while [it) is almost wholly theoretical, every 
position in it was developed from the detailed practical work I 
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have previously undertaken' (Williams 1977a: 6). What it is 
important to stress in retrospect is that this 'practical work' 
the development of Williams's anti-formalist case - was never 
couched simply in the dualistic terms attributed to him by some of 
his more recent critics. 
In the course of the ~~B interviews, for instance, Williams is 
questioned about the role and status of 'experience 1n his work, 
and its absence from the first editions of K~~~Q~Q~ is taken as a 
significant one, indicating Williams's containment in the 
Leavisite theoretical paradigm. Doesn't the term, and Williams's 
use of it, 'presuppose a kind of pristine contact between the 
subject and the reality in which the subject is immersed'? 
(Williams 1979: 167). Williams denies this, and notes that 1n 
current debates, largely conducted in the accents of Althusser, 
experience has become 'a forbidden word, whereas what we ought to 
say about it is that it is a limited word, for there are many 
kinds of knowledge it will never give us, in any of its ordinary 
senses (172). While Williams shows willing to take his 
interviewer's point that certain kinds of historical process are 
not immediately experienced and can be described only from a 
conceptual or scientific discourse, he goes on to emphasise his 
rejection of the too scientistic a position this may entail. 
' Just as I am moving in that direction' he notes, 
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I see a kind of appalling parody ... beyond me - the claim that 
all experience is ideology, that the subject is wholly an 
ideological illusion, which is the last stage of formalism -
and I even start to pull back a bit. (172) 
In fact , as Williams points out, from as far back as Ih~_LQ~g 
Revolution, he had emphasised the fact that 'there is no natural 
seeing and therefore cannot be a direct and unmediated contact 
~~ 
with reality' (167). But it looked like something of the same 
battle would have to be refought and rethought, this time, not on 
the grounds of literary studies alone, but on the terrain of the 
new ' critical structuralism . ' This emergent discourse - usually 
associated in Britain with the strengths and weaknesses of 
Althusserianism - and Williams's understanding of it as a 
characteristic ' last stage of formalism' would be the focus of his 
next major work , Marxism_and_Literature. 
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Ch _ 5_Marxisms: _Contra_Caudwell~_Ag~i~§i_Alih~§§g~ 
Most of this study assumes something of the narrative shape of 
an intellectual biography, charting Williams's academic trajectory 
from its beginnings in the 1940s through to the work completed 
before his unexpectedly early death in 1988. This chapter 
interrupts the flow of that narrative in order to discuss one 
particular , and particularly problematic, line of thought : the 
question of Williams's relations to Marxism . More precisely, it 
examines his changing relations to a changing body of work, as 
someone writing throughout as a committed socialist whose 
professional affiliations lay with literary and cultural 
criticism , to a body of thought whose own internal history has 
i t se lf been composed of a wide and often competing variety of 
de f initions and re-definitions, interpretations and re -
in t erpretations, applications, developments and utilisations., 
Most readers of Williams's work have been struck by its 
1-
am bivalent relation to Marxism .· This comes through in any 
selection from the archive of statements which have attempted to 
de sc ribe or identify it. For sure , The_Countr~_and _ the _Cit~ 
(1973) and Marxism_and_Literature (1977) are usually regarded as 
ke y works in the Western Marxist tradition of cultural and 
~ 
aesthetic theory. With Georg Lukacs and Lucien Goldmann , 
Williams shared a commitment to teasing out the relations between 
history and form ; alongside Sartre and Gramsci, he explored the 
ideas of commitment and hegemony ; like Benjamin , Brecht , and the 
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Frankfurt school, he sought to understand the dynamics of 
contemporary culture . Throughout his career, he argued for a 
better understanding of the constitutive force of culture in 
social reproduction than orthodox Marxist theory appeared to 
allow . It is somehow typical that while Martin Jay, in his 
casually encyclopaedic study Marxism and IQ1~li1~. observes that 
Williams is ' perhaps the only English Marxist able to hold his own 
with his continental peers he refrains from any substantial 
~ 
discussion of that work (Jay 1984 : 9) . . Certainly, while it is 
customary to place or claim Williams as a major thinker in the 
Marxist tradition , it is just as usual to mark out his differences 
and deviations from it. The person who appears as the ' Communist 
Professor of Communications' of one description did ' not even seem 
~ 
to be aware of what Marxism is' in another . 
Critics sympathetic to both Williams and Marxism have at times 
been eager to bring them together; others, more concerned to keep 
them apart . The former have sometimes found a means of resolving 
at least one element of this ambivalence by dividing his think i ng 
on Marxism into two distinct phases, a first stage of hostilit y 
towards Marxist theory followed by a second moment of greater 
accomodation to it. In this view , 1973 is usually seen as the 
decisive moment , with the publication of the lecture 'Base and 
Superstruc ture in Marxist Cultural Theory' and the study Ih~ 
Countr~ _and _ the _Cit~. These mark the Williams's entry or re-entry 
into a more full y Marxist mode of intellectual enquiry . Thus 
Aijaz Ahmad , whose l~_Ih~Qr~ has been one of the most passionate 
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and consistent attempts of recent years to respond , from a Marxist 
position, to Anglo-American post-structuralist and ' postcolonial' 
theory, writes of Williams's 'ambiguous relationship ... with 
theoretical Marxism', but has no doubt of his adoption of 
'increasingly Marxist perspectives' , or the way that his intellect 
' kept moving leftward' (Ahmad 1994: 49, 47, 48) , and identifies 
' the real turn' as coming ' in the mid 1970s' (49). Similarly, the 
editors of the Marxist _Literary_Theory:_A_Reader suggest that 
' [f]rom a socialist humanist or Left-Leavisite approach , 
Wi l liams ' s early critical distance from Marxism had , by the 1970s, 
de v eloped into a more explicit rapprochement with Marxism' 
(Eagleton and Milne 1996: 242). This in turn echoes Eagleton's 
own earlier judgement of The _Country_and _ the _City as ' the only one 
of his texts in which Marxist positions constitute the very terms 
of debate' (Eagleton 1976: 41). And this whole general judgement 
se e ms to receive confirmation in Williams's own statement , in 
19 7 9 , that ' now I wouldn't want to write on any question without 
tra c ing the history of it in Marxist thought' (1979: 316) . 
Or at least this view seems confirmed just as long as we do not 
read the full sentence . ' I wouldn ' t want to write on any question 
wi t hout tracing the history of it in Marxist thought ', but , or as 
Wi l liam s put it and , ' and then seeing where I stood in relation to 
tha t ' ( 19 7 9 : 316) . Where did Williams ' stand'? The verb itself 
i s somehow characteristic of that life - long assertion of critical 
independence which sometimes made it just as difficult to 
identif y his friends or his foes. ' Seeing where I stand ' the 
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assumption is that the stance is already there, just waiting to be 
found, but separate from the Marxist position. As what he knew as 
Marxism changed, did Williams's stance towards it change? We need 
to examine the available evidence with some care, and this chapter 
therefore focuses on his accounts of his relation to Marxism 1n 
Culture_and_Societ~ and in Marxism_and_Literature: that is, 
Williams contra Caudwell and against Althusser. 
We saw in Chapter One how the rejection of the available forms 
of Marxist literary criticism provoked both a major intellectual 
crisis for the young Williams, yet also provided a significant 
starting point for his work as a whole. Chapter Three argued that 
Culture_and_Societ~. published in 1958, was in part his response 
to that crisis, and seemed to him 
Revolution, which followed in 1961 - to provide a sense of what 
politically progressive work in literary studies could become. 
Chapter Five of Part III of Culture_and _Societ~, ' Marxism and 
Culture', represents Williams's first direct and systematic 
attempt at understanding the nature , force, limits and 
possibilities presented by Marxist theory meant to him, and how he 
understood it 1n relation to his own developing sense of the reach 
and force of the idea of culture. 
Marxism and Culture 
There are three sections to the chapter ' Marxism and Culture ' 
in Culture_and_Societ~. The first deals with what Marx himself 
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had to say on questions of literary and cultural theory, and then 
notes how this was modified - or, as Williams stresses, 'codified' 
- in the later work of Engels, and of writers such as Plekhanov; 
the second focuses on the English Marxist literary critical 
tradition of the thirties; and the third - which I shall not 
discuss in any detail - examines some of the implications of 
Lenin's 1905 essay ' What is to be Done?', arguing against the 
authoritarian implications of Lenin's vanguardist position, which 
Williams sees as yet another example of the contemptuous attitude 
towards 'the masses' which Culture and Societ~ as a whole aimed to 
identify and criticise. Central to all this is the Marxist 
literary criticism which Williams had learned as a young member of 
the Communist Party, and had tried to apply in his undergraduate 
studies, but abandoned under the pressure of the discipline's 
s 
internal constraints of evidence and interpretation. This is 
the object of the second section of the essay, which we shall 
therefore examine first. 
According to Williams, the Marxist interpretation of culture 
' did not become widely effective in England until the 'thirties' 
(Williams [1958]: 265). The work of Christopher Caudwell is taken 
to exemplify English Marxist criticism, and, for most readers, it 
is the sense of Caudwell's failings and limitations as a literary 
critic which comes through most strongly in his discussion. It is 
one of the few moments when the famously balanced and even-handed 
tone of assessment which characterises Culture _and_Socie!~ breaks 
down in the description of Caudwell ' s work as ' not even specific 
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enough to be wrong ((1958): 277): Caudwell ' has little to say , of 
actual literature , that is even interesting' (Williams 1958: 
277) . 
6 
Of course, this focus on ' actual literature' is inherited from 
the ~Qr~1in~ reservations about Marxist literary criticism in 
general , and regarding Caudwell in particular. H . A. Mason's 
caustic review of Illusion _and_Realit~ in 1938 was typical of the 
~Qr~1in~ stance. Mason found a 'surprising staleness and tameness 
in their [the Marxist] approach to literature' (Mason 1938: 429). 
Books like Caudwell's were ' essentially amateur works and 
consequently the proportion of unrelated generalisation is 
high .. . . the book [Illusion_ and _Realit~] does not get anywhere ' 
(429 , 433) . Behind Mason, there were Leavis ' s magisterial 
pronouncements. As Mulhern put it . quoting Leavis , ' Marxist 
c r i ticism . .. became a byword in ~Qr~1in~ for its "shamelessl y 
un c riti c al use of vague abstractions and verbal counters." 
::;. 
(Mulhern 1979: 159) . . 
Williams ' s critical rejection of Marxist literary criticism is 
then in the first instance generated from within this circle of 
professional literary critical judgement. ' What many of~~ have 
felt about Marxist cultural interpretation' (m y emphasis) , 
is that it seems committed , b y Marx ' s formula , to a rigid 
methodology, so that if one wishes to study, say , a national 
literature . one must begin with the economi c history with which 
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the literature co-exists, and then put the literature to it, to 
be interpreted in its light. (281) 
And though he refers more widely to Alick West's Crisis_and 
Criticism (1937), Ralph Fox's The_Novel_and_the_Peo~le (1937), and 
the collection of essays edited by the poet Cecil Day-Lewis, Ih~ 
Mind_in_Chains (1937), it is Caudwell's work which is singled out 
8 
for particular discussion. Ill~~iQD and Realit¥ (1937), 
Studies _ in_ a _D¥ing_Culture (1938), and Further_Studies_in_ a_D¥ing 
Q~l!~I~ (1949) are all marked for Williams by the inevitable 
reductionism of too rigid and mechanical an application of Marx's 
q 
base and superstructure formula.: 
Caudwell's I1lusion_ and_Realit¥ has chapters on ' The 
Development of Modern Poetry', and 'The Future of Poetry' These 
sketch the phases of the history of English poetry from the period 
of ' primitive accumulation', through the industrial revolution, to 
the present ' decline of capitalism'. The chapter ' English Poets' 
closes with a table which, in Williams's phrase, ' puts ' the 
literature to the economic history , 'to be interpreted in its 
light' ([19580J'• 281) , and it charts the main phases of Britain's 
economy alongside first the ' General Characteristics', and then 
the 'Technical Characteristics ' of poetry. When the economy in 
Britain was at the stage of primitive accumulation, the 'dynamic 
force of individuality is expressed in poetry' generally, and 
this comes through as technique in the prevalence of a ' iambic 
rhythm' which expresses ' the heroic nature of the bourgeois 
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illusion' and so ' is allowed to flower luxuriantly and naturally; 
it indicates the free and boundless development of the personal 
lO 
will' (Caudwell [1937) 117). '.·. 
For Williams , undoubtedly remembering the objections posed by 
Tillyard in his undergraduate tutorials, this kind of sketch is 
little more than fantasy. Any such a rigid application of the 
structure and superstructural model ' leads very quickly to 
abstraction and unreality' ([1958): 281). He derides Caudwell's 
description of poetry since the fifteen century as modern poetry, 
and modern poetry as capitalist poetry - ' the superstructure of 
the bourgeois revolution in production' in Caudwell's phrase 
(Caudwell [1937) : 55). ' To describe English life, thought and 
imagination in the past three hundred years simply as "bourgeois", 
to describe English culture now as "dying", is' he writes 
damningly, ' to surrender reality to a formula' ([1958): 281-2) 
Such unreal and badly grounded ideas come through even more 
damagingly in the the related Marxist tendencies of prediction and 
prescription. Confident in the ultimate triumph of the 
proletariat , it is an easy step for Caudwell and others (though 
Williams refers only to Alick West, Ralph Fox, and Rex Warner, he 
is undoubtedly recollecting the Zhdanov of the Zoschenko Affair ) 
to predict and then prescribe the nature of 'socialist realism' . 
This ' authoritative prescription' is just ' the kind of literary 
criticism which has made Marxism notorious' he notes (276); and, 
we can add, perhaps expecially notorious amongst the literary 
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critics of the Cambridge English school in which Williams was 
trained. 
A great deal of the acerbity of the tone in dealing with 
Caudwell comes, no doubt, from the projection on to him of 
Williams's own humiliation when trying to argue the Marxist line 
with Tillyard, and failing to convince. 'I was engaged in having 
to satisfy somebody who was professionally teaching a subject that 
my ideas were tenable and reasonable, and I could not. I was 
continually found out in ignorance, found out in confusion', 
recalled Williams (1979: 51). This humiliation is projected 
outwards, and turned onto Caudwell himself. 
it is difficult' he writes 
' It is not only that 
to have confidence in the literary qualifications of anyone who 
can give his account of the development of medieval into 
Elizabethan drama, or who can make his paraphrase of the 
' sleep' line from M~g~~!h, but for the most part his discussion 
is not even specific enough to be wrong. (Williams [195~ a1 : 
277) 
Caudwell's clumsy abstractions could not meet the discipline's 
demands for textual evidence. While Caudwell asserts that the 
history of drama in Britain was driven by the emergence of 
individuation as the effect of an increasing division of labour , 
he is unable to produce the detailed readings to support this 
assertion which would count as textual evidence in the explanatory 
235 
procedures of English studies. He asserts but cannot prove that 
Elizabethan tragedy emerges as the result of the alliance of the 
monarchy with the bourgeois class: 'the mystery moves to court 
and becomes the Elizabethan tragedy' (Caudwell [1937]: 257). This 
mechanical and impressionistic account of the drama is matched by 
the principles and practice of his textual analysis. What is 
striking is not so much the sheer clumsiness of Caudwell's 
paraphrase of Shakespeare's line - 'Sleep, that knots up the 
ravelled sleeve of care' becomes 'Slumber, that unties worry, 
which is like a piece of tangled knitting' - but rather the 
explanation that goes with it. For Caudwell, in a reductive 
adaption of Freud's distinction between manifest and latent 
content in The_InterEretation_of_Dreams, this paraphrase 
carries over most of the manifest content, but the affective 
tones which lurked in the associations of the words used have 
vanished. It is like a conjuring trick. The poet holds up a 
piece of the world and we see it glowing with a strange 
emotional fire. If we analyse it "rationally", we find no 
fire. Yet none the less, for ever afterwards, that piece of 
reality still keeps an afterglow about it, is still fragrant 
with emotional life. So poetry enriches external reality for 
us. (Caudwell [1937]: 214) 
This impressionistic enthusiasm recalls the examples of bad 
critical writing which I.A. Richards demolished with glee in his 
Practical Criticism (1929). For the literary critic trained in 
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the practical criticism of a Richards , an Empsom or a Leavis, the 
semiotic charge of poetry certainly did not resemble a ' conjuring 
trick ', and the whole premise of the new practical criticism was 
that poetry could be analysed ' rationally'. Caudwell's 
impressionistic style of description - ' glowing with a strange 
emotional fire' , 'fragrant with emotional life', ' afterglow' - was 
anathama to the careful semantic analysis of practical criticism. 
As Richards famously put it: 'The corrective ( to such 
impressionistic criticism] is equally obvious - exercise in 
analysis and cultivation of the habit of regarding poetry as 
capable of explanation' (Richards (1929]: 216). Caudwell's 
literary analysis -like that of the other English Marxists - was 
unprofessional, unable to fit into the rules and structures of 
analysis and evidence provided by the paradigm of Cambridge 
English studies . 
Yet it would be a mistake to assume that this stance of 
critical rejection , the result of Williams's internalisation of 
the new professional techniques of Cambridge English, provided the 
only frame for his discussion and assessment of Caudwell. Just as 
important was to seek to retrieve and extend some elements from 
the Marxist tradition in order to carry forward the critique of 
English studies themselves. In part , as we have seen in Chapter 
Three , this was generated through the focus on culture and 
communication. Crucial to Williams in this regard were some of 
the hotly contested debates around Caudwell's work conducted in 
the Modern Quarterl;y- in 1951 -and 1952. For in this debate , 
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Caudwell figures as just the opposite of what we have seen above: 
not the exponent of a rigid mechanical marxism, but the purveyor 
of what E.P. Thompson refers to as a '"heretical" rejection of 
ll 
reflection-theory' (Thompson 1977: 265). 
For Maurice Cornforth, QQ~~~ of Marxist cultural criticism in 
Britain, Caudwell's work appeared to challenge the most 
fundamental tenet of Marxism: the primacy of the material 
l"l-
world. 'It is a fundamental tenet of materialism' writes 
Cornforth, 
(I quote Stalin and add my own italics) 'that the multifold 
phenomena of the world constitute different_forms _of_matter_in 
~Q!!Q~.' and 'that matter is Eri~~r~. since it is the source of 
sensations, ideas, mind, and that mind is ~~QQ~Q~r~. 
derivative, since it is a reflection of matter, a reflection of 
being' (cited in Thompson 1977: 240) 
Caudwell's idea of an ' inner energy', which Williams connects to 
the Romantic heritage, is no more than a bourgeois idealism: 'The 
energy of man is itself a form of the motion of matter, just as 
the consciousness of man is a reflection of matter. Any other 
idea of energy or consciousness is idealism and mysticism' (cited 
in Thompson 1977: 248; Caudwell [1937]: 356). Viewed in this 
perspective, Caudwell is guilty of both. 
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For Williams, the ' hub' of this controversy - the charge of 
idealism - connects directly to his own arguments regarding 
culture. For Caudwell, art is valuable because the artist has the 
power to articulate · new feelings as yet unformulated', to 
constitute new adaptions to reality . Artists are explorers, 
lonely individuals , ahead of their time: ' they are engaged in 
dragging into the social world realms at present non-social' 
(cited in Williams [1958Ci.1 ', 278). For orthodox Marxists of the 
thirties like Cornforth, this is an idealist emphasis; it 
challenges the passive mode of reflective consciousness inherent 
in the structure and superstructure model. As Williams puts it: 
in writing of this kind, it would seem that Marx's basic 
conception of the relation between ' the real foundation' and 
· consciousness' and hence between structure and 
superstructure , is being revalued . (Williams [1958£t3~ 279) 
In fact , this revaluation (a positive key term in the Cambridge 
English vocabulary) is a valuable aspect of much writing in the 
English Marxist tradition, both of the thirties and the fifties . 
Williams cites E.P. Thompson's comment on William Morris - ' Morris 
has not emphasized sufficiently the ideological role of art, its 
active agency in Qh~QgiQg human beings and society as a whole, its 
agency in man's class-divided history' - to hammer the point home, 
and argues 
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it is surely surprising to find a Marxist criticizing Morris 
for seeing ' man's economic and social development always as the 
master-process'. It has normally been assumed that this was 
precisely what Marx taught, and the position Marxists wished to 
defend. One had understood that the arts~~~~ 'dependent upon 
social change' (273) 
In the end, what he finds at work in the English Marxists is a 
significant debt to Romanticism in their conception of the value 
of art as an active force in social change : 'It certainly seems 
relevant to ask English Marxists who have interested themselves in 
the arts whether this is not Romanticism absorbing Marx, rather 
than Marx absorbing Romanticism' (274). In other words , at their 
best, the English Marxists owe more to the 'culture and society' 
tradition that is the topic of Williams's own study than to Marx 
or at least to Marxism. ' In fact' he writes confidently: 
as we look at the English attempt at a Marxist theory of 
culture, what we see is an interaction between Romanticism and 
Marx , between the idea of culture which is the major English 
tradition and Marx's brilliant revaluation of it. We have to 
conclude that the interaction is as yet far from complete. 
(279 - 80) 
This claim needs to be recognised for the challenging one that it 
is . It presents no less than a recasting or reframing of the 
orthodox conceptions of the central object of Marx's works. Most 
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Marxists would probably identity philosophy, history, politics, 
and economics - but not culture - as the main constituents of 
Marx's writing, and argue from that point regarding their relative 
weights in the causal hierarchy of his thought. Indeed, the 
history of just what 'orthodox marxism' may be lies in some 
l1 
measure in just these debates . . 
Of course, Williams's recasting is in part supported by the 
significant emphasis that Marx came to place on the critique of 
political economy. His greatest work, the three volumes of the 
unfinished Q~2i!~l (1869 - is, after all, subtitled a 'Critique 
of Political Economy', and political economy is largely regarded 
as the British contribution to the three dimensions of Marx's 
project and formation, alongside the German philosophical idealism 
of Hegel and Feuerbach and the French socialism of Proudhon. 
Certainly the response to the great British and Scots political 
economists from Adam Smith through to Ricardo and Mill is a 
concern of many of the figures in Williams's culture and society 
canon. In this sense, some idea of culture as a component of the 
critique of political economy can indeed be said to be important 
to both, though in very different conceptual senses. But 
Williams's claim is, implicitly at least, far stronger than this. 
For the real claim is that the ' object' of Marx's thinking, the 
most appropriate name for the focus of his life and writings, was 
the idea of culture as Williams understood it. In any event , in 
his reading, the interest of the debate around Caudwell is that it 
exemplifies the problems of the whole Marxist paradigm : the 
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· general inadequacy among Marxists, in the use of ''culture" as a 
term' 
It normally indicates, in their writings, the intellectual and 
imaginative products of a society ; this corresponds with the 
weak use of · superstructure'. But it would seem that from 
their emphasis on the interdependence of all elements of social 
reality, and from their analytic emphasis on movement and 
change, Marxists should logically use · culture' in the sense of 
a whole way of life , a general social process . . . . The difficulty 
lies , however, in the terms of Marx's original formulation: if 
one accepts · structure' and · superstructure ' , not as the terms 
of a suggestive analogy, but as descriptions of reality, the 
errors naturally follow. (282) 
There were , as we have seen, plenty of such errors in 
Caudwell's work . And yet it had at least one one redeeming 
feature : the emphasis - entirely sympathetic to Williams's 
developing conception of creativity - on the agency of the 
creative artist. That this was precisely the emphasis which 
threatened Caudwell's status as a Marxist was more likely to 
attract Williams than not, and it is this emphasis which has been 
insufficiently appreciated in accounts of his relation to 
him. For sure, for the professional literary critic in Williams, 
Caudwell was worthless; but for the budding cultural theorist , 
certain aspects of his work were well worth absorbing. 
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Pro Caudwell 
Indeed, too much emphasis has been placed on Williams's 
negative identification with Caudwell, and not enough on what 
Williams drew from him. Critics who have been alerted to the 
existence of a more positive relationship have been puzzled not to 
find it where they expected . Thus, R.J. Sullivan, in his study 
Christoeher Caudwell, finds it ' especially disappointing ' that the 
only attention Caudwell receives in Marxism_and_Literature is 
' mention in a prefatory note', when his arguments, and 
particularly those concerning ' the part played by language in the 
formation of consciousness' considerably anticipate Williams's 
l~ 
o wn , and especially so in his use of Volosinov (1988: 122). 
But this is to look in the wrong place. It was rather with Ih~ 
Long Revolution in 1961, some sixteen years before Marxism_and 
Literature, and only three years after the caustic comments in 
Culture_ and_Society, that Caudwell's work began to appear to 
Williams in a much more positive light . 19 
Caudwell's redeeming features came through more strongly as 
Williams prepared the essays which made up The _Long_Revolution , 
and found he could ' read with him ' , rather than , as in Culture_and 
~Q Q_ig!_y , ' against him ' (Williams 1979: 128). He found ready- made 
in Caudwell a powerful formulation of the dangers of Freudianism; 
and , more positively , his emphasis on the creative aspects of 
human subjectivity were taken up in the important chapter ' The 
Creative Mind' in The _Long _Revolution. Here the measure of 
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Caudwell's positive influence on Williams can be gauged by the way 
his arguments are taken up as a support for an absolutely crucial ,, 
turn in the argument. 
'The Creative Mind' repeats and amplifies some of the discussion 
of the ' Romantic Artist' in Culture_and_Societ~ (Williams: [1958 a]: 
48-64). One of the major aims of Williams's cultural theory was 
to criticise the notion that creativity is the property only of a 
I b 
special kind of person, the artist. Theories of art commonly 
oppose the ' exceptional seeing' of the artist to the 'natural 
seeing' of the ordinary person. This opposition has remained 
constant through the three major epistemological periods of 
Western culture - the Platonist, the Romantic, and the Modern; and 
only in the Modern period does it seem possible to go beyond it, 
and pay due respect to the power of education and cultural 
formation in helping to develop innate creativity . This emphasis 
on the natural creative powers of every human being is a central 
aspect of Williams's cultural politics. 
He turns to psychology as a discipline which can offer an 
explanation of creativity grounded securely in empirical 
observation, rather than in the prejudices which have gathered 
around the figure of the creative artist . The explanation of 
perception ' as a process of the brain and the nervous system' is 
crucial , and the work of the psychologist and Reith lecturer J.Z. 
Young, is enlisted to support the main claim that creativity is 
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' not merely the artist's activity, but the activity of every human 
m i n d ' ( [ 1 9 6 J. ().) '. 3 3 ) 
Young's emphasis on the centrality of communication was 
particularly attractive. For Young, the 'creative artist is an 
observer whose brain works in new ways, making it possible for him 
to convey information to others about matters that were not a 
subject for communication before. It is by search for means of 
communication that we sharpen our powers of observation . The 
discoveries of artist and scientist are exactly alike in this 
respect ' ( [ 19 6 }~ )'. 4 4) . Nothing could have better helped Williams 
in his task of 'demystifying' the long Western tradition of the 
artist's lonely creativity and special revelatory insight. 
For what is excluded by these emphases is the essentially 
social nature of art. The dominant tradition 
tacitly excludes communication, as a social fact. Yet 
communication is the crux of art, for any adequate description 
of experience must be more than a simple transmission; it must 
also include reception and response ... The disovery of a means 
of communication is the discovery of a common meaning, and the 
artist's function, in many societies, is to be skilled in the 
means by which this meaning can continue to be experienced and 
activated ... Since our way of seeing things is literally our way 
of living, the process of communication is in fact the process 
of community: the sharing of common meanings, and thence 
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common activities and purposes; the offering, reception and 
comparison of new meanings, leading to the tensions and 
achievements of growth and change. ([1961_~1 ~ 46, 47, 55). 
This was precisely the emphasis he found in Caudwell. Despite 
the orthodox denunciations of a Cornforth, the stress on the 
culturally constituted nature of human perception (it is 
'impossible for us to assume that there is any reality experienced 
by man into which man's own observations and interpretations do 
not enter') is no mere idealism, insists Williams. 
work, when properly understood, demonstrates: 
As Caudwell's 
the facts of perception in no way lead us to a late form of 
idealism; they do not require us to suppose that there is no 
kind of reality outside the human mind; they point rather to 
the insistence that all human experience is an interpretation 
of the non-human reality. But this, again, is not the duality 
of subject and object - the assumption on which almost all 
theories of art are based. We have to think, rather, of human 
experience as both objective and subjective, in one inseparable 
process. ( 36) 
One inseparable process; both objective and subjective; not the 
duality of subject and object. With these phrases, and in this 
flow of argument , Williams sought to articulate a challenge to 
what Charles Taylor has described as the 'naturalist' outlook, a 
perspective from which all disciplines, including those in the 
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human sciences, wrongly seek to emulate the methods and 
methodologies of the natural sciences, often with crippling 
conceptual consequences. In particular, Taylor singles out the 
extremely impoverished views of human agency to be found in much 
psychological and ideological theory, and the related and common 
assumption of a disastrously instrumental conception of human 
language. As Taylor argues, in terms not too far removed from 
Williams's own later emphases in Marxism_and_Literature, ' language 
does not only Q~2!Ql ourselves and the world, it also helps 
(1"' 
constitute our lives' (Taylor 1985: 10). 
Williams found that Caudwell's essay 'Consciousness: A Study 
in Bourgeois Psychology' helped to approach some of the centr~l 
problems of what was later to become a 'crisis of the subject'; in 
1961, it provided the source for an authoritative statement of 
this process. Bourgeois psychology is wrong to separate 
consciousness from the world, consciousness changes ' as the world 
changes, not with it or separately from it but in mutually 
determining interaction with it' (Caudwell [1949): 208-9, cited in 
Williams [196J et"} ~37); he then reiterates this in his own terms: 
We cannot refer science to the object and art to the subject, 
for the view of human activity we are seeking to grasp rejects 
this duality of subject and object: the consciousness is part 
of the reality , and the reality is part of the consciousness, 
in the whole process of our living organization. (39) 
2 4 7 
That this central statement of this New Left epistemology owes so 
much to Caudwell reveals something of his importance to the 
formation of Williams's ideas on culture and communication. 
Caudwell's work was Janus-faced for Williams . While one face 
gloomily confirmed the weakness and self-deception of Marxist 
literary criticism, the other offered some promise and allure. It 
presented the consistent interest and appeal which Marxist 
cultural theory could hold - when it wasn't too dogmatically 
Marxist . In the end, this double judgement on Caudwell perfectly 
reflects his judgement on Marxist cultural theory as a whole , and 
particularly what he sees as its confusions and self -
contradictions around the explanatory status of the base and 
superstructure model. '[I]n one way or another' he sighs, 'the 
situation will have to be clarified': 
Either the arts are passively dependent on social reality, a 
proposition which I take to be that of mechanical materialism , 
or a vulgar interpretation of Marx. Or the arts, as the 
creators of consciousness, determine social reality , the 
proposition which the Romantic poets sometimes advanced. Or 
finally, the arts , while ultimately dependent, with everything 
else , on the real economic structure , operate in part to 
reflect this structure and its consequent reality, to help Q£ 
h!DQgr the constant business of changing it . I find Marxist 
theories of culture confused because they seem to me, on 
different occasions and in different writers , to make use of 
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all these propositions as the need serves. (Williams [1958): 
274 ; his emphasis) 
One lesson to be learned from Caudwell was the need to 
distinguish between the potential which Marxist theories of 
culture could offer, and the dead-end dogma which Marxist literary 
criticism had become in the hands of Communist Party ideologues 
like Cornforth, or, behind him, Zhdanov. But what had Marx 
himself had to say about all this? The first section of ' Marxism 
and Culture' offers a brief sketch of Marx's ideas, and then of 
their fall: how they were extended and codified - sometimes more 
richly , usually more reductively - in the 'scientific Marxism' of ,, 
Engels and later, of Plekhanov. 
Marxism versus Marx 
Marx was certainly not a practitioner of ' what we would now 
know as Marxist literary criticism'; he ' outlined, but never ful ly 
developed a cultural theory' ([1958 265) . Williams selects two 
major passages from Marx as the sources for this outline of a 
cultural theory. The first is the semina) paragraph from the 1859 
Critigue _of _Political _Econom~ : 
In the social production which men carry on they enter into 
definite relations that are indispensable and independent of 
their will; these relations of production correspond to a a 
definite stage of development of their material powers of 
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production. The sum total of these relations of production 
constitutes the economic structure of society - the real 
foundation, on which rise legal and political superstructures 
and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. 
the mode of production in material life determines the general 
character of the social, political and spiritual processes of 
life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their 
existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence 
determines their consciousness .... With the change of the 
economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more 
or less rapidly transformed. In considering such 
transformations the distinction should always be made between 
the material transformation of the economic conditions of 
production which can be determined with the precision of 
natural science, and the legal, political, religious, 
aesthetic , or philosophic - in short, ideological forms in 
which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out . 
(cited in Williams (1958"1~ 266) 
The second, a paragraph from Marx's The_Eighteenth_Brumair~. in 
which Marx argues that ' Upon the several forms of property, upon 
the social conditions of existence, a whole superstructure is 
reared of various and peculiarly shaped feelings, illusions, 
habits of thought, and conceptions of life' (cit 266). What 
Williams is quick to argue, putting to work the skills of the 
textual analyst, is 
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Even if we accept the formula of structure and superstructure, 
we have Marx's word that changes in the latter are necessarily 
subject to a different and less precise mode of investigation. 
The point is reinforced by the verbal qualifications of his 
text: ' determines the g~Q~~~l character'; 'more_or_less 
~~2ictl~_transformed'. The superstructure is a matter of human 
consciousness, and this is necessarily very complex, not only 
because of its diversity, but also because it is always 
historical: at any time, it includes continuities from the past 
as well as reactions to the present. (266) 
All in all, argues Williams, the formula of structure and 
superstructure may be less a concept and more an analogy: ' In Marx 
this formula is definite, but perhaps as no more than an analogy' 
(267); and he turns to Engels's later clarification of the topic 
in the letter to Bloch of 21 September 1890 as further evidence of 
this.24 In the letter, Engels stresses that though ' the 
determining element in history is ultimatel~ the production and 
reproduction in real life', the various elements of the 
superstructure ' also exercise their influence upon the course of 
the historical struggles' (cited in Williams [195Q~ ~ 267) There 
is, in other words , 
a lessening of the usefulness of the formula which Marx used. 
Structure and superstructure , as terms of an analogy, express 
at once an absolute and a fixed relationship. But the reality 
}. -
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which Marx and Engels recognize is both less absolute and -less 
clear. ( 267-68) 
In the end, in literary and cultural theory, Marx, like Williams, 
may not have been a Marxist at all . Or certainly not a Marxist 
such as Lenin. The chapter ends with a damning indictment of 
Lenin's 1905 essay What _ is_to_be_Done?. Lenin's statement - that 
' the working-class, exclusively by its own effort, is able to 
develop only trade-union consciousness' (cited in Williams [195lp<tj ~ 
283) is 'inconsistent with Marx', and against the grain of the 
political arguments 1n Culture _and_Societ~ as a whole. Williams's 
final conclusion is that it is not easy to discover what can be 
taken, in cultural criticism, ·as finally and authentically 
Marxist' ( 284). 
In this first settling of accounts, Williams 1s able to 
internalise the criticisms he had himself suffered as an 
undergraduate in an often seering account of the limitations of 
English Marxism , and especially regarding its deployment of base 
and superstructure criticism by writers such as Caudwell. And 
ye t , at the same time , he is able to extract with considerable 
profit some aspects of Caudwell ' s thought in order to support his 
own developing sense and theory of the importance of culture in 
any account and analysis of social, cultural and political 
reproduction. Indeed, it was the very tension between rejection 
and incorporation which produced perhaps the greatest statement -
i n Culture_and_Societ~ and The Long Revolution - of the New Left 
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case for a participatory democracy, and at the same time provided 
something of an authorising and differential backing for that case 
in the culture and society tradition itself . How this ambivalent 
stance - fending off , drawing in - continued to characterise 
Williams's relation to Marxism, and how the theory of cultural 
materialism grew out of this is the topic of the rest of the 
chapter. 
The Alternative Tradition 
With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to see that perhaps 
the most striking feature of Williams's account of Marxist 
cultural theory in the late 1950s was its extremely limited range 
l~ 
of textual and conceptual reference. For the Williams of 
Culture _ and _Societ~. Marxist cultural theory is the English 
Marxism he knew as a Cambridge undergraduate: no Kersch, no 
Lukacs, neither Brecht nor Benjamin, not a trace of Sartre. It 
was to be over a decade before he began to read more deeply into 
the wider history of European Marxism, as we can see from the 
paucity of references to or discussions of Marxism in his work 
~o 
until the early 1970s. And yet , these arguments anticipate the 
major themes in the great ' theory of the subject' debates of the 
late sixties and early seventies, though in a vastly different 
theoretical vocabulary , where the later emphasis on subje c tivit y 
is couched (with significant effect) in terms of 
1..I 
consciousness . . 
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As one of the key figures in the New Left revision of Marxist 
theory, Williams must have felt that with the publication of 
Culture_and_Societ~. and particularly its chapter 'Marxism and 
Culture', and the related essays of Ih~ Long Revolution, that he 
had settled his accounts with regard to Marxism. What need was 
there to say more? Marx, as he put in one essay, had correctly 
stressed the connection between culture and the economy; but had 
badly mistaken the nature of that connection. Culture and 
communication were to be understood as primary and not secondary 
components of the social totality, constitutive and not reflective 
in the maintenance and development of a social order. Human 
consciousness was always to be understood as a matter of agency, 
however severe determination might be. Thus, in 1961, the main 
c onstituents of the emerging theory of cultural materialism were 
stressed as Williams wrote that ' we cannot really think of 
communication as secondary': 
We cannot think of it as marginal; or as something that happens 
after reality has occurred . Because it is through the 
communication systems that the reality of ourselves, the 
reality of our society , forms and is interpreted. ([1961c]: 22-
23) 
I n 1965 , Williams still sees the New Left as part of a ' general 
attack on dogmatism within the Marxist tradition' ([1965]: 140). 
The _ Ma~_Da~_Manifesto of 1968, for all its commitment to the 
renewal of socialist politics and policies in Britain , and though 
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it had plenty of time for the understanding of totality, found 
no place to discuss or promote any particular variety of Marxism 
other than New Left humanism. Even up to the time of the Slant 
Symposium of 1967 - that strange amalgam of Catholics and 
socialists, gathered together by Terry Eagleton and Brian Wickers 
- Williams still found no need to revise his central take on 
Marxism. In his reply to criticisms of his work raised at the 
conference and elsewhere, he concludes: 
One of the differences of emphasis between orthodox 
contemporary marxism, and the common culture case as it has 
ordinarily been argued, is the latter's insistence that 
literature and communication are primary activities; we reject 
the idea that literature and thought are secondary, 
superstructural activities occurring after the creation of 
social reality. Literature and communication, on the contrary, 
are ways in which, at any time, reality is formed, on a level 
and simultaneous with work, the family, the whole complex of 
relationships. (Williams 1968c: 305) 
As late as 1967, ' orthodox contemporary marxism seems to have had 
nothing to offer. But by the 1970s all this is changing, and 
Williams begins to criticise those who, like his earlier self, 
had, too complacently. given up reading Marxist work. So that 
when he refers to the 'extraordinary renewal of serious study of 
Marx' in ' the last ten years' (Williams [1972b]: 71), or to 
Marxism as ' a system of political thought which until 1960 and 
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beyond was very generally regarded as un-English, irrelevant and 
irremediably out-of-date' ([1976b]: 233), he is, in part at least, 
referring to himself. And in a 1974 review of Martin Jay's Ih~ 
Dialectical Imagination, he writes 
It is hard to believe, and impossible to justify, but there are 
still very many senior members of British universities, with 
responsibilities in these fields, who are convinced that when 
they hear, for example, of Marxism, they are hearing of 
something which they mastered in the thirties: a now effortless 
mastery, which too many of their successors inherit with their 
stipends. (Williams 1974c:14) 
It seems that Lucien Goldmann's visit to Cambridge in 1970, 
only months before his death, seemed to symbolise or trigger off 
~~ 
Williams's renewal of interest in Marxist theory. In a 
memorial tribute broadcast on Radio Three, Williams noted: 
In the student generation of the last ten years there has been 
an active rediscovery of Marxism, but this has been little 
understood by their elders ... in part at least because most of 
their interested elders already know, or think they know, what 
Marxism is, from memories of the thirties. (Williams 1972a: 
375) 
In fact, the key to Williams ' s own rediscovery of Marxism is the 
finding of what he calls its 'alternative tradition', and 
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particularly 'its account of consciousness: a social analysis 
which seems to me radically different from what most people in 
Britain understand as Marxist' (1972a: 375), and certainly what he 
had understood as Marxist in his own previous account. In the 
work of Goldmann, and behind him, in the powerful figure of Georg 
Lukacs, he finds - characteristically - 'not a matter of 
influence', but rather affinities between his own work and theirs. 
In particular, Lukacs's distinction between 'actual' and 
' possible' consciousness, taken up by Goldmann, fits with 
Williams's own sense of consciousness as a primary activity. 
' Consciousness is restored as primary activity', he writes 
approvingly: 
that is the central result of this alternative Marxist 
tradition. But this consciousness is still social, and it is 
centred in history. (376) 
In other words, Williams refinds an interest in Marxism once he 
sees that its concerns run in parallel with his own . Goldmann's 
idea of the 'transindividual subject' does something like the 
conceptual work Williams was trying to achieve in his own idea of 
the ' structure of feeling' . Marxism's 'alternative tradition' is 
no more and no less than a parallel confirmation, in a different 
theoretical vocabulary, of the arguments and insights he had been 
asserting since the 1950s. While there is no doubting the deeply-
rooted strength of Williams's commitment to left politics in 
general and his specific aim of realising this commitment 
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professionally, to review and renew the study of literary and 
cultural forms and theories, Marxist cultural theory as it was 
commonly understood held little or no appeal for him. It was only 
perceived as useful when it gave conceptual support to his own 
existing and - as he liked to insist - independantly argued 
positions. 
In his memorial lecture for Goldmann, 'Literature and 
Sociology', given in Cambridge in April 1971, Williams suggests 
that the debate with Marxism - which §~~~!iQ~ seemed to have won 
conclusively in the thirties - is, in fact, far from over . The 
work of thinkers such as Goldmann and Lukacs can no longer be 
confined to an ' abandoned battlefield' (Williams 1980: 19), as in 
~~ 
fact it had been in his own work. Two years later, with the 
lecture ' Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory', 
Williams returned to the ground of his own criticism in Q~l!~~g 
and _Societ~ in order to re-assess Marxist cultural theory in the 
light of what he now saw as this ' alternative tradition ': the 
~~ 
work of Goldmann, Lukacs, and, above all, Antonio Gramsci. 
Base and Superstructure 
' Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory' - for 
many , Williams's single most important theoretical statement - was 
~> 
first delivered as a lecture in Montreal in April 1973 . The 
essay belongs to ' an active and self-renewing Marxist tradition' 
(Williams [1973b] 1980: 49), one which seeks to both clarify and 
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complicate the apparent certainties of the Marxist base and 
superstructure model. It is framed as the recovery of an emphasis 
somehow lost ' in the transition from Marx to Marxism' (31). The 
first and most important of these is the sense of the verb 'to 
determine '. 
In the classic Marxist model, the economic base determines the 
ideological superstructure . This determination is absolute , the 
superstructure is understood as the wholly predictable event of a 
known cause, the economic base. Ironically, this sense of ' to 
determine' has its roots in idealist and theological modes of 
reasoning which Marx's own use of the term is deliberately meant 
to counter . Marx places the origin of determination in human 
activit y and in social practice where determination is better 
understood as the setting of limits to, and the exertion of 
pressures on , human agency. As a counter to the absolute sense 
usuall y at work in the base and superstructure model, Williams 
emphasises an ' equally central, equally authentic' proposition of 
Marx ' s: the idea that ' social being determines consciousness' 
{ 31 ) . 
In fa c t , most discussions of the idea of the economically 
determined area of the superstructure do admit some qualification, 
moving from Engels's notion of time-lags and delays, through to 
Walter Benjamin ' s ' mediations ' and Lucien Goldmann's ' homologous 
structures '. More important , Williams calls for a thorough re-
assessment of ' the received notion of the "base" {~~~i~. 
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In much Marxist theory , the figure of ' the 
base ', by sleight of phrase, has come to be considered as an 
object in its own right , as the mode of production in a particular 
stage of its development. But this loses the quiddity of Marx's 
own emphasis on the volatile, active, and contradictory nature of 
productive activity itself. To get the real sense of 
determination at work here, we have to realise that ' when we talk 
of "the base'', we are talking of a process and not a state' (34) , 
of the setting of limits and the exertion of pressures rather than 
a predicted, prefigured and contolled content' (34). If we 
return to Marx ' s emphasis on the volatility of productive forces: 
we look at the whole question of the base differently , and we 
are less then tempted to dismiss as superstructural, and in 
that sense as merely secondary , certain vital productive 
for c es , which are 1n the broad sense, from the beginning, 
basi c. (35) 
In this idea of the base as process, culture is far from ,.., 
secondary and reflective ; it has rather a constitutive force . 
In this Williams remains absolutely true to the main emphases of 
h i s earlier criticisms of the base and superstructure model in 
All that is different is that he is now able 
t o turn to other thinkers in Marxism's ' alternative tradition ' for 
c onceptual support . He see s Gramsci ' s notion of hegemony as of 
vi tal importance : 
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For hegemony supposes the existence of something which is truly 
total, which is not merely secondary and superstructural, like 
the weak sense of ideology, but which is lived at such a depth, 
which saturates the society to such an extent, and which, as 
Gramsci put it, even constitutes the substance and limits of 
common sense for most people under its sway, that it 
corresponds to the reality of social experience very much more 
clearly than any notions derived from the formula of base and 
superstructure. (37) 
And yet, at the same time, for all its emphasis on saturation and 
determination, terms which might suggest a total and closed and 
static state of affairs, hegemony is always and essentially an 
active and ongoing process: 
its own internal structures are highly complex , and have 
continually to be renewed, recreated and defended; and by the 
same token, that they can be continually challenged and in 
certain respects modified. (38) 
Hegemony is determination at work, and as such it is a volatile, 
heterogeneous and mobile system, an economy of experience governed 
by the interplay of what are referred to as dominant , emergent and 
residual social forces and social meanings. 
often quoted moment, 
As is stressed, in an 
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no mode of production, and therefore no dominant society or 
order of society, and therefore no dominant culture, in reality 
exhausts the full range of human practice, human energy, human 
intention . .. . it is fact about the modes of domination that 
they select from and consequently exclude the full range of 
actual and possible human practice . (43) 
Understood in this way , hegemony expresses that sense of 
d e termination as the setting of limits which human agency may 
a l ways challenge , with neither success or failure written in from 
the start . The new emphases of Gramsci, Goldmann and Lukacs now 
a l low the Marxist cultural theorist to face the challenge of 
h i storical analysis with · a much greater precision and delic~cy of 
analysis' (38) than before. Marxist cultural theory need no 
l onger be restricted , as it was in the days of a Christopher 
Caudwell , to merely epochal analysis, the grand but rather sketchy 
portraits of classic base and superstructure theory. 
In many ways , this essay can serve as a summary of the main 
themes developed in Marxism_and_Literature as a whole, themes 
which - despite the insistence of some commentators - have not 
c hanged in any conceptually substantial way from the arguments put 
forward in Culture _ and _Societ~. However, as we shall see , there 
is one entirely new dimension to Williams's thinking in M~~~i~~ 
and _Literature , and that is language. The single and most 
important new aspect of Marxism _ and _Literature lies in its 
discussion of the status of language in social and cultural 
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reproduction. In classic terms, should language be understood as 
a reflective element, belonging to the superstructure; or as a 
constitutive one, a part of the base? It is worth examining the 
central chapter on language in some detail , particularly on 
account of what most readers have found to be the extreme 
CA 
compression of the book's arguments as whole, and compounded by 
,.. 'l.~ 
Williams's own notorious style of disengaged polemic. · We shall 
first offer a brief exposition of the book ' s main arguments with 
regard to Marxist cultural theory. 
In the Introduction, Williams contrasts ' the situation of the 
socialist student of literature in 1940 and in 1970' (Williams 
1977a: 4) . While in the forties, both Marxism and literature 
appeared to be relatively unproblematic terms for settled areas of 
investigation and analysis, by the seventies, Marxism enjoyed a 
~g 
new openness and flexibility of theoretical development' (1) . 
Williams distinguishes very usefully between the sense of Marxism 
as the ' basic political position' into which he had grown as a 
member of a relatively militant working-class family, and the 
cultural and literary arguments which were an ' extension ' or 
' affiliation' of that basic political identity. ' Hardly anyone 
becomes a Marxist for primarily cultural or literary reasons, but 
for compelling political and economic reasons' he writes, and this 
can easil y become - as it became in the forties - the source of 
major theoretical problems: 
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it can mean that a style of thought and certain defining 
propositions are picked up and applied , in good faith, as part 
of a political commitment, without necessarily having much 
independent substance and indeed without necessarily following 
from the basic analysis and argument . (2} 
This indeed had been the ' tight place' of Williams's predicament 
as an undergraduate. On the one hand, there was the political 
commitment which came through as the British variant of socialist 
realism, ' a radical populism' which was concerned more ' with 
making literature than with judging it' (2}, and, on the other, 
the inadequacy of this as the basis for the academic study and 
interpretation of literature. 
As the New Left emerged in the late 1950s, Williams began to 
discover new versions of Marxism (he mentions Lukacs, and, 
decisively, Brecht}, and to understand the English Marxism which 
he had criticised so forcefully in Culture_and_Societ~ as only a 
particular variant: ' primarily systematized by Plekhanov, with 
much support from the later work of Engels , and popularised by the 
dominant tendencies in Soviet Marxism' ( 3}. From the arid dogma 
of Marxism as a ' model of fixed and known Marxist positions, which 
i n general had only to be applied, and the corresponding dismissal 
of all other kinds of thinking as non-Marxist, revisionist, neo -
Hegelian, or bourgeois' (3) , the sixties saw its transformation 
i nto a more open enquiry, ' active, developing , unfinished , and 
persistently contentious' (4): 
264 
It was in this situation that I felt the excitement of contact 
with more new Marxist work: the later work of Lukacs, the later 
work of Sartre, the developing work of Goldmann and of 
Althusser, the variable and developing syntheses of Marxism and 
some forms of structuralism. At the same time, within this 
significant new activity, there was further access to older 
work, notably that of the Frankfurt School (in its most 
significant period in the twenties and thirties) and especially 
the work of Walter Benjamin; the extraordinary work of Antonio 
Gramsci; and, as a decisive element of a new sense of 
tradition , newly translated work of Marx and especially the 
Grundrisse. ( 4) 
The story Williams tells in Marxism_and_Literature is, he 
acknowledges, above all a hybrid one in which he is ' concerned to 
see different forms of Marxist thinking as interactive with other 
forms of thinking, rather than as a separated history, either 
sacred or alien '. It is also polemical one. For as well as ' an 
analysis and discussion of key elements and variants of Marxist 
thinking' , the book is also the exposition of Williams's own 
position of cultural materialism. Marxism_and_Literature, in 
other words , continues the trend of Williams's relation to Marxism 
as in equal measure a critical and appropriative one. 
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Marxism_and_Literature 
Any Marxism is, like any Freudianism, likely to be a selective 
interpretation which claims to represent the unity of an author's 
thought through a careful process of selection and elision. What 
are the main elements of Williams's version of Marxism in M~~~i~~ 
and_Literature? At first glance, Williams seems to put to work 
the usual rhetoric of unitary interpretation: 'in the transition 
from Marx to Marxism' is a key phrase which seems to suggest that 
priviliged access to the unity of the author's intentions 
characteristic of any selective interpretation . He returns again 
and again to the terms of Marx's original emphases, and seeks to 
correct the mistaken interpretations of the Marxist traditions. 
He poses his selective interpretation against others and indeed 
openly argues that Marxism_and_Literature is a polemical and not a 
neutral account, his own critique and contribution to Marxist 
cultural theory . 
But where we might see Williams as differing from the usual 
author-centred rhetorics of interpretation is in his selection of 
interpretive focus . For this focus is given by Williams's concern 
with what he calls historical semantics, with the keywords which 
tend to structure our thinking and analysis. In the first 
instance, Williams is concerned with the semantic field in which 
Marx was working and thinking . He is less concerned with the 
author and more with the keywords of an author's intellectual 
labour. 
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This choice of focus constitutes the specificity of Williams's 
project, and this is immediately apparent if we compare M~~~i§ffi 
and_Literature to the usual accounts of this topic. Williams 
engages at a level of conceptual abstraction, for all his 
commitment to the precisely constituted materiality of any act of 
individual authorship. For in a sense Williams's mode of 
analysis, his historical semantics, his practice of keywords, 
fully acknowledges - and perhaps even goes beyond - Roland 
Barthes's arguments in 'Death of the Author', where 
We now know that a text is not a line of words releasing a 
single 'theological' meaning (the 'message' of the Author-God) 
but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, 
none of them original, blend and clash. The text is a tissue 
of quotations drawn from the innumerable centres of culture. 
(in Lodge 1988: 170) 
He is concerned above all with the blending and clashing of the 
key words of cultural analysis, with concepts which 'fuse and 
confuse the radically different experiences and tendencies of 
[their] formation' (Williams 1977a: 11), in the first instance 
with society, economy and culture. 
For Williams , any Marxist cultural analysis, including the 
fragmentary work of Marx himself, inherits the inherent problems 
of any use of the term 'culture', as well as creating a few of its 
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own. By the nineteenth century, 'culture' may call up and refer 
to several distinctive and even opposing senses: 
The complexity of the concept of 'culture' is then remarkable. 
It became a noun of 'inner' process, specialized to its 
presumed agencies in the 'intellectual life' and 'the arts' 
It became also a noun of general process, specialized to its 
presumed configurations in 'whole ways of life'. It played a 
crucial role in definitions of ' the arts' and 'the humanities', 
from the first sense. It played an equally crucial role in 
definitions of the ' human sciences and the 'social sciences 
in the second sense. Each tendency is ready to deny any proper 
use of the concept to the other, in spite of many attempts at 
reconciliation. ( 17) 
In its first sense, culture refers to a certain ' inner' 




sense , it one which refers to a general process, 
defines ' whole ways of life' . Williams seems to believe that 
there is a possible 'reconciliation' of the two uses in a single 
and unitary concept of culture; or that it is necessary to find 
one. He argues that it is certainly necessary to find one if one 
is to have a Marxist theory of culture. Its absence is a striking 
problem for any Marxist theory of culture: 
The problem of knowing, at the outset, whether this would be a 
theory of ' the arts and intellectual life' in their relations 
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to 'society', or a theory of the social process which creates 
specific and different 
problem. (17-18) 
ways of life', is only the most obvious 
The story he tells is one of transition - from what Marx tried 
to say to what the selective tradition of Marxism has made of what 
he tried to say. It is a tragically ironic story, as what 1s 
repeatedly emphasised is the ways in which Marx's original 
insights were consistently refocused. The interpretation is then 
posed as 1n some sense a restorative one: the return to the 
complex unity of the original insight into the 'indissoluble 
unity' of the 'whole social process'. I n f a c t , i t i s an 
interpretation which brings together the two main currents of 
thought which have stood against bourgeois ideology of 
civilization since the late eighteenth century: 
The two decisive responses of a modern kind were, first, the 
idea of culture, offering a different sense of human growth and 
development , and second, the idea of socialism, offering a 
social and historical criticism of and alternative to 
' civilization' and ' civil society' as fixed and achieved 
conditions. (14) 
Thus , while he 1s willing to state that Marxism is simply ' the 
most important intellectual advance in all modern thought' (19) 
it still somehow comes second to the culture and society tradition 
identified by Williams himself in 1958. Centrally, Marxism 
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repeated the emphasis on ' man making his own history' which is 
identified as the decisive heritage of Vico's work, but brought to 
it a new and transforming attention to material history: 
The original notion of ' man making his own history ' was given a 
new radical content by this emphasis on ' man making himself' 
through producing his own means of life. For all its 
difficulties in detailed demonstration this was the most 
important intellectual advance in all modern social thought. 
It offered the possibility of overcoming the dichotomy between 
' society' and ' nature', and of discovering new constitutive 
relationships between 'society' and ' economy'. As a 
specification of the basic element of the social process of 
culture it was a recovery of the wholeness of history . It 
inaugurated the decisive inclusion of that material history 
which had been excluded from the ' so-called history of 
civilization, which is all a history of religions and states' 
( 1 9 ) 
In this sense, Marxism promises the healing of an old wound and 
division. It is this healing - this reconciliation - which 
Williams sees as the key feature of what Marxism has to offer to 
the theory and understanding of culture as a whole. And yet the 
account is at the same time concerned to describe the ways in 
which this original possibility and emphasis were lost . This loss 
c omes through most strongly in his discussion of two central and 
related concepts of Marxist cultural theory , the concepts of 
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ideology and hegemony, and particularly in the ways in which he 
plays the one off against the other. 
Ideology 
I have argued elsewhere that a key component of Williams's 
polemical address in Marxism_and_Literature was the work in 
British cultural analysis in the seventies which had largely been 
inspired by the work of Louis Althusser (Higgins 1986). Locally, 
Althusser's work on ideology, with its provocative coupling of 
Freud and Marx, had been used as the basis for a new ' materialist' 
approach to film studies, with film understood as a 'specific 
signifying practice' always intricately involved with questions of 
~q 
ideology and interpellation .. A significant part of Williams's 
work in the seventies took the form of an often indirect dialogue 
with ~£r~~g theory, and it was undoubtedly ~£r~~g~§ emphasis on 
signification which led Williams to a new interest in ideas and 
~o 
concepts of language . . Marxism_and_Literature traces a 
polemical history of the uses of the term in ways which highlight 
what he sees as the current problems with the concept. 
For Williams, many of the current problems with the concept of 
ideology to have been present in the the term from the very 
beginning . Antoine Destutt de Tracy, one of the leading figures 
in the new Institut de France, charged with the task of 
revitalising France's entire education system on the new 
revolutionary principles of the 1790s, coined the term in his 
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Elements _d'Ideologie of 1801. Here it refers to the 'science of 
ideas' which, traced back from Condillac through to Locke, he 
argued could be the basis of a whole new approach to education, 
learning and scientific progress. The ' natural history of ideas' 
meant that psychology could now be analysed in the truly 
scientific terms of biology, totally replacing the old reliance on 
religion as the source for moral, social and political 
theory. 
This essentially Enlightenment project was immediately 
challenged by conservative and religious opponents. Williams 
cites one such opponent - the Vicomte de Bonald - in order to make 
a theoretical point. De Bonald, turning to Rousseau rather than 
to Locke for his language theory, drew attention to the passive 
elements in de Tracy's theory, ' its preoccupation', as Williams 
puts it, ' with "signs and their influence on thought'" (56). As 
we shall see, De Bonald's critique prefigures the contemporary 
theoretical problems which Williams had with the structuralist 
theory of Althusser and others. Summing up , he concludes : 
The rejection of metaphysics was a characteristic gain, 
confirmed by the development of precise and systematic 
empirical enquiry. At the same time the effective exclusion of 
any social dimension - both the practical exclusion of social 
relationships implied in the model of ' man' and ' the world ', 
and the characteristic displacement of necessary social 
relationships to a formal system, whether the ' laws of 
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psychology' or language as a 'system of signs ' - was a deep 
and apparently irrecoverable loss and distortion. (57) 
The phrase ' apparently irrecoverable' indicates the polemical 
stake of Williams's own argument: his criticisms of the idea of 
language as a purely formal system of signs was the essence of the 
new high structuralism - a variant of the same old mistake - but 
apparently in the sense that the stake of his own study is to make 
that recovery possible. As Hegel had noted, ideology was in this 
sense ' a reduction of thought to sensation' (cited in Larrain , 
1979 : 28) . 
De Bonald ' s criticisms put into philosophical form Napoleon's 
political rejection of the ide'ologues . Though an initial member 
of the Institut, and a supporter of its aims in the 1790s, 
Napoleon turned against them in the early 1800s . In 1802, 
Chautreaubriand signalled the changing political climate by 
dedicating the first edition of his Le_genie_du _ christianisme to 
Napoleon: in 1803 Napoleon abolished the most directly challenging 
section of the Institut , that dealing with moral and political 
studies. By 1812 he was ready to tell the State Council that : 
It is to the doctrine of the ideologues - to this diffuse 
metaphysics, which in a contrived manner seeks to find the 
primary causes and on this foundation would erect the 
legislation of peoples , instead of adapting the laws to a 
knowledge of the human neart and of the lessons of history - to 
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which one must attribute all the misfortunes which have 
befallen our beautiful France (cited in Williams 1977a: 57). 
For Napoleon , ·ideology became a ' nickname .. . used to distinguish 
every species of theory' (ibid . ) which didn't rest on the solid 
grounds of self-interest . 
Marx, who had also criticised the Institut members, though from 
a different perspective, took over these now pejorative 
connotations of the term in the very title of his and Engels's 
critique of the Young Hegelians , The_German _ ldeolog~ (1846). More 
importantly, in addition to this polemical and pejorative sense, 
ideology began to take on a new theoretical distinctness for 
Marxism in this important text. Williams compares passages from 
Jbg_Qgr~~~-lggQlQg~ and from Q~pii~l_l in order to illustrate and 
exemplify some of the tensions between this new theory and its 
polemical context. 
The first is taken from Marx and Engels's The_German_Ideolog~ 
(1846), generally held to be the first work in which the 
e s sentials of historical materialism first make their appearance 
in the Marxist oeuvre in a concerted critique of Left - Hegelians 
such as Ludwig Feuerbach , Max Stirner and Bruno Bauer. Marx -
originally a member of the Doktorklub in Berlin where the Young 
Hegelians met and argued, a friend and correspondent of Bruno 
Bauer , and deeply impressed by the work of Ludwig Feurbach - had 
learned much from them. His turn away from them marks a decisive 
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moment in his own intellectual development. 
passage from early in the mammoth study: 
Williams quotes a 
We do not set out from what men say , imagine , conceive, nor 
from men as narrated , thought of, imagined, conceived , in order 
to arrive at men in the flesh. We set our from real, active 
men , and on the basis of their real life-processes we 
demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and 
echoes of this life-process . The phantoms formed in the human 
brain are also, necessarily , sublimates of their material life-
process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material 
premisses (sic). Morality, religion, metaphysics , all the rest 
of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness , 
thus no longer retain the semblance of independence . (cited in 
Williams 1977a: 59) 
Williams finds two different emphases at work in the passage. 
as through the book as a whole. First , there is the important 
theoreti c al point that thinking always take place in a specifi c 
material and ideological context ; it can have no ' semblanc e of 
independe n c e' : thi s is judged ' entirely reasonable ' . And a great 
deal of The _German _ Ideolog~ is devoted to showing the ways in 
which the idealist arguments of the Young Hegelians - what they 
took to be the solutions to Germany's social and political 
problems - were in fact no more than the ver y symptoms of tho s e 
problems . Thus Bruno Bauer ' s sincere belief that his own 
philosophical positions were revolutionary could only be held 
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through a mystificatory and self-defeating over-valuation of the 
real social impact of his own writings. Despite the sincerity of 
his own convictions, his removal from his university position was 
never going to be the tinder which sparked off a full-scale social 
~\ 
revolution. For all their idealist ferocity, the Young 
Hegelians were never going to be in a position to lead a social 
revolution. 
At the same time, Williams is dismayed - just as he had been in 
Culture_and_Societ~ - by the implications of the recourse to a 
pseudo-scientific vocabulary in the passage: 




is simplistic, and has in repetition been 
It belongs to the naive dualism of ' mechanical 
in which the idealist separation of ' ideas' and 
' material reality' has been repeated, but with its priorities 
reversed. The emphasis on consciousness as inseparable from 
conscious existence, and then on conscious existence as 
inseparable from material social processes , is in effect lost 
in the use of this deliberately degrading vocabulary. (59) 
While this 'deliberately degrading' vocabulary answers a polemical 
need. this same polemical emphasis comes to threaten the essential 
balance of the argument as a whole . If ' circumstances make men 
just as much as men make circumstances' (59), it can also be said 
that men make circumstances just as much as circumstances make 
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men. The vocabulary of an essentially passive human response -
used to highlight the failings of the Left-Hegelians - is in 
contradiction with the philosophy of revolutionary practice or 
praxis which is the centre of The _German_Ideolog~, and which many 
argue is the main new element in Marx's thinking in this 
'>"l.. 
period . . 
Against this over-emphasis on human passivity, Williams poses a 
paragraph from Q~~ii~l. in which the distinctively creative 
character of human labour is figured through a bold comparison: 
What distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is 
this. that the architect raises his structure in imagination 
before he erects it in reality. At the end of every labour-
process , we get a result that already existed in the 
imagination of the labourer at its commencement. (cited 
in Williams 1977a: 59) 
Here consciousness is correctly seen ' as part of the human 
material social process' ( 59); and, he emphasises, 
its products in ' ideas' are then as much a part of this process 
as material products themselves. This, centrally, was the 
thrust of Marx's whole argument, but the point was lost ... 
What they were centrally arguing was a new way of seeing the 
total relationships ... In a polemical response to the abstract 
history of ideas or of consciousness they made their main point 
277 
but in one decisive area lost it again. This confusion is the 
source of the naive reduction, in much subsequent Marxist 
thinking, of consciousness, imagination, art, and ideas to 
' reflexes', 'echoes', ' phantoms', and ' sublimates', and then of 
a profound confusion in the concept of ' ideology' (59-60) 
This ' loss', this ' profound confusion' comes through in the 
restricted sense of ideology as false consciousness , and the 
implied model of human subjectivity as passive, static, receptive 
only: the main weakness of Althusser's own theory. 
Closely linked with this is the sense of ideology as 'false 
consciousness and the associated emphasis on the idea of a 
scientific Marxism as the source of a ' true consciousness' . In 
one way, argues Williams, this is to mistake the idea of science . 
For Marxism science is best understood as closer to the original 
German sense of any systematic knowledge or organized learning: 
Marx's work can be understood as above all ' critical and 
historical' (63). rather than in the polemical sense of science as 
natural science deployed by Engels as a 'polemical catchword' 
(63). In this 's trong' sense of science which is most dangerous 
to Marxism . It ends up in the ~ P~!Q~! assumption of a 
"positive" method' which is not subject to self scrutiny or self-
criticism, and this ends up as ' either a circular demonstration or 
a familiar partisan claim that others are biased but that , by 
definition, we are not' (64}. For Williams. this is simply ' the 
fool's way out ' of a genuinely difficult problem. 
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In the weaker sense of scientific enquiry as any detailed and 
connected knowledge, methodically applied to the world, Williams 
is sure that this can indeed lead to the challenging of received 
assumptions and points of view. Indeed, a first principle of any 
genuine enquiry comes through in the call to examine from the 
outset theorganising assumptions, concepts and points of view 
which organise any body of knowledge. When this is done, we are 
led away from the over-general and dogmatic 'epochal' analysis of 
a Christopher Caudwell to a genuinely histori~al analysis, one in 
which ideology: 
reverts to a specific and practical dimension: the complicated 
processes within which men 'become' (are) conscious of their 
interests and their conflicts. The categorical short-cut to an 
(abstract) distinction between ' true' and 'false' 
consciousness is then effectively abandoned, as in all practice 
it has to be . (68) 
The way forward is actually to be found in Volosinov's M~r~i 2~ 
and_the _Philoso2h~_of _Language (1929), with its emphasis on the 
ideological as ' the process of the production of meaning through 
signs, and ' ideology' is taken as the dimension of social 
experience in which meanings and values are produced ... some form 
of this emphasis on signification as a central social process is 
necessary (70) . 
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The chapter began by distinguishing three versions of ideology: 
1) a system of beliefs characteristic of a particular class or 
group; 2) a system of illusory beliefs which can be contrasted 
with true or scientific knowledge; and 3) the general process of 
the production of meanings and ideas. By the end of the chapter, 
it is that third sense associated with Volosinov's work - which is 
seen as the more useful, especially since it ' undercuts' (55) the 
other two, and inhibits their tendency to result in the 
unproductive - and dangerous - dogmatism which Williams always 
associated with the failed Marxism of his youth , and which he how 
saw as seeking a return in the arid scientism of Althusser and his 
followers. 
If the emphasis on ideology as the name for the general process 
of the production of meanings and ideas , a ' radical semiotics' is 
a c cepted , is ideology likely to remain a central concept for 
cultural theory? The second section of the book - ' Cultural 
Theory ' - works to answer this question in the negative. Williams 
works through the main associated concepts in literary and 
cultural analysis - base and superstructure theory, concepts of 
determination, reflection and mediation, typification and homology 
- unpicking the ' scientist' thread which constantly reduces 
cultural intellectual and artistic production to a secondary 
phenomena . In the end, he argues, the cultural critic is likely 
to find more use in Gramsci's concept of hegemony . 
280 
Cultural Theory 
The first chapters of Part Two of Marxism_and_Literature repeat 
and amplify the main arguments of the 'Base and Superstructure in 
Marxist Cultural Theory' essay and there is no need to follow the 
extra detail of the arguments in any detail. Irony is again the 
dominant figure, as Williams insists on the ways in which Marx's 
original emphasis on the complexity of the social totality, the 
necessity for understanding it as 'an indissoluble social 
process ', was lost, transformed beyond recognition in the hasty 
process of codifying a more dogmatic Marxism. Thus he bemoans 
how, in ' the transition from Marx to Marxism, and then in the 
development of expository and didactic formulations, the words 
used in the original arguments were projected, first, as if they 
were precise concepts , and second, as if they were descriptive 
terms for observable "areas" of social life' (77). In this way 
base and superstructure theorists such as Plekhanov soon ' lost 
sight of the key processes - not abstract relations but 
constitutive processes - which it should have been the special 
functions of historical materialism to emphasize' (81). With 
regard to the key concept of determination, Marx's own emphasis on 
the necessity for historical objectivity gave way to the abstract 
objectivism of economism. 
bitter irony' : 
Once again , Williams noted how, ' with 
a critical and revolutionary doctrine was changed, not only in 
practice but at this level of principle, into the very forms of 
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passivity and reification against which an alternative sense of 
' determination' had set out to operate' ( 8 6) . 
In similar fashion, the crucial concept of 'productive forces' was 
soon restricted to idea of the economy alone, a reduction which 
Williams reads as a reduction to the bourgeois sense of the 
production of commodities for a market, rather than the truly 
Marxist sense in which the productive forces need to be understood 
on the level of politics , in relation to the'direct material 
production of "politics"' ( 93). ' From castles and palaces and 
churches to prisons and workhouses and schools' writes Williams, 
'f rom weapons of war to a controllable press': 
any ruling class, in variable ways, though always materially, 
produces a social and political order .... These are never 
!>> 
superstructural activities. (92-93) 
And again , with the concepts of reflection and mediation, 
typification and homology, he argues for the necessity of the 
recognition of culture and cultural processes as active processes 
in social reproduction , and not reflective ones. The problems are 
seen differently , he argues , ' from the beginning ' 
if we see language and signification as indissoluble elements 
of the material and social process itself, involved all the 
time in production and reproduction. ( 99) 
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Even great thinkers in the Marxist tradition - Georg Lukacs and 
Lucien Goldmann, Theodor Adorno and Walter Benjamin, though they 
all came at times very close to recognising the primacy and 
positivity of culture, all failed, in the end, to fully grasp the 
implications of this, blinkered as they are by the still dominant 
metaphors of the base and superstructure argument, constrained by 
the scientistic emphases on 'false' versus ' true' consciousness. 
For Williams, only one thinker manages to escape the pitfalls of 
most Marxist cultural theory: Antonio Gramsci. 
Hegemony 
Gramsci's work, and particularly his concept of hegemony, 
represents for Williams ' one of the turning-points in Marxist 
~~ 
cultural theory' (108). · If anything can repair the losses 
accrued in the transition from Marx to Marxism, it is the concept 
of hegemony - a concept which also brings together what Williams 
had earlier called the ' two decisive responses' to bourgeois 
ideology - socialism itself, broadly understood, and the culture 
and society tradition which Williams had outlined in 1958 (1977a: 
14). For hegemony is a concept 
which at once includes and goes beyond two powerful earlier 
concepts: that of ' culture' as a 'whole social process ', in 
which men define and shape their whole lives; and that of 
' ideology', in any of its Marxist senses , in which a system of 
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meanings and values is the expression or projection of a 
particular class interest. (108} 
I t goes beyond culture - and can therefore correct, at least by 
implication, some of the faults spotted 1n Williams's own works by 
critics like Thompson and Eagleton - in its attention to the 
' specific distributions of power and interest' which are always at 
work within culture. And it goes beyond ideology because of its 
recognition of the 'wholeness' of the social process, and its 
' refusal to equate consciousness with the articulate formal system 
wh i ch can be and ordinarily is abstracted as "ideology''' (109} as 
in the case of Althusser. Williams explains: 
It of course does not exclude the articulate and formal 
meanings , values and beliefs which a dominant class develops 
and propqgates. But it does not equate these with 
consciousness , or rather it does not reduce consciousness to 
them. Instead it sees the relations of domination and 
subordination, in their forms as practical consciousness, as in 
effect a saturation of the whole process of living - not only 
of political and economic activity, nor only of manifest social 
a c ti v it y, but of the whole substance of lived identities and 
relationships , to such a depth that the pressures and limits of 
what can ultimately be seen as a specific economic , political, 
and cultural s y stem seem to most of us the pressures and limits 
of simple experience and common sense ... . It is a lived system 
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of meanings and values - constitutive and constituting - which 
as they are experienced as practices appear as reciprocally 
confirming. (109-110) 
When seen in this way, 'the whole question of class rule, and of 
opposition to it, is transformed' (110): 
Gramsci's emphasis on the creation of an alternative hegemony, 
by the practical connection of many different forms of 
struggle, including those not easily recognizable as and indeed 
not primarily 'political' and 'economic', this leads to a much 
more profound and more active sense of revolutionary activity 
in a highly developed society than the persistently abstract 
models derived from very different historical situations. (110-
111) 
And similarly , 'there is a whole different way of seeing cultural 
activity , both as tradition and as practice' (111) - once again, 
not as secondary superstructural effects of some given base, but 
as active constituents of a whole social order . As Williams 
emphasises: ' A lived hegemony is always a process . 
except analytically, a system or a structure' (112). 
can hegemony be singular: 
It is not, 
And neither 
it does not just passively exist as a form of dominance . It 
has continually to be renewed, recreated, defended, and 
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modified. It is also continually resisted, limited, altered, 
challenged by pressures not at all its own. (112) 
Thus Williams would , in the end, and in a futher detotalising 
move, prefer to refer to the hegemonic rather than to hegemony: 
The reality of any hegemony, 1n the extended political and 
cultural sense , is that, while by definition it is always 
dominant , it 1s never either total or exclusive. (113). 
This is particularly visible in the history of cultural production 
itself, where Williams returns to his own concept of the selective 
tradition as · a deliberately and selective and connecting process 
which offers a historical and cultural ratification of a 
contemporary order' (116); and the related emphasis on the 
coincidence and conflict between dominant, residual and emergent 
forces in any single historical moment . 
often quoted moment , 
As he puts it, 1n an 
no_ mode_of _2roduction_and_therefore_no_dominant _social _ order 
and_therefore _no_dominant_culture _ever_in_realit~_includes_or 
exhausts _all _ human _2ractice i_human _ energ~i _ and_human_intention. 
( 1 2 5 ) 
And all of this - what has been summed up as the lessons of 
Marxism's ' alternative tradition' - comes to bear on the renewal 
of Williams's own innovatory concept of structure of feeling. 
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Though it is as well to remember that 'concept' may not be quite 
the right word to describe Williams's use of the term. In fact, 
any survey of its appearance in his work will find that it is 
deployed in a number of very different ways across his writing as 
a whole, and seems to come to acquire - or acquire the need for -
conceptual rather than merely descriptive status rather through 
its repeated use than through any consistent theoretical 
exposition. Hence Williams's admission that he has 'never been 
very happy' with the phrase, though he keeps coming back to it 
' from the actual experience of literary analysis rather than any 
satisfaction with the concept itself' (1979: 159). The centrality 
- and uncertainty - of the term reflects many of the tensions in 
~$ 
Williams's whole relation to Marxism. 
Structures of Feeling 
As we saw in Chapter Two, the idea of structure of feeling 
came into existence as an alternative to the Marxist emphasis on 
ideology at work in thinkers such as Christopher Caudwell . 
Williams's own detailed work on drama had left him very 
dissatisfied with the epochal application of ideology to the 
history of drama , and the phrase 'structure of feeling' was 
introduced in the Preface_to_Film in 1954 as a direct alternative 
to base and superstructure theory. After that, it returned with 
increasing explanatory emphasis throughout the main body of 




How does Williams construct his new account of his trademark 
concept in Marxism_and_Literature? The introductory paragraphs 
outline what he sees as the central problem facing all analysts of 
cultural expression: 'the basic error' remains 'the reduction of 
the social to fixed forms' (129). 
For common to both Marxism and Literature is a tendency to 
think cultural process through an opposition between the social 
and the personal. For Marxists, implies Williams, the social is 
seen as given or fixed in some way and this is apparent in the 
ways in which crude theories of ideology place and understand the 
history of cultural expression as the superstructural reflection 
or effect of the economic base, the 'secondary evidence of changed 
social and economic relations between and within classes' (131). 
In its turn , and in its own crude forms, Literature has tended to 
privilege the personal in the guise of ' the human imagination' as 
somehow free from determination, as accessing a realm of 
initiative and creativity ordinarily unavailable. Against these, 
he argues that the social is best understood as the dimension in 
which people experience and resolve the pressures of determination 
in ways which always vary specifically , from one group or 
individual to another , and from one historical moment to another. 
These pressures may be conscious or unconscious , and may in the 
end be resisted or prove determining: the outcome is never decided 
in advance, because the resolution always (for the agent) takes 
place in the present tense. ' Structure of feeling ' is then the 
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concept which tries to focus on this present tense experience as 
opposed to notions of ideology or world-view which tend to reduce 
' practical consciousness' to frozen subjection. 
argues Williams, are 
What's at stake, 
meanings and values as they are actively lived and felt, and 
the relations between these and formal or systematic beliefs 
are in practice variable (including historically variable), 
over a range from formal assent with private dissent to the 
more nuanced interaction between selected and interpreted 
beliefs and acted and justified experiences . (132) 
' Feeling ' is then used to capture the mobility, delicacy and 
intricacy of this whole interactive process, with its 
' characteristic elements of impulse, restraint, and tone' and its 
' specifically affective elements of consciousness and 
relationships ' ( 132) . This is 'practical consciousness of a 
present kind, in a living and interrelating continuity' (132) 
The word Williams deliberately avoids here is the keyword of 
Althusserian and post-Althusserian debate , subjectivity. 
is clear that what is at stake in the whole discussion of 
structure of feeling - though never named as such - is the 
For it 
question of the subject. It would , of course, be easy to read 
William's reference to and insistence on ' presence' , in this 
chapter and elsewhere in Marxism _and_Literature, as symptomatic of 
his outdated humanism, and as a sign of his lack of theoretical 
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sophistication by later standards. And it is hard to imagine that 
Williams's use of the term isn't provocatively intertextual. 
Nonetheless, despite his use of a term which forms part of the 
official anathemata of Derrida's thought, Williams's actual 
argument around it comes surprisingly close to some of the main 
critical points Derrida himself sought to establish. Indeed, it 
is with the discussion of 'presence' that Williams seeks to 
justify the need for his idea of the 'structure of feeling', and 
this does offer something of a distinctive development - or at 
least framing - of Williams's founding arguments, though these are 
~"=>-
al so present. 
At the same time, these fluid subjective feelings are alw~ys 
related to some larger structure, 'a set, with specific internal 
relations, at once interlocking and in tension' as a part of a 
social experience 'which is still !Q ErQQ~~~·. In this sense, 
' structure of feeling ' 1s somehow prefigurative: once it is fully 
formed, it 1s no longer a structure of feeling and ' a new 
structure of feeling will usually already have begun to form, in 
the true social present' ( 132). It 1s a ' cultural hypothesis' 
which best fits the available evidence of cultural expression, and 
Williams's main point is , as always, to stress the primary nature 
of cultural expression; 
as a matter of cultural theory this 1s a way of defining forms 
and conventions in art and literature as inalienable elements 
of a social material process: not by derivation from other 
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social forms and pre-forms, but as social formation of a 
specific kind which may in turn be seen as the articulation 
(often the not fully available articulation) of structures of 
feeling which as living processes are much more widely 
experienced. ( 133) 
This large - and somewhat confusing - claim is a familiar one. 
Literature can present somehow more substantial evidence of 
historical process than the dry facts and statistics of - for 
example - the ordinary historian, of, for that matter , the 
abstract conceptualisations of the sociologist. Structure of 
feeling is anticipatory, and not merely reflective of social 
change . It presents ' in solution' a social consciousness which 
has not as yet fully emerged. This is the very centre of 
Williams's important reminder that ' [p]ractical consciousness is 
almost always different from official consciousness' (130) , and , 
despite the implicit reference to the recently discovered work of 
Volosinov , goes all the way back to Williams's original 
formulations in Preface _ to_Film. Nonetheless, the theoretical 
dimension , which brings into play the linguistic dimension, and 
the differences between inner and social speech, is of 
considerable value against the rather one-dimensional accounts of 
linguistic determinism which seemed to be currently available in 
British post-structuralism. 
Williams is certainly right 1n his basic intuition - to steer 
clear of the Scylla of superstructural determination by a too 
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narrowly conceived idea of an 'economic' base - and the Charybdis 
of literary idealism - that the individual imagination can always 
transcend its circumstances. But in the end he falls into 
precisely the trap he had spotted with regard to base and 
superstructure theory when he rightly remarked that a mere phrase 
or figure had assumed too great an explanatory task. 
Unfortunately, Williams chose to set one phrase - structure of 
feeling - against another - determination of superstructure by 
economic base. In the end, there is neither the conceptual focus 
or clarity necessary to make Williams's own phrase more than a 
very suggestive one. Ironically, 'structure of feeling' is still 
itself a phrase which betokens a thought 'in solution' rather than 
one fully 'precipitated' - and articulated - as a concept. 
Nonetheless, at the centre of the new account is no longer 
'consciousness' 
consciousness 
as it was in 1958, but the marxisant ' practical 
derived from Marx's use of the term in The_German 
In addition, this new 'pract ical' consciousness is 
deliberately and significantly related {O 
(.llol11S;t\Ol1 llA1.(]: 116-1 J 




consciosness , insists 
is almost always different from official consciousness, and 
this is not only a matter of relative freedom or control. For 
practical consciousness is what is actually being lived, and 
not only what it is thought is being lived. Yet the actual 
alternative to the received and produced fixed forms is not 
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silence: not the absence, the unconscious, which bourgeois 
culture has mythicized. It is a kind of feeling and thinking 
which is indeed social and material, but each in an embryonic 
phase before it can become fully articulate and defined 
exchange. Its relations with the already articulate and 
defined are then exceptionally complex. (131) 
Exceptionally complex , and requiring some considerable attention 
to the structures of language, the possibilities of expression and 
repression at work in any language system. In Politics_and 
~~ii~r~. Williams refers to Volosinov's distinction between 
manifest speech and inner speech to argue much the same claim -
historically there are certain language situations which are 
repressive. People talk of language as a means of expression , 
but it is also evidently a means of selection . In certain 
socio - historical circumstances, there are things which could 
not be said, and therefore, in any connecting way, not thought. 
This may help to explain the very common cultural phenomenon of 
an extraordinarily shocking innovation in discourse which yet 
produces elements of recognition. The possibility of a pre -
emergent as well as an emergent structure of feeling 
corresponds ... to this phenomenon. ( 197 9: 182) 
What is clear is that the idea of language itself needs 
considerable attention and scrutiny if the idea of culture is to 
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have any significant explanatory force in an account of social 
and political reproduction . 
As we have seen , and as a number of early reviewers remarked, a 
great deal of what Williams argues in Marxism _and_Literature is 
familiar , both as the summary of recent work like the essay ' Base 
and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory ' , and beyond that, 
of the thinking and arguments of Culture_and_Societ~ in the 
~i 
1950s. · Williams's central emphasis remains the same : the 
insistence on the idea of culture as a way of thinking the social 
t o tality, the refusal of cultural production as a secondary effect 
o f the economic base. While it is correct that the range of 
r e ferences to Marxist cultural theory has significantly increased, 
and that Williams's tone is considerably more welcoming, little 
ha s changed in the substance of his own arguments . Though he is 
now able to refer to a European-wide range of work in what he 
te rmed ' Marxism ' s alternative tradition', what is most notable 
about i t is the way in which it seemed to share Williams ' s own 
emphases on the importance of cultural production to social and 
p o litical reproduction. 
In consequence , I would argue that those who, like Ahmad, seem 
to see a substantial shift in Williams's relations to Marxist 
c ultural theor y in the 1970s are mistaken . As had been the case 
from the beginning , it would be better to see Williams ' s relation 
t o Mar x ism as always an unusual one, with its combination of 
d i sciplinary rejection, political sympathy , conceptual criticism 
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and conceptual support . In the end, Williams's relation to 
Marxism presented a distinctive - but not unusual, in the larger 
discourse of Western Marxism - mixture of the critical and the 
incorporative. 
And all this is reasonably explicit in what was to be 
Williams's final word on the subject, the essay 'Marx on Culture' . 
As always, the very title indicates how Williams has selected the 
idea of culture as the background, he gives himself a slight 
advantage in the contest. The essay adds little to the basic 
elements of his earlier analysis, despite or perhaps because of 
its exclusive focus on Marx's own writings. ' To learn from Marx 
is not to learn formulae or even methods', he insists (1983 : 
224), and in a detailed commentary on passages from The_German 
!Q~QlQg~ and elsewhere, he distinguishes historical from merely 
categorical analysis, arguing that the ' worst consequence' of 
certain readings of Marx has been to mistake the two, ' to the 
neglect of the real social and material history of the production 
of art and ideas' (210). In the end, he writes, 
It is only from the most active senses of the material 
production of culture and of language as a social and material 
process that it is possible to develop the kind of cultural 
theory which can now be seen as necessary, and even central, in 
Marx's most general theory of human production and development . 
That he did not develop such a cultural theory , and indeed that 
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from some more limited formulations and misleading forms of 
'Marxist' cultural theory were developed and propagated, in 
ways that actually blocked the inquiry, must now be 
acknowledged. (1983c: 225) 
And certainly acknowledged 'now', some twenty-five years since 
the general case had first been made. For the critical conclusion 
is very similar to that reached in 1958, where Williams had 
already argued against the 'limited formulations and misleading 
forms of 'Marxist' cultural theory', and for the need to pursue an 
open and less dogmatic inquiry. That the 'limited formulations' 
were now those of French Althusserians rather than the English 
Communist Part of the 1930s changed the obje~t but not the 
substance of the criticism. That he now found allies for his own 
views in Gramsci and Volosinov rather than Caudwell and J.Z. Young 
did not alter the essential case. 
And yet there is one major difference in the articulation of 
Williams's idea of cultural process between 1958 and 1977. This 
is is the concentration and focus on the idea of language. As a 
matter of fact, this emphasis did not come through until the 
writing of the actual text of Marxism_and_Literature itself: the 
original lectures on Marxism and Literature in the 1970s contained 
~q 
no significant references to language. · Once again we can see 
the importance of that oppositional and dialectical strain in 
Williams's thinking. For the new emphasis on language came above 
all from a desire to combat the centrality given to language in 
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the new structuralist and post-structuralist theories which were 
referred to collectively as 'the newly dominant mode of critical 
structuralism'. As he noted in Politics_in_Letters: 
I also particularly didn't want [M~r~i§~-~ng_iit~r~!~r~] to be 
a replay of the unfinished polemic between Marxism and the 
§fr~!in~ of the thirties. In a sense my thrust was much more 
against the limits of the newly dominant mode of critical 
structuralism, because this was what was being taken as Marxist 
literary theory all over Western Europe and North America. 
(Williams 1979: 339) 
It is this 'critical structuralism' which is the major polemical 
target of Marxism_and_Literature, a mode of idealist literary 
study claiming the authority of Marxism and the prestige of 
association with powerful intellectual movements in many other 
*o 
fields' (340) We need to pay particular attention to this 
third aspect, which seemed to Williams to ironically reduplicate 
so many of the worst aspects of the traditional literary criticism 
he had argued against from the very beginning. 
In discussion with Red_Shift soon after the publication of the 
book, Williams drew attention to what he himself saw as a major 
new element in his thinking: 'Marxism does not have a theory of 
language' he noted: 
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It has borrowed certain theories of language from other 
disciplines and other theoretical positions, and because it 
does not have one it goes wrong again and again on this 
question. (Williams 1977b: 15-16) 
and he was enthusiastic about what he regarded as his new 
discovery: 'I've found, I believe, a way of showing that language 
is primary because it is material ... I believe that language is 
the material process of sociality' (16). It is because of this 
new and distinctive attention to the question of language, and the 
ways in which they form the substance of his attack on the new 
'c ritical structuralism', that we need a very careful account of 
the arguments in Chapter Two Part One of the book. 
The Constitutivity of Language 
There are five basic sections to the chapter . The introductory 
section occupies just the first two paragraphs, and states that 
the focus of the account will be on the history of the theory of 
language in relation to the idea of language as activity. The 
second section argues that the eighteenth century is the crucial 
period for the development of the idea of language as activity, 
and concentrates on the ideas which the eighteenth century 
theorists were arguing against to set up their own notions (1977a: 
22-3). Section three examines the development of the argument 
from Vico through Herder and Rousseau and sees how that argument 
was slowly deformed by the objectivist ideology which came to 
298 
dominate lipguistics from William Jones to Saussure (23-28). 
Section four introduces a comparison between the 'objectivism' of 
the emergent discipline of linguistics and the more recent forms 
of structuralist Marxism; it deals with the vicissitudes of the 
idea of language as constitutive in Marxist theory from Marx to 
Marr (28-35). Section 5 examines the work of Volosinov, from 
whose Marxism_and_the_Philosoph~_of_Language as great deal of 
Williams's general arguments are in fact derived. In particular, 
Williams examines Volosinov's emphasis as language as social; and 
the consequent revision of ideas of language as system, of 
language as expression, and of the concept of the sign, which are 
necessitated by this fundamental assertion (35-41). Section 6 , 
the conclusion, points to some problems in Volosinov's own 
account, and looks forward to the development of Vygotsky's work, 
especially in response to Chomsky's emphases on biology, 
competence and performance (41-44). 
The beginning of an essay is often worth attention, and a 
careful analysis of it can often help in understanding an author ' s 
argument as a whole. Williams begins with a statement of his 
central argument: ' A definition of language is always, implicitly 
or explicitly , a definition of human beings in the world' What 
will be offered, in other words, is an assessment of the 
ideological bearing of different theories of language, whether 
they foreground that bearing or not. While Marxism has 
'contributed very little to thinking about language', its two main 
emphases - the idea of language as an activity, the second, the 
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need for a historical account of theories of language themselves -
are worthwhile. Taken together, these can mount a significant 
challenge to what Williams sees as 'relatively static ways of 
thinking about human beings in the world' (21). In other words, 
Williams's own move in this discussion of language theory is to 
parry representations of language which reduce or threaten the 
human subject's capacity for agency and activity in relation to .... , 
the language-system. 
The second section suggests the idea of language as an activity 
began in the eighteenth century 'in close relation to the idea of 
u-"1. 
men having made their own society'. What were theorists such 
LI~ 
Their object was the previously 
dominant Platonist tradition in which '"language" and "reality" 
had been decisively separated' and where attention was focused 
exclusively on the problem of ' the correctness of n~~ing'. This 
was an idealist theory, an inquiry into the constitutive realm of 
'ideas' . 
Against this, a theorist like Vico argued that 'we can have 
full knowledge only of what we can ourselves make or do' (23): 
language is a human creation, indeed something that helps to 
constitute the society in which people live. 'Vico opened a whole 
new dimension ' (23) because of the centrality he gave to the idea 
of language as a human activity, one which was ' positively, a 
distinctively human opening of and opening to the world: not a 
distinguishable or instrumental but a constitutive faculty ' (24). 
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This opposition between instrumental and constitutive capacities 
of language later becomes the crux of Williams's thinking about 
language. 
The third section traces some of the historical development of 
this idea of language as activity, including the ' extraordinary 
advance in empirical knowledge of languages' which took place in 
the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Once again, in 
keeping with the starting assertion that representations of 
language - even in theoretical terms - always imply a political 
representation of the world, Williams stresses the ways in which 
this apparently neutral scientific activity can best be understood 
in particular relation to ' the dynamic development of Western 
societies in a period of extending colonialism' (25). This is the 
context which informs that the work of a linguist like William 
Jones in India , and Williams deploys the insights of Volosinov to 
~~ 
argue his basic point. ' What was characteristically studied in 
comparative philology' he notes 
was a body of ~~QQ~Qe of language: in effect, centrally, the 
alien written word . . . On the one hand there was the highly 
productive application of modes of systematic 
observation,classification and analysis. On the other hand 
there was the largely unnoticed consequence of the privileged 
situation of the observer : that he was observing (of course 
scientifrically) within a differential mode of contact with 
alien mat erial: in texts, the records of a 2~e! history; in 
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speech, the activitytf an alien people in subordinate 
(colonialist) relations to the whole activity of the dominant 
people within which the observer gained his privilege. Ihi~ 
g~fini~g_situation_inevitabl~_reduced_an~_sense_of_language_as 
active l~ _and_2resen t l~ _ cons ti tut i ve. ( 26} 
In other words the colonialist situation of the observing linguist 
reinforced the tendency to ' objectivism', and threatened to reduce 
the idea of language away from its idea as activity towards its 
definition as a system. 'Language-use' he stresses 'could then 
hardly be seen as itself active and constitutive' (27). In the 
development of comparative linguistics: 
Language came to be seen as a fixed, objective , and 1n these 
senses ' given' system, which had theoretical and practical 
priority over what were described as ' utterances' (later as 
' performance ') . Thus the living speech of human beings 1n 
their specific social relationships in the world was 
theoretically reduced to instances and examples of a system 
which lay beyond them . (27} 
And Saussure 1s the main twentieth century inheritor of this 
reified understanding of language, an understanding of language in 
which the early sense of language as activity has been decisively 
cC" • 1 0 s t .(%-) 
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We might note that at this point in the argument, Williams 
looks aside to 'an important and often dominant tendency in 
Marxism itself': the idea of society as 'a controlling "social" 
system which is~ E[!Q[! inacessible to "individual" acts of will 
and intelligence' (28). Williams is undoubtedly thinking here of 
Althusser's theory of Marxism, and in particular, his development 
of the theory of ideology which - as I argue elsewhere - rests on 
just such a conception of language (Higgins 1986). For this 
glancing aside is in fact Williams's way of making his own 
discussion of language a contribution to the ongoing struggle over 
representations and definitions of ' human beings in the world' . 
The polemical centre of his arguments is the structuralist Marxism 
of Louis Althusser, though that polemic is curiously marginalised 
in the chapter - and indeed, in the book - as a whole. Williams 
is in any case very quick to move from this polemical moment to a 
brief account of Marxist work on language, and this constitutes 
the fourth section of the chapter. 
Here there is a difficult intellectual knot. Marxist thinking 
is ' wholly compatible with the emphasis on language as practical, 
constitutive activity' (29) to be found in Vico; but it also opens 
up some of major problems regarding the meaning of the key idea of 
language as ' constitutive' There is, writes Williams, 
an obvious danger .. . of making language ' primary' and 
' original', not in the acceptable sense that it is a 
necessary part of the very act of human self-creation, but in 
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the related and available sense of language as !h~ founding 
element in humanity: 'in the beginning was the Word'. It is 
precisely the sense of language as an indissoluble element of 
human self-creation that gives any acceptable meaning to its 
description as 'constitutive'. To make it 2~~Q~~~ all other 
connected activities is to claim something quite different. 
( 2 9) . 
This takes us to the very core of Williams's objections to 
most thinking on language, where the main problem lies in the 
conception of the subject which underlies the theory. Here the · 
exclusion of activity, of making, from the category of 
' objective reality' left it contemplated only by ' subjects', 
who might in one version be ignored in the observation of 
objective reality - the active 'subject' replaced by the 
neutral - observer' . . . ( 32J 
- precisely the ideology he had fought against in The_Countr~_and 
1h~_Qi1~. as we saw in the previous chapter. And this same 
exclusion of activity is to be found in contemporary communication 
theory, which in constantly reducing language to the status of an 
instrument, ignores the real and complex force of language as 
constitutive. 
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It is in the neglected work of Vygotsky and Volosinov that some 
way out of this impasse may be found. Their work challenges the 
usual opposition between expressive and systematic ideas of 
language, in which the subject is either seen as all-powerful, or 
totally subdued, and brings into focus the constant negotiation 
between system and expression which is the main force of a fully 
social understanding of language. 'Volosinov argued that meaning 
was necessarily a social action, dependent on a social 
relationship', emphasises Williams (36). This focuses crucially 
on the idea of sign which is never for Volosinov merely an 
arbitrary element in a Saussurean 'system of signs', but is rather 
always a socially activated element in such a living system. For 
Volosinov: 
signs can exist only when this active social relationship is 
posited. The usable sign - the fusion of formal element and 
meaning - is a product ofthis continuing speech-activity 
between real individuals who are in some continuing social 
relationship. The 'sign' is in this sense their product, but 
not simply their past product, as in the reified accounts of an 
already-given language system. The real communicative 
'products' which are usable signs are, on the contrary, living 
evidence of a continuing social process, into which individuals 
are born and within which they are shaped, but to which they 
then actively contribute, in a continuing process. This is at 
once their socialization and their individuation: the 
connected aspects of a single process which the alternative 
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theories of 'system' and ' expression' had divided and 
dissociated. We then find not a reified ' language' and 
' society' but an active social language. Nor is this language 
a simple ' reflection' or ' expression' of 'material reality'. 
What we have, rather, is a grasping of this reality through 
language, which as practical consciousness is saturated by and 
saturates all social activity, including productive activity. 
( 37) 
In the end, argues Williams, it is ' of and to this experience -
the lost middle ground between the abstract entities, 'subject' 
and ' object', on which the propositions of idealism and orthodox 
materialism are erected - that language speaks' (37-8) . And he 
elaborates on Volosinov's distinction between sign and signal to 
push this point further, stressing the ' multi-accentuality of the 
sign (38-9): 
The signal, in this sense, is fixed, exchangeable , colle c tive 
property ; characteristically it is easily both imported and 
exported. The true signifying element of language must from 
the beginning have a different capacity: to become an i~~g~ 
~ig~ . part of pract ical consciousness. Thus in addition to its 
social and material existence between actual individuals, the 
sign is also part of a verbally constituted consciousness which 
allows individuals to use signs of their own initiative, 
whether 1n acts of social c ommunication or in practices which, 
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not being manifestl~ social, can be interpreted as personal or 
private. (40) 
This emphasis allows one to escape some of the dead-end arguments 
which Williams found in the new 'critical structuralism', with its 
reliance on a certain reading of structural linguistics. The 
central point is always to resist the 'reduction of the key fact 
of social determination to the idea of determination by a system' 
( 4 0) . In conclusion, writes Williams 
We can add, to the necessary definition of the biological 
faculty of language as constitutive an equally necessary 
definition of language development - at once individual and 
social - as historically and socially constituting. What we 
can then define is a dialectical process: the changing 
practical consciousness of human beings. (43-4) 
The changing practical consciousness of human beings. That had 
been Williams's emphasis from the start - a focus he had found 
present but blurred in Marx ' s own writing, and dissolved to the 
point of near invisibility in the history of the transition from 
Marx to Marxism which followed. 
Conclusion 
It is hardly surprising that the main response of Williams ' s 
committed Marxist readers was to question the questions he posed 
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to orthodox Marxism. Where, it has been asked, is Williams's 
acknowledgement of the importance of the state to his discussions 
of social change? What is the role and status of class 
consciousness in his arguments? Where in his work is there any 
serious consideration of the dynamic of the forces and relations 
of production? How do his arguments relate to the classical 
Marxist conceptions of mode of production and social formation? 
Above all, can his rejection of the base and structure model 
really be intended to deny the fundamental Marxist emphasis on the 
determination by the economy of the social totality, in however 
~b 
final an instance? 
Williams's lack of attention to these questions - the terms and 
tenets of orthodox marxist analysis - led to Perry Anderson's 
magisterial judgement in 1976. While Williams is ' the most 
distinguished socialist thinker to have come from the ranks of the 
Western working class', his work 'has not been that of a Marxist' 
(Anderson 1976: 105). But then, one might reply, that was never 
Williams's aim . Anderson's remark needs to be supplemented, I 
think, by something like Terry Eagleton ' s judgement in 1989. 
'[ T]here are many sterile ways of being ~orrect', he notes, and, 
troping a phrase of Milton's, concludes that in relation to 
orthodox Marxism , Williams is best seen as a 'truthteller in 
heresy ' . ' [W)hatever he has contributed to Marxism has been 
founded, necessarily, on his early break with it' (1989b: 175) 
The judgement perfectly captures the paradox at the centre of 
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Williams's relations to Marxism , as well as the ambivalence of 
'f.':}, 
Eagleton's relations to Williams .. 
Williams had little patience with any taxonomy of the orthodox. 
Apropos the ambivalence in Marxist circles towards the work of 
Christopher Caudwell , he affirmed that it was ' a quarrel which one 
who is not a Marxist will not attempt to resolve' (1958: 277), and 
made it clear in Culture _and _Societ~ that he in no way regarded 
himself as a Marxist . Again, in 1971, with regard to criticisms 
levelled at Goldmann and Lukacs as Left Hegelian or left idealist, 
he remarked ' If you're not in a church, you're not worried about 
heresies ' ([1971d] : 20), again implying that he had no wish to be 
counted as one of the faith. Throughout his career he argued 
c onsistently against the tendency to reduce intellectual positions 
to a common currency of proper names, referring contemptuously to 
those ' robots' who believe ' that the world exists in terms of 
their own fixed points': 
Are you a marxist, a revisionist , a bourgeois reformist? Are 
you a Communi s t , a left radical, a fellow-traveller? What 
an s wer can a man make to that kind of robot questioning ? 
(1961b : 129) 
His response to any such questioning in 1961 was simple and 
d i rec t : ·. .,.Go away '' ,\ ( i b i d . ) . But what is abundantly clear in 
any account of Williams and Marxism 1s that the question of 
Marxism never did go away. As we have seen, throughout this study 
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as well as in this particular chapter, it is probably true to say 
that , on some level, Williams was always thinking about 
Marxism, even if he didn't exactly want to. 
- Chapter One examined how the very motor and dynamic of his 
thinking was formed from an attempt to reconcile the apparently 
irreconcilable clash between Marxism and literature. The essays, 
indeed the very project , of Politics_and_Letters (1947-48) 
asserted the need for a political criticism, though one which 
could not be easily sustained within the disciplinary and 
conceptual framework of English studies . In Chapter Two, we saw 
how, with the elaboration of the idea of a ' structure of feeling' 
in Preface to Film (1954), he sought to articulate an alternative 
to any too mechanistic an explanation of the relations between 
economic base and cultural superstructure. Modern Traged~ (1966) 
continued the dialogue with Marxism through its original attempt 
to come to terms with the fact of Stalinism by placing it within 
the category of the tragic, while at the same time seeking to 
refresh tragedy as an aesthetic category through the consideration 
of revolution. The_English_Novel_from_Dickens_to_Lawrence (1970) 
ended with a rejection of the base and superstructure model whose 
very marginality and casualness - just the tag-end of a sentence -
reveals just how central the issues remained to Williams. The 
writing of Marxism_and_Literature gave him an opportunity to 
review the core of questions and theoretical problems which had 
been central to his work throughout. 
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Can Marxism then be said to be central to Williams's thought? 
Or merely marginal? Neither term really fits the nagging 
constancy with which Marxism provided a background and point of 
reference for his more foregrounded preoccupations with literature 
and culture. It must never be forgotten that Williams was first 
and foremost a literary and cultural critic, and that his interest 
in and interpretation of Marxism was constructed largely from 
within the discursive boundaries of his profession. This simple 
fact only makes his theoretical achievement all the more striking : 
no literary critic before him had ever thought through what 
Marxism might mean to literary criticism quite so thoroughly, so 
forcefully , or so originally. 
One thing for sure is that Williams's engagement with Marxism 
was just as oppositional and combative as his relation to orthodox 
literary criticism . As he put it in 1958, ' I could not have begun 
this work [the writing of Q~l1~~~ and Societ~] if I had not 
learned from Marxists and from Leavis ; I cannot complete it unless 
I radicall y amend some of the ideas which they and others have 
left us ' ([1958b] : 14) . Williams was not only the critic of 
' official English culture' whose work contra Cambridge English 
formed the subject of the previous chapter; he was also and always 
a critic of what he took to be official Marxist culture. His aim 
was never to be or become a Marxist in any orthodox sense. It was 
rather to offer a series of ' amendments ' and corrections to what 
he saw as a range of mistaken emphases in orthodox Marxist theory . 
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In this sense, there can be no doubt that his rejection of the 
base and and superstructure argument was intended as a direct 
challenge to the related strains of economism and functionalism 
which he was not alone in finding at work in a great deal of 
~8 
Marxist theory, including Marx's own. : Williams argued 
consistently against those who would construe the mechanisms of 
social reproduction in any way which reduced people to the status 
of mere ' bearers' of social relations, the dupes of ideology. He 
argued consistently for a better understanding of the situational 
complexity of human agency, and came to figure his case, 1n the 
end, on the idea of the constitutive force of language in a way 
which was the product of some forty years of thinking on, through 
and against the orthodox ideas of literature and Marxism. 
oppositional thinking came through as a theory of cultural 
This 
materialism which Williams was willing to set against what he saw 
as the dogmas of historical materialism. In the next chapter, we 
shall examine cultural materialism in relation to the other great 
QQ~~ that Williams set himself against: the formation he came to 
call the ' bourgeois idea of literature' 
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Ch _ 6 _Towards _a_Cultural _Materialism_ 1977-1981 
The previous chapter traced some of the main contours of 
Williams's complex relations to Marxist cultural theory. We saw 
how his central emphasis on the constitutive force of culture in 
social and political reproduction culminated in the advocacy of a 
Q~li~r~l materialism . Cultural materialism challenged the Second 
International's commitment to the singular, absolute and uni-
causal priority of the economy, and refused its equally firm 
relegation of cultural activity to a secondary role in the 
reproduction of the social order . The means and relations of 
communication belong alongside the means and forces of production 
as one of the constituents of any explanation of the functioning 
of the social totality.1 Williams's Q~li~r~l materialism argued 
instead for the centrality of a line of thought occluded in the 
usual accounts - Marx and Engels's stress on the importance of 
' practical consciousness and suggested that culture be 
recognised as a primary force 1n the reproduction of, and 
therefore all c hallenges to , any existing social order. Hence 
his persistent emphasis on the necessity of the ' long revolution ' 
whil e ready to accept the need for a punctual ' short' revolution , 
he argued that no concept of revolution could ever be really 
complete without an understanding of the necessity for a ' long 
revolution' , a c ultural revolution.2 
But the theory of cultural materialism looks two ways. As 
Q~li~r~l materialism , it is the name Williams gave to his 
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distinctive version of Marxist theory, but, as cultural 
materialism, it refers to his response to the theory and practice 
of literary analysis at work in the existing institutions of 
English studies. This theory and practice , the discipline of 
English literature is distinctively bourgeois in nature and 
effect. Bourgeois literary analysis is marked by an over-emphasis 
on the individual at the expense of the social ; and a tendency to 
ahistorical and apolitical analysis. To borrow and adapt Edward 
Said's useful terms, bourgeois literary theory produces an idea of 
literature as a pure textuality cut off from the entanglements of 
all worldly circumstance.3 
Cul tural Materialism versus Cambridge English 
In Williams's view, both Leavisism and literary structuralism 
share a series of family resemblances, the common features of the 
bourgeois response to the pressures of modernity and mass culture. 
In Culture and_Societ~ Williams had argued that this structure of 
response , fi~t articulated i ~-tk 1920s, was rfeated with 
renewed vigour and stridency in the post-1945 period. 
and Literature . he argues a further contfnuity between the 
modernist dilemna and the advent of structuralist and post-
structuralist theory: the textualising focus is common both to the 
founding project of Cambridge English in which he had been trained 
as an undergraduate. and to the more recent work in literary 
theory and analysis branded , perhaps rather too summarily , as 
·s tructuralism'. and more recently extended and developed as the 
314 
self-consciouly post-structuralist theory appropriate to the new 
global world of post-modernity. The theory of cultural 
materialism was intended as a challenge and check to this 
subterranean continuity. In this chapter, we examine how the case 
for a cultural materialism , first argued in Marxism _and 
Literature , was deployed in the debates around ' structuralism ' 
provoked by the 'MacCabe Affair' ; and subsequently extended and 
developed in Williams's later study, Qyl!Yr~ (1981) . 
Literature and Marxism 
Few reviewers of Marxism _ and _Literature attempted the daunting 
task of trying to chart or to assess Williams's argument as a 
whole ; and few of the broader discussions of his work have done so 
either . Reviews focused largely on the first item in the title 
Marxism - and much less attention was paid to the second, 
Literature. This has had the unfortunate consequence - which I 
discuss further in the Conclusion - that while Williams's term 
' cultural materialism ' has been adopted by a number of progressive 
academ ics . that adoption has always involved what we might call a 
certain translation of Williams's own concept, and, as with any 
translat i on , a certain loss or simplification of the original . 
This chapter seeks to revive the force and complexity of 
Williams' s own arguments . 
Marxist stalwart Arnold Kettle reviewed the study 
unsympathetically. rejecting it because of its foundation in 
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Cambridge English and New Left attitudes. For Kettle, any Marxism 
in which 'concepts are given so central a place ... and in which the 
particular concept of "reflection" is placed on a sort of 
Stalinist dunce's or whipping stool, 1s almost bound to err on the 
side of theoreticism and academicism'. From a different 
perspective, George Woodcock belittled the book as a ' confessional 
document - the autobiography ... of a true believer [in Marxism]', 
while Bernard Sharrat saw little in it save 'a summary and 
summation of most of Williams's already published work.' The most 
detailed account appeared in the American journal I~lQ~. where 
Michael Scrivener wrote (against Anthony Barnett's view that 
Williams ' pleads too much for the continuity of his position') of 
the 'real continuity' between his arguments in 1958 and 1977, but 
notes how the chapter on language demonstrates just 'how 
innovative Williams actually is.' Many commented on the daunting 
abstraction of the language and the arguments as the book sought 
to compress the competing idioms of a century's thinking on 
Marxism and culture into one volume and one argument.4 
Generally missed was the attempt in Marxism _and_Literature to 
forge the theory of a new discipline through the critique of the 
existing discipline of English studies. 
The principles of the cultural materialism which Williams 
developed as the theoretical and disciplinary critique of 
Cambridge English are given most fully in the third part of 
Marxism and Literature. but the main lines of attack are 
anticipated in the chapter on Literature in Part I of the study, 
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where he deconstructs or defamiliarises the orthodox idea of 
literature by tracing its emergence from the eighteenth century to 
the present day . 
Contra Leavis 
' It is relatively difficult' he writes at the beginning of the 
chapter ' Literature' 'to see "literature" as a concept' (Williams 
1977a : 45). That ' relatively' has a complex force: it implies the 
difficulty may be, and may only be, a relative one , but relative 
to what? Perhaps the implication is that the conceptual 
difficulty may be there , only or especially there, for someone 
trained in the Cambridge English school, where literature appears 
as a ' specific description ' of particular works , but certainly 
never any thing so cold and abstract as a ' concept'. 
English terms, 
In Cambridge 
it is common to see ' literature' defined as ' full, central 
immediate human experience usually with an associated 
reference to ' minute particulars' By contrast, 'society' is 
often seen as essentially general and abstract : the summaries 
and averages , rather than the direct substance, of human 
living. Other related concepts, such as ' politics', 
' sociology' , or ' ideology' , are similarly placed and 
downgraded , as mere hardened outer shells compared with the 
living experience of literature. (45) 
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The references are, of course, to the work of F.R. Leavis, for so 
many years the effective QQ~~Q of Cambridge English, despite his 
lack of institutional recognition.5 Leavis argued over some 
fifty years for the value and specificity of literary criticism 
through an extremely strong negative contrast of it with both 
traditional conceptions of literary history , and against any 
criticism based in theory - be it psychoanalytic, Marxist or 
philosophical.6 
As Leavis put it in his essay 'Literary Criticism and 
Philosophy' : ' the reading demanded by poetry is of a different 
kind from that demanded by philosophy .... Philosophy, we say, is 
"abstract", and poetry "concrete'" (Leavis [1952) 1962: 212) And 
this came through even more strongly in Leavis's responses to the 
two most explicit challenges to his and §gr~1i~~·s 
procedures.? Rene Wellek's challenge, in a review of Leavis's 
Revaluation, published in §gr~iiQ~ in March 1937, was met - or 
avoided - with a stinging response in which Leavis refused 
Wellek ' s request to make his theoretical assumptions explicit on 
the grounds that he was a literary critic and not a philosopher. 
If he , Leavis, ' avoided such generalities, it was not out of 
timidity. It was because they seemed too clumsy to be of any use 
he asserted. ' I thought I had provided something better' he 
offered. ' My whole effort was to work in terms of concrete 
judgement and particular analyses (215) - to work through the 
particularity of textual analysis and literary evaluation. 
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And again, some sixteen years later, faced with the challenge 
of F.W . Bateson's new Oxford journal Essays_in_Criticism, and its 
promotion of a new 'contextual reading' , one which demanded a 
consistently historical dimension to literary analysis, Leavis 
could only reply by refusing to meet the grounds of the 
accusation, and launching a counter-accusation at Bateson and 
other contextual critics. Such critics were guilty of 'the 
academic over-emphasis on scholarly knowledge', one which 
' accompanies a clear lack of acquaintance with intelligent 
critical reading' (Leavis (1953] 1968: 281) . In the end, as far 
as Leavis is concerned Bateson's proposed discipline of contextual 
reading ' is not merely irrelevant; it isn't, and can't be, a 
dis c ipline at all: it has no determinate field or aim' (Leavis 
(1953]: 292) . All that ' Bateson's posited relation between poem 
and "social context"' can amount to ' is a matter of vain and 
muddled verbiage' (296-7). 
rather different emphasis: 
Or, as Williams summed it up, with a 
Arguments from theory or from history are simply evidenc e of 
the incurable abstraction and generality of those who are 
putting them forward. They can then be contemptuously 
reje c ted , often without specific reply , which would be only to 
fall to their level. (Williams 1977a : 45) 
For Williams . Leavis's project - the project of Cambridge 
English i n its most powerful form - represents an ' extraordinary 
ideological feat ', one in which the specific literary process of 
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'formal composition within the social and formal properties of 
language' is effectively elided, ' or has been displaced to an 
internal and self-proving procedure in which writing of this kind 
if genuinely believed to be (however many questions are then 
begged) "immediate living experience" itself' (46). To fully 
understand this ideological and theoretical achievement - one 
which ' can hardly be examined or questioned at all from outside' 
we need, he urges, to grasp the history of the concept of 
literature itself. For it is only in terms of this history that 
we can find a point of entry into an otherwise self-supporting 
structure of arguments, establish a point of address from which to 
prise open an otherwise closed system of assumptions. 
From Literacy to Literature 
For Williams , the history of the term literature is one of the 
increasing specialisation and reification of its component senses. 
This is summed up in the striking shift in the meaning of 
literature away from its original sense as literacy, to the now 
dominant sense of literature as a categ?rY of use and condition 
rather than of production' (1977a: 47). He locates the beginnings 
of this shift in the eighteenth century, where, in a new extended 
meaning, literature goes ' beyond the bare sense of "literacy"' to 
become the ' apparently objective category of printed works of a 
certain quality', Once this has happened , the term loses the 
basic reference to ' reading ability and reading experience' (48) 
which it initially held and could express. Since the eighteenth 
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century, 'three complicating tendencies' have emerged - tendencies 
which have by now become 'received assumptions.' First. there was 
a move from 'learning' to ' taste' as the criterion for literary 
quality; second, the meaning of literature was increasingly 
restricted to imaginative works only (in the early part of the 
century , literature covered history, philosophy and virtually all 
forms of bound and printed communication) ; and third , the period 
saw the development of the concept of a national literary 
tradition. 
All of these came together in the idea of a canon of national 
literature. a selective tradition which is apparently - but only 
apparently - based in objective judgements of literary value and 
worth. Long before it became a regular professional move to 
' question the canon Williams was sharp and to the point in his 
assessment of its foundational rhetoric, the grounding of the 
c anon in apparent norms of aesthetic judgement: 
As subjective definitions of apparently objective criteria 
(which acquire their apparent objectivity from an actively 
consensual class sense), and at the same time apparently 
obje c tive definitions of subjective qualities , ' taste' and 
' sensibility' are characteristically bourgeois categories. (48-
9) 
Similarly , he charts the related development of literary 
criticism , the shadow of literature in the new senses . Indeed, in 
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the argument, it is the practice of literary criticism which acts 
as the main guarantee of the new restricted senses of literature. 
He is harsh on its emergence as an academic discipline in the 
twentieth century: the so-called (in Basil Willey's phrase) 
'Golden Age of Cambridge English' - the moment of its entry as a 
new consc1ous discipline into the universities' in the 1920s 
was no more than 'forms of class specialization and control of a 
general social practice, and of a class limitation of the 
questions which it might raise' (49) .8 
development, 
By the time of this 
the category which had appeared objective as ' all printed 
books', and which had been given a social -class foundation as 
' polite learning' and the domain of 'taste' and ' sensibility', 
now became a necessarily selective and self-defining area: not 
all ' fiction' 
' Literature'. 
was 'imaginative'; not all ' literature' was 
' Criticism' acquired a quite new and effectively 
primary importance, since it was now the only way of validating 
this specialized and selective category .... What had been 
claimed for ' art' and the 'creative imagination' 1n the central 
Romantic arguments was now claimed for 'criticism', as the 
central ' humane' activity and ' discipline'. ( 5 1 ) 
- precisely Leavis's idea of the discipline.9 With the idea of 
the canon. the practice of literary criticism was justified by 
literature, and the idea of literature was confirmed by literary 
criticism, in the mutually supportive dynamic which Williams had 
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identified as the dynamic of a ' selective tradition' in which 
[t]he 'national literature' soon 
became a tradition. It was not, 
ceased to be a history and 
even theoretically, all t 'hat 
had been written or all kinds of writing. It was a selection 
which culminated in, and in a circular way defined, the 
' literary values' which ' criticism' was asserting .. . . To oppose 
the terms of this ratification was to be 'against literature' . 
(51- 52) 
- exactly the structure of argument and assumption so powerfully 
welded together in Leavis's seminal series of canonical studies, 
his famous ' revaluations' .10 
Williams rightly regarded this transformation, within the 
discipline of literary studies, of a full history into a selective 
tradition as an ' extraordinary ideological feat'. The first step 
in combatting it was to grasp the idea of ' "literature" as a 
specializing social and historical category' (53), and next , to 
seek to recover some of the basic senses of literature as literacy 
which have been repressed in and through the developing history of 
the word. Literacy in this sense goes beyond the basic mastery of 
reading and writing to become a secondary or critical literacy; 
and it also extends the usual boundaries of textuality to include 
the relatively new practices of composition and communication 
available in film , television and video. 
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Williams moves on, from this point 1n Marxism_and_Literature, 
to a similarly challenging discussion of the Marxist idea of 
ideology , and from there to his analysis of the Marxist debates on 
cultural theory which we have examined in Chapter Five. In Part 
III, 'Literary Theory', he returns to the discussion and 
dissection of bourgeois literary theory and its particular idea of 
literature. He begins by questioning the restricted sense of 
literariness underlying traditional conceptions of the literary. 
The Multiplicity of Writing 
Against the reified and separated conception of literature at 
work in orthodox literary studies, Williams asserts what he calls 
the ' multiplicity of writing'. Though he does not use the term 
' representation' in his discussion in Marxism_and_Literature, the 
concept of representation is perpetually at work in it, understood 
as the totality of signifying practices through which a society 
forms its expression and expresses its deep forms and structures. 
Williams asserts the generality of signifying practices which 
together make up a society's forms of representation against the 
idea of literary writing as an activity and production somehow 
separate and different from other forms of social creation and 
expression . 
In the orthodox terms of the discipline, ' literature' has been 
restricted to aesthetic writing, and its study has taken the form 
of a largely evaluative criticism. Against this, Williams urges 
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what he calls the ' multiplicity of writing.' 
Revolution, he had argued for the recognition of creativity as an 
everyday activity, rooted in perception itself, rather than as a 
special instrumental feature of the artistic temperament alone.11 
The concept of literature, he reprises in Marxism _ and_Literature, 
has operated a ' specialization and containment' of this ordinary 
creativity, though never with complete success. The main obstacle 
to the full recognition of the ordinariness of creativity, and the 
consequent acceptance of the multiplicity of writing, is the 
orthodox division established, in theory and across time, between 
literary and non-literary writing. Against this falsely 
specialising opposition between ' fictional'and ' factual' writing , 
he insists that the 
range of actual writing similarly surpasses any reduction of 
' creative imagination' to the ' subjective ', with its dependent 
propo sit ions: ' literature' as ' internal' or 'inner' truth ; 
other forms of writing as 'external' truth. These depend, 
ultimatel y. on the characteristic bourgeois separation of 
' individual'and ' society' and on the older idealist separation 
of ' mind ' and ' world'. The range of writing, in most forms, 
crosses these artificial categories again and again, and the 
extremes can even be stated in an opposite way: autobiography 
( ' what I experienced ', ' what happened to me ') is ' subjective ' 
but (ideally) ' factual' writing; realist fiction or naturalist 
drama ( ' people as they are ', ' the world as it is') is 
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- objective' (the narrator or even the fact of narrative 
occluded in the form) but (ideally) - creative' writing. (148) 
In other words, the artificial categories deny the most 
significant feature of all forms of writing, namely -the very fact 
of address ... §!.!:!!:!~~· (149). Stance - the mutual positioning of 
reader and writer through the process of composition and address 
was constitutive in all writing.12 And this fact of address 
includes, and is perhaps even especially relevant to, writing in 
which the stance is consciously and conventionally - impersonal ', 
as in the composition of scientific papers and their - necessary 
creation of the "impersonal observer"' ( 149). There is a rhetoric 
of objectivity , one which can range from the activation of the 
c onventions of scientific writing and research , to their rather 
more suspicious troping and deployment in other forms , where , by 
sleight of phrase, the rhetoric of impersonality cloaks the figure 
of an interested observer, as occurs, in exemplary fashion, in the 
case of Orwell.13 
In the end , the bourgeois dichotomies of fact and fiction, and 
the orthodox positing of objective versus subjective , work to 
contain and occlude nothing less than the social and ideological 
bearings of all composition and language - use , and alongside this, 
the real sociality of the human subject. Against the banal 
assertions of the independence , separation and - freedom ' of the 
individual subject of bourgeois and liberal theory , but also 
against the arguments of Althusserian theory and its many 
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variants, in which the human subject is placed as the absolutely 
determined 'bearer' of social relations, and against the carceral 
subject of Foucauldian analysis, endlessly repeating its initial 
conditions of socialisation as the content of its subjectivity, 
Williams argues for a conception of the human subject in which the 
agency of human subjectivity is given a measure of recognition 
equal to that accorded to the idea of its determinations. 
Acceptance of the ' actual multiplicity of writing' makes of every 
person - as in the starting-point of Gramsci's theory - an 
intellectual in the basic sense of an active and responsive 
language-user, rather than merely the subject of an always 
determining language-structure, the product and 'bearer' of always 
external determinations.14 
The Social and the Aesthetic 
A part of the problem with the orthodox category of literature 
is the ways in which it embodies the constitutive tensions of the 
larger concept of the aesthetic. The aesthetic shares some of the 
negative aspects of literature in its careful selection and 
specialization of human creative energy to forms of class culture ; 
but it also has positive aspects, as Williams had argued - though 
in a very different theoretical language - in Culture _ and_Societ~. 
For the history of the concept of the aesthetic is ' in large part 
a protest against the forcing of all experience into 
instrumentality' and represents a resistance to those same 
327 
alienating and reifying forces of bourgeois culture which make 
literature such a restrictive and specialised category. 
Following the work of his former research student, John Fekete, 
Williams praises Lukacs's attempt to place the aesthetic as a 
category of action and agency, one which is neither ' practical' 
nor ' magical', but which represents 'a real mediation between 
(isolated) subjectivity and (abstract) universality' (151).15 
Nonetheless, he argues that Lukacs's placing of the aesthetic as a 
distinguishable category of material production is open in the end 
to the same difficulties which plagued the Russian Formalists' 
earlier attempt to distinguish and separate out a specific ' poetic 
language' from within the ordinary social processes of 
language.16 
There were two responses to this problem . First, ' the 
conversion of all social and political practice to "aesthetic" 
forms'; and second, a way of seeing the aesthetic as a function or 
practice rather than as a property of either special objects or 
the use of specific devices. Williams favoured the second option 
- to be found in Jan Mukarovsky ' s Aesthetic _Functioni_Norm_and 
Value_as_Social_Facts (1970) - over the first, which he sees 
exemplified in the ' "closed forms" of structural linguistics and 
in structuralist-semiotic literary and cultural studies' (152). 
In fact, Mukarovsky's work represents ' the penultimate stage of 
the critical dissolution of the specializing and controlling 
categories of bourgeois aesthetic theory ' (153). In an important 
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passage, he summarises just how, in the given terms of this 
theory: 
'Art' is a kind of production which has to be seen as separate 
from the dominant bourgeois productive norm: the making of 
commodities. It has then, in fantasy, to be separated from 
' production' altogether; described by the new term 'creation' 
distinguished from its own material processes; distinguished, 
finally, from other products of its own kind or closely related 
kinds - ' art' from ' non-art'; ' literature' from 
' para-literature' or 'popular literature' ; 'culture' from ' mass 
culture'. (153-54) 
As Williams had argued in Culture_and_Societ~ } consequences 
of this separation are profound and mystificatory. This 
' narrowing abstraction' of art, he writes, ' is then so powerful 
that , in its name, we find ways of neglecting (or of dismissing as 
peripheral) that relentless transformation of art works into 
commodities ' which is characteristic of capitalist societies 
(154). ' Art and thinking about art' , he emphasises, ' have to 
separate themselves , by ever more absolute abstraction , from the 
social processes within which they are still contained' (ibid) 
' Aesthetic theory is the main instrument of this evasion', he 
asserts , and concludes that: 
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In its concentration on receptive states, on psychological 
responses of an abstractly differentiated kind, it represents 
the division of labour in consumption corresponding to the 
abstraction of art as the division of labour in production. 
(153-4) 
And yet, though Mukarovsky's work 1s correct in making these 
emphases, it doesn't go quite far enough. 
a r t 
Mukarovsky shows that 
1s not a special kind of object but one in which the aesthetic 
function usually mixed with other functions, 1s ~Q~!Q~Q!. 
Art , with other things (landscape and dress, most evidently), 
gives aesthetic pleasure, but this cannot be transliterated as 
a sense of beauty or a sense of perceived form. since while 
these are central in the aesthetic function they are socially 
and historically variable, and in all real instances concrete . 
( 153) 
A further s tep is necessary . Williams is critical of what he see s 
a s Mukarov sky 's abstraction of the aesthetic as a unitary 
" function ', and suggests that the aesthetic can always be better 
described in terms of a series of situations'. This avoids the 
positing of the usual false antithesis between art as either pure 
" ideology ' - understood as th e c ommunication and imposition of 
so c ial and politi c al meanings and values - or as the pure 
· aesthetic ' - concerned only with the beauties of language and 
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form. He argues that it is better to 'face the facts of the range 
of intentions and effects, and to face it as_a_range': 
All writing carries references, meanings and values. To 
suppress or distort them is in the end impossible. But to say 
all ' all writing carries' is only a way of saying that language 
and form are constitutive processes of reference , meaning and 
value, and that these are not necessarily identical with, or 
exhausted by, the kinds of reference, meaning, and value that 
are also evident, in other senses and in summary, elsewhere. 
( 155) 
The aesthetic, whatever else it is, is always a particular 
response to a specific situation, in a given signifying medium. 
At this point, Williams once again deploys his new sense of the 
constitutive force of language to great effect: 'language and form 
are constitutive processes of reference, meaning and value'. To 
argue otherwise is to see language merely as the medium for 
expression, understood as an essentially private act, one made 
possible by the individual possession of language as an instrument 
under the control of the sovereign ego of the bourgeois subject. 
That is , to see the aesthetic as Williams had himself seen it, 
particularly in his early work , where an ideology of artistic 
expression and instrumentality - elements of which, as we saw in 
Chapter Two, were derived from Eliot and fetishized in the theory 
of cinema as ' Total Expression' - held sway. In order to stress 
the importance of this new sense of the constitutivity of 
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language, he examines some of the dynamics of that misleading 
term, medium, and the role it plays in the orthodox view in which 
language is simply the transparent medium for an always 
instrumental expression, the property of an always centred and 
always knowing subject. 
Language as medium 
For Williams, the constitutive properties of language are all 
too easily abstracted and objectified in the orthodox idea that 
' thoughts exist before language and are then expressed through its 
' medium"' (158) .17 Against this, he argues that if language is to 
be understood as a medium, then it needs to be grasped as a medium 
which - far from being neutral or value free - is in itself the 
concrete embodiment of social, political, and ideological 
conflicts. Language is never merely a system; it is always a 
social practice. And it is in this notion of language as a social 
practice that the radical aesthetics of modernism - which so 
stressed the potential defamiliarising effects of language-use -
joins the revolutionary theory and practice of Marxism. In the 
end , the ' full sense of practice' in Marxism or modernism ' has 
always to be defined as work on a material for a specific purpose 
within certain necessary social conditions' (160). As Williams 
had argued in Part 1 Chapter Three of Marxism_and_Literature, 
language ' is not a medium; it is a constitutive element of 
material social practice' (165), even, indeed, a special kind of 
material practice; that of human sociality' (165) . 
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Full recognition of the real constitutive force of language in 
human sociality has been evaded by the two alternative views of 
language available to orthodox literary theory. Here language is 
either seen as instrumental or systematic, ' expressive' or 
' formalist'. ' Each of these general theories' writes Williams, 
' grasp real elements of the practice of writing, but commonly in 
ways which deny other real elements and even make them 
inconceivable' (165). Following Volosinov, whose work he had 
discovered by a happy accident on the open-stack shelves of 
Cambridge's University Library, Williams insists that ' meaning is 
always E[QQ~Q~Q; it is never simply expressed. '18 ' No 
expression', he emphasises 
no account , description, depiction, portrayal - is ' natural ' or 
' straightforward'. These are at most socially relative terms. 
Language is not a pure medium through which the reality of a 
life or the reality of an event or an experience or the reality 
of a society can ' flow'. It is a socially shared and 
reciprocal activity, already embedded in active relationships, 
within which every move is an activation of what is already 
shared and reciprocal or may become so. (166) 
And with a theoretical insight refreshed by his happy encounter 
with Volosinov , Williams reiterates the core of the theory of 
communication present in Culture _and _Society and Ib~ _1Q~g 
Revolution: ' to address an account to another is , explicitly or 
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potentially, as in any act of expression, to evoke or propose a 
relationship' (166) .19 
The Russian Formalists had grasped one aspect of this, drawing 
attention to the devices through which expression could be 
strengthened; but in the end they lost their way. Reacting 
against notions of language and expression as ' natural' , they 
reduced language to what they saw as its basic elements, to 
signs within a totalised 'system of signs', anticipating in this 
regard the inner dynamic of the new 'critical structuralism . ' In 
the end , the Formalists were responsible for the creation of ' a 
new myth ' the idea 
that the ' system of signs is determined by its formal internal 
relations ; that ' expression' is not only not 'natural' but is a 
form of ' codification'; and that the appropriate response to 
' codification' is ' decipherment', 'deconstruction' . (167-68)20 
Williams sees this form of analysis - which, once again following 
the arguments first put forward by John Fekete, he associates with 
both French structuralism and American New Criticism - as 
dangerously c ompatible with the very forms of alienation it seeks 
to analyse. For, he argues, what really follows from this 
position ' i s the universality of alienation , the position of a 
closely associated bourgeois idealist formation , drawing its 
assumptions from a universalist (mainly Freudian) psychology' 
(168). In this sense , the Russian Formalists anticipate the 
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arguments of the structuralist movement, and all those caught up 
in what he calls elsewhere, again borrowing from Fekete, the 
'language paradigm' .21 
What 1n the end is necessary to combat this paradigm is, argues 
Williams. a 'fully social theory of literature' in which the over-
emphases of both expressionism and formalism are refused, rejected 
and redefined. For the notations beloved of the 'language 
paradigm' are in fact ' relationships, expressed, offered, tested, 
and amended in a whole social process, in which device, 
expression, and the substance of expression are 1n the end 
inseparable' (171-72). Such 1s the founding argument of cultural 
materialism , and Williams argues that evidence for this could be 
established through any fully social history and analysis of 
existing literary concepts such as convention, genre, form, and 
author. 
These indeed are the key terms whose analysis constitutes the 
remainder of the study, demonstrating in each case the ways in 
which the force of these concepts 1s lessened by their failure to 
fully comprehend the force of language in the constitutivity of 
the social process 1n the wa y that cultural materialism 
recommends . Thus Williams argues - drawing on the arguments and 
evidence gathered in The_Country _ and _t he_ Ci ty - that ' the 
presentation of pl~g~ depends on variable conventions': 
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Descriptions of great houses, of rural landscapes, of cities, 
or of factories are evidence examples of these variable 
conventions, where the ' point of view' may be experienced as an 
'aesthetic' choice but where any point of view, including ~hat 
which excludes persons or converts them into landscape, is 
social. (177) 
Similarly, genre is described as ' neither an ideal type nor a 
traditional order nor a set of technical rules' but a ' social 
relationship' (185); while the discussion of an orthodox literary 
theory in which ' the figure of the individual author ' , a 
characteristic form of bourgeois thought' (193) - needs to be 
challenged by the 'reciprocal discovery of the truly social in the 
individual, and the truly individual in the social' (197). In all 
of these assertions , language needs to be seen as in a strong 
and indeed constitutive sense !h~ social practice, ' the practice 
of human sociality itself.' 
At the centre of cultural materialism is the call for a 
critical attitude towards all forms and practices of 
representation , and not only those associated with literature. A 
key characteristic of cultural materialism is its bringing 
together three dimensions of intellectual analysis and enquiry 
which are far too often kept apart. to the detriment of each: the 
textual, the theoretical or conceptual, and the historical. 
Cambridge English, at least in the evaluative mode bequeathed by 
Leavis and his followers, had tended to privilege the textual at 
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the expense of the theoretical and the historical, as Leavis's 
non-debates with Wellek and Bateson had shown. Contemporary 
structuralism - as Williams understood it - tended to focus on the 
theoretical over the historical and, in a curious sense, over the 
textual, often allotting texts only the role of example in the 
demonstration of the 'truths' of theory, just as in some 
historical analysis - both liberal and Marxist - texts were 
regarded merely as ' illustrations' of a historical process which 
was already comprehended in full. 
In all of these partial approaches, bourgeois and Marxist 
alike, what might be called the productivity of the text was 
ignored - that productivity which meant that texts could contest 
as well as articulate or embody given ideologies. This, in turn, 
exemplified the ways in which the constitutive role of culture in 
the production and reproduction of society was badly understood 
and in consequence marginalised in most liberal and Marxist 
accounts . The task of a cultural materialism was to attend to 
that constitutive role of signification within cultural process, 
and so to seek to integrate the three usually separated dimensions 
of textual, theoretical and historical analysis. Only through 
this kind of integration could the fundamentally social role of 
language and communication be fully understood and asserted 
against the separated and reified analyses of both bourgeois and 
also (insofar as it had insufficiently freed itself from bourgeois 
categories) Marxist literary and cultural theory. 
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Against the orthodox emphases of the 'bourgeois theory of 
literature' , which limits and reifies the workings of expression 
through the category of the aesthetic, cultural materialism 
emphasises the depth, richness and complexity of the fully 
theorised sense of language as constitutive. Cultural materialism 
1s the analysis of the constitutive grounds and force of all forms 
of signification at work in human society. 
Crisis 1n English Studies 
Published in 1977, Marxism _and_Literature presented equal 
challenges to the orthodoxies of both Marxist cultural analysis 
and traditional literary criticism through its arguments for a 
cultural materialism. In many ways, these arguments anticipated 
or participated in, the emergence of a new body of work whose 
theoretical force and impetus led to a widespread sense of a 
' crisis in English studies', one which continues some twenty years 
later as the self-contained discipline which English literature 
was for the first fifty years of its professional existence 
struggles to respond to the infusion of ideas, concepts and 
practices from the diverse constituents of 'theory'. 
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to examine, in the 
necessary detail , the relations between Williams's work and what 
Anthony Easthope has usefully dubbed ' British post-
structuralism' (Easthope 1988). A full-scale comparative 
exercise. placing Williams's work in direct comparison with the 
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work of European thinkers, would require a different framing than 
this narrowly focused study of its relations to English studies. 
It would entail the establishment of a discursive common ground 
that would accommodate Williams's theoretical vocabulary, and the 
conceptual vocabulary of post-structuralism, as well as a detailed 
reading and analysis of the major works of Foucault, Derrida, 
Lacan ~i _Qi~. and at the same time a detailed appraisal of the 
selective deployment of the work of the French school in British 
work. 
Yet it is worth saying, before examining the detail of some of 
Williams's arguments, that Easthope's study, which does much to 
establish that larger frame, is interestingly blind to and silent 
on the ways in which cultural materialism was an attempt to come 
to terms with the problems of that whole formation.22 Easthope, 
like many of Williams's other
1
obituarists. locates the main force 
and value of his work with the arguments of the Culture and 
~QQi~i~ period , rather than with the later and more sophisticated 
arguments of Marxism _and _Literature and Q~11~~~- Against this 
placing of it , which has the effect of limiting its force and 
r e levance to the 1950s, ' left - liberal , culturalist and empiricist' 
in Easthope's des c ription (Easthope 1988: 2), let us examine some 
of the ways in which the arguments were intended to carry some 
force in and against the emerging theories of ' British post -
structurali s m' 
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The MacCabe Affair 
In Cambridge, ' British post-structuralism' came into focus in 
the arguments and debates surrounding the notorious MacCabe 
affair of 1980-81, 'Cambridge's biggest academic row since the 
bitter days of Dr. F.R. Leavis' .23 A few remarks about the 
tenure system at the University of Cambridge are necessary to set 
the scene. 
Generally speaking, to become a tenured lecturer in the English 
Faculty at Cambridge University, it is necessary first of all to 
go through a preliminary and probationary appointment as an 
Assistant Lecturer for a period of five years. This is then 
followed - or not - by what is known as ' upgrading ' to the tenured 
position of University Lecturer . Assistant Lectureships are 
themselves hard fought for, and promotion or upgrading is usually 
dependent upon maintaining a good record of academic publication, 
the translation of the completed Ph . D into a publishable book , and 
demonstrated competence and expertise in the field of the 
appointment. There is, in other words, ~eneral agreement and 
consensus about the workings of promotion. The MacCabe Affair 
attracted unusual national attention in the press as that 
consensus visibly broke down , and brought into focus emergent 
shifts and trends in the study of literature, and moves beyond th e 
given paradigm of literary study as British academic work in 
literary studies began to move away from its intensely enclosed 
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and nationalist focus, and to examine work from Europe and the 
USA. 
Colin MacCabe was hired by the Faculty as an Assistant lecturer 
in 1976, and was refused tenure in the second of a number of 
meetings of the Faculty Board in 1980 (the first meeting was 
apparently inconclusive). This seemed a highly unusual decision, 
as MacCabe had already made a name for himself in British 
intellectual and political life through the publication of a 
number of seminal essays on film, literature and theory , and the 
publication of his thesis as a provocative book on James 
Joyce.24 
This already significant body of work represented some of the 
first stirrings of Easthope's 'British post-structuralism', that 
heady mixture of Lacanian psychoanalysis, Althusserian Marxism , 
and the textual analysis of film and literature.25 As David 
Simpson wryly remarks, MacCabe's publications alone made him ' by 
any publicly recognized standard spectacularly overqual i fied for 
tenure' (Simpson 1990: 251); but he was nonetheless refused 
upgrading. The decision was bitterly fo~ght and the occasion of 
much debate both within and without the university.26 One moment 
in this debate was a lecture given by Williams to the English 
Faculty in March 1981, later revised and published as ' Crisis in 
English Studies'. 27 Criticised by many at the time for too 
distanced and magisterial a view of the conflict , the lecture can 
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best be read in terms of Williams's prediliction for the longer 
historical view of crises and debates . 
The lecture opens with an oblique and ironic reference to the 
MacCabe affair ( ' Recent events in Cambridge, of which some of you 
may have heard') as the occasion for the lecture. Williams 
describes his main purpose as one of ' identifying and briefly 
explaining some currently controversial positions beyond the 
labels which are being so loosely attached', of clarifying, in 
effect , the ideas of Marxism and ' structuralism' which were being 
used to identify , and vilify, MacCabe's work and positions in the 
"\.,8 
dispute over his promotion. : In the first instance , argued 
Williams , it was necessary to stress the simple diversity of 
a v ailable positions in both Marxism and structuralism . While 
s e veral of these positions are in fact in sharp opposition to each 
other (Williams is far from endorsing MacCabe ' s own position, as 
we s hall examine in the next chapter), what is at stake in the 
present dispute is the general compatability of these tendencies 
with the existing paradigm of work in literary studies in 
Cambr i dge. that is with the current ' working definition of a 
per c eived field of knowledge' , one which ' as object_of _knowledge, 
based on certain fundamental hypotheses . . . carries with it 
definitions of appropriate methods of discovering and establishing 
'l-~ 
such knowledge' ([19P~\:>~~ 192). , · For Williams, the MacCabe 
affair was a symptom . ' although at a relativel y early stage', of 
crisis in the explanatory power of the Literature paradigm, and 
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consequently a moment for the elaboration of his alternative, 
cultural materialism. 
In an impressive piece of synthesis and condensation, Williams 
outlines many of the main themes of Marxism_and_Literature, 
focusing on the question of the compatability of Marxist and 
structuralist arguments with the dominant literary paradigm. 
Structuralist literary criticism, he argues, is in the end no more 
than 
an indirect inheritance from the kind of thinking which 
Richards had been doing about the isolated internal 
organization of a poem ... What had happened in Cambridge was ... a 
confused but striking association of moral and indeed normative 
judgement with these techniques of isolated internal analysis. 
(206) 
The apparently new literary structuralism of the 1960s and 1970s 
' is not only congruent with the paradigm ... It is the paradigm 
itself in its most influential modern form' (206). Indeed, argues 
Williams, Althusserianism - a key influence on MacCabe's own work 
- can itself be understood as a particular variant of this 
literary structuralism. Here society is understood as a rule-
governed system, determined in the last instance by the economy, 
in which there are a number of sub-systems or practices which 
enjoy a relative autonomy from that determination. The binding 
force of this is ideology in general, understood as ' the condition 
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of all conscious life'. In Althusserian theory, human experience 
itself is seen as ' the most common form of ideology . It is where 
the deep structures of the society actually reproduce themselves 
as conscious life' (207) , and Williams's tone is mocking as he 
writes that ideology is in this account 'so pervasive and so 
impenetrable ... that you wonder who is ever going to be able to 
analyse it' (207). For Althusser, Theory made this possible; but 
literature itself also enjoyed a 'relatively privileged 
s i tuation ': 
Literature is not just a carr1er of ideology, as in most forms 
of reflection theory. It is inescapably ideological , but its 
specific relative autonomy is that it is a form of writing , a 
form of practice , in which ideology both exists and is or can 
be internally distanced and questioned. Thus the value of 
literature is precisely that it is one of the areas where the 
grip of ideology is or can be loosened , because although i t 
cannot escape ideological construction , the point about its 
literariness is that it is a continual questioning of it 
internall y. (208) 
Whil e Williams admits that this me thod has been used 1n some ver y 
detailed and inter e sting analysis ', it still partic i pa te s in th e 
logi c of the dominant paradigm . 
~o 
Finall y , he turn s to semioti cs, understood as bringing an 
i mportant new emphasis to structuralism . This n e w emphasi s c omes 
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through the re-admission of the category of agency into the idea 
of structure . Instead of seeing literary works 
as PtQctYQ~ct by the system of signs , which has been the central 
emphasis of the most orthodox forms of structuralism , this 
later semiotics has on the contrary emphasized that productive 
systems have themselves always to be constituted and 
reconstituted , and that because of this there is a perpetual 
battle about the fixed character of the sign and about the 
systems which we ordinarily bring to production and 
interpretation . 
' deconstruction' 
One effect of this shift is a new sense of 
not the technical analysis of an internal 
organization to show where all the parts, the components, have 
c ome from, but a much more open and active process which is 
c ontinually taking examples apart , as a way of taking their 
§.Y§.i ~!!!~ apart. (208 - 9) 
Here Williams moves a little away from the rather slight 
definition of ' deconstruction' he had adopted and criticised in 
Marxism _ and _Literature , and finds some common ground with the 
emerging ' post-structuralism' of his Cambridg~ colleagues like 
MacCabe and Heath , suggesting that this new ' more open and active 
process of analysis might be better termed a ' radical semiotics'. 
This radical semiotics , despite its connections to the 
' structuralist v e rsion of production and reproduction which ha s 
been much more widely influential - and more welcome and at home -
in literary studies ' ( 209) differs signifi c antly from it and c ould 
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contribute to the challenging of the dominant paradigm of literary 
studies. In this challenge, there is common ground between a 
radical semiotics and cultural materialism. 
While ready to admit that much of his own work - as we saw 1n 
Chapter Four - 1s located well within the dominant literary 
paradigm, though 'with an exceptionally strong consciousness of 
the social determinants upon it'. But, he argues, and most 
critics seem to agree, The_Countr¥_and_the_Cit¥ signalled a break 
with the dominant paradigm, 
because it sets out to identify certain characteristic forms of 
writing about the country and the city, and then insists on 
placing them not only in their historical background - which 1s 
within the paradigm - but within an active, conflicting 
historical process in which the very forms are created by 
social relations which are sometimes evident and sometimes 
occluded. (209) 
The key word 1s ' active'. Cultural materialism and radical 
semiotics come together in their recognition of subjective agency, 
the ways 1n which systems of language and conventions of 
representation not only coerce but also enable expression. 
1s this recognition which places them 'outside the paradigm 
altogether' (210). Nonetheless. this does not mean the 
abandonment of the study of literature as such . 




moved away from the ultimate common concern , the works about 
which knowledge is to be gained. It has moved much wider than 
literature in its paradigmatic sense , but it still centrally 
includes these major forms of writing , which are now being 
read, along with other writing, in a different perspective. 
Cultural materialism 1s the analysis of all forms of 
signification , including quite centrally writing, within the 
actual means and conditions of their production. (210) 
It is this emphasis on the analysis of the means and conditions of 
production of all forms of signification that cultural materialism 
and radical semiotics may connect. There are still major 
differences , writes Williams, especially with reference to the 
ways in whi c h radical semiotics draws on structural linguistics 
and psychoanal y sis, ' but I remember saying that a fully histori c al 
semiotics would be very much like the same thing as cultural 
materialism' (210). 
' Ver y much like the same thing as cultural materialism ' - this 
i s how Williams refers, in a characteristically oblique fashion, 
to Ma c Cabe's own work, and to what Christopher Ricks, a brilliant 
liberal professor of English at Cambridge, and a major player 1n 
the Ma cCabe Affair , described as the work of a particular 
radical . Marxist , semiological clique' (cited in Simpson 1990 : 
264) . In retrospect , it seems clear that though the local battle 
against thi s n e w work was lost in MacCabe's own case, the war was 
3 4 7 
not. In reality, there were many diverse strands to this work, 
ranging from the emphasis on psychoanalysis to be found in the 
theory and practice of film analysis of what became known as 
' Screen Theory' of MacCabe himself and his mentor Stephen Heath, 
as well as feminist critics such as Laura Mulvey and Jacqueline 
Rose; the exciting extension of this to the analysis of painting 
to be found in the work of Norman Bryson; and the more 
historically-based work of critics such as John Barrell and David ~, 
Simpson , to name but few . . Indeed , if anything has come to 
dominate contemporary literary studies , it has been the 
combination of theoretical and textual analysis characteristic of 
structuralist writing; but what is less evident is whether the 
third dimension of analysis, the historical , so crucial to 
Williams's own project of a cultural materialism, has been so 
widely adopted . 
Some indication of the importance which Williams gave to the 
historical dimension comes through in his discussion of the 
procedures of cultural materialism in Politics_and_Letters in his 
opening remarks c oncerning the aims of The _Countr~_and_the_Cit~. 
F i rst of all , he notes how in his project he wanted to get away 
from the theoretical project associated with Macherey and Eagleton 
i n which ' since all literature is a mode of production employing 
c ertain conventions, what we must now do is systematise our 
perceptions of this fact into an overall literary theory ' 
')"1. 
( Williams 1979 : 304) . ' Instead, his project was ' quite 
d i fferent': 
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it was to try to show simultaneously the literary conventions 
and the historical relations to which they were a response -
to see together the means of the production and the conditions 
of the means of production. For the conditions of the means of 
production are quite crucial to any substantial understanding 
of the means of production themselves. The tendency in some 
recent criticism on the left has been to exclude these 
conditions, dismissing any concern with them as historicism 
or sociologism. (1979: 304) 
The emphasis of cultural materialism lay in the ways in which in 
' the very process of restoring produced literature to its 
conditions of production reveals that conventions have social 
roots. that they are not simply . formal devices of writing' (1979: 
306). The lecture closes with some serious questions concerning 
the future viability of English literature as a unitary 
discipline, asking whether ' radically different work ' can 
still be carried on under a single heading or department when 
there is not just diversity of approach but more serious and 
fundamental differences about the object of knowledge (despite 
overlapping of the actual material of study)? Or must there be 
some wider reorganization of the received divisions of the 
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humanities, the human sciences, into newly defined and newly 
~ 
collaborative arrangements? (1981 : 211) 
This emphasis on the possibilities offered by such 'newly defined 
and newly collaborative arrangements' is taken up in Williams's 
next major study, Q~l!~r~. published as the first volume in Gavin 
~:, 
Mackenzie's New_Sociolog~ series in 1981. 
Culture 
Q~l!~r~ is a relatively neglected work in Williams's Q~~Yr~ . 
Mainly. I think, this is due to the ways in which his usually very 
'l\.t 
clear sense of an opponent is too internalised in this work. 
Bruce Robbins, an American scholar with a long and consistent 
record of intelligent interest in Williams's work, provided a 
defensive Foreword to the second American edition. retitled Thg 
Sociolog~_of_Culture, where he notes its ' strange, austerely 
formal , somewhat unprepossessing appearance' (Williams 199 ~2? 
xi) . : He attributes this, in part at least, to the book's 
desire to ' see the big picture ... to rise above the usual 
signposts , landmarks, and boundaries by which the cultural 
landscape has been known' (xi). What is lacking in the account 
(and in Robbins's too) is the small picture: any foregrounding of 
the fact that the book is best understood as the attempt to sketch 
out the contours of a new discipline with which could replace 
actually existing literary studies, one based in the theory of a 
cultural materialism. 
350 
As such, it calls for the analysis of all forms of 
signification, including quite centrally the diverse forms and 
occasions of writing, but an analysis which is conducted at all 
times in terms of the means and conditions of production. As 
Anthony Giddens, a Cambridge sociologist who shared many of 
Williams's reservations about structuralism , put it, in a 
respectful review which also made the key link to the Cambridge 
English debate around ' structuralism', cultural materialism 
regards culture as a 'signifying system', but not in the 
abstract way characteristic of structuralist thought: for 
Williams emphasises strongly the need to analyse the ways in 
which signifying practices are constituted institutionally , and 
~~ 
reproduced over time. (Giddens 1981b: 216.) 
Williams writes, in the familiar accents of the New Left 
arguments he had helped to develop in the 1950s, of the need for a 
sociology of culture which would challenge the 'general social and 
sociological ideas within which it has been possible to see 
communication, language and art as marginal and peripheral , or as 
at best secondary and derived social processes ' (Williams 1981: 
10) . Instead , and here he puts to work the more precise 
theoretical vocabulary he had acquired through the writing of 
Marxism_ and_Literature , it would take as its starting point the 
' constitutive' features of cultural practices, and emphasise the 
ways in which culture is better understood as ' the ~ignif~ing 
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~~~i~~ through which necessarily a social order is communicated, 
reproduced, experienced and explored' ( 13) . The new sociology of 
culture emphasises 'the social as well as the notational basis of 
sign-systems', adding ' a deliberately extended social dimension' 
to what would otherwise remain a textual analysis confined within 
the barrenness of purely formal attention (31). 
Throughout the book, Williams is wary of what we might call the 
tendency for premature theorisation at work in much of the 
available sociological inquiry. '[T]heoretical constructs derived 
from empirical studies' he warns 'and their extension or 
generalisation are always likely to presume too much, in the 
transition from local and specific to general concepts ' (33), and 
in Chapter 2 , ' Institutions', he examines the relations between 
cultural producers and institutions and the ways these have always 
been historically mediated by cultural formations ' the variable 
relations in which "cultural producers" have been organised or 
have organised themselves' ( 35). In this way, he is able to 
present a far more nuanced view of the relations between artistic 
production and patronage than the usual formulae - of the artist 
and his public, or of economic base and cultural superstructure -
allow. Chapter 3 ' Formations' similarly focuses on another 
problem which is usually ignored in the orthodox sociology of 
culture: that posed by artistic movements, cultural formations in 
which ' artists come together in the common pursuit of some 
artistic aim ( 6 2) . While ' orthodox sociology' has found it easy 
to ' analyse cultural effects, where large numbers and control 
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groups are available' as in the press, the publishing combine or 
the broadcasting company, the small and temporally specific groups 
which occur so often in the actual history of cultural production 
tend to slip through the wide mesh of orthodox investigation. 
Williams writes suggestively - but rather too schematically - of 
just how important such analysis can be in brief accounts of the 
Godwin Circle and the Bloomsbury Group (74-7; 79-83). 
The study constantly urges the need for a more narrowly focused 
analysis, one which attends to the specificities of textual 
analysis, and yet with an equal eye to the means and conditions of 
that textual production. The advice is good; but it is not 
followed through in Q~l!~r~ itself, which remains, in the true 
sense of the term, a theoretical study: the urging through 
abstract argument of the need for a historically precise and 
theoretically specific form of cultural analysis which accepts the 
full force of the idea of the primacy of cultural production. The 
difficulty is that Q~l!~r~ argues abstractly for a cultural 
materialism whose explanatory force is less embodied in abstract 
theory and assertion, and more in the practice of a precise 
contextual analysis which draws a great deal on textual evidence 
for its strength. 
Indeed, Q~l!~r~ is best read alongside the essays in frQ21~~ 2 
in_Materialism_and _Culture and Writing_in_ Societ~ which more fully 
embody the theoretical insights at work in Q~l!~r~. Far too many 
of the interesting and central assertions made in Q~l!~r~ remain 
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too abstract in the primary sense of the word - too summary, too 
withdrawn from particular examples, and the particularity of 
examples - in a (negative sense of the) word, too theoretical. 
The interesting claim that the establishment of soliloquy as a 
convention in English Renaissance drama was at one and the same 
time a development of social practice and the discovery ' i~ 
Q[~IB~iiQ fQ[IB, of new and altered social relationships' (1981a: 
142) , is better made as a case in the essay 'On Dramatic Dialogue 
and Monologue' (1984 : 31-64); similarly, the idea that in 'French 
mid seventeenth-century neo-classical tragedy ... the social content 
of the formal changes is especially clear ' ( 153) reads only as a 
bare assertion in Q~1.1~[~. while in the essay 'Form and Meaning: 
!HPPQ1~.1~.§ and fh~g_r~· (1984: 22-30), this general point is given 
specific substance. So it is that while an essay such as ' The 
Bloomsbury Fraction' represents Williams's work at its best -
theoretically sophisticated, historically nuanced , textually acute 
- the four or five pages in Q~11~.r~ are simply too compressed to 
do justice to the depth and sophistication of the arguments , and 
Williams ' s fine insight - that ' the extreme subjectivism of . . . the 
no v els of Virginia Woolf belongs within the same formation as the 
economic interventionism of Keynes' ( 81) ·- can only come through 
as an unsub s tantiated claim in a somewhat tedious blur of abstract 
>0 
argument . . 
All in all, the book as a whole calls in a thin theoretical way 
for the necessity of a thick analysis . Cultural materialism - if 
it were to become a professional academic discipline - would be 
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the analysis of all forms of signification within their means and 
conditions of existence, with these conditions understood in terms 
of both their formal and socio-political context. In this way, 
cultural materialism promises to supersede the usual opposition 
between ' formalist' and 'sociological' approaches which has been 
so damaging to progressive analysis, the cause of such ' damaging 
and widespread' confusion (138). It is only when we pause to 
articulate that what Williams means by that damaging and 
widespread confusion is virtually the whole of existing literary 
studies, whether orthodox literary, orthodox Marxist, or orthodox 
theoretical, that we realise the real scope of his ambitions for 
cultural materialism. Q~l!~r~ is Williams's sketch for a 
sociology of culture which isn't, but could become, 
discipline' (233). 
a new major 
A constitutive feature of this new discipline would be its 
supersession of orthodox literary studies . Williams had begun his 
professional career as an academic student of literature and 
culture with great uneasiness, torn, as we saw in Chapter One, 
between a Communist party orthodoxy he could not sustain in the 
face of the greater explanatory power of the discipline of 
English , and yet equally unable to accept its deliberately liberal 
or conservative apoliticism. Cambridge English - the local 
version of English studies which nourished his oppositional 
thinking - saw itself as an attempt at solving or at least 
responding critically to the pressures of modernity and the new 
mass society. What the ever - deepening critique of Cambridge 
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English led him to was, as we have seen, the formation of the 
theory of cultural materialism. 
' We begin to think where we live' was one of Williams's most 
striking - and most characteristic - formulations, the formulation 
of the very typicality he often seemed to claim for his own 
experience of the social and political divisions of Great 
~ 
Britain. : Certainly, with regard to the study of literature and 
culture, there can be no doubt that Williams lived and thought and 
~ 
argued in Cambridge. , . We saw in Chapter One just how decisive a 
starting-point Cambridge English was for him: it represented the 
' tight place' from which he had to escape; and, in the chapters 
which followed, just how much of his subsequent work and thinking 
was the product of a more or less continuous oppositional dialogue 
with Cambridge English, whether focused on drama , tragedy, the 
novel or the country house poem. As he later noted , he was 
involved with Cambridge English for a full two-thirds of its 
'l q 
history .. Similarly, in his autobiographical essay ' My 
Cambridge' , he notes just how important it was for him '· t o work 
out [his] particular argument in Cambridge' (Williams 1989c: 12) , 
and this despite - or rather precisely because of - the fact that 
h e detested so many things about it: 
after fifteen years I am intellectually more isolated from it, 
and from any thing at all likely to happen in it, than I was 
when I came. The key moment, perhaps, was my rejection of 
356 
literary criticism: not only as an academic subject but a~ an 
intellectual discipline. (ibid., p. 13) 
' My rejection of literary criticism . .. But nobody quite believes I 
mean it ', he went on . ' I no longer believe in specialized 
literary studies. In fact,' as he put it in a 1977 interview, ' I 
don't believe, in any simple way, in the specialization of 
literature' (Williams 1977b: 14). Strong - and paradoxical -
words from someone whose professional life had been devoted to 
literary criticism! And yet the paradox was absolutely defining, 
determinately constitutive. Marxism _ and _Literature is the 
summar y , in the necessarily abstract terms of theoretical 
e x position , of that continued narrative of opposition. Or, a:s 
Williams put it, with his usual dry humour, the book spells out 
' theoretically a position that has been developing over a long 
time' (ibid., p.16) - over , in fact, a working lifetime. As we 
shall see in the chapter which follows, it was from within the 
theory of cultural materialism that Williams was able to 
articulate , in the last phase of hi s thinking, the deep irony that 
Cambridge English was in the end a part of the problem of the 
mod e rn i t y it sought to transcend. 
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Ch_7 _Against _ the _New_Conformism_1981=1~~1 
This chapter examines the last phase of Williams's work, the 
writing completed after the publication of Q~l1~r~ in 1981, and 
before his untimely death in 1988. His sudden demise left his 
final projects incomplete, though we are fortunate to have 
available some of their major components. Tony Pinkney has 
assembled most of the essays intended for the projected study, Th~ 
Politics _of _Modernism, and these were published in 1989; and two 
of the projected three volumes of novels dealing with the history 
of Wales, Peo2le _of_the _Black_Mountains , have appeared. 1983 saw 
the publication of his most directly political book since the 
collaborative Ma~_Da~_Manifesto of 1967, the study Towards 2000, 
as well as the monograph QQQQ~11, Throughout Williams's 
impressive industry produced the usual range of cultural, 
political. and literary essays , lectures, and reviews, as well as 
a further novel , iQ~~l1i~~. 1n 1985. Writing_and_Societ~. a 
collection of literary essays appeared 1n 1984 , and 1n 1989, Alan 
O'Connor edited the collection Ra~mond _Williams_on _Television, 
which principally consisted of the television reviews written for 
The Listener between 1968 and 1972. Two further posthumous 
selections also appeared in 1989: Resources_of_Ho2e, edited by 
Robin Gable. drawing mainly on Williams ' s political writings; and 
What _I_Came _ to_Sa~. selected by Francis Mulhern , focusing 
primarily on literature and culture. These brought Williams's 
critical writings up to a total of some twenty - four volumes, the 
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most substantial body of work in cultural politics produced by any 
socialist academic of his generation.l 
What were Williams's main preoccupations in this final period? 
The phenomenon of Thatcherism provided the dominating cultural and 
political context . Virtually all his work in this period, though 
on different levels and in different ways, sought to provide a 
socialist response to the agenda of political and ideological 
issues which were largely set by the emergence and ascendancy of 
the New Right.2 In this chapter we shall examine the terms of 
the active opposition to, and critique of, what he came to call 
the ' New Conformism': a political mood of the moment whose 
cultural roots, it was argued , lay in the long history of 
twentieth century modernism and its appropriations. Something of 
this history, and its particular relation to the formation of 
Cambridge English, formed the focus of his retirement lectures in 
1983. 
Revisionary Retirement 
Williams took up the option of early retirment from his post as 
Professor of Drama at Cambridge University in the summer of 1983 . 
He wanted to devote himself full-time to writing, though he did in 
fact continue to teach a few classes on Practical Criticism. and 
to give a number of seminars on Modernism for the Modern Languages 
Faculty. and these formed the basis for The_Politics _of 
Modernism.3 On April 25 and 26 , he delivered his two formal 
359 
retirement lectures, and took the opportunity both to look back on 
the troubled history of Cambridge English as an intellectual and 
academic project , and forward to the new focus of interest for his 
own continuing work: the ideas and differential practices of 
modernism. 
In the first of these, 'Cambridge English, Past and Present', 
Williams reviewed the history and future prospects of English 
studies at Cambridge in the light - or rather the pall - cast by 
the MacCabe Affair. 
English"?' he asks. 
'Was there ever in fact a "Cambridge 
For certainly the situation of literary 
studies in Cambridge was just 'as tangled, as problematic and as 
unresolved' as it had been in 1961. on his return to Cambridge as 
a Lecturer in the English Faculty, though no more and and no less 
so than it had been in his undergraduate years in the late 30s and 
early 40s. Why this tangle, why this confusion? 
In Williams ' s view, Cambridge English was flawed from the start 
by the very condition of existence it so prided itself upon: its 
deliberate separation, as an academic discipline, from the formal 
study of language.4 ' Theoretically' he ~rged. ' it is clear that 
it is in language that the decisive practices and relations whi c h 
are projected as "literature", "life" and "thought"' - the triple 
focus of attention in Cambridge English 
discoverable' (Williams [1983a]: 188). 
are real and 
But in its founding 
gesture , Cambridge English had turned away from the history of 
language - ' Language in history: that full field' (189), as he put 
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it - and the consequent possibility of treating it as something 
more than ' a background to be produced for annotation' , 1n some 
private transaction of reading pleasure. For, taken 'in the 
fullest sense language (as he had argued in Marxism_ and 
Literature) was the necessary ground for 
the kind of reading in which the conditions of production, in 
the fullest sense, can be understood 1n relation to both writer 
and reader , actual writing and actual reading. A newly active 
social sense of writing and reading, through the social and 
material historical realities of language , in a world in which 
it is closely and precisely known , in every act of writing and 
reading, that these practices connect with, are inseparable 
from, the whole set of social practices and relationships which 
define writers and readers as active human beings, as distinct 
from the idealized and projected ' authors' and ' trained 
readers' who are assumed to float, on a guarded privilege, 
ab o ve the rough , diverse and divisive world of which yet , by 
some alchemy , they possess the essential secret. (189) 
Despite the self - regarding myths of a Tillyard or a Willey, it was 
because of its abandonment of the study of language as a social 
practice that Cambridge never did develop a fully coherent course 
of study around the discipline of English Literature.5 In 
reality, th e re was never a ' Cambridge English', if by that one 
were to understand 
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a distinctive and coherent course and method of study. The 
Golden Age was golden only in its beginnings, its searchings, 
its open and freespeaking and for some years tolerant 
experimentation and enquiry. (190) 
'For some years indeed, since, as we saw in the previous chapter, 
the MacCabe Affair had precisely demonstrated at least the present 
absence of any such intellectual and academic virtues. 
In the second lecture, 'Beyond Cambridge English', Williams 
reframes the substance of his own career as an attempt to 
challenge and question the assumed relations between the methods , 
practices and techniques which had come together as Cambridge 
English, and the larger cultural formation of literary modernism . 
He repeats and amplifies his central concern -the strange fact 
that ' many people still think that "language" is self-evidently a 
separate "subject" from "literature"' (Williams [1983b]: 213) , and 
reiterates his view that it would be in the matter of how the 
complex general problems of language ' are dealt with, in the 
coming years. that the success or failure of English studies, 
will .. . be decided' (213) . In line with the core arguments of 
Marxism _ and _Literature , the social reality and effectivity of 
language is emphasised. a reality in which language is to be 
understood neither as absolutely determing system, nor as 
absolutely spontaneous expression , but rather as constitutive in 
th e active and dialogical sense which Williams had learned from 
Volosinov. This emphasis provides the core for what wa s to be his 
362 
final challenge to the complacent self-understanding of Cambridge 
English, and the focus of the final phase of his writing and 
research: what North American critic Jonathan Arac has called his 
· remarkable retrospect on modernism' (Arac 1986b: xxxviii). 
Cambridge English had always assumed a defensive stance 
in relation to the perceived pressures of modernity, acting as the 
champion of figures such as Eliot and Lawrence against the dark 
forces of mass society and mass civilization. From the beginning 
of his career, Williams had argued against the anti-democratic 
bias which was all too evident in many of the founding arguments 
of the Cambridge English school and its allies.6 In the 
retirement lectures, he is firmer than ever in placing the 
dis c ipline of English within modernism, rather than , as it wished 
to be seen, outside it, as a bulwark against the sinister forces 
of mass civilization, shoring its cultural fragments against the 
threatened ruin of civilization . Cambridge English was not the 
ground of some possible solution to the pressures of modernity : it 
was itself a part of the larger problem posed by the conservative 
response to modernity. With an insight sharpened by some thirty 
years of argument and analysis, he suggested there were 
significant connections between contemporary theory and argument 
and the wider structures of early twentieth century modernism. 
In a review written around the same time as the retirement 
lectures. Williams suggested that the · central problem' was ' the 
understanding of "modernism" itself. Is it a general name for a 
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group of diverse innovations and experiments in the arts?' he 
asked. or 
are these innovations and experiments the specific elements of 
a much more general shift in social relationships, which has 
led to theoretical changes in a much wider field, including the 
theoretical positions from which 'modernist art' is favourably 
or unfavourably interpreted? (1983d: 439). 
The cultural materialist perspective - which emphasises the role 
of the arts in any shifts in social relationships - favoured the 
second option. Hence his assertion, in the second lecture, that a 
great deal of contemporary analytical orthodoxy is 1n fact derived 
from an unexamined structure of modernist thinking: 
Formalism in literary analysis; the epistemological break that 
is said to distinguish Marxism; the break and innovation of 
psychoanalysis; the break and innovation of theoretical 
linguistics , from Saussure: structuralism in anthropology and 
sociology: these , as forms of thinking and in the cultural 
practice that accompanies them, compose ' modernism'. (1983b: 
220) 
This should be recognised as an unusually broad definition of a 
much contested term. and one which moves decisively beyond its 
ordinary deployment in literary history . 7 Indeed , it is 
striking that in many ways the definition is best read as 
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referring to the literary theory emerging in Britain through the 
mid- to the late 1970s. The definition thus encompasses and seeks 
to connect the work of figures in very different discursive fields 
across some sixty years of intellectual history, assembling a 
montage of the ideas of a Victor Shlovsky in 1916 with those of 
the school of Althusser in the 1960s, as well as placing Freud 
with his great interpreter Lacan. and suggesting connections 
between all of these and developments in and from the work of 
Saussure, Levi-Strauss and Goldmann and others.8 
For Williams, all of these - the staple constituents of Theory 
- compose the ' specific cultural formation' generally known as 
modernism. As the single most decisive aspect of this formation , 
Williams singles out how it 'has been at once a response to and 
governed by an underlying and decisive uneveness of literacy and 
of learning : the uneveness, specifically, of a class society, at a 
definite and critical stage' (221). 9 This uneveness comes 
through in the symptomatic emphasis on alienation and estrangement 
in this whole cultural formation. ' The common factor', he argues, 
' in the different theories and practices that are grouped together 
as modernism' 
is an estrangement - a sense of both distance and novelty -
which is related in its own terms to some large 
characterisation of the · modern world' but is in reality the 
response of a disturbed and exposed formation - writers, 
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artists and intellectuals - to conditions which were blocking 
their own most significant kinds of work . (221-2) 
This estrangement - celebrated as the ostranenie of Russian 
Formalism - was never only a question of form or technique.10 
According to the theoretical and historical emphases of cultural 
materialism, literary explanation does not come to an end with 
formal observation. The fact of technique needs itself to be 
interpreted socially: 
The decisive condition of the practice was the availability, 
within a new kind of social formation, of social relationships 
which eventually corresponded to the practical initiatives. 
They were found within the new social form of the metropolis: 
typically the imperial metropolis of Paris, London and 
eventually New York. An extraordinary number of the innovators 
were not so much exiles and emigres, though this was how they 
started , but immigrants, which is where the conditions of their 
practice formed. (222)11 
Seen in this light - that cast by the methodological commitment of 
cultural materialism to examine cultural expression in terms of 
its means and conditions of existence - the ' aesthetic 
universality ' claimed by the modernists was forged from an 
' initial strangeness ' , the product of experiences of both 
estrangement and exposure 
metropolitan civilization : 
and , as product, marketed from a newly 
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What began in isolation and exposure ended, at many levels, in 
an establishment: as the decisive culture of an international 
capitalist world, which could trade both the original and .the 
adapted forms. (223) 
At the same time, a significant constituent of this whole cultural 
formation was constituted, expressed and disseminated in the 
activities and practices of educationalists and intellectuals, 
mainly based in the universities, where, as Williams argues it, a 
new sense of the objectivity of systems, and of this 
objectivity as something that needed to be penetrated by new 
forms of analysis, taking nothing as it appeared but looking 
for deep forms, deep structures, with the eyes of a stranger, 
came through in field afer field: in linguistics, in 
anthropology, in economics, in sociology, in aesthetics, in 
psychoanalysis .... The whole text was to be read without date 
and author: this was the new and necessary discipline. ( 223) 
The implicit logic of Williams's whole argument is easy to follow. 
This discipline, this mindset, had been anticipated as an academic 
discipline in the 1920s and 1930s as the 'new and necessary' 
discipline of Richards's Practical Criticism (1929). It re-
emerged in the 1950s and 1960s as the structuralism of Saussure 
and became influential in the work of figures such as Levi-
Strauss, Goldmann , Todorov and Lacan.12 And in the post-1968 
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period, this mutated into the new and necessary discipline of the 
postmodern in the work of writers like Baudrillard. For Williams, 
there is a significant continuity of position running through all 
of these, and it is that stance he is concerned to identify. 
With an unusual rhetorical colouring, he turns to look back on 
this whole development 'in turn, with the eyes of a stranger': 
What I then see is not only what they have achieved but their 
own deep forms. I can feel the bracing cold of their inherent 
distances and impersonalities and yet have to go on saying that 
they are indeed ice-cold. I see, practically and 
theoretically , the estranging consequences of the general 
assumption - as active in modernist literature as in 
theoretical linguistics and structuralist Marxism - that the 
systems of human signs are generated within the systems 
themselves and that to think otherwise is a humanist error. 
( 2 2 3) 
Just the humanist error which had been the target of so many 
critical positions since the 1960s, ranging in idiom from Lacan's 
insistence that a signifier represents the subject for another 
signifier', across Althusser's stirring call, in the sharp tones 
of a structuralist Marxism, for a revival of 'Marx's_theoretical 
anti-humanism' (Althusser [1965) 1969: 229). to Foucault's 
enigmatic wager 'that man would be erased. like a face drawn in 
sand at the edge of the sea' (Foucault [1966] 1970: 387), as well 
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as many other claims of the 'death of the subject' by Barthes, 
Deleuze, Derrida and others . 13 What most concerned Williams was 
- as we shall see below - the terms of its local manifestation in 
the debates around the ' classic realist text' in both film and 
fiction. He found these arguments , based as they were in a 
broadly Althusserian theory of ideology, to be theoretically 
compromised and historically incorrect . Ironically , the arguments 
of the avant-garde theorists of the cultural left shared too many 
basic assumptions with the New Conformism . We shall first examine 
how Williams saw these basic assumptions in Towards_2000 , and then 
examine how these came through , though in different guise, in the 
arguments around ideas of modernism and the ' classic realist text' 
in the work of some of Williams's Cambridge colleagues and broad 
p o litical allies.14 
Towards 2000 
The · estranging consequences of the bourgeois modernist world-
view are taken up as the central thrust of Williams's arguments in 
his most specifically political essay since the collaborative M~~ 
Da~ _Manifesto , the book - length study, Towards 2000, published in 
1983 . That c herism - and the debates on the left which it provoked 
- provides the essential context for understanding the book's 
central arguments and address. 
Thatcherism and , more importantly , Thatcherism apparently 
triumphant. Margaret Thatcher had rather surprisingly defeated 
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Edward Heath in the leadership contest of 1975, two years after 
his administration had been brought down in the 1973 General 
Election. Heath's failure was generally attributed to his 
inability to deal forcefully enough with the Miners' Strike of 
197kwe../The indomitable Maggie - the ' Iron Lady' - went on to win 
no than three successive election victories in 1979, 1983 , 
and 1987 . As had been promised, the period saw a significant 
redistribution of wealth, largely through selective income tax 
cuts and the increase in VAT , from the poor to the rich; a massive 
and unparalleled increase in unemployment and in bankruptcies in 
the manufacturing sector; a partial dismantling of the welfare 
state ; increased political centralisation ; a significant erosion 
of trade union rights; and - to contain the protests, riots and 
disruptions provoked by these aggressive policies - an equally 
signifi c ant strengthening and militarisation of the police 
force .1 5 ' To those who had, much was given' - Hugo Young's 
summary encapsulates much of the agenda and achievements of 
Thatcher ' s administrations (Young 1989: 502). 
Thatcherism was the object of some major analysis and 
rethinking on the left , and the occasion "for not a little 
immediate despair . The jingoism and jubilation following 
Br i tain 's victory in Falklands War of June-July 1982 marked 
perhaps the nadir of left - wing feeling, summed up in Tom Nairn's 
desperate cry that the lesson of the Falklands War was to show 
that the ' real England is irredeemably Tory' (Nairn 1983: 288) 
Similarly , in a series of provocative articles , Stuart Hall 
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brought the arguments and insights of the Birmingham Studies 
Cultural Centre into play, emphasising the strength and force of 
Thatcherism as an ideology, and, above all, as an ideology that 
had found something the left was missing: ' a powerful means of 
translating economic doctrine into the language of experience, 
moral imperative and common sense (Hall 1983: 28).16 
Thatcherism enjoyed hegemony because it had created had created an 
almost unassailable ' authoritarian popularism' . While many were 
swayed by Hall's arguments, others were more cautious, and refused 
to lend Thatcherism the kind of internal coherence apparently 
granted to it in Hall's analysis. Bob Jessop and others preferred 
to stress the internal contradictions of Thatcherism , and urged 
that it ' must be seen less as a monolithic monstrosity and more as 
an alliance of disparate forces around a self-contradictory 
programme ' ( Jessop et al 1984: 34). 17 
Throughout this entire period, Williams maintained a sturdy 
sense of his own political identity, holding to the continued 
force and relevance of socialist ideas. In 1983, just four weeks 
before the General Election, Williams had argued against the easy 
conclusion, that if Thatcher were to win ·this would show ' that the 
majority of the British people can be defined as Thatcherit e in 
consciousness' ((1983e]: 163), and warned of a danger on the left 
of acquiescing to ' an interpretation which, as it were, would 
blame the majority of the British people for not accepting a 
socialist analysis ' ( 164) .18 Later, in 1986, he lamented what he 
saw as too defeati s t a tendency on the left , asking , with som e 
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anger and disdain whether it was ' only an accident that one form 
of the theory of ideology produced that block diagnosis of 
Thatcherism which taught despair and political disarmament in a 
social situation which was always more diverse, more volatile and 
more temporary? Is there never to be an end to petit-bourgeois 
theorists making long-term adjustments to short-term situations?' 
(Williams [1986c]: 175) . And in July 1987, in one of his final 
interviews, asked whether he felt ' disillusioned' by the rise of 
the Right and Thatcher's recent election victory - her third, his 
reply was characteristic: 'Disillusionment, not at all; 
disappointment , of course it was clearer than ever 'that the 
socialist analysis is the correct one' ([1987c]: 315). Williams's 
political writing - but not only his political writing - set out 
to combat and challenge that block diagnosis and the sense of 
despair which fed it. 
Against Stuart Hall's idea of an 'authoritarian populism' , 
Wi lliams set the idea of Thatcher's 'constitutional 
authoritarianism ', preferring to focus attention on the actual 
mechanisms and contradictions of state democracy than on 
ideological explanation. In a striking essay on the tv coverage 
of the Falklands War , he stressed the ways in which the reporting 
raised questions cru c ial to the ' culture of contemporary 
democracy'. and what was happening to it in Thatcher ' s 
administration . What was evident was 'the unique modern 
combination of a Cabinet with absolute sovereign power , acting 
within a complex of parliamentary parties , opinion polls and 
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television'. This combination represented ·a new political form, 
latent for many years but now at least temporarily made actual' 
((1982]: 42). Its name: constitutional authoritarianism; and it 
needed to be thought as an expression of that larger 'culture of 
distance' which Williams associated with Thatcherism, but also 
more broadly with the New Conformism which underlay Thatcherism, 
that ' latent culture of alienation, within which men and women are 
reduced to models, figures and the quick cry in the throat' 
( 4 3) . 
Similarly, in an essay ' Mining the Meaning', written for the 
London _Review _of_Books during the bitter, prolonged, and 
ultimately failed Miners' Strike of 1984-85, he put out a 
challenge to the key words of Thatcherite economic common sense' 
The destructive catchwords of management, g~Q~Q~i~ and 1~~=~QQ= 
Qrggr ', he argued, work to conceal ' the real operations of a new 
and reckless stage of capitalism' ([1985c]: 127) . Against the new 
' common ground' proposed by Thatcher and her ideologues, Williams 
argued that the miners struggles · outlined a new form of the 
general interest ' (ibid.), one which could challenge ' the logic of 
a new nomad capitalism' (124) , and its confident belief that ' all 
the redundant people and discarded communities can continue to be 
politically marginalized or , if they act on their own behalf to be 
contro l led by centralized communications (the political argument, 
as in this strike, taking place not in Parliament but on radio and 
television) and [accepting here some of Hall's arguments] by new 
forms of policing' (127) .19 
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In other essays and speeches - many delivered for the Socialist 
Society, at whose inaugural meeting Williams spoke in 1981, or 
written for its fortnightly political magazine, New Socialist -
he addressed the issues of nuclear disarmament, ecology, and the 
need for labour party reform and called for a thorough 
reassessment and redefinition of socialist goals and 
strategies. All of this came together with the publication in 
1983 of Williams's most extended piece of socialist analysis and 
advocacy, Towards 2000. Never was Williams more active as a 
socialist thinker than in this last decade of his life. 
What is striking, argues Williams, in the book's central 
insight, is the ways in which the ' innovative forms ' of modernist 
representation - which were originally composed to challenge ' the 
fixed forms of an earlier period of bourgeois society' - have 
themselves become ·stabilised as the most reductive versions of 
human existence in the whole of human history': 
The originally precarious and often desperate images -
typicall y of fragmentation, loss of identity, loss of the very 
grounds of human communication - have been transferred from the 
dynamic compositions of artists who had been, in majority , 
literally exiles, having little or no common ground with the 
societies in which they were stranded, to become, at an 
effective surface, a · modernist ' and ' po st-modern ist' 
establishment. (Williams 1983c: 141) 
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These new forms have now become ' a widely distributed "popular" 
culture that is meant to confirm both its own and the world's 
destructive inevitablities ' (142) as if every active citizen was 
no more than a Vladimir or an Estragon, a Hamm or a Klov.20 
Although Towards _ 2000 is concerned with the local struggle 
against Thatcherism in Britain, it also seeks to address that 
struggle in the global context of late capitalism. In a 
controversial move , Williams takes as his starting-point the final 
section of The _Long _Revolution (1961) , the prescient analysis 
' Britain in the 1960s' , which is reprinted in full as the first 
c hapter of the new book.21 In a 1965 note, Williams had already 
admitted , under the pressure of criticisms from historian Asa 
Briggs , that the original framework of the essay suffered from too 
nationalistic a focus.22 In Towards 2000 the terms of the 
nationalist focus are themselves examined alongside the orthodox 
form s of international analysis. 
The book as a whole is concerned with the fixed terms of 
' normal' political analysis of late modernity . He contrasts 
public with private projections of the future, and questions the 
supposedly ' obje c tive ' projections which are used as the ba s is for 
current party- based political thinking. In fact, argues Williams, 
the political manifesto , based as it is on the rhythms of the 
electoral process is too short-term in focus to deal with social 
and political phenomena which are on l y susceptible to proper 
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analysis and adjustment in a much larger time-scale. Such a time-
scale has more in common with our private thinking where, for 
example, the 
relatively ungraspable date of 2050 ... is within the normal 
lifespan of my grandchildren, and all the more traditional ways 
of thinking about the future would certainly include this kind 
of natural human foresight and concern . The apparently more 
practical urgencies which foreshorten calculation, for 
temporary advantage, are in this respect as in others more 
damaging to the most basic human order. (Williams 1983c: 16) 
Williams notes how modernism has favoured the ' systematic 
d ys topia' (1~~1 , Animal_Farm, Brave _ New _World) as a form, and how 
these works commonly suggest that 'the very attempt to achieve a 
sy s tematic utopia leads straight to a systematic dystopia' They 
impl y ' a complacent projection of actual and historically 
in s tituted so c ial orders as permanently necessary and ex c lusive ' , 
and it is this implication which ' most deeply discourages those 
who see very clearl y that their own social order is in crisis 
Again s t this , Williams calls for a renewal of positive utopian 
thinking , one whi c h offers ' an imaginative reminder of the nature 
of histori c al c hange: that major social orders do rise and fall , 
and that n e w social orders do succeed them' . Such a reminder is a 
ne c essary part of the formation of any socialist discourse whi c h 
wishes to offer a projection of the future contrary to the 
prev ailing negati v e and modern i st version s . 
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Indeed, a large part of the book is devoted to a critique of 
just these prevailing versions, which Williams associates with 
modernism. Deploying the particular kinds of linguistic, 
historical and ideological analysis of language which are 
essential components of his cultural materialism, it is argued 
that there is an ideological unity to the basic prevailing 
attitude towards the world, a distinctively modernist frame of 
thinking and analysis: 'The dominant version' he writes 
has been a basic orientation to the world as raw material. 
What has been steadily learned and imposed as a way of seeing 
the world not as life forms and and land forms, in an intricate 
interdependance, but as a range of opportunites for their 
profitable exploitation. (261) 
Against this, we need to assert the 'principle of a society 
sustained by its economy has to replace the practice of a society 
determined by a market' ( 97). The argument, in other words, turns 
partly on the force of representation as a systematic way of 
seeing which provides or enforces a basic orientation to the 
world as raw material'. 23 As such, this same way of seeing is 
active both in modernism, and in our contemporary understandings 
of modernism , though with one significant difference. As Williams 
was to argue in his final essays, the orthodox interpretations of 
modernist practice itself tended to select just one strand of the 
the ideology of modernism and so repeat and enforce it, the strand 
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of 'bourgeois dissidence' which Williams had first criticised 1n 
relation to Orwell, and which he renamed, in his final essays, the 
New Conformism.24 
New Conformisms 
Tony Pinkney has collected most of the essays which Williams 
had intended for publication, and adding some cognate 
supplementary material, together with a lengthy editorial 
introduction, and this was published in 1989 as The_Politics_of 
Modernism: _Against_the _New_Conformists.25 Many readers found the 
collection somewhat unsatisfactory. Prendergast wrote of ' an 
uncomfortably strained quality in much of the writing' (1995b: 
196) , while Loren Kruger described it as 'thought-provoking but 
sometimes sketchy' (1991: 144). Chris Baldick, in a review for the 
Times Literar~ Su22lement. found problematic Williams's division 
of interest between ' the original modernist formation itself and 
an academically processed version of it', and suggested that the 
first ' is not carried through to substantial detail, while the 
second suffers from a characteristic reluctance to name or even 
adequately describe the position polemically assailed' (Baldick 
1989: 1205). In the account which follows I seek to describe a 
little more fully the positions under attack, and to show why, for 
Williams , there was no division of interest between the original 
modernist formation and the later academic histories of it . First 
it is necessary to examine some of Pinkney's framing of Williams ' s 
work in this final phase. 
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In a substantial Introduction to the selection - 'Modernism and 
Cultural Theory' - Pinkney sets up a fascinating intellectual, 
political and historical context through which to frame and read 
the final essays. These same arguments are taken up, extended and 
amplified in a related essay, also published in 1989, 'Raymond 
Williams and the "Two Faces of Modernism"', and together these 
form the basis for a later monograph on the novels.26 In his 
Introduction, Pinkney distinguishes between the ' "official" line' 
which Williams takes in his final essays , and what he claims as an 
equally important but iIB2ligi! 'sub-text' to the book. This sub-
text ' runs the case rather differently', and consequently there 
are 'two almost incompatible views of Modernism and the avant-
garde' at work in The_Politics _ of_Modernism. The second, concedes 
Pinkney , only comes through only ' as trope rather than argument' 
( 2 6) . As trope indeed: for there are several moments at which he 
has to twist the evidence to fit his case that ' it was 
Expressionism that aesthetically formed Williams' (1989b: 25). 
Thus . in support of his assertion that Williams must have known 
about Brecht in the late 1930s, he quotes him as saying that 
' there were wa y s of knowing about [Brecht's] work, if distant and 
specialized ones (cited Pinkney p. 17; Williams 1979: 215-16), 
but neglects to mention Williams's own admission of his own ' lack 
of awareness' of Brecht's work in this period, or his defensive 
remark that such ignorance concerning Brecht was ' very common a t 
the time' . ' It was only in the mid and late fifties that most of 
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us got to know Brecht', he states (215-6) , in direct contradiction 
to Pinkney 's view. Similarly, Pinkney writes that Williams 'adds 
the name of German Expressionism' (1983b: 19) to the modernist 
litany, and quotes Williams as saying that ' in the late thirties 
admiration for~~ Caligari or Metro~olis was virtually a condition 
of entry to the Socialist Club at Cambridge' (Williams 1979: 
232). The only problem is, that when read in context, this is 
best understood as a wry remark, the phrase 'condition of entry' 
heavily ironic. For far from demonstrating an admiration for 
German Expressionism, Williams is actually engaged in distancing 
himself from it. His own stated admiration - in complete accord 
with the arguments of The _Politics _of _Modernism - is for the 
'early Soviet cinema', which had always seemed to him to be 'the 
major work that took up the original naturalist project' (ibid.). 
He praises Eisenstein's work against that of the German 
Expressionists. German Expressionist cinema is in fact identified 
as the forerunner of the mistakes and excesses of avant-garde 
cinema. ' In the sixties,' he says, ' there was a development of 
' 
incredibly complex seeing, but of nothing very much. The 
complexity became a fetishized concentration on the point of view 
at the expense of what was viewed. This cinema could genuinely be 
described as formalist in the sense that it was preoccupied with 
problems of the medium without any adequate relation between its 
methods and the kind of content these were supposed to interpret' 
(Williams 1979: 232). Nothing could ·be clearer: the quotation 
which Pinkney picks as evidence for Williams ' s interest in and 
support for German Expressionism comes in reality from a context 
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of argument which is critical of expressionism as an avatar of the 
' arid formamalisms of the sixties'. E~Q~ Pinkney, Williams is 
criticising - and not endorsing - the German Expressionist 
experiment . 
In arguing for the ' sub-text' of The_Politics_of_Modernism, 
Pinkney overstates his case, and can only support it by bending 
the available evidence to fit his preconceptions. Indeed, the 
larger case compounds the problems discussed in Chapter Two, ~ 
2~Q2Q§ of Pinkney's discussion of Williams on drama. 
repeated over-estimation of the impact and appeal of 
There is a 
Expressionism, and a tendency to substitute his reading of the 
dynamics of modernism for Williams's own which leads to a certain 
blurring or misalignment in explanatory focus, as well as a 
sub s tantial negelect of the political context which Williams was 
always addressing, however indirectly. Pinkney is much more 
c orr e ct - though in contradiction with some of his own assumptions 
- when he writes that Williams had , from the beginning, 
\ 
reservations' about Brecht's work, and particularly its 
major 
' enthronement of the critical spectator' (1983b: 20), and this 
will be dis c ussed further below. 
The reason for the over-estimation doubtless lies in Pinkney's 
de s ire t o overturn the usual idea of Williams as an ' English 
Lukacs' .28 He chooses Lukacs ' s expressionist opponent Ernst 
Bloch as an 
~~ 
alternative figure of comparison. In both cases, it 
would be a mistake to try and turn what works as a partially 
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illuminating comparison into any theoretically substantial case. 
Williams's own formation was very different from either that of 
Lukacs or Bloch, notwithstanding Pinkney's attempt at making 
common ground in expressionist modernism. The simple fact was 
that Williams's main formative influence was Cambridge English, 
which can be understood, and as Williams grew to understand it, as 
itself a modernist cultural formation, rather than an objective 
~8 
analytic response to the pressures of a perceived mass modernism. 
Rather than seeking the ' sub-text' of The _Politics_of 
Modernism , let us examine the ways in which the book continues the 
argument against the new critical structuralism' which Williams 
had begun in Marxism_and _Literature, and which he now continued, 
under the new pressures of Thatcherism, as an argument against the 
'N ew Conformism'. This dimension of address - Williams contra 
Thatcher - lies outside the scope of Pinkney's fascinating but in 
the end academicist and anachronistic analysis. Writing against 
the New Conformism meant writing against the new right-wing forces 
represented in the Thatcher regime of 1979-1990, and anticipated 
in the period in opposition which the Conservative Party spent 
from Edward Heath 's defeat as Prime Minister in 1974 until the 
election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979. For Williams , this also 
meant arguing against those modes of analysis in literary theory 
which leant unwitting support to the conceptions of the self, 
individual or subject which Thatcherism drew upon for its 
representation of an acquisitive and asocial world. That these 
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modes of analysis could be found in theoretical work intended for 
the left only made these criticisms the more urgent. 
The sovereign individual 
The ' New Conservatism' which became known as 'Thatcherism' set 
out by defining itself against the ' social-conscience 
Conservatism' which had dominated the British Conservative Party 
since Labour's victory in 1945 (Riddell 1985: 2). Sir Keith 
Joseph was the first to articulate its main directions as 
something of a conversion experience. In April 1974 he realized 
that though he had believed himself a true Conservative for some 
twenty years, he had been mistaken: only now could he see what 
true Conservatism really was (Young 1989: 79) . In a series of 
speeches and articles, Joseph argued that the Conservative Party 
had betrayed itself by granting too much to the imaginary ' middle-
ground' of the post-war consensus on the centrality of welfare 
state policies. This ' middle-ground' was unstable, with a built-
in drift leftwards ' dictated by extremists of the left' claimed 
Joseph (Joseph 1976: 21). The party needed to identify and occupy 
a new and distinctively conservative ' common ground' if they 
As a wished to re-establish the real principles of conservatism. 
part of this , think-tank ideologues Norman Strauss and John 
Hoskyns prepared a strategic plan for Joseph in the autumn of 
1977. one whose main component was a direct challenge to trade-
union power. Though the report was never published , and had no 
immediate effect on policy, it did articulate , for the first time, 
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the 'subterranean impulses of hard-right Conservatism' which 
slowly made their way into the Thatcherite agenda (Young: 115) 
A new common ground; new, or perhaps at least distinctive in 
the fervour and forthrightness with which socialism was excluded 
from any rightful part or participation in the social whole. 'The 
choice facing the nation is between two totally different ways of 
life' urged Thatcher on the eve of the 1983 election. 'And what a 
price we have to fight for: no less than the chance to banish from 
our land the dark, divisive clouds of Marxist socialism'. On 
another occasion : ' I have always regarded part of my job as - and 
please do not think of it in an arrogant way - killing socialism 
in Britain'; and again: 'Britain and socialism are not the sime 
thing, and as long as I have health and strength they never will 
be ' (cit Hayes: 98). Another way of putting this, which came 
through in a notorious moment in a live interview with WQ~~~ ~ ~ 
WQrlct, was more brutal and much more contentious: ' there is no 
such thing as society. There are individual men and women, and 
there are families' (cit Hayes: 89). 
This unscripted remark was the cause of much immediate 
controversy. and provided a useful way in to the full implications 
of Thatcher's free-market ideal of the non-society. 'To say there 
is no society but only individuals is fundamentally an amoral 
position' thundered Ralf Dahrendorf, ' It's the philosophy of 
social darwinism ' (Dahrendorf 1988: 197) . 29 As Mark Hayes has 
emphasised, what this meant in practice ' was that certain groups 
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were deprived of full citizenship by material deprivation: social 
security claimnants, the unemployed, the sick, the disabled, the 
homeless and many pensioners began to constitute a new alienated 
under-class . . .. Under Thatcher citizenship status very much 
depended upon one's position in the market - a citizen had no 
tangible value independent of the market order' (Hayes: 91-2). 
As the linchpin of this asocial social philosophy lay a 
conception of the individual which placed a particular emphasis on 
the subject ' s moral capacity, or rather, on an unusual definition 
of just what moral capacity was . As Thatcher herself put it, a 
moral being is one who exercises his own judgement in choice. In 
so far as a citizen's right and duty to choose is taken awa y b y 
the state , the party, or the union, his moral faculties atrophy 
and he become s a moral c ripple' (Thatcher 1977: 108) . Seen in a 
positive light, Thatcher's moral code simply insisted ' on treating 
people as rational and responsible rather than as candidate s for 
special favours' (Minogue 1988: 141). But as Minogue also 
emphasises , this soon shades into ' the repudiation of collective 
guilt' around the issue of pursuing profit above all else (Minogue 
1988: 125) . From there, it was easy to see Thatcherites as 
' supremely selfish to the exclusion of all other concerns' 
(Letwin 1992 : 18-19). Kenneth Baker summed up this aspect of 
Thatcher's moral vision nicely in April 1988: ' Tories did not 
need to apologi s e for the increased scope to what might be called 
acquisitive individualism' (cit Young: 526). 
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' Acquisitive individualism': the phrase could be Williams's, 
though uttered in an angry rather than complacent tone. This 
definition of the human subject as essentially an acquisitive 
individual, with this acquisitiveness somehow the necessary 
property of a moral subject, was central to the ' new conformism' 
of Thatcher's 'counter-revolution' (Williams [1986c]: 172). As 
one defender of Thatcherism put it, the ' Thatcherite conception of 
the individual is the most important and at the same time the 
least understood element of Thatcherism' (Letwin 1992: 32). For 
Williams at least, it was best understood as one line of descent 
from a particular branch of bourgeois dissidence. Many of the 
arguments of these post-modernists of the New Right rested on a 
certai n conception of the subject as the 'sovereign individual': 
The politics of the New Right, with its version of 
libertarianism in a dissolution or deregulation of all bonds 
and all national and cultural formations in the interests of 
what is repre sented as the ideal open market and the truly open 
soc iet y, look very familiar in retrospect. For the sovereign 
individual is offered as the dominant political and cultural 
form , even in a world more evidently controlled by concentrated 
economics and mili tary power . ([1988a]: 62) 
What was curious was that the uonservative promotion of the 
's overeign individual' should share some common ground with the 
idea of the ' critical spectator' deployed in some leftist literary 
and cultural criticism. The ' sovereign individual' was 
386 
essentially asocial, its definition of freedom an illusion. The 
' critical spectator' occupied - or would like to occupy - a place 
impossibly outside social determination - as Williams had argued 
vis-~-vis Eagleton's critical commentary: the 'basic fault' was to 
assume that 'by an act of intellectual abstraction you coulkd 
place yourself above the lived contradictions both of the society 
and of any individual you choose to analyse, and that you yourself 
are not in question' (Williams 1977b: l'l. ). Common to both was 
the denial of the precisely constituted social materiality of the 
human subject, an aspect which the rationalist (or irrationalist) 
critique of the knowing subject failed to grasp.30 
Some of the main components of Williams's arguments against 
this New Conformism came together in the Guardian Film Lecture he 
gave on 21 July 1985, where he took up one of the main themes of 
Towards 2000, arguing that the 'celebration of possibility 1s the 
most profound need' (Williams [1985a]: 129). In the lecture , 
Williams dwells on the over-determinations of the idea of cinema 
as a ' popular' medium of entertainment. At best, he says , this 
classification 1s ' double-edged': it celebrates the possibilities 
for working-clas s culture that some early theorists and 
practitioners saw in cinema as a popular medium, but this 
celebration all too often ignores the ways 1n which cinematic 
narration presents a a swerve away from any genuinely radical 
solutions to common problems. 
melodrama 
For a key element in film 
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is that after many twists and turns, and seemingly hopeless 
situations, the poor victim is saved and the poor hero or 
heroine lives happily ever after. There is no problem in 
understanding why these resolutions were popular. But there is 
a problem, in trying to relate th~se often magical or 
coincidental lucky escapes of individuals to anything that 
could be called, in the easy slide from 'popular', a genuinely 
radical or socialist consciousness. ( 1 1 1 ) 
Similarly, Williams argues that the common claim that film 'was 
inherently open, as against the relatively closed forms of other 
media' (111) needs careful examination, especially when this 
assertion settles into ' the now conventional rejections of what 
are called "naturalism" and "classical realism"' (111). These are 
' muddled and muddling concepts' he warns, and goes on to reiterate 
some of the objections to the 'contemporary radical rejections of 
Naturalism' that he had first made, pointedly enough, at a ~frg~D 
summer school in 1976. 'Naturalism' he reminds us 
has close historical associations with socialism. As a 
movement and as a method it was concerned to show that people 
are inseparable from their real social and physical 
environments. As against idealist versions of human 
experience, in which people act under providence ... naturalism 
insisted that actions are always specifically contextual and 
mater i a 1 . ( 11 3 ) 
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It is therefore a 'a bitter irony' that in the terms of 
contemporary debate on film, 'Naturalism came to be understood as 
the very thing it had challenged: mere reproduction' (114). 'In 
our kind of time' he warns, 'the dissident bourgeois is not 
necessarily a radical, though that is often the self-presentation' 
(114) .31 In discussion after the lecture, he had harsher words 
still for those who falsely claimed the terrain of the popular: 
All I would say is that those whom with some deliberateness I 
called enemy artists - I don't just seem them as different, I 
see them as enemy - endlessly harp on the failure of 
relationships, the dislocation of communities, the defeat of 
noble efforts, the end of idealism. This really is the only 
thing with which they can defend this social order: not that 
it's good , but that it's inevitable ... And because of that there 
is what I called a bourgeois dissident form of art which shows 
all this with great power.32 
It was this ' deliberateness', and the anger which Williams ' s 
use of the word contained, which powered these final essays on 
modernism . and their repeated attacks on ·the broad formation which 
he named and understood as the New Conformism. 
The Critical Spectator 
A central component of the orthodox version of modernism which 
Williams wished to challenge came through as an academic argument 
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about modernism , one which had focused particularly on the idea of 
language. A part of the reticence to name his opponents, 
commented on many times by critics, and mentioned in particular 
relation to The_Politics_of_Modernism, might be read as the 
necessary delicacy - or unworthy indirection - of political 
solidarity: Williams was at times criticising his allies here. 
More generously, and I think more correctly in Williams's case, it 
can be seen as the refusal to entirely associate intellectual 
positions with the fullness and complexity of individual identity . 
Williams had an unusually equal respect for both the specificity 
of theoretical argument, with its sometimes too easy talk of 
'posi tions', and the specific agency and historicity of any 
embodied human subject. The case of Orwell - so critical and yet 
so respectful - need only be recalled.33 The work of at least 
two of Williams's Cambridge colleagues and allies - Stephen Heath 
and Colin MacCabe - was at issue with regard to the arguments of 
The _Politics_ of _Modernism.34 I shall focus in particular on the 
arguments put forward by Colin MacCabe as these exemplifed some of 
the trends criticised by Williams, and particularly what he came 
to call the 'enthronement of the critical spectator' (Williams 19tlll 
'J.\b ) . 
As we saw in the previous chapter, Williams had supported and 
defended MacCabe through the violent Cambridge dispute over 
the question of his tenure in the English Faculty. But, within 
that general support , there were a few critical and theoretical 
reservations. In particular, as he had put it in his 1981 lecture 
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on the affair, there were still ' radical differences' between his 
own position and the 'reliance on structural linguistics and 
psychoanalysis' which characterised the work of his Cambridge 
fellows, though he had put it to them 'that a fully historical 
semiotics would be very much the same thing as cultural 
materialism' (1981b: 210). We can take MacCabe's arguments 1n the 
1970s - culminating in his controversial study James_Jo~ce_and_the 
Revolution_of_the_Word (1979) - as points where these ' radical 
differences' come through in the elaboration of what has come to 
be known as 'British poststructuralism' .35 
MacCabe's arguments - 1n common with what has become generally 
known as the 'Screen-theory' - assumed a broadly Brechtian stance 
on the politics of culture, arguing the critique of realism as an 
urgent necessity.36 His seminal essay, 'Realism and the Cinema : 
Notes on Some Brechtian Theses', takes its focus from Brecht's 
remark that realism ' is an issue not only for literature: it is a 
major political , philosophical and practical issue and must be 
handled and explained as such - as a matter of general human 
interest ' (cited MacCabe [1974]: 34). Brecht's original 
arguments on this matter were sharpened by the application of a 
powerful new theoretical vocabulary, drawn from Althusser's work 
on ideology , and the theories and arguments concerning the 
subject's relation to language to be found in Freud and Lacan. 
These came together in a focus on the idea of the ' classic realist 
text' , and the political necessity of mounting a formal challenge 
to it. In some sense , the ' classic realist text' threatened to 
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implications for a society based on the notion of the individual 
as an independent and self-sufficient entity. It is only be the 
acceptance of the most reductive account of the relation between 
politics and literature that Joyce's texts can be dismissed as 
non - political' (152). These 'political implications' are 
primarily the result of Joyce's deconstruction of the ideological 
implications of a classic realism. ' Instead of a traditional 
organisation of discourses which confer an imaginary unity on the 
reader' he argues, 
there is a disruption of any such position of unity. The 
reader is transformed into a set of contradictory discourses, 
engaged in the investigation of his or her own symbolic 
construction. What is subverted in the writing is the full 
Cartesian subject and this subversion is a political event of 
central importance. (152-3) 
MacCabe's position - and the work with which it was associated 
- was powerful, stimulating and controversial and helped to launch 
a whole wave of similar studies which - predictably enough - found 
something of the same challenge to classic realism and its liberal 
humanist subject in an increasing variety of writers, forms, and 
periods.38 In an interesting autobiographi c al sketch, MacCabe 
later noted how he and other of the ' radical semioticians' had 
been strongly influenced by the French interpretation of modernism 
as a form of ' writing which disrupted the stability of meaning and 
identity' (MacCabe 1985 : 8) At the very lea s t, the work of 
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theorists such as Derrida, Barthes and the I~l_Q~~l group on 
writers such as Mallarme. Bataille and Artaud 'broke with the 
sterility of Leavis's restriction of modernism to Lawrence and 
Eliot' (ibid). Yet MacCabe also acknowledged, with the benefit of 
hindsight, the ways in which the ' political weight' he and others 
gave to their arguments ' was deeply problematic' (ibid). 
MacCabe's own retrospective judgement in 1985, if not prompted 
by Williams's arguments, would certainly have been shared by him. 
In The _Politics _ of _ Modernism Williams repeatedly criticises any 
literary-historical interpretation which would reduce the complex 
historicity of actual modernist works and the question of their 
address to the status of mere evidence for the truth of the 
theories of a self-proclaimed contemporary avant-garde in literary 
theory . It was surely no accident that Williams chose the 
Strathclyde conference of 1986 , ' The Linguistics of Writing', 
organised b y Colin MacCabe, Derek Attridge, Alan Durant and Nigel 
Fabb, and with guests including Jacques Derrida and Gayatri 
Spivak , as the moment to argue this point very fully .3 9 
Williams begins the lecture combatively with two quotations 
from August Strindberg ' s Naturalist manifesto, the Preface to i~~~ 
Strindbe rg writes of his characters in terms reminiscent , 
for Williams , of current po s t -stru ct uralist dogma : the y are 
conglomerations from past and present stages of civi lization; 
the y are excerpts from books and newspapers , scraps of 
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freeze its reader into a stance of ideological complicity as 
unchallengeable as that ascribed to the subject in Althusser's 
theory of ideology. Challenging it therefore offered a way out of 
the functionalism inherent to Althusser's theory and the political 
impotence associated with it. In cinema, this meant adopting a 
critical stance towards apparently progressive films such as Kl~1~ 
or Da~s _of _Ho2e on the grounds that ' the classic realist text 
cannot deal with the real as contradictory' (39), and endorsing 
the more avant-garde work of film-makers like the Straub-Huillet 
team and Jean-Luc Godard which seemed to offer ' the possibility of 
articulating contradiction' (50) .37 To ' change the position of 
the subject within ideology' (53) was the task of cultural 
practice and therefore of any progressive film-making and film -
criticism. In literature, the critique of classic realism and the 
liberating potential of contradiction could be found at work in 
the classic modernism of James Joyce. 
For MacCabe, Joyce's work gave an unparallelled ' primacy to the 
material of language' and in so doing offered ' a different 
experience and ... different political consequences, from the 
classic realist text ' (MacCabe 1979: 133). In a powerful and 
persuasive argument, he charted Joyce's increasing challenge to 
realism across Dubliners, Ste2hen_Hero and A_Portrait _ of_the 
Artist _ as_a _ Young _Man , and through to its culminating point in 
Finnegans_Wake. In this text, he concludes, the ' acceptance of 
movement and process , coupled with the awareness of identity as a 
constant effect of the passage of language, has profound political 
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humanity, pieces torn from festive garments which have become 
rags - just as the soul itself 1s a piece of patchwork' (cited 
in Williams [1986a]: 65). 
His point in doing so, and the polemical focus of his essay as a 
whole, 1s to act as a challenge to certain tendencies in applied 
linguistics , and to forms of literary analysis seemingly derived 
from them , which have appropriated a selective version of 
Modernism , and within this an internal and self-proving definition 
of the avant-garde , as a way of ratifying their own much narrower 
positions and procedures' ( 65) . The first consequence of this 
appropriation is a fundamental distortion of the actual history of 
modernist and avant-garde movements: ' [W]e can still not say ,! he 
argues, ' of either supposed movement, that what we find in them is 
some specific and identifiable position about language, or about 
writing, of the kind offered by subsequent theoretical or pseudo -
historical propositions' (66). He finds no evidence to support 
the idea that there is in modernism 
a common rejection of the representational character of 
language and hence of writing ... we shall misunderstand and 
betray a century of remarkable experiments if we go on trying 
to flatten them to contemporary theoretical and quasi-
theoretical points . ( 66) 
All of Williams's suspicions regarding the idea of the ' classic 
realist text' , the critique of representation, the explanatory 
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value of psychoanalysis and the utility of any attempt to conjoin 
it with Marxism come through in the harsh tones of this reference 
to 'contemporary theoretical and quasi-theoretical points' .40 
Against any such appropriation, he returns to the 1920s debates 
around Russian Formalism which had become increasingly central to 
his own arguments.41 
Shklovsky's slogan the 'resurrection of the word' has often, 
argues Williams, been taken by contemporary theorists as the core 
definition of literary Modernism. In this appropriation, it is 
read in relation to Saussure's deconstruction of the sign, and 
used as the basis for an argument in favour of the non-
referentiality of language. Against this, Williams points to 
Eikhenbaum's account of his participation in the movement 
(Eichenbaum (1926]). For him, 'the basic slogan uniting the 
initial group was the emancipation of the word from the shackles 
of the philosophical and religious tendencies with which the 
Symbolists were possessed' (cited in Williams 1989a: 6 7) . In 
its historical context, Shklovsky's emphasis is best understood as 
a rejection of the religious and idealist elements of the Russian 
Symbolist movement, that is. as ' a secularisation, a 
demystification, of the "poetic word" of the Symbolists' (68). 
In fact, there were two broad attitudes towards language to be 
found in the diversity of modernist writing. The first is that 
which ' treats language as material in a social process' and the 
second, that which ' sees it as blocking or making difficulties for 
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authentic consciousness ( 7 7) . I For Williams, Breton's 
surrealism is a major manifestation of the second tendency, as can 
be seen by its preoccupation with and promotion of ' automatic 
writing' . Here language is 
simultaneously identified with the blocking of ' true 
consciousness' and, to the extent that it could emancipate 
itself from its imprisoning everyday forms and, beyond that, 
from the received forms of ' literature', as itself the medium 
of the idealized ' pure consciousness ( 73) 
But what is absent from this kind of account is any recognition of 
the real soci ality of language. This absence comes through 
particularly strongly in the case of Artaud, where ' the purpose of 
writing (as we have since often heard) is not communication but 
illumination' - a contrast, which Williams wryly notes seems 
necessarily to modify the second term to self - illumination' 
*'l. 
(71) . , What this can then lead to, and what in practice it did 
lead to , is ' an emphasis - which indeed became a culture - on the 
experience itself, rather than on any of the forms of embodying or 
communicating it' (71). 
Against Surrealism, Williams poses the forces of social rather 
Lt~ 
than subjective Expressionism, and its emphasis on the cry. 
While surrealism sought to transcend contradictions, he argue s, 
social expressionism confronted them, even to the point of 
' raising them to a principle of form ' (74). In this form, the 
397 
individual cry may carry a social charge, and even become, as in 
the dramas of a Toller or a Brecht, 
the cry that fights to be heard above the news bulletins, the 
headlines, the false political speeches of a world in crisis; 
even the cry which can become a slogan. a fixed form, to shout 
as a means of collective action. That direction in language 
sought , in its own terms, to intervene in the social process 
and to change reality by struggle. (75) 
He then returns to the crucial case of Russian Formalism, 
which, as it came through into an influential tendency in 
literary theory, was a disastrous narrowing of the very facts to 
which it pointed' (75). The formalist arguments were taken to 
imply the rejection of any notions of · content', · representation' 
and ' intention'; but this interpretation misses out entirely the 
great contribution of Volosinov, whose argument regarding the 
· multiaccentual' nature of the sign. What the theorists all too 
often forgot what was their own conditions of practice, the 
existence of their own intentions in what Williams calls a 
characteristic error 
Under the spell of their own selected examples, of valued but 
highly specific uses. they forgot that every act of composition 
in writing, indeed every utterance, at once moves into specific 
processes which are no longer in that way open: which indeed, 
as acts, even in the most seemingly bizarre cases, necessarily 
398 
have 'content' and ' intention' and which may, in any many 
thousands of ways, even in these terms ' represent'. To retain 
the useful abstraction of basic linguistic material, which is 
properly the ground of lnguistic analysis, in arguments whi c h 
offer to deal with what is already and inevitably a wide range 
of practices , in which that material is for this and that 
purpose being used, has been to misdirect several generations 
of analysts and even, though fewer in number , some writers. 
( 76) 
It was an error he had indicated earlier in the paper , through his 
example of Hugo Ball's famous reading of Gadji_Beri_Bimba. For 
here, as he pointedly remarks , the ' relapse to the rhythms of the 
mass in the middle of an outraging Dadaist spectacle is not only 
funny; it is, like the sudden locating appearance of Zanziba r , a 
reminder of how deeply constituted, socially, language always is, 
even when the decision has been made to abandon its identifiable 
""' .... 
semantic freight' (68-9). 
Though each of the two positions is historically located in the 
period we know as modernism , the first , with its emphasis on 
language as material in a social process is, for Williams, 
' modernist in both theory and practice ' while the second, though 
modern ist in pra c ti ce, needs to be understood. ' in its underl ying 
theory ' as ' intransigent idealism' (77). In conclusion, he 
summar!ses: 
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what we have really to investigate is not some single 
position of language in the avant-garde or language in 
Modernism. On the contrary, we need to identify a range of 
distinct and in many cases actually opposed formations, as· 
these have materialized in language ... Formal analysis can 
contribute to this, but only if it 1s firmly grounded in 
formational analysis. ( 7 9) 
- the formational analysis which brings together history and 
theory in cultural materialism. -
Williams was deeply suspicious of a view of literary history 1n 
which texts from the past somehow confirm the theoretical 
paradigms of the present. In the first instance, he challenged 
the all too-easy periodisation and unitary description of 
modernism , and from that, what he saw as a dangerous formulation 
of the present as the post-modern. So, 1n ' Metropolitan 
Perceptions and the Emergence of Modernism', he extends the basic 
arguments from the last chapters of The _Countr~_and_the·Cit~ . and 
his remarks on modernism in his retirement lectures and Tg~~~Q~ 
~QQQ to argue that ' the metropolis of the second half of the 
nineteenth century and of the first half of the twentieth century 
moved into a quite new cultural dimension' (Williams [1985b]:44), 
and that this did indeed result in some common themes and forms, 
as a response to the character of the new metropolis. and most 
deeply, ' the artists and writers and thinkers of this new phase 
found the only community available to them: a community of the 
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medium; of their own practices' (45); but he closes the essay by 
challenging the consequent 'metropolitan interpretation of its own 
processes as universals' (47). This was the burden of his lecture 
on March 17 1987 at Bristol University, ' When was Modernism?', 
when he warned against ' a highly selected version of the modern 
which then offers to appropriate the whole of modernity' (Williams 
1987a: 33), and again, with some warmth, repeated in the W.D. 
Thomas Memorial lecture, 'Country and City in the Modern Novel', 
on 26 May 1987, where he urges we must not make the mistake of 
supposing that the contemporary is really the universal, but 
lately discovered' (Williams [1987b): 4). Modernism, he warns 
not so much in practice but as a set of ideas, really does 
reduce all past experience in this way: the contemporary 
becomes the universal, even the eternal. A genuinely modern 
consciousness , on the other hand begins by recognising that its 
very modernity is historical, that is to say, that it is a 
product of specific and discoverable social and historical 
changes. ( 1987b: 4-5) 
The cas e was pursued with renewed vigour in two essays 
published in 1988. In ' The Politics of the Avant-Garde' and 
' Theatre as a Political Forum', both written for the collection 
(, f'VY\yAl)-0-.N) - C,t.t; u. 1 t.1 !?] 2 
Visions _and _Blue2rints, he further develops his case for the ,~ 
necessity of a more historically differentiated view of the avant -
garde. 
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In the first essay, Williams argues that differentiations 
between modernist and avant-garde artists are best achieved 
through a formational rather than an individual analysis. He then 
distiguishes between modernists and the avant-garde in the 
following terms: 'Modernism had proposed a new kind of art for a 
new kind of social and perceptual world. The avant-garde, 
agressive from the beginning, saw itself as a breakthrough to the 
future' ([1988b]: 51), that is, these belong to the third phase of 
the modernist movement as a whole. In the first phase, innovative 
groups of artists ' sought to protect their practices within the 
growing dominance ofthe art market and against the indifference of 
th e formal academies' ( 50) and in a second moment, these groups 
shifted to ' the defence of a particular kind of art became first 
the self-management of a new kind of art and then, crucially, an 
attack in the name of this art on a whole social and cultural 
order' (51). It is only in this third phase that the term avant -
garde can properly be used. 
Though both groups might call for revolution, the substance of 
that call could be very different . For sure, the ' Futurist call 
to destroy "tradition" overlaps with socialist calls to destroy 
the whole existing social order' , but Williams finds a ' decisive 
difference' between ' appeals to the tradition of reason and the 
new celebration of creativity which finds many of its sources in 
the irrational , in the newly valued unconscious , and in the 
fragments of dreams ' ( 52). Hostility to the bourgeois order could 
similarl y develop in two directions: the conservative, with its 
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claim that the artist was the only true aristocrat, and the 
consequent rejection of both the unwashed masses and the 
bourgeoisie; and the radical, in which the artist affiliated him -
or herself directly with the people or the workers against the 
bourgeoisie and the aristocrats (55). In the end, he suggests, 
many modernists are best seen and understood as ' bourgeois 
dissidents ' only, and one way of recognising them as such lies in 
the emphasis they give to the idea of the 'sovereign individual'. 
The real inheritors of this ' bourgeois dissidence' are the post-
modernists of Thatcherisrn and the New Right. 
In 'Theatre as a Political Forum', Williams further 
substantiates hi s case, and in the process offers a significant 
~~ 
correction to his own early views on twentieth c entury drama. -
Where Yeats and particularly Eliot had figured large, with the 
promise that their poetic drama apparently held for a work of 
Total Expression, they are confined , with Paul Claudel , to a 
telling parenthesis at the end of this essay as examples ' of an 
avant -gar de as an arriere-garde' (Williams [1988c]: 94). He 
insists above all. in this telling piece cultural material ist 
analysis , on the n ecess ity for understaniing the theoretical 
claims of any avant-garde in relation to their historical 
circumstances. This is particularly important in the case of 
something like the avant-garde , a movement whose rhetoric 
characteristically insists ' even the immediate past' , and is 
especially so when 
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the rhetoric of the avant-garde, characteristically rejecting 
even the immediate past, has survived into what appears to be 
scholarly and critical discussion, with deeply negative effects 
not only on the work of the earlier period but, more to th~ 
present point, on the understanding of the complex character of 
avant-garde theatre itself and especially its relation to 
po 1 it i CS. ( 8 3) 
As a first and necessary move, the work of the avant-garde in 
theatre must be located in relation to what it so stridently 
rejected in its origins, and whose rejection has become almost 
meaningless in repetition - the broad movement known as 
Naturalism. It was from within this movement (which he traces 
back to the emergence of bourgeois drama in eighteenth century 
England) that the first phase of the modernist revolt began. in 
the work of figures such as Ibsen and Strindberg. In their work, 
a division between the deep conventions of naturalism and the 
surface of what by then had become the mere naturalist habit is 
effected. The ' furious denunication' which this deep naturalism 
produced represents, argues Williams, a direct continuity from 
Modernist Naturalism to the work and the reception of the avant -
garde' ( 85) . 
And yet. he continues, the common rejection of naturalism has 
worked to conceal ' the only important question: that of the 
alternative directions in which a continuing bourgeois dissidence 
might go' (86). The example of German Expressionism shows some of 
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the main differences between ' social' and ' subjective' 
Expressionism. Here the case of Brecht is central, passing as he 
does from the subjective Expressionism of the early plays, through 
to the social Expressionism of the Lehrstucke, the teaching plays, 
in which there was a ' direct interaction of avant-garde theatre 
wqith a militant working-class movement which has found the 
appropriate cultural institutions' (90). This moment was cut 
short by the brutality of the Nazi regime; and Brecht moved ahead 
to what he became most known by - the theatre of estrangement, and 
its emphasis on 'complex seeing'. Against the apolitical Brecht 
of mainstream commentary, Williams argues for the insights yielded 
by the cultural materialist method: 
To abstract the specific methods, or the theoretical phrases 
attached to them, as determining forms without reference to 
their very specific and limiting social situations, is to 
c onfirm the actual development of the avant-garde, culturally 
and politically, towards a new aestheticism. (91) 
In this cultural politics , which he asso~iated both with the 
crit i que of the classi c realist text and the arguments underlying 
Thatcherism, the ' fragmented ego in a fragmented world has 
survived as a dominant structure of feeling' (93). The main 
consequence of this 'is to render all activity and speech as 
illusory and to value theatre, in its frankly illusory character, 
as the privileged bearer of this universal truth ' (93). 
this direction , as Williams feared was the direction of 
Taken in 
405 
contemporary theory as well as some contemporary theatre and 
writing, the avant-garde becomes an arriere-garde, and the 
provocative images of the avant-garde settle into the conventional 
representations of a powerful new conformism. 
Conclusion 
Williams did not to live to write the concluding essay of the 
book , ' Against the New Conformists' , or to fully decide on the 
contents of the book as a whole. But it is clear enough that the 
new conformism only repeated the main tenets of the old conformism 
that Williams had spent his life refuting. Both expressed a 
counsel of despair and subjugation that needed to be challenged 
and rejected whether it was expressed in the claims of monetarist 
economic theory or structuralist Marxism. As we have seen, a 
substantial amount of Williams's writing in these final years was 
devoted to the critique of the New Right and the need to develop 
strategies on the left to meet the challenge of Thatcherism and 
its key conception of the sovereign individual' . At least an 
equal amount of energy and force was spent in developing a 
critique of its strange mirror - image: the critical spectator. 
For Williams. contemporary theory had internalised the most 
passive images of human subjectivity available in the modernist 
repertoire: trapped and frozen in place like characters in 
~DQg~~~- ideologically defined as the mere bearer of economically 
determined social relations, contemporary theory as Williams 
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~ 
understood threatened to produce a subject whose idea of 
~ 
liberation was reduced to the politics of textuality. While these 
New Conformists might claim to wield the cutting edge of 
structuralist or post-structuralist theory, and to give authentic 
voice to the rigours of postmodernity, their claims needed to be 
read against the longer history in which they participate but 
would prefer to forget; their theoretical assumptions to be 
checked against the findings of a broader intellectual 
~b 
analysis. 
In the end - and this was the end for Williams - the lesson of 
these final writings is that we need to subject all conformisms to 
the critical, historical and theoretical analysis of which his own 
work was such a powerful examplar. That this was left incomplete 
at his death alters nothing of its basic lesson: that the tasks of 
critical assessment can never in principle be complete as long as 
a fundamentally divisive and unjust social system prevails . These 
tasks now include the necessity of coming to terms with Williams's 
cultural materialism . In the Conclusion, I shall examine som e of 
the first attempts at doing this . 
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Conclusion 
It is now almost a decade since the death of Raymond 
Williams. The elegaic obituaries and the occasionally hostile 
memorials have been written, and the first attempts have been made 
to take the measure of his work. As the person and presence of 
Raymond Williams fades into memory, what becomes of the body of 
work that remains behind? The question can no longer be how to 
respond to Williams's always careful, always strategic 
interventions. It is how to place his work, and how to resolve or 
at least come to terms with the necessary tension between 
its historical and contextual interpretation, and its contemporary 
theoretical assessment. Where are we in the difficult task of 
se ttling Williams's intellectual legacy? 
To pose the question , when we are hardly beginning to 
understand the real complexities of intellectual property , is not 
an easy task, as Lacan so deliberately contrived to dramatise. 
Jacques Derrida, writing of the especi ally difficult case of Karl 
Marx, ha s given so me indication of the theoretical complexity o f 
the very idea of an intellectual legacy in his recent and timely 
study. Spectres _ of_Marx (1994). 
first consider: 
As he writes there , we need to 
the radical and necessary heterogeneity of an 
inheritance ... An inheritan ce is never gathered 
together. it is never one with itself . Its 
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presumed unity, if there is one, can consist only 
in the injunction to reaffirm_b~_choosing ... If the 
readability of a legacy were given, natural, 
transparent, univocal, if it did not call for and 
at the same time defy interpretation, we would 
never have anything to inherit from it. (Derrida 
1994: 16) 
We have seen in previous chapters just how aware Williams was :ck 
this general problem of heterogeneity , both in relation to the 
canons of the literary tradition, as well as to the interpretation 
of a complex body of thought such as Marxism. Williams made 
repeated challenges to the orthodoxies of literary interpreta~ion, 
posing the idea of the 'selective tradition' against Leavis ' s 
' great tradition', asserting the complex reality of modern 
tragedy against Steiner's 'death of tragedy', as well as working 
to demystify the conventions of pastoral and modernist writing. 
In the same questioning mode, Williams was ever alert to the 
dangers implicit in what he termed the ' transition from ·Marx to 
Marxism', and urged the need to question the received ideas and 
images of Marx's legacy. Williams's consequent analysis - which 
was consolidated in the theory of cultural materialism - was, as 
Terry Eagleton puts it. the work of a ' truthteller in heresy' 
someone who deviated ' from a deadening orthodoxy in order to 
recover and revitalize what (was] of value in it' (Eagleton 1989: 
175). In all this. Williams was certainly one who - in Derrida's 
terms - ' reaffirmed by choosing': we owe his work no less careful 
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attention, and so need to withstand , in the first instance, a 
certain bewitchment of language in operation around the idea of 
inheritance. 
To speak of an intellectual legacy, to speak of it as if it 
were some kind of stable property or fixed goods to be inherited, 
gives entirely the wrong impression. For the subject of 
intellectual inheritance - as Derrida emphasises - is not and 
cannot be a passive recipient , a lucky legatee. The legatee must 
always be active , an interpreter. Intellectual inheritance 
rewrites the grammar of legacy. To inherit in this sense can only 
mean to re-read , and to possess through reading in the strongest 
senses of interpretation: reaffirmation through choice. It means 
at least two things . To be alert to the possibility of rereading 
the work, and to the implications of its deployment in new 
circumstances: but at the same time to recognise just how much 
this possibility itself depends upon a certain vigilant and 
critical attention to the production and dissemination of ideas 
about the meanings and limits of Williams's work , ideas which 
constantly threaten. by sheer repetition, to become received ideas 
in the sense which so troubled Flaubert. That these are 
n ecessary. but not easy. task s is apparent in the studies of 
Williams that have appeared to date. The tensions between 
historical account and theoretical assessment are apparent in the 
difficulty - or ease - with which readers of Williams place his 
wor k. and in so doing. position themselves, and seek to position 
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their readers through the dialogical dynamics of writing which 
Williams explored in Marxism _ and _Literature and elsewhere. 
These dynamics can be observed around the ways 1n which 
Williams's theory of a cultural materialism 1s remembered and 
redeployed. This was, as we saw 1n Chapters Five and Six, a 
theory which, as a gyl1Yr~l materialism , seeks to establish the 
constitutive force of culture for any account of historical change 
and any political practice; and. as a cultural materialism 
stresses the historical and political determinants of any cultural 
or signifying practice against bourgeois theories which are 
usually predicated upon an over-estimation of individual 
creativity. Any account of Williams's legacy needs to include 
discussion and assessment of this project. 
this assessment been so far? 
How satisfactory has 
While the statement that cultural materialism makes up the 
substance of Williams's intellectual legacy is hardly likely to be 
challenged. exactly what constitutes cultural materialism is mu ch 
less certain. despite Williams's attempts to spell it out 1n 
Marxism _and _Literature and Qy11Yr~. In the claims and counter-
cliims regarding just what cultural materialism is, there are 
certainly no guarantees that what Williams thought of as a concept 
- what he spent spent. in a sense, his whole intellectual life 
thinking towards as a concept, one with a definied theoretical 
content. and which described the shape of a new potential 
discipline - could ever be simply inherited. The difficulties are 
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particularly striking and present once cultural materialism is 
treated less as a concept and more as a 'term', that is, as a 
signifier whose signified content can be filled in according at 
the whim of the interpreter. 
Cultural Materialisms 
Such problems were evident at an early stage, even in as 
politically well-intentioned a collection of essays such as that 
edited by Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield. Their influential 
Political _Shakes2eare: _New_Essays_in _Cultural_Materialism (1985) 
laid strong claim to Williams's cultural materialism, defining 
this as a method which combined 'historical context, theoretical 
method, political commitment, and textual analysis' (1985: vii), 
and describing the content of that commitment as ' the 
transformation of a social order which exploits people on grounds 
of race , gender and class' (viii). While there is no doubt that 
this commitment to commitment is in line with Williams's own 
record of cultural and political activism, and that the general 
definition is broadly in accord with Williams's own, something of 
the specificit y of Williams's cultural materialism is lost or 
dissolved, both in regard to cultural materialism as a concept and 
as a concept intended to support significant disciplinary 
transformation . Dollimore and Sinfield's presentation of cultural 
materialism keeps it bound too much within the borders of existing 
literary studies. In the end , though the work displayed here 
under the banner of cultural materialism may be welcomed as a 
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radical strategy within literary studies, it needs to be 
recognised as internal to English studies in much the same way as 
Williams recognised much of his own early work as 
' compatible ... with the dominant literary paradigm ' (Williams 
[1981) 1984: 209) .1 
This becomes more apparent if we examine Dollimore's further 
description in his own essay in the volume, 'Shakespeare , Cultural 
Materialism and the New Historicism' 
' "cultural materialism"' as a ' term. 
Here Dollimore describes 
.borrowed from its use by 
Raymond Williams' - but , as the scare-quotes around 'cultural 
materialism' indicate, this ' borrowing' is also something of an 
adaption and redefinition. In practice , Dollimore's sense of 
cult ural materialism is derived from 'an eclectic body of work' , 
one whi c h includes ' the convergence of history , sociology and 
English in c ultural studies, some of the major developments in 
feminism. as well as continental Marxist-structuralist and post -
structuralist theory, especially that of Althusser, Macherey . 
Grams ci and Foucault' ( 1985: 2-3). The problem lies with just 
that eclecticism. Williams spent a great deal of his time 
criticising s truct uralist Mar xis ts such ~s Althusser and Macherey , 
and post - structuralist theory more generally, and indeed intended 
his own theory of cultural materialism as a conscious alternative 
to ' the newly dominant mode of critical structuralism' (Williams 
1979: 339), it is hardly surprising that Williams , in his c autious 
' Afterword' to the volume, re corded a 'cer tain wariness , an 
unease , about the volume, centred on its ' main title' (Williams 
413 
1985: 231) - Political _Shakespe~r~ - but, I think, going beyond 
the issue of the title alone. 
For Williams, the title suggested too strong a kinship with 
the usual appropriations of Shakespeare around the critic's own 
beliefs, and especially apparent in the 'dismal practice ... of 
assembling lists of reactionary or progressive writers' (1985: 
237) current in the 1930s. Thus, though he commends the 
collection for the 'edge of challenge to existing confusions and 
certainties' which it provides, and welcomes in particular ' the 
studies of contemporary productions of Shakespeare, in education 
and performance' (237), he nonetheless closes his essay with a 
recommendation for the actual procedures of his own cultural 
materialism, intimating that these have not been followed in the 
collection as a whole: 
the most practical and effective new direction 
will be in the analysis of the historically based 
conventions of language and representation: the 
plays themselves as socially and materially 
produced , within discoverable conditions; indeed 
the texts themselves as history. (239) 
Reading Williams's ' Afterword', there 1s a strong sense that there 
is some distance - both conceptual and practical - between 
Williams's idea of a cultural materialism and the sense given to 
it as a 'term' by Dollimore and others. 
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Similarly, the most recent study that I know - Scott Wilson's 
Q~l!~r~l _M~!~ri~li~~~ - Ib~Qr~- ~~9_rr~Q!iQ~ (1995) - goes so far as 
to distinguish between a 'mainstream' cultural materialism, 
associated with Williams, who (again) is credited with devising 
' the!~£~ "cultural materialism"' (my emphasis), but not the 
concept; and an apparently natural development from this which 
would integrate it with 'the general economic theories of George 
Bataille' and ' the work of Lacan and Derrida' (Wilson 1995: xi) . 
This new cultural materialism is again striking for the diversity 
of approaches which are held to be in its scope. It includes 
' influential critics such as Stephen Greenblatt, Jonathan 
Goldberg, Jonathan Dollimore, Alan Sinfield, Francis Barker, 
Catherine Belsey and Terry Eagleton' (viii); but neglects - to my 
mind - many more obvious candidates for the practice of cultural 
materialism in the more narrow sense which Williams wished to give 
to the concept. These include critics such as John Barrell, 
Norman Bryson, Stephen Heath , Christopher Prendergast, Morag 
Shia c h , and Paul Willis in Great Britain; and John Fekete and 
David Simpson (both formerly of Cambridge, and now in the USA) as 
well as Edward W. Said and Bruce Robbins in the USA whose works 
seem to have much closer ties to Williams's own conception of the 
theory, though never without differences of qualification and 
emphasis.2 
The main danger 1n all this 1s that cultural materialism the 
concept is threatened by its dissolution into cultural materialism 
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the term. This can all too soon and too easily become something 
less than the attempt at an ambitious programme for a new 
discipline which occupied Williams's thoughts in the early 1980s 
than a politically correct version of already existing English 
st udies , and is all too easily reduced to the single dimension of 
enquiry which American critic Louis Montrose described as 'the 
uses to which an historical pr~~~D1 puts its versions of the 
English past' (1989: 27).3 Of course, while this was always an 
element in Williams's attention to historical semantics and to the 
dynamics of the selective tradition, it was never the whol e story, 
and represents only one question which the cultural materialist 
critic can put to the history of cultural production. 
The motive for this extension of cultural materialism into 
much more flexible and eclectic dimensions of enquiry may well be 
a desire to renew or revitalise interest in Williams's 
increasingly distant thought, a sense captured in Dworkin's 
comment that ' though he has been dead for only the last five (sic) 
years , he is already part of a different political age (Dworkin 
1993: 54), or Cornel West ' s characterisation of Williams as ' the 
last of the great European male revolutionary socialist 
intellectuals' (West 1995: ix). Such comments expr es s - at least 
implicit l y - the assumption that the simple fact of our historical 
posteriority gives the voc abulary of our own intellectual 
formation an unchallengeable theoretical supremacy: PQ~1 _hQg i_ ~rgQ 
hoc _melius. It is an assumption whi c h is alien to the deeply 
historical mod e of enquiry present in Williams's cultural 
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materialism , which always embodied the principles of open and 
self-critical dialogue in its readings of the past. 
Yet this assumption is very apparent in a certain confident 
inflection present in some recent theoretical assessments, and is, 
indeed, picked out by the editors of Views _ Be~ond_the_Border 
QQ~g1r~ (1993) for particular comment. 
contributors to the collection 
As they point out, many 
remain critical of [Williams's] failure to employ 
psychoanalysis, deconstruction, and other 
avant-garde approaches to theorise the 
relationship between colonial and post-colonial 
formations. (Dworkin and Roman 1993: 13) 
Here the vocabulary of ' failure' obscures the nature and 
persistence of Williams's critical engagement with what he 
understood as psychoanalysis , deconstruction ' and other avant-
garde approaches', as well as his ground-breaking , though limited, 
attempts to discuss the relations between colonising metropolis 
and a colonised world. Similarly, the editorial team of the 
British journal New Formations stress how Williams · would 
doubtless have resisted the way that many of our articles draw on 
radical post-structuralism' and note how though ' his work 
constituted a sustained critique of the QQg1~g1 of the Arnold -
Mill-Leavis tradition. he retained from it a paradigm of the fQr~ 
of culture which made him reluctant to question the integrity of 
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identity as such' (1988: 3-4). Again, the deployment of a 
vocabulary of 'resistance' and ' reluctance' characterises 
intellectual disagreement as a personal flaw or failing, and thus 
makes impossible any account of Williams's objections to post-
structuralism.4 
It is now necessary to get beyond this stage of current 
assessment, in which it appears to be enough - at least in some 
cases - to register differences of theoretical jargon, or field of 
focus, to criticise Williams for his hostility to psychoanalysis, 
or his apparent indifference to issues of gender or 
- postcolonial i ty' . 5 For the claims made - or at least 
implicitly present - in many of these accounts run th e risk of 
refusing the basic rule of historical interpretation, shared by 
cult ural materialism. that an author's thought needs to be 
understood within its means and conditions of production if 
commentary on it is not to fall into ahistoricism and ana c hronism. 
Any claims that our own theoretical vocabulary is indeed superior 
to Williams 's clearly needs to be tested in practice , rather than 
simply assumed as a starting-point. Indeed, in my view. the best 
recent essays on Williams are precisely those which submit their 
claims to the test of interpretive practice, probing the limits of 
Williams's thinking. and offering revisions of and extensions to 
it in a spirit of critical and constructive dialogue which is far 
removed from the brash claims of N~~ Formations.6 
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As is evident from the structure of this study, I believe 
that any real assessment of the force of Williams's work needs to 
be historical as well as theoretical. It needs to attend to the 
terms of the conceptual vocabularies available to Williams, a 
sense of their limits , as well as a sense of what use and 
difference Williams made of and to them, before seeking to 
describe the limitations of Williams's 1hiQ~iQg. The analysis of 
Williams's own work can best be made in terms of its cultural, 
conceptual and political means and conditions of production, in 
line with the theory (or at least Williams's theory} of cultural 
materialism. I have argued in this study that two essential 
dimensions for such assessment are provided by the discourses of 
literary criticism and Marxist cultural theory which Williams · knew 
or imagined he knew, and the consequent history of his critical 
and questioning relations with them. 
But. in the spirit of Derrida's injunction , and as a wa y of 
bringing this study to a conclusion, I wish to move away from this 
general examination of Williams's work as a critic, both social 
and literary. and reaffirm my own sense of the continued value and 
significance of Williams's work by examining a single thread of 
argument which, though it runs throughout and is ever present in 
Williams's work , has never received, to my knowledge, specific 
attention as such. 
idea of literacy.7 
This is Williams's powerful revaluation of the 
This r eval uation or reworking of literacy 
does two things: i t extends the scope of literacy. that is, 
extends the kinds of text which it is held to be appropriate to 
419 
lend critical scrutiny to, and it increases, if you like , the 
depth of literacy, the understanding of literacy as a force in the 
world , in the constitution and reproduction of any social order. 
Literacies 
Literacy is a term which appears with increasing frequency in 
the final phase of Williams's work: the essays collected in 
Writing_and _Society examine 'the changing relationships ... between 
writers and assumed or intended readers, in conditions that 
developed from uneven or partial literacy to a more general 
literacy in which there were persistent inequalities in access to 
writing and reading' (1984: 5); 'It is often said that there are 
more than six centuries of English literature. It is not often 
said that there are less than two centuries of English literacy' 
(Williams [1983] 1984: 212); the 'struggle for literacy was as 
real a social struggle as any struggle for subsistence or food or 
shelter' ([1987] 1989c: 154); Williams's final recorded interview 
was focused on the ' Politics of Literacy' ([1988] 1991). Yet - as 
I shall show - Williams's concern for literacy was there from the 
start as a major constituent of all his thinking and analysis from 
Reading_and _C riticism through to the final essays. 
In Chapter Six, we examined Williams's reservations about the 
most closely related term , literature. and showed how Williams 
argued for a return to its original sense as reading capacity or 
ability. In Marxism_and_Literature, Williams points out how 
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literature first comes into English in the fourteenth century from 
the Latin li11~~~ . a letter of the alphabet. Litterature was 
then in effect a condition of reading, of being able to read and 
having read, a sense much closer to contemporary literacy. 
Indeed , argues Williams , the very emergence of literacy as a 
separate word in the nineteenth century corresponds to a shift in 
the meaning of literature away from its sense as reading ability 
to the idea of literature as canon, as the apparently objective 
category of printed works of a certain quality, and then with a 
usual further restriction to fictive and imaginative writing only 
(Williams 1977 : 46 -7 ). In K~Y~Qrg~. he further stresses how 
in recent years literature and literary ... have 
been increasingly challenged, on what is 
conventionally their own ground, by concepts of 
writing and communication which seek to recover 
the most active and general senses which the 
extreme specialization had seemed to exclude. 
(Williams 1983: 187) 
For if stage-drama had consistently posed problems to the 
specialised definition, and with difficulty had found a place in 
the literary c anon , what of the new compositions for radio and tv 
broadcast , for film and video? Williams's ' deconstruction ' (as we 
might now say) of the meaning of literature opened up the whole 
field of what is now generally known as cultural studies, whi c h 
might be described . in Williams's terms. simply as ' the analysis 
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of all forms of signification', and not only literature in the 
restricted senses. 
This extension of analysis beyond the boundaries of 
conventional English studies is widely recognised as a significant 
theoretical advance and disciplinary challenge, and is the simple 
basis for Williams's position as one of the ' founding-fathers' of 
cultural studies.8 In many ways , the emergence of cultural 
studies marks the recognition of the interest and value of non-
literary signifying practices, and consequent new modes of 
literacy , which go beyond and destabilise the powerful opposition 
in literary studies between 'high' and 'low' culture. This 
opposition had been the object of Williams's critique in the 1950s 
in crucial essays such as ' Culture is Ordinary ' as well as in the 
seminal Culture _and _Societ~. later studies such as Communications 
(1962) and Television: _Technolog~_and_Cultural _ Form (1974), and 
accompanying essays and analyses. All this helped to consolidate 
the major shift in disciplinary focus associated with the 
extension of English as a discipline and the emergence of cultural 
studies. 
But if a significant part of Williams's legacy is the 
extension of the idea of literacy beyond the specialised and 
restricted senses available in mainstream literary studies , it is 
also in part a matter of the sheer moment and force which Williams 
attributed to literacy in the world . Williams ' s work presents a 
challenge to the understanding of what we might call the social 
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dynamics of literacy, literacy as a force 1n the world. This 
comes through most visibly in the repeated scepticism that 
Williams showed towards the idea of literacy at work in orthodox 
English studies . For des~ite the local intensity and energy which 
Cambridge English brought to bear in its reading practices, 
Williams found that these nurtured a paradoxical passivity 1n the 
reader. This passivity was precisely the opposite of the 
conscious agency with which Williams wished to charge the idea of 
literacy as a social - and not only textual - practice. 
The basic point was made as early as Reading_and_Criticism in 
1950. Here Williams urged the need for the definition of literary 
studies as a ' mature reading' a question of ' the exten s ion of 
l i teracy in the fullest sense' (Williams 1950 : 21). Literac y 1n 
the fullest sense: the phrase captures a central and unifying 
feature of Williams's diverse and heterogeneous work. From th e 
studies of drama in performance, through the study of keywords , 
a c ross the literary criticism, and into the heart of Wiiliams 's 
theory of the ' long revolution', are the ties between education 
and demo c ra c y , the figuring of literacy as a crucial element 1n 
social reprodu c tion and the questioning o1 social order, th e idea 
of literacy as the practice of the citizen as well as the property 
of the reading subje c t. 
Something of what this ' fullest sense ' of literacy might b e 
in relation to literary criticism was amplified in Culture _and 
Here William s criticis e d the ways 1n which the seminal 
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work of I.A. Richards nonetheless embodied · a kind of servility to 
the literary establishment' ([1958]: 251). Despite the fact that 
with Practical_Criticism, Richards "did more than anyone else to 
penetrate the complacency of literary academicism' (ibid.), 
Richards, · even as a brilliant opponent' (252), was in thrall to 
the figure of "Aesthetic Man': "alone in a hostile environment, 
receiving and organizing his experience' (ibid). In the end, the 
·account of the inadequacy of ordinary response when compared with 
the adequacy of literary response is a cultural symptom rather 
than diagnosis'; Richards's "idea of literature as a training 
ground for life is servile' (ibid). 
Servile is the key word. It sums up that sense of subjection 
to class norms of aesthetic judgement which Williams saw as a 
substantially disabling constituent of traditional conceptions of 
literature, and a a major impediment to the full understanding of 
the dynamics of cultural process. The point is forcefully made in 
Politics_and _ Letters, where Williams sums up one of the main 
lines of argument in Marxism _ and_Literature as the realisation 
" that its categories of literature and of criticism were so deeply 
compromised that they had to be challenged ig_1Q1Q' (1979: 326}. 
What " has come to be understood as criticism is a detached 
process' he asserted, and stressed how "it is all over this 
tradition that the process of judgement is something which occurs 
above any specific instances or situations ' (335). 
training very hard' he acknowledges, 
· 1 had this 
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and what you were told to do was to forget 
yourself, to forget your situation, to be in a 
naked relation - but with your training, of course 
- to the text; while the text itself was similarly 
taken out of all its conditions and circumstances. 
My whole encounter with literary criticism really 
revolved around this pseudo-impersonal attempt to 
judge works without any sense of presence of the 
individual making judgement - its effort to divest 
itself of circumstances, to rise above history, to 
talk of literature rather than the individual or 
group making a critical judgement. (335) 
Williams associates this ' textualism' (which is a danger any 
purely ' theoretical' assessment is always open to , including 
assessments of Williams ' s own work) with the ' ideological capture' 
of Richards's work , one in which the practice of reading is 
privileged over its theorisation, with a consequent emphasis on 
the ' activity of reading' over attention to ' the process of 
composition' (Williams 1979: 193). ' The result' he sums up 
wa s the subsequent definition of the work as a 
1~~1. an ideological c apture which has persisted 
relatively intac t from English Practical Criticism 
to American New Criticism right down to Literary 
Structuralism today . (Williams 1979: 193) 
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Williams's resistance to this 'servile' textualism provides a 
significant continuity across Williams's work as a whole, linking 
early works such as Reading_and _Criticism, and Culture_and 
§Qgi~i~. with the ' Cambridge English' studies Modern_Traged~ and 
The _Countr~_and _ the_Cii~. and connecting these in turn with the 
cultural materialist studies Marxism_and_Literature and C~ltu£g. 
Against this, he placed an idea of literacy as a means to cultural 
empowerment and political emancipation: the theory of cultural 
materialism, and the practice of a critical literacy. This idea 
and ideal of a critical literacy constitutes the basic -and in 
many ways most powerful - aspect of his intellectual legacy. It 
unites and expresses the connections between education and 
politics implicit in Williams's central political ideal of a 
participatory as opposed to a parliamentary democracy.9 
At the same time, in Williams's thinking about and thinking 
through of Marxist cultural theory, this active literacy serves as 
to figure a self-reflexive agency with which to oppose , too 
rigid an idea of determination at work in base and superstructure 
theory . with its evidently reductionist conception of the 
relations between cultural and economic practices . Williams 
argued throughout his work against any interpretation of Marxism 
in which the human agent is represented only as a passive and 
serv i le subje c t , whether the argument was presented in the form of 
the ' mechanical materialism ' which he knew from the 1930s debates , 
and in which ' the arts are passively dependent on social reality' 
(Williams [1958]: 274), or whether it appeared in its 1970s guise, 
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as that ' fashionable form of Marxism' - the more sophisticated 
Althusserian argument - 'which makes the whole people, including 
the whole working class, mere carriers of the structures of a 
corrupt ideology' (Williams [1976/77] 1980: 241). 
His work is often at its most powerful when the two 
constituents of this critical literacy - the textual and the 
political - come together in the sceptical analysis of the 
available representations of the world through which the world is 
thought about and acted upon. Culture_and_Societ~ had deployed 
this critical literacy to great effect in its deconstruction of 
the casual use of the term 'masses', as we saw in Chapter Three; 
and we can observe the same force and moment in Williams's 
analysis of the idea of the 'consumer in The _ Long _Revolution.10 
It was the very principle which motivated the political analyses 
of the Ma~_Da~_Manifesto in 1968, whose starting-point was ' the 
dangerous gap: between name and reality; between vision and powe r; 
between our human meanings and the deadening language of a false 
political system' (1968: 13), and in which Willjams and his co -
editors called for a ' new total description' (185) of the social 
order to set against the dominant ideological representation . ' In 
any complicated society' it was argued, 
social realities not only exist; they are formed 
and interpreted. For any actual people, including 
the most exposed, direct experience of the society 
is fragmentary and discontinuous. To get a sense 
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of what is happening, at any given time, we depend 
upon a system of extended communications. The 
technical means for this now exist in many new and 
effective forms. But it is then necessary to 
realize that the overwhelming majority of these 
means are firmly in capitalist hands. (39-40) 
If in any complicated society social realities not only 
exist but are formed and interpreted, then a part of any political 
st ruggle must be a critical sense of the ways in which reality is 
formed and interpreted through its representations. A great deal 
of what a critical literacy is about has to do with just that 
crit ical analysis of representations, of the ways we think through 
our social realities in order to act upon them. In the 
Introduction to K~Y~Qr9§, Williams gave some sense of the 
importance of this extension of the basic sense of literacy into a 
critical literacy. 
What the analyses in K~Y~Qr9§ can offer, he writes , ' is not 
resolution [of the conflicting senses of key words] but perhaps, 
at times. just that extra edge of consciousness' which can be the 
turning-point in social and political struggles (Williams 1976: 
21). K~Y~Q£9§, in fact, can be taken as the exemplification of 
Willi ams's commitment to a critical literacy, as we can see 
through his description of the book's central task and central 
stance.11 ' This is not a neutral review of meanings ', he advises 
the reader: 
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It is an exploration of the vocabulary of a 
crucial area of social and cultural discussion, 
which has been inherited within precise historical 
and social conditions and which has to be made at 
once conscious and critical - subject to change as 
well as continuity - if the millions of people in 
whom it is active are to see it as active: not a 
tradition to be learned, nor a consensus to be 
accepted, nor a set of meanings which, because it 
is ' our' language, has a natural authority; but as 
a shaping and reshaping, 1n real circumstances, 
and from profoundly different points of view: a 
vocabulary to use, to find our own ways in, to 
change as we find it necessary to change it, as we 
go on making our own language and history. 
(Williams 1976: 21-22) 
This 1s a lengthy and agitated sentence, as Williams tries to cram 
in the various tasks of a critical literacy as well as give some 
sense of what the criticism 1s directed against. ' [I]nherited 
within precise social and historical conditions', ' real 
circumstances ' , ' making our own language and history': the echoes 
of Marx's discussions of the question of agency in historical 
materialism are deliberate . 12 And just as deliberate is 
Williams ' s attention to and emphasis on the constitutive force of 
language and critical analysis with regard to this central 
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question of historical agency. The vocabulary is inherited, and 
;..., 
it has a determing role - the strong sense of constitutive - in 
" 
forging human consciousness; it is active 'in millions of people' 
But that strong constitutive force can be challenged, and the 
vocabulary appropriated by the people themselves if that 
inheritance is 'made at once conscious and critical'. When this 
happens, and the time or the tense is important here, the 
apparently 'natural authority' of the language can be challenged, 
and it becomes a vocabulary to use, to find out own ways in, to 
change as we find it necessary to change it, as we go on making 
our own language and history' i~'"d.). 
As we saw in Chapter Five, Williams differs significantly 
from one strand of thinking in structuralist and post-
structuralist theory. In this profoundly textualist emphasis, the 
language-system appears to be seen as entirely constitutive of 
human subjectivity, a nightmarish view apparent - at least at 
times - in the writings of a wide range of thinkers from Adorno 
and Althusser , through to Foucault and Derrida. Against this, 
Williams was scrupulous in assigning a fully dialectical function 
to language, as a system which at one and the same time enables 
even as it tends to determine the possibility for the production 
of human thought and subjectivity. For Williams, the self or 
subject 1s never simply an effect of language, as it sometimes 
appears to be 1n the more rhetorical pronouncements of some 
structuralist and post-structuralist thinkers. Language does not 
simply determine self-consciousness; it also enables it. This 
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reflexivity - what Anthony Giddens has usefully characterised as 
the 'reflexive monitoring of action' - is the key to Williams's 
belief in the possibility of developing, through analysis, that 
' extra edge of consciousness ' .13 
For these reasons, the question of literacy engages (to 
borrow Edward Said's useful terms) not only with textuality, but 
with the worldliness of discourse.14 Williams's ' more than a 
reader' works to promote an engaged and critical literacy in which 
the attention of the reading subject is never merely textual , but 
turned outward, always seeking the connection between the world 
and the te x t, always placing the reader as a potentially political 
agent in a participatory - rather than merely representative -
democrac y . This active literacy was at the very centre of 
hi s vi s ion of the role of education in the ' long revolution ' tha t 
third (after the industrial and democratic revolutions) and ' most 
difficult' revolution to interpret, the cultural revolution , t h e 
rev o lution of literacy: 
We s peak of a c ultural revolution, and we must 
c ertainly se e the aspiration to e xtend the active 
pro ce s s of learning , with the skills of lit e racy 
and other advan c ed communication, to all people 
rathe r than to limited groups, as comparable in 
importan c e t o the growth of democracy and the rise 
of scientifi c industry. (Williams (1961]: 11) 
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These, ultimately, were the terms and conditions of Williams's 
cultural-political agenda. All education participates in the 
reproduction of social consciousness; but also, potentially at 
least, it can be the ground for challenging existing social 
consciousness.· This was the lesson Williams drew from his 
formative experience in Adult Education (examined in Chapter 
Three), as we can see from the comments made looking back over the 
debates of that period in his 1983 Tony MacLean Memorial lecture: 
The true position was, always essentially was, 
that the impulse to Adult Education was not only a 
matter of remedying defjcit, making up for 
inadequate educational resources in the wider 
society. nor only a case of meeting new needs of 
the society, though those things contributed. The 
deepest impulse was the desire to make learning a 
part of the process of social change itself. 
([1983] 1989c: 158) 
As William s concluded: ' The building of social consciousness is of 
real consciousness, of real understanding of the world' (166). 
There is no better - or simpler - definition of the aims of a 
critical literacy . 
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And perhaps there is no place where the recognition of this 
aspect of Williams's legacy - the theory and practice of a 
critical literacy - is more important than in South Africa, and 
in the debates around education, particularly university 
education, and, more specifically still, in current discussions of 
the future of English studies. I shall first discuss the 
relevance of Williams's critical literacy to debates on English 
studies , and close with a few remarks on the relevance of critical 
literacy to university education in general.15 
To focus for the moment on the area of literary studies. It 
is clear that the particular emphasis which Williams gave to the 
que s tion of literacy within literary studies could make a vitally 
important contribution towards their reformulation in South Africa 
(not to speak of elsewhere). Most discussions of the future of 
English studies in South Africa have focused on the question of 
the canon.16 Not s urprisingly, it seems increasingly strange for 
a country like South Africa, with its eleven official languages, 
to devote most of its energies to studying a literary canon 
originall y imposed by the colonising power of the British Empire . 
Should English studies be the study of English literature, 
understood as the national c anon of Great Britain? Williams had 
at any rate showed the difficulty of the question with relation to 
the internal history of ' English literature'. and also pointed to 
the further diffi c ulties once varieties of ' World - English' were 
taken into account (Williams [1987) 1989c: 150-53). There have 
been welcome developments in the changing of the content of the 
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canon, and the ever greater inclusion of South African, 
African, African, Commonwealth and World English texts. 
Southern 
But is 
the best way forward to think only in terms of a new version of 
coverage, revising the contents to the canon? 
I think not, and suggest that in this moment of crisis we 
might do well to follow Williams's lead and think the question 
through less in terms of the canon's contents, and more in terms 
of the actual practices involved in literary studies, the actual 
practices of a critical and extended literacy. In the first 
place, we need to focus on the very special and distinctive place 
which ' English studies' has given, in practice, to the idea of 
language. 
For literary studies, language 1s grasped not only as an 
instrument of communication, or a totalised synchronic system, but 
as an object of attention and analysis in its own right , as 
language in action. Literary studies is above all a hermeneutic 
or interpretive discipline , a discipline which scrutinises our 
unthinking notions of communication, and problematises any too 
simple idea of language as instrument. Because we are, in George 
Steiner's phrase , ' language animals ' , because language seems so 
natural to us that we have usually forgotten we ever had to learn 
it in the first place, we are usually willing to regard language 
unproblematically as an instrument, as a medium of communication, 
and to see communication as a simple exchange of information 
through dialogue , and to think of that dialogue as taking place 
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between equal partners.17 Literary studies poses a challenge to 
each and every one of these assumptions. When language is 
understood only as instrument, its capacity to refer to the world 
is likely to be understood as an ability to reflect reality, and 
that reflection judged in terms of scientific exactitude, in terms 
of scientific objectivity . It is in relation to these questions 
that contemporary theoretical debates around structuralism and 
poststructuralism repeat and extend the concerns of the emergence 
of literary studies as a discipline in the Britain of the 1920s. 
It was precisely against this emergent orthodoxy - perhaps 
most rigorously articulated by the British school of analytic 
philosophy, in the work of Bertrand Russell and the Wittgenstein of 
the Tractatus_Logico-Philoso2hicus (1921) - that literary studies 
began in the nineteen-twenties, with key theorists like I.A. 
Richards, William Empson and F.R. Leavis, to argue for a very 
different view of language, one that emphasised its expressive and 
constitutive characteristics and against reductive views of 
language as merely reflective. Indeed, the work of the literary 
critics oddly anticipates and has some c~mmon ground with 
Wittgenstein's later philosophy, itself so critical of his own 
earlier work and formation. 
For the later Wittgenstein language did not simply reflect 
the world, more or less correctly , for a disembodied and hence 
neutral observer. Rather language constituted the very terms of 
that reflection of the world for the observer . For critical 
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theorists, language is not the transparent window on the world of 
an empiricist philosophy, language constitutes the very frame of 
that view. Language gives the necessary (though not sufficient) 
conditions for seeing the world, and seeing is understood as the 
active interpretation of the world, rather than its passive 
reception. The primary task of criticism is to remind us that 
even the most habitual seeing is always a matter of representation 
- a question of the ways in which existing descriptions attempt to 
position us in relation to understanding the world. 
It was just this element of interpretation which was absent 
from the Tractatus and which Wittgenstein, in his later work, was 
concerned to restore. In a sense, we can read that later work as 
an attempt to thoroughly deconstruct the implications of the idea 
in the Tractatus that language could be a picture or reflection of 
the world. and to undo the simple scientistic opposition between 
truth and falsity present in its statement that any ' picture 
agrees with reality or fails to agree; it is correct or incorrect, 
true or false' (Wittgenstein 1961 [1921]: 10). For what is absent 
from this formulation is just that element of embodied (socially, 
politically, historically) subjectivity which makes interpretation 
the key to expressive or constitutive theories of language. The 
critical theorist would have to rewrite this as · a picture always 
claims to agree with reality, to be correct and true ; but we must 
never forget that a picture is always a re-presentation of reality 
and be skeptical of its claims, recognising it as an interested 
and a c tive interpreta tion of reality . ' Language is the medium of 
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our knowledge of the world and not the world itself. It is never 
the event itself, but the analysis and interpretation of the 
event. Critical literacy, as a second-order literacy which seeks 
to identify what Williams called the address of the text as well 
as its content, offers the opportunity for resistance to the 
authority of representation. 
As I have argued elsewhere, English departments in South 
Africa might do well to consider the lessons of Williams's 
critical literacy, and to move towards a pedogical model which 
emphasised the skills and techniques of critical analysis, 
observing the three dimensions of textual, historical and 
theoretical analysis which distinguish Williams's CUftural 
materialism, and to work to deploy these skills in critical 
literacy outside the traditional canonical content of English 
studies to include (as , in practice if not in theory many 
departments do) film, television and media studies more broadly 
which do not have an assured institutional setting. 
It is not surprising that Williams - in a phrase quoted 
earlier - referred to the struggle for literacy as just - as real a 
social struggle as any struggle for subsistence or food or 
shelter' (1989c : 154), and pointed out, in the same lecture , how 
the struggle for an active literacy was 
at several points viciously beaten back, and then 
in a sense only admitted on term which are again 
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becoming highly fashionable and contemporary: 
because people would need to read instructions and 
even to write down certain things in the way of 
record to be able to work . ([1987] 1989c: 154) 
Against this servile literacy, Williams posed the capacity to 
read, and to read critically, which he termed, in a 1984 lecture 
given to the Classical Association, 'high literacy: 
It is high literacy, finally, which calls the 
bluff of authority, since it is a condition of all 
its practical work that it questions sources, 
closely examines offered authenticities, reads 
contextually and comparatively, identifies 
conventions to determine meanings: habits of mind 
which are all against, or should be all against, 
any and every pronunciation of a singular or 
assembled authority. ([1984] 1989c: 55) 
To be sceptical of and questioning towards · any and every 
pronunciation of a singular or assembled authority'. A difficult 
task indeed.18 What is for sure is that the project of such a 
critical literacy easily moves beyond the tasks of a single 
discipline, and Williams's definition is deliberately broad (after 
all, Williams is discussing the future of Classical studies in 
British universities - in some ways suffering much the same sense 
of threat in Thatcherite Britain as Eng. Lit. does in the new 
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South Africa, where, as I shall discuss in a moment, a similar 
definition of instrumental or vocational education is at work). 
In the end, the tasks of this high or critical literacy can be 
seen as no less than a way of summing up or describing the aims 
and ideals of academic education as such, particularly 1n the 
disciplines associated with critical thinking as such -
disciplines such as history, philosophy, and sociology, for 
example and not in any way seeking to provide an exhaustive 
list.19 
Throughout this study, I have tried to show the ways 1n which 
this high or critical literacy is at work in Williams's studies in 
literature, cultural production, and in the theories of cultural 
production associated with both Marxism and English studies. This 
' high literacy', or as I prefer to call it, critical literacy, 
identifies or names a central feature of Williams's legacy. But 
it also reaches beyond, to the broader questions facing academic 
university education in general - a topic which is, like English 
studies themselves, under pressure and under discussion in South 
Africa just as much as it is elsewhere.20 
That the widescale lack of educational provision for 
providing even primary literacy in South Africa clearly represents 
a major challenge to the effective practice and extension of 
democracy in any of its significant senses. Yet the visibility of 
this crisis of primary literacy should not obscure the existence 
of the related crisis in higher literac y. Debate on university 
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education in South Africa - at least as it is represented in the 
National Commission for Higher Education's recent report, A 
Framework_for_Transfor~~iiQQ (1996) - is significantly divided 
between two emphases which are certainly in tension with each 
other, and may in the end prove practically if not logically 
contradictory. 
On the one hand, the Report claims - in line with Williams's 
broad definition of what ' high literacy' has to offer - that it is 
the task of higher education to support a healthy 
public opinion and vibrant public debate by 
developing a culture of critical discourse in 
society, and by nurturing those intellectual and 
moral qualities which are preconditions for 
independent and critical thi~king, maturity of 
judgement , social responsibility and commitment to 
the publi c good. (60) 
This e mphasis on the critical component of higher education, and 
its relation to the functioning of democracy through open and 
critical debate is mentioned several times in the Report as a 
whole. At the same time , much of the report is couched in the 
discourse which Williams had identified as that of the ' industrial 
trainers' in The _Long _Revolution, that is, those who defined 
education ' in terms of future adult work , with the parallel clause 
of teaching the required social character - habits of regularity, 
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'self-discipline'. obedience, and trained effort' ([1961]: 162). 
Thus the Report argues for the implementation of a neo -
conservative redefinition of university education around the needs 
of globalisation and the world-market.21 The main task of higher 
education is seen as providing the labour market, 'in a knowledge-
driven and knowledge-dependent society' 
with the high level competencies and expertise 
necessary for the growth and prosperity of a 
modern or modernising economy. Higher education 
is in other words expected to teach and train 
people with a view to fulfilling specialised 
social functions or to occupy learned professions 
and other vocations 1n administration, trade and 
industry. (68) 
In this kind of formulation, it is striking - though depressingly 
familiar to any reader of Williams - how 'society' and the ' needs 
of society' become 1n the end code or cover-words for the needs of 
the economy. This is apparent, just to give one instance, 1n the 
following recommendations from the Report, with their casual 
reification of 'human talent and potential' into 'human resource 
development', and finally into the ' provision of person-power for 
the changing labour market': 
It should be clear that the features of the South 
African economy listed above present direct 
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challenges to higher education, the first and 
foremost being human resource development; that 
is , the mobilisation of human talent and potential 
through the training and provision of person-power 
for the changing labour market. ( 54) 
That this is completely at odds with the very different definition 
of 'human resource development' implicit in the previous 
definition of the task of higher education to ' support a healthy 
public opinion and vibrant public debate by developing a culture 
of critical discourse in society' and ' by nurturing those 
i ntellectual and moral qualities which are preconditions for 
independent and critical thinking ' is clear. How this tensio·n 
will be resolved and whether this apparent contradi c tion can be 
o v ercome remains to be seen. What is more certain is that in this 
r e spect , as in so many others, the example of Raymond Williams's 
c ommitment to the teaching and deployment of a truly c ritical 
l i teracy will remain an important one in the struggle to work 
towards a viable and participatory democracy , whether in South 
Africa or elsewhere . 
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Notes to Introduction 
1. See, for example, The _ Independent January 28 (Terry Eagleton 
and Frank Kermode); Ih~ - Q~~rQi~~ January 29 (Frances Mulhern) Ih~ 
Morning_Star February 4 (Tony Benn); The Listener February 4 ------------
(Anthony Barnett); Times _Higher _Educational_Supplement February 5 
(Fred Inglis); The _New_Statesman February 5 (Stuart Hall); Ih~ 
~~!1Q~ March 5 (Edward W. Said and Edward P. Thompson). The BBC's 
Channel Four broadcast a special tribute to Williams on 28 
February. Warwick University also organised a memorial conference 
on 30 April: for a brief account, see Lovell 1989. The British 
journal , News _ from _ Nowhere devoted a special issue to Williams -
Ra~mond _Williams: _Third _Generation February 1989, as did the US 
journal Social Text in 1992. --- -· ----- -- - See also Blackburn 1988 and 
Eagleton 1988. Patrick Parrinder's remark is drawn from his 
' Diary' (Parrinder 1988), and Juliet Mitchell's from the report on 
the National Film Theatre forum 'Raymond Williams - Towards 2000' 
{June 30 1989) in Higgins 1989. I borrow and adapt a few 
paragraphs from that essay in this introduction. 
2. The interviews with the New_Left _Review. conducted in 1977 and 
1978, and published as Politics _and _Letters in 1979 remains an 
extraordinarily useful, detailed and stimulating account of 
Williams's life. It can now be supplemented , and at times 
corrected. by Inglis 1995. though this study is marred by some 
considerable ambivalence towards Williams and his work (in this 
regard. Raphael Samuel's important review (Samuel 1995) is a 
necessary corrective). Alan O'Connor's thin study (1989) 
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provides an outstanding bibliography of Williams's writing, and of 
criticism on Williams - though one in need by now of some 
extension. 
3. For a scrupulously detailed account of this period of 
Williams's life, as well as an outstanding selection of work from 
this period , see Mcilroy and Westwood 1993. 
4. See E.P. Thompson 1961: ' [H]is work is very important indeed, 
and . .. so far as we can speak of a New Left he is our best man' 
(p. 24). See also Perry Anderson's repeated praise of Williams : 
in ' Origins of the Present Crisis' (Anderson 1965) Culture_and 
~QQi~iY and The _Long _Revolution are said to ' undoubtedly represent 
the major contribution to socialist thought in England since the 
war (1965: 11) ; and , above all , in his seminal essay , ' Components 
of the National Culture' (Anderson 1969). 
5. Or so Williams tells the story (Williams 1977d). Inglis 
(1995: 176) contests this view, but gives no sources for his 
disagreement. 
6. See the report on Edward W. Said's memorial speech in Higgins 
1989, especiall y pp. 83-4: Said 1990; and , more generally, Said 
1994. 
7. This initial phase of public mourning was followed by a surge 
of critical interest in Williams, as the first attempts were 
made to get his work as a whole into focus. Jan Gorak's The_Alien 
Mind _of _Raymond _Williams (composed before his death) was published 
in 1988, and was soon followed by Alan O'Connor's too hasty study 
Raymond _Williams: _Writingi _Culturei_Politig§ (1989). Nicolas 
Tredell's Uncancelled _Challenge: _The _Work _of _Raymond _Willi~~§ 
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followed in 1990; and, the best of these monographs , Andrew 
Milner's Q~l!~r~l Materiali§~. came in 1993. These were followed 
by John Eldridge and Lizzie Eldridge Ra~mond _Williams: _M~hing 
QQnn~Q!iQn§ (1994) ; and Fred Inglis's biography , Ea~mond Williams 
(1995). Various aspects of Williams's work were examined 
separately in volumes of essays edited by Terry Eagleton (1989c) 
and Dworkin and Roman (1993), and in special issues of the 
journals News from Nowhere (1989) and Social _Text (1992) , with the 
latter becoming the basis for a further volume of essays, 
M~1~rialism: _On __ Ra~mond _Williams ed. Christopher Prendergast 
(1995) . 
8 . For Williams as a novelist , see Davey 1989 ; Robbins 1990: 
Pinkney 1991 : Di Michele 1993; discussions of Williams's own 
play s are to be found in Gorak 1988 : 32 - 39, and Sharrat 1989: 
136 - 49; and accounts of Williams's political identity are to be 
found in Eagleton 1976b ; Barnett 1976; Hirschkopf 1988; Blackburn 
1989 and Brenkman 1995. For Williams on the mass media, see 
Williams [1962a] and [1974a], and the lengthy interview 1986e. 
Accounts of this work can be found in Eldridge and Eldridge 1994 : 
98 - 110 : Hitchcock 1995 ; and. for general discussion , see Lusted 
(ed . ) 1989. 
9 . See. for instance. the memorial editorial ' Identities' in~~~ 
Formations _ 5 (Summer 1988) , as well as Cornel West's statement. 
' Raymond Williams was the last of the great European male 
revolutionary socialist intellectuals born before the end of the 
age of Europe (1492 - 1945)' (West 199 5: ix). More explicitly , R.L . 
Dworkin's remark that ' though he has been dead for only the last 
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five (sic) years , he is already part of a different political 
age (Dworkin 1993: 54). I examine the implications of the ~g~ 
Formations editorial in Higgins 1995. Prendergast (1995b) makes a 
careful interrogation of the implications of West's statement. I 
examine Dworkin's comment - and the whole issue of Williams's 
relevance to us today - in the Conclusion . 
Notes to Chapter One 
l. Most commentators follow Eagleton's assessment of this early 
period as probationary, and pass over it without serious 
consideration. Ward (1981) makes no mention of these early works , 
beginning his analysis only with Culture _and _Societ~ . For Gorak, 
the early work is ' programmatic .... [it) reflects Cambridge 
t r aining and Cambridge tastes' (1988: 19). O'Connor (1989) 
s i milarly focuses on the post-Culture _and _Societ~ works. Recent 
exceptions to this blindness are Pinkney (1989a, 1989b) (these 
accounts are discussed in Chapters 2 and 4); Mcllroy (1993a , 
1993b) ; and Eldridge and Eldridge (1994), where there is brief 
discussion of the early works on drama (l994 : 115-21) . 
2 . See Eagleton 1976a , 1976b. My references are to 1976b. 
Eagleton's relations to Williams's work h~ve a long and complex 
history , and really need attention as an item of discussion in 
their own right . Eagleton himself later writes of the 'brisk 
impatience of relative youth' (Eagleton 1989a: 4) which had 
characterised his 1976 assessment ; but , at the same time , he 
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reaffirms the central drift of his criticisms in Eagleton 1989b. 
See also Eagleton 1984: 108-15. 
3. Notably Kiernan (1959) and Thompson (1961) in their respective 
review essays . I examine their views in some detail in Chapter 
4. 
4. See the discussion of the ' epistemological break' in Althusser 
[1965]: 26-30. The broad division into three phases - the works 
of the young Marx, the works of the break, and the mature works is 
further broken down into further sub-divisions, with the youthful 
works of 1840-1845 divided into the ' liberal - rationalist' phase 
of 1840-42, and the ' community-rationalist' phase of 1842-45; and 
the mature works themselves divided into the mature works proper 
(1857-1883) and the writings of the maturing phase (1845-57). 
1845 is the yea r of the break. The most comprehensive account I 
know of to date is Gregory Elliot's Althusser: _The _Detour _ of 
See especially p. 139: 'Althusser took the scientificity 
of Marxism for granted - it was a ~QQn~ of his whole enterprise. 
He elaborated an indigenous Marxist epistemology which he employed 
to exclude the Early Works from the canon and to purge historical 
materialism of any remaining ideological elements. Suitably 
rectified , historical materialism was submitted to the scrutiny of 
the epistemology which proceeded triumphantly to uphold its claims 
to scientific status by virtue of its a-humanism and 
a - hi storicism: another circle of circles . What was never in doubt 
was the scientificity of Marxism: the raison-d'etre of Althusser 's 
intervention was to defend that status.' (Elliot 1987: 139). 
the same might be said of Eagleton's claims. 
Mu c h 
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5 . Inglis recalls asking Williams about Eagleton ' s attack in 
1976, and records his reply as follows: ' "I think he might have 
sent me a copy beforehand," he said imperturbably , but I think he 
was a bit hurt , even so, by Eagleton's swashbuckling' (Inglis 
1995: 252). See also Inglis 1995: 248 for Anthony Barnett's 
immediate response to Eagleton, the ground of his essay (Barnett 
1976) . This debate ' initiated a long moment of reparation by 
Anderson and his fellow-editors which culminated as the interviews 
Inglis published as Politics _ and _Letters' (Inglis 1995: 251). 
i n c ludes some particularly interesting - and poignant -
correspondence between Williams , Perry Anderson and Frances 
Mu lhern over some particular details of the book. See Inglis 
19 95 : 2 4 9-251; 259-265. 
6. The words are uttered by the hunter, Ulfheim , to the artist 
P r ofessor Rubek in Act III of the play. A more recent translation 
render s them as ' No, nothing seems difficult at first ; but then 
yo u c ome to a tight corner where you can ' t go forward or back. 
And there y ou stick - "tree'd" , we sportsmen call it' ( Ibsen 1974: 
2 8 6) . 
7. See Annan (195 5) for a description of the closely-knit society 
of ' Oxbridge'. For his particular response to Williams. see Annan 
1991 . where his work is described as 'rhetorical , evasive and 
va c uou s' in tone s heavil y marked by class condecension (1991: 
360). 
8 . Other 1950s ' scholarship boys' included Kingsley Amis, Donald 
Davie, John Wain and Ri c hard Haggart. 
d i stingu i sh William s among s t these. 
It is interesting to 
The usua l c asual 
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identification made between Williams's and Hoggart ' s respective 
projects , seen as the founding moments of British Cultural 
Studies, stands in need of some serious questioning. See, for 
instance, the debate in Adult_Education between Haggart and 
Williams (Haggart (1948) and Williams (1948): now easily available 
in Mcilroy and Westwood 1993: 136-45); Williams's review of Th~ 
Uses _of _Literac~ (Williams 1957b; also in Mcilroy and Westwood 
1993: 106-10); and the later discussion between them (Willams and 
Haggart 1960; Mcilroy and Westwood 1993: 111-20). See also 
Williams 1957c where he explicitly criticises Hoggart's separation 
of politics from family life: 'Haggart is wrong , however, in 
supposing that these are to be set on one side of a line (family 
values, neighbourhood etc) , while on the other is set the wider 
social product - the Labour movement - which he describes as the 
work of a minority. Of course only a minority is really active , 
politically but we must not be confused by bourgeois ideas of the 
nature of a minority. There, a minority is thought of as 
isolated , self-defensive, opposed to the majority ' s values' 
(1957c: 31). 
9. See , in particular, Williams 1977d: 'There was little 
personal difficulty or dislike, but the formation was easy to hate 
- and I have to record that i responded aggressively . The myth of 
the working -c lass boy arriving in Cambridge .. is that he is an 
awkward misfit and has to learn new manners. It may depend on 
where you come from. Out of rural Wales it didn't feel like that. 
The class whi ch dominated Cambridge is given to describing itself 
as well-mannered, polite. sensitive. It continually contrasts 
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itself favourably with the rougher and coarser others ... If I then 
say that what I found was an extraordinarily coarse, pushing, 
name-ridden group, I shall be told that I am showing class-
feeling, class-envy, class-resentment. That I showed class-
feeling is not in any doubt. All I would insist on is that nobody 
fortunate enough to grow up in a good home, in a genuinely well-
mannered and sensitive community, could for a moment envy these 
loud, competitive and deprived people' (pp. 5-6). Inglis gives an 
excellent and well-researched account of Williams's schooldays in 
his Raymond Williams, especially pp. 38-69. 
10. Gorak bends the evidence a little in order to argue his case 
that Williams ' s entire intellectual identity was grounded in his 
own profound alienation. He writes, for instance, of how 
' [Williams's] working-class status in an emphatically middle - class 
university marginalised him still further' (Gorak 1988 : 10). But 
as O' Connor notes , the Socialist Club claimed as many as 1 , 000 
members in 1939 - approximately 20% of the membership of the 
universit y (O'Connor 1989: 7). Pinkney also stresses the 
'intensely Modernist political sub-culture around the university 
Socialist Club' available to Williams (Pinkney 1989a: 8). For 
details of the very active social life of young communists in the 
1950s, see Samuel 1986a and 1986b. And for Williams ' s own 
recollections of the period, see Williams 1979: 39-54; and 
Williams 1977d. 
11. See Cambridge _University_Socialist _ Club _Bulletin_March 6 
1940 . 
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12. See Cambridge University Socialist Club Bulletin Vol 4 No 4 
Tuesday November 5 1940 p. 2. 
13. Lionel Elvin was a Fellow of Trinity Hall 1930-44. See 
Mcllroy and Westwood 1993: 24 for useful biographical notes. 
E.M.W. Tillyard, along with Mansfield Forbes and I.A. Richards, 
was one of the trio of new appointments made to lead the new 
English school. Tillyard, a former Classicist, specialised in 
Shakespeare and Milton. His study, The_Elizabethan_World_Picture 
(1952), can be taken as an exemplary instance of the 'background' 
approach to literary history that Williams detested. See also his 
1948 essay, ' Is a New History of Criticism Possible?', for a 
warning against a history of literature which is too attendant to 
the interests of the day: 'there is the risk that the premises on 
which the book was being written would have changed before the end 
was reached' ( 164). 
14. Williams singles out Fox as the centre of leftist discussions 
of literature in Williams 1979: 44. For an excellent discussion 
of socialist realism in the Russian context, see Regie Robin, who 
concludes that it 'marked a historical period of Soviet society 
with, at heart, an aesthetic of transparency and clarity, a 
monologic dream of cultural and ideological homogeneity, and a 
very specific figuration, the positive hero' (Robin 1992: 299). 
15. Cited in Hewison 1981: 23. The publication of The _Condemned 
Playground: _Essays _ 1927-1944 in 1945 brought Connolly significant 
public attention. See Shelden 1989: 'Given his ambition to 
influence the cultural policy of the new government, he could not 
have managed better the timing of the book's publication. The 
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argument of 'Writers and Society' received prominent attention in 
many of the reviews of the book' ( p. 140). 
16. See Leavis 1933: 63-67. 
17 . For Politics _and_Letters. as well as the Soviet Literary 
Controversy essay in Vol 1 No 1, Williams wrote ' Lower Fourth at 
St Harry's' - challenging Connolly to write about the American 
Congress Committee on UnAmerican Actitvities as he had done about 
Zhdanovism in Russia; 'Radio Drama' - a discussion of Macneice's 
The _Dark_Tower in relation to Williams's developing theory of 
naturalism: 'Dali, Corruption and his Critics' , a review of Dali's 
autobiography in which Williams argues that 'biography and psycho-
analysis have nothing to do with literary criticism' - all in Vol 
1 Nos 2 & 3. In the final Summer 1948 issue, a section from Dr~~~ 
f rom_ Ibsen _ to __ Eliot. 'The Exiles of James Joyce'; - ... And Traitors 
Sneer'. a review of Coward and West; and possibly, under the name 
Michael Pope. another review, 'The American Radio' For Thg 
Qriii~. Williams wrote three reviews ('Saints , Revolutionaries and 
Carpetbaggers, Etc'; 'Ibsenites and Ibsenite-Antis'; and ' The 
Delicac y of P.H. Newby'); and one major article, ' A Dialogue on 
Drama '. 
18 . For an interesting account of the development of ' cold war 
culture ' in Britain, see Sinfield 1989, and especially Chapter 6 
'Fr eedom and the Cold War' (1989: 86-115), though the Zoschenko 
Affair is not discussed. 
19 . Zhdanov echoes and elaborates the criticisms first made by 
the Central Committee of the Party and published in rr~yg~ 21 
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August 1946. See Zhdanov 1947. See also Lewis 1946-47a, 1946-
47b. For a useful account of the whole affair, see Vickery 1963. 
20. Connolly quoted extensively from Culture _and _Life (28 June 
1946) and fr~Y~~ (21 August 1946) in his article 'The Fifth Form 
at St. Joe's', (first published in HQ!:i..?;Q[! September-October 
1946). See Connolly 1953, especially p. 135: 'The artist who 
cares truly for individual freedom, aesthetic merit or 
intellectual truth must be prepared to go once more into the 
breach against the Soviet view with all the patience , fervour and 
lucidity with which, ten years ago, he went into action against 
the nascent totalitarianism of the Nazis.' 
21. The _Modern _~uarterl~ 2:1, pp. 3, 4. 
22. In fact the debates go back to the 1940s. See , for example, 
' Writers and Society, 1940-43' in Connolly 1945: 260-87 . These 
essays best represent the decadent aestheticism Williams so 
detested. An interesting comparative response from George Orwell 
can be found in his review of Connolly's Ib~ Unguiet Grave (1945) , 
which he describes as 'a cry of despair from the !:~[!l!~r who feels 
that he has no right to exist, but also feels that he is a finer 
animal than the proletarian' (Orwell [19~5]: 365) . For an 
excellent general discussion of the issues involved , see Sinfield 
1989: 43-47. 
23. For a fascinating study of Communist Party culture in the 
1940s and 1950s. see Samuel 1986a and 1986b. and especially 1986b: 
63-68. According to Inglis, Williams certainly had a very strong 
personal motive for leaving the Party. He quotes Annette Lees - a 
friend of Williams and his wife-to - be , Joy Dalling. on the Party's 
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check on their political suitability: 'They said we were 
"politically unconscious" - well , we~§£§, to their way of 
thinking. 
the Party. 
Raymond was very angry at once, and that's why he left 
He said, "They' re not te 11 ing me who I can marry'" 
(Inglis 1995: 84). See also Williams 1979: 52-3. 
24. As Mulhern noted. Politics_and _Letters was one of the 
journals which signalled a clear shift away from the ~Qr~ti~¥ 
paradigm. See Mulhern 1979: 226-7; 230-233. 
24. Williams does use the term 'environment' to describe the 
contemporary cultural context and refers directly to Leavis and 
Thompson's book in footnote seven of page 20. 
Notes to Chapter Two 
1 . See Williams 1991 for a fine bibliography compiled by Graham 
Holderness. See the 'Foreword' to the American edition of 
Q~l1~£~. retitled Ih§ _ ~QQ!QlQg¥_Qf_Q~lt~rg for Bruce Robbins's 
description of Chapter 6. 
2. Anthony Barnett was the first to challenge Eagleton's view of 
the relevance of drama to Williams's work (Barnett 1976: 54). 
Pinkney picks up Barnett's point, and argues against the tendency 
to trivialise Williarns's interest in drama as some kind of 
' quaint , engaging, marginal hobby' with no real bearing on his 
' general social concerns' (Pinkney 1989b: 19 - 20): but, as I shall 
discuss below. his essay misrepresents the nature of Williams's 
early interests. See also Graham Holderness's introduction to 
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Williams 1991. More generally, see Sharratt 1989, Kruger 1993, 
and Eldridge and Eldridge 1994, especially Chapter 6, pp 115-116. 
3. O'Connor 1989 is symptomatic in this regard. No detailed 
examination of the early work is given. It is dismissed in the 
single sentence 'The existentialist themes of his early work on 
Ibsen are revised and replaced by the idea of "complex seeing" 
f r om Br e ch t ' ( 0 ' Connor 1 9 8 9 : 8 0 ) . See also Note 2 above. 
4. In the Politics _ and _Letters interviews, the ~1R team do ask 
about Williams's 'high appreciation of Eliot's drama'; but his 
response avoids any direct mention of Eliot, or discussion of the 
question of his formative influence . The four pages of his 
response do not address the question of Eliot's influence 
directly: ' Let me say it was impossible for me to write adequately 
about dramatic forms until I fully understood the nature of the 
historical movement of naturalism and realism, which I did not at 
the time' (Williams 1979: 202). Gorak (1988: 21) is partially 
correct in stating 'Williams remained locked within Eliot's 
guiding assumptions and values', as I shall discuss below. 
5. Fred Inglis, for example. refers to Drama _ from _ Ibsen_ to _Eliot 
simply as a 'critical guide to modern drama' (Inglis: 126). 
6. See also his review of Look _Back_in_Anger as ' the best young 
play of the decade ' (Tynan 1964: 41-2). 
7 . Williams's impatience with the existing dramatic criticism can 
also be seen in his review of studies by Muriel Bradbrook and 
Brian Downs in The Critic where he argues ' there is no acceptable 
literary criticism of Ibsen's plays available in English' (1947e: 
6 5) . Inglis records that the publishers of Drama _ from _ Ibsen _ to 
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EliQ1 sent on a letter from Kay Burton of Newnham College, 
objecting that Williams drew too much from Muriel Bradbrook's 
lectures of 1945-46 in his own study. Inglis quotes selectively 
from Williams's reply to the publishers, and notes that Ms. Burton 
was satisfied by Williams's account, but maintains his own 
scepticism (see Inglis 1995: 138-139). In point of fact, 
Bradbrook's study , Ibsen _ the _Norwegian is fully acknowledged in 
Williams's text, and is explicitly discussed at several points 
((1952]: 42, 44, 56, 61, 65, 73). Even a casual comparison of 
the two suggests little in common save that they are writing about 
the same play . For Bradbrook, P~~r _gyg! ' is a far better play 
than Br~gg. which was written out of despair , but lacks the true 
c larity of tragedy. The story of Peer is the story of his 
struggle to get away from the trolls - in Christian phrase. the 
search for salvation .. . he is also a comic character. a gaily 
caricatured typical Norwegian ' (Bradbrook 1946: 54). Williams 
interprets the play around ideas of vocation and relationship 
foreign to Bradbrook's reading, and his reading owes more to Eliot 
than to any other single influence. See , for instanc e, his 
concluding remarks: - e~~r _gygt ' s success, and its difference from 
Br ~gg. is that they mythological and legendary material which 
Ibsen uses provides a more completely objective formula for the 
central experience than any he found before or after ... In f~~r 
GYn1 words. once again. are the sovereign element of the drama' 
(Williams [1952]: 60). Ingli s misreads the book title as It~~n 
the Dramatist. perhaps in a Verlesen which seeks to annul 
Bradbrook's central theme - to show how Ibsen ' s plays reveal 
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typical aspects of the Norwegian character - and to seek to 
connect it more closely with Williarns's interest in Ibsen's work 
as showing the possibilities of verbal drama. 
8. See Williams 1947a, 1947e, and 1947f. 
9. See, for instance, Eliot's '"Rhetoric" and Poetic Drama', 'A 
Dialogue on Dramatic Poetry', and 'Four Elizabethan Dramatists' in 
his Selected_ Essa;ys (London: Faber, 1951). 
10. See Eliot 1924; Knights 1937; Wilson Knight 1930. 
11. For a succinct overview of Eliot's career as a dramatist, see 
Innes 1992, especially p. 387 : ' In the era immediately following 
the Second World War, too, when serious new drama was restricted 
to J.B.Priestley's restatements of his 1930s themes or Terence 
Rattigan ' s naturalistic problem plays, the religious vision of 
Eliot's poetic drama set the standard ... But their Establishment 
traditionalism relegated Eliot's plays to period pieces the moment 
the first post-war generation of playwrights stormed the theatre.' 
12. Eliot's views on the social importance of such common systems 
of belief are most strongly expressed in 'The Idea of a Christian 
Society' [1939]: and in ~otes _Towards _ the _Definition_of _Culture 
[1948] . Williams confronts Eliot's social philosophy head-on in 
William s 1958a: 227 - 243. 
13. These come through most strongly in Eliot 1934 , [1939] , and 
r1948] . For excellent recent assessments, see Asher 1995. Cooper 
1995 , and Julius 1995. 
14 . See Eliot 1966: 145 . 
15. Inglis has described this we ll , suggesting that ' Williams 
made the mistake so many people make, that we know what we feel by 
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introspection' (1995: 220), and therefore believed that writing 
worked by 'producing in others a facsimile of his feelings' rather 
than through persuasion (221). 
16. See Williams [1953c]: 186. This essay was written prior to 
Preface_to _Film. 
17. For more detail, see Williams 1979: 230-33. 
18. The revised and extended version of Drama _ in_Performance 
published in 1968 includes a new chapter on Bergman's film W!!Q 
Strawberries repeats many of the same emphases. See, for example, 
Williams 1991, p. 150: 'What has happened in Bergman's case, 
though by no means in all films, is that the dramatic author has 
become his own director: the unity of text and performance is 
achieved, not conventionally, but in the phases of the work of one 
mind . ' 
19. See Pinkney 1989a and 1989b. I further discuss Pinkney's 
inflation of the evidence for Williams's interest in German 
Expressionism - necessary to make his ' anti-Lukacsian' case -
in Chapter 6. 
20. Thus he writes of Williams's ' overvaluing of [Eliot's] 
"break" with Naturalism in Drama _ from _ Ibsen_to_Eliot in 1952' 
(Pinkney 1989a: 9), but doesn't register just how central Eliot 's 
ideas were to Williams in this early period. 
21. Eagleton (1976b) focuses his discussion of the term on the 
book which came from the lectures he heard as an undergraduate 
student (Williams 1970) ( 1976b: 33-34). Simpson, in his acute 
essay 'Raymond Williams: Feeling for Structures, Voicing 
"History"'. begins his dis cussion of the term with Culture _and 
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~Qgi~t~. and only examines the term as it appears in the la+er 
versions of the books on drama (1995: 29-50). Only Peter 
Middleton's essay, 'Why Structure Feeling?', examines its first 
use in Preface to Film. Middlet0n asks the right question - 'To 
understand Williams's attachment to the concept we need to explore 
the n <l ture of the problem he was trying to resolve by its 
intr0duction' (1989: 52); but his account is marred by its failure 
to recognise that Williams is less interested in attacking the 
' post-Comtean philosophical tradition', and more concerned with 
criticising the Marxist tradition, or at least the scientist 
variant of it associated for us primarily with Althusser, and by 
Williams with the English Marxism of the 1930s and 1940s. 
22. See Simpson 1995b, especially pp. 36-37, 42. Simpson shares 
many of Eagleton's doubts about the theoretical value of the term. 
23. See especially Chapters 4 - 6, 'English Poets: (I) Primitive 
Accumulation '. 'English Poets: (II) The Industrial Revolution'. 
and 'English Poets: (III) Decline of Capitalism ' . Here Caudwell 
argues, for instance, that in the 'period of primitive 
accumulation the conditions for the growth of the bourgeois class 
are created lawlessly .... The absolute-ind~vidual will overriding 
all other wills is therefore the principle of life for the 
Elizabethan age' (Caudwell [1937): 73 -4) . 
24. See J.R. Williams [1953], and the reply and counter-reply by 
Raymond Williams and J.R. Williams in Mcllroy and Westwood 1993: 
196-198. 
25. Thus it is no surprise that in Q~11~~~. William' s s ketch of 
the form cultural materialism might take as a new discipline - the 
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sociology of culture - the history of drama is the privileged 
example choosen to exemplify the central assertion that ·certain 
forms of social relationship are deeply embodied in certain forms 
of art ' (Williams 1981a: 148). 
Notes to Chapter 3 
1 . See Williams 1979: 7; Parrinder 1987a: 58; Anderson 1965: 15; 
Dworkin 1993: 41 ; Simpson 1995: 36 ; Inglis 1995: 146; Gorak 1988: 
40. John Beaver ' s review from The_Twentieth _Century is quoted on 
the back cover of The _Universities _and _Left _Review Vol 1: 5 Autumn 
1958: ' Among the young, not to know about - I won't say have read 
- The _Use s _ of _Literacy and Culture_and _Society is to brand oneself 
the literary equivalent of a square. 
2 . See Eagleton 1976b: 25, and New Formations 5 Summer 1988 p. 4 . 
The New _Formations Editorial 1s further discussed in the 
Conclusion , and the issues it raises are discussed at length in 
Higgins 1995 . 
3. See John Mander's comment, in his 1960 review of Julian Symon s 
The _Thirties i_A_Dream _Revolved: ' In the thirties the working -
c lass intellectual was a bit of a joke . .. It is difficult nowaday s 
t o think of younger left-wing intellectuals who do DQ! come from 
working-c lass or lower middle - class homes' (cited in Hewison 1981: 
199). 
4. Se e Morrison for an interesting portrait of the social, 
political and a es the tic tensions at work in the 1950 s : 
'Cons ci ou s l y i d e ntif y ing with soc i a l ist agent s of change , Ami s and 
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other members of the Movement are nevertheless attracted to the 
"old" pre-1945 order .... To be politically astute in the 1950s, the 
Movement implied, was to be politically inactive' (1980: 77, 95). 
Unfortunately there is no space here for a thorough consideration 
of Williams's relations to contemporaries like Kingsley Amis and 
Donald Davie, although some of the strength of the antipathy is 
felt in Williams's only published poem 'On First Looking into~~~ 
Li.!!~~· (Williams 1984: 257-8). For Amis on Williams, see Amis 
1962. See also Hewison: 'Amis and Wain prepared the stage for the 
Angry Young Man, Colin Wilson gave him an identity as the 
Outsider, John Osborne gave him a voice. John Braine proceeded to 
demonstrate that he had absorbed the materialistic morality of his 
times' ( 1981: 135), and Chapters 5 and 6 in general. Sinfield 
offers a useful distinction between 'middle-class dissidence' and 
a 'left-liberal class fraction' in his insightful study of the 
period (1989: 238). 
5. See Inglis 1995: 109: 'His answers to the special paper on 
George Eliot ... were clear in the memory of Muriel Bradbrook twenty 
years after she had marked them.' 
6. As Williams later wrote. 'it should b~ stressed that it was a 
gbQiQ~: it was distinctly as a vocation rather than a profession 
that people went into adult education - Edward Thompson, Hoggart, 
myself and many others whose names are not known' (Williams 1986b: 
15 4) . He also records that the extra money was welcome: 'Trinity 
offered me a senior scholarship at 200 a year for three years, 
but the adult education job I saw advertised at Oxford paid 300 a 
year. So a financial factor came into it' (Williams 1979: 64) . 
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7 . Richard Hoggart worked in the Department of Adult Education at 
Hull University from 1946 to 1959. The_Uses_of_Literac¥, usually 
associated with Williams's Culture _and_Societ¥, appeared in 1957. 
Edward P. Thompson was Extra-Mural lecturer at Leeds University 
from 1948 to 1965. 
8. See Mcilroy 1993a; he sums up: 'We can, therefore, whilst 
granting the importance of his lonely professional regime. make 
too much of his intellectual isolation .... he was in contact with 
and in dialogue with leading scholars, and in the first dozen 
post-war years was editor of three important journals ' ( 1993a: 
12) . See also Inglis 1995 Chapter 6 'Worker's Education in the 
Garden of England' 
9 . Kermode 1959. Here, as in his later review of Modern Tragedy, 
Kermode prefers to turn a blind eye to the fundamentally political 
address of Williams's work. and to focus only on its literary 
critical aspect. 
10. But see also reviews of Culture_and _Societ¥ by Dwight 
Macdonald: ' I don't think Mr Williams's ideas are effective. In 
fact I don't think they are ideas at all. They are , rather, 
prejudices - prejudices on the right side, generous and sincere 
and democratic prejudices , but still idees _recues, unexamined 
assumptions ' (MacDonald 1961: 79); Briggs 1961; and especially 
Anthony Hartley's three essays, which for Williams, summed up 
' that se c tor of right - wing liberal opinion ... which saw it as a new 
attempt at a reassociation of culture (sic] and social thinking 
which it thought had been seen off after the thirties' (Williams 
1979: 132): Hartley 1958, Hartley 1959 , and Hartley 1961 , 
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especially p. 581: ' His [Williams's] own view of culture - which 
can roughly be called populist - seems to be based on a series of 
confusions as to the meanings covered by the word and to neglect 
the necessarily individual and aristocratic function of the 
creative artist.' 
11. Haggart 1959; Gregor g1_~1- 1959. 
12. See Pi ttock 1962. 
13 . Cowling was later one of the founder members of the Salisbury 
Group, a gathering of Conservative academics, commentators, and 
politicians , most of whom had present or past connections with 
Peterhouse College. This was established in 1977 to promote 
' traditional conservatism'. Cowling expressed just what that 
meant in his keynote statement of the group's first publication, 
Conservative _Essa~s: 'It is not freedom that Conservatives want: 
what they want is the sort of freedom that will maintain existing 
inequalities or restore lost ones' (cited in Edgar 1984: 44). The 
group also included Roger Scruton, author of an essay on Williams 
in his Thinkers _of _ the_New_Left (1985). In the essay, Scruton 
characterises Williams's interests in democracy and social justice 
as sentimental. See also Scruton 1984. 
14. Williams took a characteristically longer view, and had 
drifted out of the Communist Party by 1941. In Politics_and 
Lg11~re- he describes the key event for him as the East German 
Rising and its suppression in 1953 (Williams 1979: 88-89). 
15. See also Hall 1989b. This essay remains one of the finest 
single essays on Williams's work as a whole. For useful 
discussion of some of the tensions around cultural studies between 
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Hall and Williams, see Dworkin 1993; and Milner 1993: 76-84, 87-
90 . 
16. Crossman is cited in Dwight Macdonald p . 83 from The Guardian 
9 March 1961: also cited Inglis 1995: 170. Gorak's judgement 
betrays the over-emphasis and tendentiousness which mars his study 
' In fact, without Culture_and_Societ~ the work of the British "new 
left" with its sustained critique of British social and political 
institutions, might never have occurred' (1988: 52). 
17. Biographers Peter Ackroyd and Lyndall Gordon pass over 
Eliot's specific targets and prefer to see Notes _ towards _ the 
Redefinition_of _Culture merely as evidence for Eliot's 
inc reasingly pessimistic mood . See Ackroyd 1984 : 291 - 2 and Gordon 
19 88 : 221 - 3. Against this psychologisation and privatisation of 
public and political arguments, see Cooper 1995 . 
18. See Shaw 1959 for a survey of the ' Great Debate ' c oncerning 
t he attainment of ' university standards ' in Adult Education , as 
well as a discussion of the related questions of ' voluntaryism ' 
v ersus ' professionalism'. See also Mcilroy and Westwood 1993 . 
19 . The argument in adult education reflected broader ideological 
and political discussions: see, classically , Bell 1960. Lasch 
1973 gives a us e ful account of the ' end of ideology' movement in 
t he US conte x t . For a useful surve y of the Brit is h arguments , 
s ee Stedman Jones 1984b . 
2 0 . Se e Ra y bould 1947, 1948 , 1949 , and 1951. 
21 . For Williams ' s own ac c oun t, s ee Williams 1979: 78 - 8 3 . S e e 
a lso Mc ilroy and Wes tw o od 199 3: 2 03- 0 6. 
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22. Bell's identification of civilization with the values of a 
well-educated elite who would, if necessary, be supported by an 
ignorant working-class gives an excellent idea of the kind of 
arguments Williams was opposing. A particularly revealing passage 
reads: 'The rich men and women of the eighteenth century 
cultivated their taste. The poor, as I hope presently to show, so 
long as to be poor means to be unfree and uneducated, are 
concerned actively with civilization only in so far as by their 
labours they make it possible, and. passively, in so far as their 
manners , habits, opinions and sentiments are coloured by it .... I 
have not yet notived that the soon-to-be sovran [sic] proletariat. 
the working men of old England, manifest any burning desire to 
avail themselves of such means of civilization as they already 
dispose of. Rather it appears to me their ambitions tend 
elsewhither. Far from discovering amongst them any will to 
civilization I am led to suspect that the British working man 
likes his barbarism well enough' (Bell [1928): 49-50 , 156) . 
Perhaps Williams 's definitive reply is to be found in the essay 
' The Bloomsbury Fraction', where he sums up their general position 
as one in which the function of the 'soc~al conscience, in the 
end. is to protect the private conscience (Williams 1980: 167). 
23. Some recognition of this is to be found in Lloyd and Thomas's 
description of Culture_and _Societ¥ as ' a counterhegemonic work of 
enormous significance' (Lloyd and Thomas 1995: 271). See also 
Robbins's interesting discussion, and especially his comments 
' Culture _ and _Societ~ is so powerful and moving a case for 
professional legitimation not despite but because of its 
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fundamental commitment to political opposition' (Robbins 1993: 
79) And see the whole discussion in Williams 1979: 97-107. 
24. Cobbett began like Burke as an opponent of the French 
Revolution. See Williams's monograph Qgbb~11 (1983b) for a fine 
analysis of the continuity across Cobbett's differing political 
allegiances. 
25. See, for instance, Viswanathan who argues, that Williams 
' consistently and exclusively studies the formation of 
metropolitan culture from within its own boundaries .... Despite 
[his] life-long commitment to contesting purely abstract 
categories of analysis that draw on system rather than history, 
his critical practice paradoxially reproduces them in the context 
of imperialism' (1993: 218, 224). 
Qi i~, see also Said 1993: 98-100. 
Apropos The _ Countr~_and_the 
For a spirited defence of 
Williams in this context of argument, see Prendergast 1995b. 
26 . See, for instance, Eliot's description of the ' Community of 
Christians' ' It will be their identity of belief and aspiration. 
their background of a common system of education and a common 
culture which will enable them to influence and be influenced by 
each other, and collectively to form the conscious mind and the 
conscience of the nation' ( 1982: 68). 
27. As Mulhern remarks, in Fiction _ and _ the _Reading _Public, the 
'notion of an original unity of ' culture' and 'civilization' 
which in F.R. Leavis's argument had been an unobtrusive 
assumption, was now expounded as the first principle of a theory 
of cultural history' (Mulhern 1979: 38). It was Williams's 
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implicit criticisms of the Leavis's that drew the ire of critics 
such as Green (1968: 108-09); and Watson 1977a, and 1977b. 
28. Eliot may well have played a central role in this. See, for 
instance, his statement, in _Th~_Idea _of _ a _Christian_Societ~ ~hat 
'the tendency of unlimited industrialism is to create bodies of 
men and women - of all classes - detached from tradition, 
alienated from religion and susceptible to mass suggestion: in 
other words , a mob. And a mob will be no less a mob if it is well 
clothed, well housed and well disciplined' (Eliot 1982: 53). 
29. See Cunningham 1988, especially Chapters 9 and 10 , ' Movements 
of Masses' and 'Mass Observations'. See also Carey 1992. Carey 
appears ignorant of Williams's arguments in Culture _and _Societ~ 
while presenting a mirror-image to them, and writing in terms very 
close to Williams's central point regarding the use of the term 
masses: ' I would suggest, then. that the principle around which 
modernist literature and culture fashioned themselves was the 
exclusion of the masses. The defeat of their power, the removal 
of their literacy, the denial of their humanity. What _ this 
ig!~llectual _effort _ failed _ to _acknowledge _was _ the _masse~_ do _not 
~~i~! - __ The _rnas si _ that _ is _ to _ sa~i_is_a_metaphor _ for_the _ unknowable 
~gg _ invisible. __ We _c annot _ see _ the _mass . Crowds can be seen; but 
the mass is the crowd in its metaphysical aspect - the sum of all 
possible crowds - and that can take on conceptual form only as 
metaphor. The _metaphor _of _ the _mass _ serves _ the _purposes _of 
individual _ self-assertion_because _ it _ turns_other _people _ iD!Q _a 
conglomerate. __ It _ denies _ them _ the _ individualit~ _which _ we _ascribe 
to _ourselves _and _ to _people _we _ know ' (1992: 21; my emphases). 
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Carey appears to be guilty either of plagiarism or an 
extraordinary oversight in his scholarly preparation for the 
study. See also Eldridge and Eldridge 1994: 'The challenge to the 
use of 'mass as a concept is, threfore [sic], not some quirky 
pedantry, but a way of drawing attention to its ideological and . 
control implications' (64). For a contrary and critical view, see 
Parrinder 1987a. What is at stake in Williams's discussion is the 
site of observation, one which is always implicated in society, 
and never free from interest and implication. 
30. I discuss The_Long_Revolution a little more fully in Chapter 
5 below . For some interesting and substantial discussion, see 
Williams 1979: 133 - 174, and Eldridge and Eldridge 1994: 76-97. 
31 . For an interesting critical extension of Williams's arguments 
in this regard, conducted with particular reference to feminism, 
see Kappeler 1986, expecially pp. 167-95. 
32 . Baldick 1983 remains an indispensable guide to this topic. 
33. Though Thompson also had some major critical points to make, 
as we shall see in Chapter 5. 
Notes to Chapter Four 
l. See Inglis 1995, especially chapters 8 and 9, for a general 
sketch of the period. The _Ma~ _Da~_Manifesto was largely drafted 
by Williams after lengthy discussions with other members of the 
group, including Stuart Hall and Edward Thompson. See Hall~!. !"!l· 
1968; and for an account of this. and related matters, see 
Williams 1979: 369-376 . See Williams 1971a and 1971b for an 
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extract from Williams's speech apropos of the Dutschke affair. 
For an account of Williams's role and activities in the Arts 
Council, see the essays ' Politics and Policies: The Case of the 
Arts Council' in Williams 1989a: 141-50, ' The Arts Council' in 
Williams 1989b: 41-55 and 'Middlemen' in Williams 1989c: 98-107. 
See ~!§~Q 12 (1971) pp. 17-34 for A_Letter _ from_the _Countr~. 
broadcast in April 1966; and ~1~~9 9 (1967) pp. 15-53 for r~Ql!Q 
I~g~i!:~, broadcast 15 March 1967. The best discussion of them is 
to be found in Sharrat 1989. Williams's columns for The_Listener 
have been collected (Williams 1989d). 
and D. Lusted (ed.) 1989. 
See also Williams 1974a , 
2. Drama _ in_Performance includes extra chapters 'Plays in 
Transition', 'Modern Experimental Drama', and 'Wild _Strawberries. 
by Ingmar Bergman', as well as silent elisions of passages in 
praise of Eliot ; Drama _from_Ibsen_to_Brecht is restructured, and 
has additional chapters: 'The ~~ilg§ of James Joyce·. ' Federico 
Garcia Lorca ' , ' Dylan Thomas's Play for Voices', ' O ' Neill : 
Mourning becomes ~l~g!r§', 'Giraudoux: ~lgg!r~·. Sartre, Tb~ 
Eli~§· , ' Georg Buchner: A Retrospect', 'D.H.Lawrence : Th~ 
Widowing _of _Mrs _Holroi:d'. 'Arthur Miller' , ' Bertolt Brecht' and a 
whole section. Recent _Drama, as well as a completely new 
Conclusion. Once again, a central revision lies in the 
downplaying of Eliot's example and achievement. In Qr~~ll 
(London: Collins , 1971) Williams is much harsher in his assessment 
than in his discussion in Culture and Societ~. In his 
'Introduction' to The _Pelican _Book _of _English _Prose. Williams 
formulates some of the themes of writing and observation crucial 
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both to the study Qr~§ll, and to The _Countr~_and _ the_Cit~. The 
Introduction is reprinted, with minor changes, as 'Notes on 
English Prose 1780-1950' in Williams 1984: 67-118. 
3 . As mentioned in the Introduction, Inglis (1995:176) disputes 
this , suggesting that Williams had been contacted by a Faculty 
legate before the letter arrived, and had already agreed to accept 
a lectureship if one were offered; but he gives no source or 
evidence for this view. For Williarns's own account, see [1977d]: 
4. 
4 . This chapter - and indeed this study as a whole - assumes the 
centrality which Williams leant to Cambridge English. It comes 
through most evidently in his 1974 remark: ' If I take my example 
from Cambridge English, it is not only because of local experience 
and concern. but mainly because, by common consent, the changes 
embodied in Cambridge English, expecially between the mid-1920s 
and the 1940s, have been so widely influential in many parts of 
the English- speaking world. If an old definition of the subject 
was anywhere broken up, and a new curriculum and new definitions 
decisively propagated, it was, at least in the early stages. in 
Cambridge' (1974b: 1293). 
5 . Williams's two talks for the BBC Third Programme, ' Literature 
and Rural Society ' and ' Literature and the City' establish a 
starting-point of the project as a whole (1967a , 1967b). 
6. See in particular Williams 1971, especially Chapter 4 
'Experience and Observation'. and Williams 1989e . 
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7. For a later continuation of the argument, see Williams's 
review of Steiner's AD1igQD~e (1984b). 
8. See Deutscher (1949). Williams notes he began working on KQQ~ 
1n 1957 (Williams 1966: 9) The play is omitted from the 1979 
reissue by Verso books on the grounds that it now seems to me to 
belong to another area of my work' (Williams 1979: 9). It has 
been little discussed: Sharrat observes 'I don't quite know what 
kind of relation Williams saw between the written text of KQQ~ and 
any possible production of it' (1989: 132). This was perhaps to 
put politely what some put more frankly: Kermode observed that 
KQQ~ was 'disastrously bad' (1966: 85). 
9. For a succinct expression of Anatoly Lunacharsky's views, see 
his essay 'On Socialist Realism' (Lunacharsky (1933]). 
10. In a curious way, Steiner shows his own awareness of the 
ahistorical features of his own interpretation, but manages at the 
same time to make a virtue of them. See especially p. 192: ' In 
the imagination of the nineteenth century the Greek tragedians and 
Shakespeare stand side by side, their affinity transcending all 
the immense contrarieties of historical circumstance, religiou s 
belief, and poetic form. We no longer use the particular terms o f 
Lessing and Vitor Hugo. But we abide by their insight. The word 
· tragedy ' encloses for us in a single span both the Greek and the 
Elizabethan example . The sense of relationship overreaches the 
historical truth that Shakespeare may have known actually n e xt to 
nothing of the actual works of Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides . 
It transcends the glaring fact that the Elizabethans mixed tragedy 
and comedy whereas the Greeks kept the two modes severely 
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distinct. It overcomes our emphatic awareness of the vast 
difference in the shape and fabric of the two languages and styles 
of dramatic presentation. The intimations of a related spirit and 
ordering of human values are stronger than any sense of 
disparity.' 
11. Williams may be recalling some of the detail of Ralph Fox's 
argument in The_Novel_and_the_People. Compare Fox (1937]: 99. 
12. The final chapter on Brecht - 'A Rejection of Tragedy' - is 
in many ways the weakest and most schematic. As the anonymous 
reviewer in the Times _ Literary_Supplement (possibly George 
Steiner) noted, it was irritatingly brief and paid little 
attention to existing scholarly work. See Times_Literary 
§~221~~~~1 1966: 717-18. 
13 . Though for Walter Stein, Modern _Tragedy was unusually 
successful in bringing together political sensibility and literary 
analysis. 'Unlike so many who have sought to bring modern 
literary and political concerns into active relation, he 
[Williams] really has the interests and equipment of a serious 
lit_erary critic. Modern Tragedy bears the fruits of this 
conjunction: though its special signific~nce, both literary and 
political , seems to have been almost entirely missed on its 
appearance (Stein 1969: 22). Nonetheless, Stein criticises 
Williams for its tendency to ' overstatement' (211) and its over-
identification of the everyday tragedies of modern experience with 
' remediable social disorders' (210). As John 0 . Thomson (1980) 
also noted: 'Fabianism and Stalinism are the twin positions on the 
left which Williams is wr iti ng against ' (1980: 49). 
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14. This was Anthony Barnett's personal response, recorded in 
Inglis (1995: 250). See also Barnett 1976. For a recent overview 
of the book, which focuses on the German Romantic tradition of 
tragic thinking marginalised in Williams's study, see Surin 1995. 
15. See George Steiner fig~l_Presences (London: Faber, 1989) for a 
very different critical assessment of modernity. 
16. Compare Eliot's essay, ' Tradition and the Individual Talent' 
and its key assertion that 'the historical sense involves a 
perception , notonly of the pastness of the past , but of its 
presence; the historical sense compels a man to write not merely 
with his own generation in his bones, but with a feeling that the 
whole of the literature of Europe from Homer and withion itthe 
whole of the literature of his own country has a simultaneous 
existence and composes a simultaneous order ' (Eliot [1919): 14) . 
17. Ward notes how the book is 'in effect an answer to Leavis ' s 
influential book' (1981: 53). Jon Thompson, for example, sniffs 
at Williams' s ' propensity, as in The_English_Novel _ from _Dic kens_to 
!,.~~!.:g!}~g ( 1971) (sic) [ actually 1970] to merely offer an alternate 
version of Leavis's Great Tradition' (1993: 73). lnglis describes 
the book as the ' unacknowledged correction by Williams the class-
warrior to Leavis 's The _Great _Tradition' (1995: 213), while 
O'Connor mentions The _English _Novel as 'a record of his lectures 
on the English novel', but curiously makes no mention of its 
direct opposition to Leavis (1989: 25) , though he does lay stress 
on the importan ce of its concept of ' knowable community' in 
Williams in Chapter 5. Only Eagleton (1976: 34) and Hall (in 
Eagleton 1989: 63) appear to appreciate the theoretical substance 
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of the book as a whole, though Eldridge and Eldridge have a good 
assessment of Williams's arguments concerning the book's 
discussion of the 'knowable community' (Eldridge and Eldridge 
1994: 132-33). 
18. Mulhern has described the self-enclosure of Leavis's thinking 
well: ' Premissed upon a refusal of "abstraction", Leavis 's 
"system" could not consistently be defended - except in the name 
of a process offered as the alternative to "abstraction" and 
"system" as such. For the system as a whole, reticence was the 
price of cohesion' (Mulhern 1979: 170- 71). See also Baldick 
1983 , Bell 1988 and Belsey 1982 for interesting accounts. 
19. See Peter Widdowson's excellent account of the reception of 
Hardy's novels in his indispensable Hard~_ in_Histor~ : _A _ Stud~_ in 
Literar~_Sociolog~ (1989), especially Chapter 1 ' The Critical 
Constitution of "Thomas Hardy"' (Widdowson 1989: 11-76) 
20 . See ' Modern Fiction' in Woolf 1968, especially pp. 189 - 92. 
And c ompare Williams's further remarks, in ' The Bloomsbur y 
Fraction': ' In the very power of their demonstration of a private 
sensibilit y that must be protected and ext e nd e d by forms of pubi c 
concern, they fashioned the effective forms of the contemporar y 
ideological dissociation between ' public' and ' private ' life. 
Awareness of their own formation a s individuals within society, of 
that specific social formation which made them explicitly a group 
and implicitly a fra c tion of a class, was not only beyond their 
reac h : it was directly ruled out, since the free and civilized 
individual was already their founding datum . ... The final nature o f 
Bloomsbur y as a group is that it was indeed , and differentiall y, a 
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group of and for the notion of free individuals' (Williams 1980: 
168-69). 
21. See, for instance, Said 1983: 240; Jameson 1991: 6. 
22. See, respectively, Thompson 1975: 34; Coombes 1973: 71; 
Watkins 1978: 141; Scruton 1985: 61; Lerner 1973 63; Berman 1973: 
1: Said 1989: 152; Ferrara 1989: 102; Eagleton 1976: 39; Ward 
1981: 46. See also Eldridge and Eldridge 1994: 175-97 for a 
useful general commentary on Williams's study. 
23. See Simpson 1995a: 72-91 for a fascinating discussion and 
critique of more recent examples of this mode. In some senses , 
Simpson 1995b can be regarded as a continuation of the same 
discussion. 
24 . Perhaps Williams ' s most direct response, though still evasive 
in that it doesn't address Kiernan or Thompson's points directly , 
and in some ways trivialises them .. is to be found in his remarks 
at the Slant Symposium in 1967. Here he tries to escape the 
problem by using a different phrase - a ·culture in common' rather 
than a common culture; but he insists that in ' speaking of a 
common culture ... one was speaking critically of what couldbe 
summarised as a class society'; and he closes by asserting that 
'the fantasy that some critics have had, that a common culture 
would be a uniform and conformist culture, or the fear that some 
friends have expressed , that a co mmon culture would be notoriou s ly 
difficult to attain because it is impossible to find any large 
number of people in general agreement , do not seem to hold ' 
(Williams [1968b]: 34, 36, 38) See also 1968c. p. 297 : - r would 
therefore agree that in this [Thompson's] sense the problem of a 
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common culture is the problem of revolutionary politics: the 
problem of intervening constantly in society to extend and 
transform the institutions which enable people to get that kind of 
access. 
25. Though Williams does not discuss Hibbard's essay directly, it 
is included - though mis-referenced 
to The_Countr~ _ and_the_Cit~. 
in the bibliographical notes 
26. See, for example, Barrell 1972; Barrell and Bull 1973; 
Barrell 1980; and Simpson 1987. 
27. It may be that this partial identification with Crabbe blinds 
Williams to the need to place his work with far greater historical 
precision. More likely, it is a question of the large focus of 
the study as a whole which inevitably means it is often mistaken 
on particular points. Compare some of the critical comments in 
Barrell and Bull 1974: 380-81 , and, again, in Barrell 1980 . where 
he argues that ' the "real" history that Raymond Williams has 
praised Crabbe for introducing into the tradition of rural poetry , 
as opposed to the nostalgic mythology of Goldsmith , is revealed 
instead a s an attempt to abolish the sense of history altogether' 
(87-88). See al so Inglis 1995 : 237 -3 8 . 
28. For a more recent account , focusing particularly on Joyce, 
see Moretti 1995. There is mu c h common ground between Moretti and 
Williams, though Moretti appears not to know Williams 's work . 
Compare also the account of tragedy in Moretti 1983: 42-82. 
29. Williams's attention to imperialism. and to some third - world 
writing, though cursory, was unusual at the time, and make s it 
important to be very c areful with c laims that Williams wa s 
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absolutely indifferent to what has become known as colonial 
discourse. While it is certainly true to say that it was not the 
focus of his attention, it was there in the margins at a time when 
most criticism was absolutely blind to it: this itself seems 
something of an achievement. See, for instance, the ways in which 
Said's observation that the 'few tantalizing pages in The_Countr~ 
and_the _Cit~ that touch on culture and imperialism are peripheral 
to the book's main idea' (Said 1993: 77), are transformed into 
critical attack in Viswanathan (1993), Pyle (1993), and 
Radhakrishnan (1993). 
30 . This argument was anticipated as early as 1961. See Williams 
1 961b. Though Williams was not to know it, the Chinese Revolution 
- which he mentions with respect alongside the Cuban revolution -
in fa c t represented a similar catastrophe. For very contrasting 
accounts, see Hinton 1966, and the play David Hare made f rom it , 
:E~!!~h~!!, ' an optimistic document' (Hare 1976: 9); and Becker 
(1996) for new research on the whole period. 
31. Compare Williams 1958a, p. 274: 'It certainly seems relevant 
to ask English Marxists who have intersted themselves in the arts 
whether thisis not Romanticism absorbing Marx , rather than Marx 
trans f orming Romanticism.' 
32. For a survey and exemplary collection of such new work, see , 
for instance , Nussbaum and Brown who declare that the ' new' 
d e fined in the ir colle c tion The_New _Eighteenth_Centur~ ' has it s 
roots in re c ent renewed attention to interdisciplinary work and in 
particular the relationship of literature and history' (1987 : 9 ). 
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33. See Simpson 1995a and 1995b. 
34. Compare, for instance, Jonathan Arac's focus in Postmodernism 
and_Politics, on 'one of the most vexed areas in contemporary 
theory, that of representation' (1986: xx), and his further 
discussion pp. xx-xxviii. 
35. See Williams 1961a, Chapter 1 'The Creative Mind', and 
Chapter Five below for further discussion of this important 
essay. 
Notes to Chapter Five 
1. I distinguish in this chapter between Williams's relation to 
Marxism as a socialist, engaged in a wide variety of practical 
political activities, and the question of the relation of his 
academic work and writing to Marxism. This chapter deals with the 
latter. though there is considerable overlap between them. For 
accounts and assessments of the former, see Eagleton 1976b, 
Barnett 1976 , Mulhern [1984), Hirschkop 1989, Brenkrnan 1995. 
2. And therefore participating in the dilemna first mapped out by 
I 
Perry Anderson in 1976, in which the dominating characteristic of 
Western Marxism was its shift in attention away from the practice 
of politics to the contemplation of culture as the prospect of 
European-wide revolutionary insurrection declined. As Anderson 
later summed up the case: ' the major exponents of Western Marxism 
also typically pioneered studies of g~l1~~~1 processes - in the 
high e r ranges of the superstructures - as if in glittering 
compen s ation for their neglect of the structures and 
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infrastructures of politics and economics ' (Anderson 1983: 17). 
3. Jay refers to Gallagher 1980 as the main source for his takeon 
Williams. See also the spirited exchange between Gallagher 
(1992), Aronowitz (1992) and Ross (1992) in Social_Text 30: 79-
101. 
1995 . 
Gallagher's essay was reprinted unaltered in Prendergast 
4. The first is cited as Anthony Sampson's description in Williams 
[1975]: 65; the second, the judgement of C.L.R . James: [1961): 
115 . We have already examined, in Chapters One and Four , some of 
the arguments of Eagleton, Kiernan and Thompson. Arnold Kettle's 
reviews of Williams present a usefully consistent record of the 
orthodox Marxist criticisms of Williams. See his reviews of 
Culture __ and _S ociet~ and The _Long _Revolution (1961), Marxism _and 
Literature (1977), and Politics _and _Letters (1979), in which he 
writes ' all this is typical of bourgeois sociology ... [Williams 
fa i ls to] really get to grips with the nature of class division' 
(1961 : 305) , and, 1n summation, 'A Marxism in which "concepts" 
are given so central a place as Williams gives them and in which 
the particular concept of "reflection" is placed on a sort of 
Stalinist dunce 's or whipping-stool , is almost bound to err on the 
side of theoreticism and acadernicism' (1977: 72) . As Mcllroy and 
Westwood put it, ' Raymond Williams remained an original and 
unconventional swimmer in the contradictory currents of Marxism' 
(1993: 267) 
1978/79. 
For a more positive assessment, see Merrill 
5. Leon Trotsky 's Literature _ and _Revolution [ 1923] was , of 
course. absent from the Communist Party's literary critical canon 
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in the 1930s a c r u c i a 1 1 a ck ' , W i 11 i ams 1 ate r rue f u 11 y 
acknowledged (1979: 49). 
6. Indeed, so strong was the influence of Williams's judgements 
on Caudwell in Culture_and_Societ~ that they have only recently 
begun to be challenged. Eagleton's comments reproduce Williams's 
own dismissive tone: ' Who is the major English Marxist critic? 
Christopher Caudwell, helas ... there is little, except negatively, 
to be learnt from him' (1976b: 21). Mulhern launched the first 
defence of Caudwell in an essay for New_Left_Review (Mulhern 
1974); but, strangely, though Mulhern mentions Culture_and 
~Q~ig!~, he does not try and meet Williams ' s arguments on Caudwell 
head on. E.P. Thompson joined the debate with an essay published 
in The_Socialist_Register. seeking to rescue Caudwell as an 
anatomist of ideology' (Thompson 1977: 234). In the most recent 
study, following Thompson's line, but translating it into a 
somewhat Althusserian vocabulary which Thompson would have 
rejecte d , R.P. Sullivan sees Caudwell as primarily concerned with 
' the problem of the subject, the role of language in the 
structuration of consciousness, and the nature of "reality" 1.n 
relation to humanity's imaginary or illusory understanding of it' 
(1987: 161). The editors of Marxist _Lit erar~_Theor~:_A_Reader 
note that although ' it is one of the landmarks of British Marxist 
literary criticism, Caudwell's work has been dismissed more than 
admired. Raymond Williams , for example, commented that Caudwell 
was often not specific enough to be wrong ' (Eagleton and Milne 
1996: 91). 
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7. Mulhern is citing Leavis ' Under Which King Bezonian?' (Leavis 
1933: 171) here. See also Leavis 1933, pp. 5-9: 'Marx as a 
Marxist, one ventures, was not really concerned about literature 
and art; his concern was for a simplification involving, as an 
essential condition, the assumption that literature and art would 
look after themselves ... it is certain that for most Marxists the 
attraction of Marxism is simplicity: it absolves from the duty of 
wrestling with complexities; above all, the complexities 
introduced if one agrees that the cultural values - human ends -
need more attention than they get in the doctrine, strategy and 
tactics of the Class War .... There i§, then, a point of view above 
classes; there Q~n be intellectual, aesthetic and moral activity 
that is not merely an expression of class origin and economic 
circumstances: there!§ a 'human culture' to be aimed at that must 
be achieved by cultivating a certain autonomy of the human 
spirit.' And Leavis [1952]: 182-203. 
8. Though Pechey, in a fas~inating discussion of the ~Qr~1in~ 
image of Marxism also draws attention to the significant 
influence of ~lick West, whose ' antithetical reading of Romantic 
discourse' is seen as the 'precondition of Culture_and_Societ~· 
(Pechey 1985: 71). 
9. Milner 1993 gives an excellent concise account of Caudwell and 
others (pp. 23-32). 
10. As Mulhern notes, the ' frequency with which the word 
"express" occurs in his text is due to no lexical frugality on his 
part: it denotes precisely the relationship between poetry and 
economy in his system' (1974: 50-51) 
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11. Williams wonders with evident frustration why Thompson didn't 
publish his views at the time of the original debate. See 
Williams 1979: 77. 
12. For an interesting and informed discussion of the history of 
this 'fundamental tenet ' in the context of debates within the 
Second International, see Colletti 1972, especially Chapter 2 
' Bernstein and the Marxism of the Second International'. There is 
considerable common ground between Colletti and Williams on many 
points of theory , though, as Ferrara (1989) notes, little 
knowledge of Williams's work in Italy . 
13. The literature on this is , of course, immense, and the 
debates continue. For a slightly hostile survey of the first 
c entury of competing definitions , see Kolakowski 1981. 
14. Sullivan ' s study is perhaps marred by its too insistent 
attempt to see Caudwell's work as the precursor of post-
structuralist doctrines, as in his assertion that Caudwell's 
· emphasis on the role of the subject to effect change, to reshape 
reality through an "inner design'' ... opened up a debate within 
Marxism that still has contemporary relevence (1988: 109). As 
Amigoni rightly observes, ' what his study lacks is a sustained 
attempt to theorize the contestatory historical relationships 
between the various strands of critical discourse that Caudwell 
was negotiating and Sullivan is tracing ' (1989 289-90). 
15. Amigoni repeats Sullivan's error in his review, asserting -
wrongly - that while Williams suggested that ' the interrogatory 
approach to "orthodox" Marxist positions . .. enabled him to reread 
Caudwell's aesthetics with new eyes ... he never specified the 
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nature of the vision (1989: 287). By 1977, he had already done 
so 1n The_Long_Revolution. Thus, for example, and as I have 
argued elsewhere (Higgins 1990, 1991), Williams takes his 
position on psychoanalysis almost word for word from Caudwell. 
Compare, for instance, Williams 1961 : 93-7 with Caudwell (1949]: 
160- 62, 175, 177. 
16. In the tradition so brilliantly discussed in Frank Kermode's 
seminal study The_Romantic _ lmage (Kermode 1971). See, for 
instance, his summary of Walter Pater's position: "The artist or 
the "aesthete", so elevated above all others , "refines" the 
instruments of "intuition" till "his whole nature" becomes one 
complex medium of reception; what he receives is the vision - the 
"beatific v1s1on (Kermode 1971: 33). See also Kappeler 1986: 
178-83 for an interesting discussion of both Kermode and Williams 
around these issues. 
17 . Se e Taylor 1985 , Chapter 9, "Language and Human Nature' pp . 
215 - 247. And , for a magisterial extension of the general argument 
across the whole range of Western philosophy , see Taylor 1989a . 
Taylor was , of course, one of the founding editors of the ~g~ _Lgfi 
flgyi~~ . and participated in the Slant sy~posium alongside Williams 
in 1967 . For a concise account of his later move away from 
Marxism and towards a socialist humanism - worth comparison with 
Williams ' s criticisms of the · transition from Marx to Marxism' 
see Taylor 1989b. A similar critique of these · naturalist ' 
assumptions is to be found in Giddens 1979a and , as one of the 
compone nts o f a powerful critique of orthodox Marxist assumptions. 
in Gidden s 1981a. 
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18. See in particular Engels's Anti-Duhring and Georgy Plekhanov 
A_Contribution _ to _ the _Question_of_the_Develo2ment_of_the _Monist 
View_of_Histor~ (1894) and Art _and _Social _Life (1953). Kolakowski 
( 1978) gives a succinct summary of the main lines of Plekhanov's 
thought, concluding ' Marxist philosophy as expounded by Plekhanov 
was a repetition, without attempt at further analysis, of Engels's 
formulas, generally in an exaggerated version' (340). For an 
important analysis and differentiation of the thought of Marx and 
Engels in general, see G. Stedman Jones 1977. 
19. As Williams himself was the first to admit: 'I was talking 
about the people and ideas I first focussed as Marxism when I was 
a student ... It was a deficiency of my own generation that the 
amount of classical marxism it knew was relatively small' (1979 : 
316). 
20. Williams's activity as a reviewer gives some indication of 
this. Before 1970, only four reviews deal with Marxist works : 
reviews of Lukacs ' s The _Historical _Novel in 1962, of Sartre's 
philosophy and of The_Left_Review, in 1968 , and in 1969 , a review 
of Marcuse . After 1970, some 11 reviews are published. These are 
from a total of over two hundred published in The Guardian alone. 
Nonetheless , we don ' t have to go quite so far as Aronowitz, who 
states that ' Williams first seriously engaged Marxist theory onl y 
in the 1970s' (1995: 321), and further suggests that Williams's 
rejection of the base and superstructure argument was present only 
in ' the last fifteen years of his life ' (ibid.: 333). 
21. For an interesting critique of both structuralism and 
orthodox Marxism which has much in common with Williams, 
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particularly with regard to questions of agency, see Giddens .1979a 
and 1981a. 
22. There is no discussion of Goldmann's monumental work on 
Pascal and Racine, Thg _fligggQ _YQQ [1956], in Williams's MQggrQ 
Ir~ggg~ . though the book was published in English translation in 
1964 . Explicit references to Goldmann.'s work all postdate his 
Cambridge visit. 
23. The lecture rates as one of Williams's strongest single 
performances , and only the considerable overlap with the central 
ideas of ' Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory' 
inhibits me from dealing with it more fully here. In it, he makes 
his case for his own cultural materialist analysis against both 
Cambridge English and orthodox Marxism. 'Looking at our work' he 
writes of the Cambridge English school, ' it could be said that we 
lacked a centre, in any developed philosophy or sociology. 
Looking at his [Goldmann's] work ... it could be said that he had a 
received centre , at the level of reasoning , before the full 
contact with substance began' (1971: 22). For succinct 
expressions of the views of Goldmann's which Williams discusses , 
see , for ' scientism' , the lecture ' Dialectical Thought and 
Tran s individual Subject' (Goldmann [1970]), especially pp. 90 - 92 ; 
for the concept of ' structure'. the essay ' La Methode 
structuraliste genetique en histoire de la litterature' (Goldmann 
196 4b) , e specially pp. 338 , 344-45; for something of the nature of 
the debt to Lukacs. ' Introdu c tion aux problemes d ' une sociologie 
du roman ' ( 196 3 a : 21 - 5 7 ) . His relatively static methodological 
principles are spelt out in Goldmann 1952: for their most fruitful 
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realisation, see Goldmann's masterpiece, The _Hidden _God [1956]. 
Jay (1994) has a useful survey of Goldmann's work as a whole. For 
a probing account of Williams's essay, see Said 1984, where he 
writes in favour of Williams as a 'reflective critic' (1984: 238) 
noting ' however far away in time and place Williams may be from 
the fiery rebelliousness of the early Lukacs, there is an 
extraordinary virtue to his distance, even the coldness of his 
critical reflections on Lukacs and Goldmann, to both of whom he is 
otherwise so intellectually cordial' (240) 
24 . For Goldmann, see previous footnote. Williams had reviewed 
Lukacs's The_Meaning _of_Contemporary_Realism favourably in 1963, 
noting it was ' far from the simple abuse of "decadence" .... I have 
not seen a better correlation of the style and structure of the 
modern novel' (1963: 385). In 1971. he refers to History_and 
Class _Consciousness, and in 1977 to Studies _ in _European _Realism. 
The _Theor~_ of _ the _Novel, and The _Historical _ Novel (which he had 
also reviewed (1962c)). 
25. See Said 1984: 240. 
26. For an insightful commentary on this passage, see Prendergast 
1995b. He reads it as the location of a significant knot in 
Williams's whole thinking about the primacy of culture, noting 
that ' there are two stories, complementary but not fully 
compatible' at work. and pointing out that ' if everything is there 
at the beginning. it would seem that some things are more at the 
beginning than others' (1995b: 12 - 13). 
1995b; Eagleton 1976b. 1989b . 
Compare also Simpson 
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27. Inglis is characteristically rude, describing Marxism _and 
Literature as Williams's ' unreadable book' (Inglis 1995: 249), and 
quite simply refuses to engage with any of its actual arguments. 
28. Perhaps it is time for a study of the ' moment' of the N~~ 
Left _Review, on the lines of Mulhern's study of §gr~1in~? 
Certainly Williams's knowledge of a wider range of Marxist 
thinking would have been very different without the work of that 
journal and its wider publishing projects. 
29. See, for instance , Heath 1981, MacCabe 1979, 1985 . For an 
excellent account of what has become known, sometimes 1n reductive 
fashion , as 'Screen theory', see Lapsley and Westlake 1988. The 
line of Williams's dialogue can be traced through essays such as 
'A De fence of Realism', first delivered at a §gr~~~ summer school 
1n 1977 (Williams 1977e), 'The Reader in Hard Times' (in Williams 
1984: 166-74) , Williams [1983j) , and [1985a]. See also Coward and 
Ellis 1977 for a full statement of the ' new critical 
structuralism' which Williams opposed . 
30. See , for instance, the ways in which the doyen of §gr~~~-
theory , and Williams's colleague at Jesus College , Stephen Heath. 
picks out the emphasis on language in Marxism _ and _Literature as 
the ke y point of contact with his own formulations in Heath 1984 . 
31 . The example is David McLellan's, not Marx's. See McLellan's 
still informative Ih~ _Young _Hegelians _and _Karl _Marx (London: 
Macmillan , 1969) p. 61 . 
32 . Compare Lichtheim 1967 and Larrain 1979 (40-9. 64-6) for 
fur t her discussions of this. 
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33. On this passaage in particular. see especially the valuable 
discussions with the New _Left_Review team in Williams 1979: 
350-55, and Eagleton's reprise of the whole argument in Eagleton 
1989b. 
34. Williams was certainly not alone in thinking this. As Perry 
Anderson observes, in the opening sentence of his nuanced and 
convincing account of Gramsci's work, ' Today, no Marxist thinker 
after the classical epoch is so universally respected in the West 
as Antonio Gramsci. Nor' he warns, 'is any term so freely or 
diversely evoked on the Left as that of hegemony, to which he gave 
currency (1976-77: 5). Milner (1993) describes the publication 
of Gramsci's Selections _ from _Prison _Notebooks in 1971 as 'a major 
intellectual event' (54), while Dworkin notes the ' critical 
adoption' of Gramsci's work in the 1970s as a part of the 
' theoretical project of negotiation between ''structuralism" and 
"humanism''' which characterised the work of the Birmingham Centre 
for Cultural Studies (Dworkin 1993: 47). See also, in a different 
vein, Trevor Griffith's play, Occupations (Griffiths [1972] 1980) 
and the special issues of the journals I~lQ~ 31 (1977) and 
boundar~ _ 2 ' The Legacy of Antonio Gramsci' ( 1986) . Jay 1994 has 
a characteristically useful and incisive · survey (1994: 150-173). 
35. As I argued in Chapter Two, its first useage in Preface to 
Eil~ is distinctly offered as an alternative to Marxist 
explanation though this is something glossed over and indeed 
occluded in Williams's account of the matter in Politics _ and 
L~:t.:t.~!:e.. 
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36. Simpson notes some of the key moments 1n the history of the 
terms use in Williams's work, and correctly observes how the 
'literary-critical definition of the structure of feeling has the 
effect of distracting Williams from any detailed engagement with 
nonliterary historical data .... This allows Williams to float the 
structure of feeling as a prototheoretical concept that never 
quite takes on a sharp outline ... ' (1995b: 40). 
37. In the 1965 lecture, 'Differance', Derrida wove together many 
of his main philosophical themes around the idea of 'differance' 
noting first how the simple graphic distinction between it (a 
neologism) and the actual word 'difference' can be seen but not 
heard , can be read but not articulated. For Derrida, this 
usefully illustrated that division between writing and speech, or 
system and subject, and this in turn helped to bring into unusual 
focus: the assumption of a founding or pre-given state of 
self-consciousness as the basis for philosophical reasoning. 
Alongside this assumption, and indeed helping to constitute it, 
was the similarly unquestioned assumption of the philosophical 
subject's apparently or potentially instrumental control of the 
medium of philosophical reflection, human language. Thus Derrida , 
in the course of the essay, imagines a voice questioning his own 
arguments, wistfully asking ' can one not conceive of a presence , 
and of a presence to itself of the subject before speech or signs, 
a presence to itself of the subject in a silent and intuitive 
consciousness?' ( Derrida 1965: 16). His reply 1s firmly in the 
negative : ' Such a question ... supposes that, prior to the sign and 
outside it. ·excluding any trace and any differance, something like 
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consciousness is possible. And that consciousness , before 
distributing its signs in space and in the world, can gather 
itself into its presence ( 16) . This supposition, or better, 
presupposition, is precisely the target of Derrida's arguments. 
38. See, for example , Sharrat 1982. I discuss the main reviews 
of Marxism _ and _Literature in Chapter 6. 
39. Williams was kind enough to give me some tapes of the 
original lectures , and these confirm this view, so strangely 
reminiscent of John Locke's tardy inclusion of language in the 
great Essa~ _Concerning_Humane _Understanding of 1689 . 
40 . Lesley Johnson, for one , is sceptical regarding Williams's 
success in this, commenting ' Such a rejoinder (as that presented 
by Marxism _and _Literature) to a major school of thought whose 
impact on cultural studies in England in the 1970s has been 
considerbale is more thanb disappointing. It indicates that 
Williams is unable to confront its fundamental principles from 
within the confines of his own thought' (1979: 165) . M~· ma in 
point in the section which follows is that Williams does manage to 
make something of a break or at least a significant extension to 
his own thought through the new considerations of language. 
41. Anthony Giddens and Pierre Bourdieu. from their respective 
places in the discipline of sociology. have similarly argued 
against so me of the excesses of the structuralist and post-
s tructuralist emphasis on the determination of the language system 
on human subjectivity. See , for instance , Giddens 1979a, 
especi all y pp . 9-48; and Bourdieu's s ummary of his own stance: 'I 
wanted to reintrodu ce agents that Levi-Strauss and t he 
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structuralists , among others Althusser, tended to abolish, making 
them into the simple epiphenomena of structure. And I mean 
agents, not subjects. Action is not the mere carrying out of a 
rule , or obedience to a rule' (1990: 9). See Garnham and Williams 
1980 for an interesting consideration of Bourdieu in relation to 
the claims of cultural materialism. 
42. Like so many literary critical historians, Williams ignores 
the massive contribution of John Locke to these debates. For a 
welcome beginning to questioning the usual representations of 
Locke's work in literary criticism and literary theory, see Walker 
1994 and Schalkwyk 1995. 
43 . See Vico 1948. And, for a commentary which anticipates 
Williams's own emphasis, see Said 1975, especially the Conclusion 
' Vico in His Work and in This' (pp. 347-381). Said similarly 
deploys Vico ' s work against 'the general line of French New 
Criticism' which ' has been entirely to doubt and subsequently 
nullify the constitutive, authorizing powers of the human subject 
in the soc - called human sciences' (374). For Said like Williams 
' The _New _Science never loses sight of its intention to describe 
man among men (355). 
44. Compare Volosinov [1929] (1986): 73 - 6. See also Clark and 
Holquist's valuable discussion of the whole question of Marxism 
and language in Chapter 10 of their study, Mikhail _Bakhtin (1984: 
212 - 237): and, more generally, Holquist 1990. 
45 . For a detailed challenge to this view, see Moriarty 1995, 
especially pp. 94 - 101 . 
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46. See, for instance, Kiernan 1959 and Thompson 1961, and the 
discussion of these in Chapter Four. The interviews with the~~~ 
Left _Review team present a fascinating dialogue around all these 
questions. See especially Williams 1979: pp 164-72. For a more 
recent critique of Williams in this regard, see Robbins 1993: 144-
45. 
47. Though it must be said that Eagleton's own essay is not 
itself without some considerable ambivalence. In my reading, 
Eagleton agrees with virtually all of Williams's criticisms of the 
base and superstructure model, and can do no more than affirm that 
nonetheless these arguments need to be supplemented by some kind 
of improved version of the model, which Eagleton can only offer as 
a refiguring of it . 
48. It is interesting to compare Williams's positions with those 
independantly argued in and through the different disciplinary 
discourse of sociology. Giddens, for instance, suggests that 
' Only if historical materialism is regarded as embodying the more 
abstract elements of a theory of human Er~~!~,, does it remain an 
indispensable contribution to social theory today' (1981a: 2) , and 
his subsequent discussions suggest much common ground with 
Williams. Not surprisingly, the New _Left _Review respons e to 
Giddens shares many of the same features as their criticisms of 
Williams. See Wright 1983 , especially p. 32: 'Particularly once 
the simple functionalist version of the base -superstructure model 
is abandoned, it is difficult to argue systematically for the 
structural unity of economi c and political relations within the 
theory of social development and the concept of class.' 
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Notes to Chapter Six 
1. For a usefully condensed account, not discussed in the 
previous chapter, see Williams 1978a. Anderson notes that the 
work of the Cambridge anthropologist Jack Goody shares something 
of this same emphasis with Williams (Anderson 1990a: 76-8). See 
especially Goody 1977 and 1986; and his essay 'Alphabets and 
Writing' in Williams 1981c. 
2 . See, for example , Williams's insistence, in Politics_and 
L~!!g~~ ; ' When I wrote [The_Long _Revolution] I was mainly 
conscious of the immense length of the full social transformation, 
which has usually been underplayed. yet which should be intrinsic 
to all strategic socialist thiunking . I have no doubt now that 
the short revolution, to use tha~ phrase, has to occur. I 
wouldn't at all dissent from the traditional notions of the 
violent capture of state power, but I would put this revolution in 
a more specific way: it is accomplished when the central political 
organs of capitalist society lose their power of predominant 
social reproduction ... the condition for the success of the long 
revolution in any real terms is decisively a short revolution , 
which I would define not so much in terms of duration as of the 
loss by the state of its capacity for predominant reproduction of 
the existing social relations (1979: 420-21). See also Williams 
[1975) , esp . pp. 73 , 76 ; and his review of the work of Rudolph 
Bahro (1980b). 
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3. See Said 1983 . 
4. See, respectively, Kettle 1977: 72; Woodcock 1978: 593; 
Sharrat 1982: 37; Barnett 1977 145; Scrivener 1979/80: 193. 
goes so far as to suggest that the 'work itself viewed 
independantly remains too drastically abbreviated to be 
comprehensible' (1988 : 75) 
Gorak 
5. The history of Leavis's relations to the Cambridge English 
Faculty was itself a fraught and combattive one. As Williams put 
it in a memorial essay, Leavis ' had worked a lifetime in a Faculty 
he opposed and despaired of' ( 1984c: 20) 
6. For a sympathetic assessment, see Bell 1988. Bell's defence 
of Leavis can be summarised in his statement 'The critical impact 
of Leavis lies not in the complexity of his ideas ~hQ~1 lite~ature 
so much as in the quality of attention !Q it' (1988: 12). For a 
philosophically sophisticated defence, see Casey 1966. See also 
Inglis 1982. For more sceptical assessments, see Mulhern 1979 and 
Baldick 1983 . 
7. In Mulhern's words: 'The most notable feature of Leavis ' s 
humanism was its obdurate anti-scientism. The improper 
aggrandisement of the established sciences of nature and society, 
and misconceived attempts to transpose their models into the 
domain of culture , were in his view among the greatest threats 
posed by contemporary "civilization" to human integrity ' (Mulhern 
1979 : 170) . 
8. For the rather self-congratulatory accounts of the ' Golden 
Age' of Cambridge English. see Willey 1964; Tillyard 1958: Bennet 
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1973. and Bradbrook 1973. For more sceptical approaches, see 
Mulhern 1979 , Doyle 1982, and Baldick 1983 . 
9. As, classically, in Leavis 1943. I argued in Chapter 1 that 
Leavis's direct influence on Williams had been over-exaggerated, 
and the extent of Eliot's influence relatively unregistered; but 
there is no doubt that that Leavis's work formed a reference point 
for English studies 2~r _?~· For more detail on Williams's actual 
and complex relations to Leavis and his work, see Williams 1959b, 
1978c, and 1984c . 
10. See especially, Leavis [1932]; [1936]; and [1948]. 
11. See Williams 1961a, especially Chapter 1 'The Creative 
Artist '. 
12. For a rich formulation and exemplification of this topic, see 
Williams [1969b). 
13. For more on this , see Williams 1989e, and Williams's crisp 
monograph Qr~~ll (1971a). 
14. See Gramsci 1971: 5-23, and especially p. 9: ' All men are 
intellectuals , one could therefore say: but not all men have in 
society the function of intellectuals.' And, for an interesting 
development of this. Said 1994, and Williams's brief discussion in 
1981b: 214 - 16. Here as elsewhere , there are strong similarities 
between William s and Said: see Higgins 1996a for some basic points 
of comparison. 
15. See Fekete 1977 where he observes how the tradition of 
literary criticism ' becomes lo c ked into an ideological 
subject/object dualism that ?~P~r~i~ 2 experienc e and 
expression,instead of seeking significance precisely in their 
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relationshiE' (p. 21). The accompanying footnote, to be found on 
pages 224-25, traces the idea back to Lukacs's late work, Thg 
SEecificit~_of_the_Aesthetic. 
brief but useful commentary. 
See Lichtheim 1970: 116-29 for a 
16. For a succinct account of the Russian Formalist movement, see 
Bennet 1979, and , for a more sophisticated survey, see Jameson 
1972. The standard scholarly account remains Ehrlich 1955. See 
also Trotsky ([1923] 1960). Williams was particularly influenced 
by Bakhtin and Medvedev [1928]. 
17. This, of course. was the starting-point for Ludwig 
Wittgenstein's revolutionary arguments concerning the role and 
status of language in thought and philosophy. Despite 
Wittgenstein's centrality to Cambridge philosophy, and to 
Cambridge thinking more generally , his work seemed to have no 
impact on Williams. See Eagle ton 198?_ for a provocative account. 
Similarly , many of Williams's arguments are put with great force 
in the particular context of structural linguistics by Emile 
Benveniste (1966). especially Chapters 18-21 . 
18. See. for instance . Volosinov [1929], and especially its 
supercession of the ' two basic trends ' in the understanding of 
language - 'individualistic subjectivism' and ' abstract 
objectivism' - in favour of a theory of language as · verbal 
interaction' or · utterance' in Part II Chs 1-3 pp . 65-98 . 
19. Williams owed a large debt to Volosinov , many of whose works 
are now thought to be principally inspired or even written by 
Mikhail Bakhtin . In this regard , Clark and Holquist conclude · a 
c onclusive answer to th e question of Bakhtin ' s authorship cannot 
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be found' ( 1984: 148). I simply follow Williams's references here 
and make no attempt to adjudicate the issue. His accidental 
discovery of their work, in the early 1970s, was due to the open-
stack system prevailing at the Cambridge University Library (see 
Williams 1979: 
20. He argues the case more fully in his later essay, 'The Uses 
of Cultural Theory', and attends to some of the difficulties in 
distinguishing the work of Volosinov from that of Bakhtin. See 
Williams 1986c: 163-176. 
21 . See Williams's ' Foreword' to Fekete 1977: 'Since the middle 
sixties. and with gathering pace, there has been a form of 
apparent rejection of this critical tradition which is in fact 
only a new, more powerful but also more alienated version of its 
fundamental problematic of objectivist organization. Critical 
structuralism, often in confusing association with an objectivist 
form of Mar xi sm , has indeed to be seen, as Dr Fekete argues, as a 
phase of this destructive tradition, rather than as any kind of 
alternative to it' (1977: xiii). 
22. The best Easthope can say is that ' two pages' of Williams 's 
essay, ' Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory' 
'inaugurate what will be referred to as "left - deconstruction"' 
(Easthope 1988: 14). and , later, that the essay opened the road 
'for an analysis of literature not as texts but as a practice of 
reading in which they are institutionally constructed' (153) - a 
familiar deformation of Williams's cultural materialism in its 
restriction to and containment within literary studies, as I argue 
in the Conclusion. 
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23. See The _Guardian Jan 17, 1981 (cited in Simpson 1990 p. 256). 
The best accounts of the whole affair are to be found in Simpson 
1990 and Inglis 1995: 278-85. See also Colin MacCabe's own 
discussion and analysis of events in ' Class of '68: elements of an 
intellectual autobiography 1967-81' in MacCabe 1985: 1-32. 
24. See MacCabe 1985, 1979. and MacCabe ~1 - ~l ~ 
25. See Easthope 1988, especially pp. 41-2, 135-41. 
26. See Cambridge _Universit~_Reeorter 10 February 1981, pp. 1- 35 
for the discourses of Stephen Heath, John Barrell , Michael Long, 
Howard Erskine - Hill , Geoffrey Kirk, and Williams himself. 
27. The essay was first published in New _Left _Review 129: 51-66 
as ' Marxism, Structuralism and Literary Analysis'. 
the retitled version, Williams [1981b]. 
I quote from 
28 . As Simpson notes, the term ' structuralist' was the one that 
the ' "business as usual" faculty majority chose as their Q!!!Di~!!! 
g~ih~!:~!!! definition of the enemy' (Simpson 1990: 246). Compare 
MacCabe' s own account, in 'Class of '68': ' By calling m.e a 
"structuralist" my opponents revealed their ignorance about both 
structuralism and my own work' (MacCabe 1985: 30). 
29. See especially the three essays, ' The Fiction of Reform', 
Forms of English Fiction in 1848' , and ' The Reader 1n Hard_Times' 
in Williams 1984a: 142-74 , and my review of Writing_i n _Societ~ for 
a discussion of Williams ' s ' ambivalence' with regard to the 1970s 
' critique of realism ' (Higgins 1985: 169). MacCabe 's influential 
essay, ' Reali s m and the Cinema: Notes on Some Brechtian Thes es' 
was first published in ~Q£~~D 15:2. Summer 1974 (Mac Cabe 1974). 
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See Docker 1989 for a useful survey of the whole debate between 
Williams and the §~~~~D position. 
30. See Althusser's own 'A Letter on Art' (1966] in Althusser 
1984; and, under the influence of Althusser, Macherey 1966. 
31. See , for instance, Bryson and Kappeler 1983, produced as a 
response to the MacCabe Affair, but focusing on 'the issue of 
teaching, and the issue of theory and its relation to practice' 
(vii). 
32. Williams was very likely thinking of two chapters in 
Eagleton's Criticism_and _ Ideology: Chapter 2, ·categories for a 
Materialist Criticism' and Chapter 3 "Towards a Science of the 
Text' in which Eagleton follows the Althusserian emphasis of 
Pierre Macherey's A Theory _of _Literary_Production (Macherey 
[1966)). 
33. For further elements of that ' wider reorganisation' , see the 
essays gathered together in Williams (ed . ) 1981c. 
" Introdu c tion' , Williams explains how ' the study of 
In the 
communications, in its modern forms , is a convergence, or 
attempted convergence, of people who were trained. initially, in 
very different fields: 1n history and philosophy, in literary and 
cultural studies. 1n sociology, technology , and psychology' 
(1981c: 11). Contributors include - amongst others - Jack Goody 
on "Alphabets and Writing' and Ferrucio Rossi - Landi on 'Language' 
34. Nicholas Tredell, in rather neglected study, Uncancellecl 
Qb~ll~gg§ (1990) rightly observes that ' To some extent, Q~l1~~~ 
both challenges and incorporates an idealizing (and by this time 
failing) Althusserisme' (73). 
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35. There are many points of contact between Williams and Giddens. 
Compare, for example, Giddens 1979a and 1981a, as well as his 
review essays [1979b] and 1981b. 
36. Williams's arguments in this regard are given more fully in 
one of his best single essays, 'The Bloomsbury Fraction' 
(1978/80). 
37. This was the opening sentence of his address to the Slant 
Symposium From _Culture _ to _Revolution in 1968. See Williams 1989 
p. 32. And it summed up just the phenomenological certitude which 
- aside from Williams's strictly political agenda - most perturbed 
Eagleton. See especially his comments on 'his consistent 
over-subjectivising of the social formation' in Eagleton 1976 pp. 
32 - 35. Eagleton speaks more warmly of the same traits in his 
memorial essay, noting how 'he could be aware of the massive 
importance of his own work without the least personal 
vanity ... because he had a curious ability to look on himself fromn 
the outside. to see his own life as in a Lukacsian sense "typical" 
rather than just individual' (Eagleton 1989b: 8). 
38. The New_Left _Review team have it almost right when noting. 
' Your rejection of literary criticism appears to be founded on a 
very narrow identification of it with one American school in the 
20th century - it ignores the whole history of German, French or 
Italian aesthetics for example . You seem to be arguing that since 
New Criticism is objectionable we must reject criticism 1Q~! 
~ Q~!::i' (Williams 1979: 337). Of course, Williams was never 
interested in the New Criticism as such, seeing it as only a 
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selective repetition of some of the elements of Cambridge 
English. 
39. See Williams 1983g, especially p. 177 , and 1983h. 
Notes to Chapter Seven 
1 . See , respectively, Williams 1989a, 1989d, 1990 , 1984, 1989b, 
1989c , 1989e. 
2 . This includes the only substantial work (aside from P~QP1~ Qf 
the _Black_Mountains) not concerned with modernism that Williams 
produced in this final period - the monograph Cobbett (1983b). -- - - - --
Even here, concern with the dynamics of Thatcherism pervades the 
book a s a whole , as one can see from the following paragraph ; 
' "Nobody owes the British people a living," government s now 
r e gularl y t e ll the British people. This astounding revelati o n is 
addr e ssed to peopl e for whom, in majority, the problem has alwaY,s 
b e en how to make and keep a living through successive crises of 
economic disorgaisation and war. It is addressed to hard-working 
people by the representatives of a system which has at i ts best 
made the results of hard work uncertain and at worst nullified and 
squandered them. But there is deeper irony than that. The 
addres s is made b y representatives of a system which insists that 
the possessors of capital and of privilege are, precisely, owed a 
li v ing by e verybody els e. Thi s no doubt accounts for the sense of 
a novel truth, as it forms in their mouths. For it is no surprise 
to anybod y else. It was onl y the great proprietors of the 
' National De bt' and the Fund s who b e lieved and took steps to 
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ensure that a living was owed to them. It was a debt, as we have 
seen, which Cobbett wanted to repudiate, in the real interests of 
the nation' (1983b: 73-4). The book is also noteworthy for 
Williams's return to the Marxist debate regarding the 
understanding between the forces and relations of ' production: see 
especially pp . 59-68. 
3 . Personal communication 1987. With characteristic generosity, 
Williams was kind enough to lend me the only typescript copies of 
a series of essays intended for The _Politics _ of_Modernism . 
account of our discussion, see Higgins 1989. 
For an 
4 . The point was first argued in a lecture given 1n 1974, which 
sadly remains unpublished in any of the collections of Williams ' s 
essays . See Williams 1974 . Standard accounts of the origins of 
Cambridge English and its inaugural break from the study of 
l anguage include Mulhern 1981; Baldick 1983: and Doyle 1982. 
5. Se e Till y ard 1958 and Willey 1964. 
6 . See Mulhe rn 1979 , Baldick 1983, Doyl e 1982, and Eagl e ton 1 98 3 
for useful general accounts. 
7. For a useful guide to the literary deployment of the term , see 
Bradbury and Mc Farlane (eds.) 1991 . 
8. Compare , for instance, the contents of three popular r e ader s 
in literary theory : David Lodge's Modern _Criticism_and _Theor~ :_A 
R~~g ~r (1988 ), which has essays and selections by Saussure , 
Shklovsky , and Lacan ; Robert Con Davis ' s Contemporar~_Literar~ 
Criticism: _Modernism _ through _Post-Structura l ism (1986). which 
features Shklovsky , Le v i-Strauss. a s well as several essays on 
Freud and Lacan; and Dan Latimer' s Contemporary_C ritical _Th~or~ . 
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Terry Eagleton's Literar~_Theor~: _An _ Introduction (1983) is the 
best overall introduction to the field; see also Jefferson and 
Robey (eds . ) 1982. 
9. See the Conclusion for a discussion of Williams's renewed 
interest in the idea of literacy. 
10. See, classically, Victor Shklovsky's extraordinary essay, 
' Art as Technique' [1917], and, more generally, the summary 
account and defence (against Trotsky ' s influential critique [1923] 
by Eichenbaum [1926]. For a useful discussion of the term itself, 
see Jameson 1972: 75-79. 
11. Pyle, for one, rejects this account. ' What remains 
unexplored' in this analysis of modernist language, he argues, is 
' the possibility that these eruptions of the material sign that 
characterize the modernist text are not attributable solely to the 
social fact of immigration. Williams's historicism does not 
permit him to entertain the possibility that this historical 
condition of modernism, the engagement with a language that is not 
one's own. is less an exception than in inevitable feature of our 
insertion into language. Perhaps, in other words, modernism 
represents a particular thematization of inherent properties of 
language' (1993: 269). This still leaves Pyle to account for why 
this thematization should take place with modernism rather than at 
any other time. His related claim that 'Williams's conceptions of 
culture and community demand that one understand language as a 
human instrument' ( 1993: 269) seems to be contradicted by 
Williams's arguments in Marxism _ and _Literature , at least as they 
are construed in Chapter Five of the present study , and by the 
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complex challenge to instrumental notions of language implicit in 
I develop some of these arguments in relation to 
Quentin Skinner's badly focused critique of Williams (Skinner 
1988) - so strongly endorsed by Parrinder 1987a and Inglis 1995 -
1n an unpublished conference paper (Higgins 1996b). 
12. Compare Williams's similar accounts in 1979: 337 and [1981b]: 
206. Moriarty is, I think, rightly sceptical of the logic of 
Williams's genealogy here when he writes that, not content with 
the plausible argument 'of a congruence between New Criticism and 
st ructuralism' he ' insists to a striking extent on a suppositious 
actual influence of the former on the latter', but is in the end 
unable to offer vny 'empirical or textual evidence for his 
accou:-it' (Moriarty 1995: 102 -3) . 
13. See, for instance , Barthes [1968]. Foucault (1969]. Derrida 
(1965). For an account of ' death of the author' theory which also 
seeks to place it historically, see Jameson 1991: 14-15. 
14. Something of a comparable position - though articulated 1n a 
very different conceptual idiom, and with a very different range 
of cultural references - is to be found in Jameson's work on 
postmodernism. See, for instance, his remarks concerning the 
Brecht-Lukacs debate, and particularly his provocative assertion 
' there is some question wh e th e r the ultimate renewal of moderni s m. 
the final dial ect ical subversion of the now automatized 
conventions of an aesthetics of perceptual revolution, might not 
simply be ... realism itself! For when modernism and its 
accompanying techniques of "e s trangement" have become the dominant 
style whereby the consumer is reconciled with capitalism, the 
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habit of fragmentation needs itself to be "estranged" and 
corrected by a more totalizing way of viewing phenomena' (Jameson 
1977: 211}. 
15. The well-prepared attack on the National Union of 
Mineworkers, as well as the general curbing of trade union 
activity was initiated through the Employment Acts of 1980 and 
1982, and completed by the Trade Union Act of 1984; attacks on the 
autonomy of local government; the 'increasing militarization of 
the police force' (Hayes: 79) was effected by the Criminal Justice 
Act of 1982, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984, and the 
Public Order Act of 1986. 
16. See especially Hall 1983, 1988. 
17 . Compare Riddel' s judgement: ' There was therefore no upsurge 
of popular support for Mrs Thatcher and her administration .... The 
1983 election did not suiggest there was yet any new consensus 
about British society and the management of the economy ... Mrs 
Thatcher and her administration have aroused as much bitter 
antagonism as fervent support' (Riddel 1983: 4 - 5). Of course , 
Hall's point was precisely to examine the dynamics of that 
' alliance of disparate forces' as that i~ precisely the role of 
the hegemonic in his Gramscian based theory. 
18. See Milner 1993: 76-84 for a usefull discussion of Hall and 
Williams's differences . As Milner puts it. ' A structuralist 
understanding of discourse as necessarily "polysemic" is thus 
combined, in Hall ' s a c count, with an equally structuralist sense 
of popular passivity, so as to "construct" much of the British 
working class itself as positively Thatcherite. Unsurprisingly . 
1 
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the substantive analysis appeared to Williams even more 
wrongheaded than the theoretical' (ibid.: 82). 
19. This essay was the occasion for some dispute regarding 
Williams's stature as a public intellectual. · one must ask what 
good is a critical intellectual if he won't criticize his own 
side?' stated R.W. Johnson in a 1990 review essay. Johnson found 
' no mention' in the essay 'of the fact that a substantial minority 
of miners had broken away over the issue of the denial of 
democracy, and that some had suffered violence as a result' (6), 
and all in all ' complete failure, indeed refusal, to confront the 
cardinal facts of the strike' (6) As always , the selection of 
what counts as 'cardinal facts' is often the expression of a prior 
political perspective. There is no mention, in Johnson's account, 
of the Thatcher government's long preparation for inflicting a 
defeat on the National Union of Mineworkers for their part in the 
downfall of the Heath administration: a much more significant 
' denial of democracy'. See Young for a detailed account: pp. 
365-78. Several aspects of the review are, to say the least, odd: 
the charge that the historical labour movement was · a truly sacred 
cow to Williams' is not supported by the criticisms which Williams 
had levelled at it since the 1950s (see Williams 1979 : for 
examples), nor does this accusation quite fit with the critical 
stance taken in many of the essays in Resources _of _HoEe which 
Johnson is reviewing . Similarly , Johnson's claim that after the 
1960s Williams managed to write only ' one good book' of literary 
and cultural criticism, Qr~~ll. 1s decidely eccentric, ignoring as 
it does The _Countr~ _and _ the _ Cit~. Robin Blackburn's response, 
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despite its fury, is undoubtedly correct here: ' It is not Williams 
who is ' vacuous', but your reviewer if he fails to see the effort 
to spell out alternatives in these essays [from Resources_of_Ho~e. 
edited by Blackburn] or in Towards 2000' (Blackburn 1990: 4). 
See Hall gi _~l~ 1978 for the policing argument. 
20. Adorno's discussion of Samuel P.ecket makes an interesting 
point of comparison. For Adorno, the force of Becket's work is 
located precisely in the ways in which it embodies the new 
cultural and political situation without the comfort of the usual 
bourgeois illusions. See for example, his remarks that ' all 
subject matter appears to be the sign of an inner sphere, but the 
inner sphere of which it would be a sign no longer exists . ... 
- ~~gg~~g is the epilogue to subjectivity ... The only aspect of 
freedom still known to it is the powerless and pitiful reflex 
action of trivial decisions' (1991: 251, 259). 
21. See Stedman Jones 1984a for some critical comments on this 
procedure. 
22 . See Briggs 1961: ' Mr Williams's last chapter seems to suffer 
also from being confined to an English framework of reference' 
( 387) . 
23. Gorak emphasises the book's 'unusual combination of 
progressive analysis and sympathetic human understanding' (1988: 
118). while Morgan finds that ' balanced discussion ... is followed 
by pages of appallingly loose argument' (Morgan 1983: 1223). The 
most thorough ac c ount and analysis of Williams's proposals is to 
be found in Mulhern [1984]. 
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24. See Williams 1958a: 285-94; and again , more harshly , in 
1971a. As he admits in 1979 , ' I must say I cannot bear much of it 
[Orwell's writing] now' (391) 
25. In addition to the essays it appeared Williams intended for 
publication, Pinkney adds transcripts of a lecture given in 
Bristol in 1987, ' When was Modernism', and of a discussion between 
Williams and Edward Said in 1986, 'Media, Margins and Modernity'. 
It excludes 'Country and City in the Modern Novel', a text which 
Williams told me he intended for the book in our discussion in 
1987. This essay is available in Pretexts:_Studies _ in_Writing_and 
Q~11~r~ 3:1 (1989). 
26. See Pinkney, 1989a, 1989b , and 1991. 
27 . For a classic staging of their opposed views, see the two 
essays ' Discussing Expressionism' (Bloch) and ' Realism in the 
Balance' (Lukacs) in Bloch ~1- ~L .. 1977 . The debate as a whole is 
best framed by Lukacs 's 1934 essay, ' Expressionism : Its 
Significance and Decline' in Lukacs 1980. See Lunn 1985: 78-90 
for a useful general discussion of Lukac 's position . 
28. Robbin s gra sps this dimension of the argument well in hi s 
interesting dis cussi on of the dynamics of literary 
professionalism. See, for instance, his acute remark ' Rather than 
tracing a fall from modernism into professionalism. Williams 
suggests that in its essence mod e rnism already~~§ 
professionalism' (Robbin s 1993: 59). In thi s sense, Williams 's 
arguments may b e read against Anderson's claim that Britain 
produced no significant mod ernist formation. The institution of 
the discipline of English st ud ies itself corresponds to at least 
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two of Anderson's three criteria for modernism (Anderson 1984: 
105) 
29. See Williams's 1972 lecture, 'Social Darwinism', for a fine 
anticipation of many of the ways in which conservative thinkers 
tried to draw on Darwin's thought. Indeed , the concluding 
sentences of the lecture can be read as anticipating the main 
lines of argument at work in The _Politics _of_Modernism: Social 
Darwinism is a part of 'the social theory of that system which had 
promised order and progress and yet produced the twentieth 
century. Instead of facing that fact, in all its immense 
complexity, the rationalizers and the natural rhetoricians have 
now moved in to snap at and discourage us: not to ratify an 
imperialist and capitalist order. but to universalize its 
breakdown and to persuade us that it has no alternatives, sinc e 
all "nature" is like that' (Williams [1974d]: 102). 
30. For some further development of this, see 'The Politics in 
Identity : Hume and Derrida on Subjectivity' (Higgins , forthcoming 
in Transpositions 1, 1998). 
31. Compare Williams 1977e. As we shall see below. Williams ' s 
remarks should be read in the context of MacCabe's assault on the 
' classi c realist text' (MacCabe [1974]). For a useful overview 
(though they negle c t Williams's distinctive contribution) of the 
~grg~~ d e bat e on realism in film, see Lapsley and Westlake 1988. 
32. The post - lecture discussion is not given in Williams 1989a . 
For this. se e Britton (ed.) 1991: 27. 
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33. Or, for that matter, his own response to Eagleton's 
criticisms, as we discussed in Chapter 1. 
34. See, for instance, Heath 1981. Many of Williams's oblique 
criticisms are met in Heath 1991 . 
35. This useful phrase is Anthony Easthope's, who has commented, 
in several accounts, on the importance of MacCabe ' s arguments in 
the development of British poststructuralism (see Easthope 1988, 
etc) . He describes James _ Jo~ce_and _ the_Revolution _ of_the _Word as 
contrasting 'the classic realist text with Joyce 's modernism' and 
as ' prepared to argue that Joyce's modernism, specifically that of 
Finnegans _Wake, leads to a revolutionary politics because in 
denying thereader's pleasure it opens the reader's desire ' 
(Easthope 1988: 136, 138). Lodge (1982) presents th e best 
critical ac count of MacCabe's arguments from an orthodox literary 
perspective. 
36. For the fullest statement of this case, see Walsh 1981. 
37. Some of the strains and tensions in the position had already 
become apparent by 1976 when MacCabe asserted. in adjacent 
sentences, both that ' the breaking of the imaginary relation 
between text and viewer is the first pre-requisite of political 
questions in art', and also ' that the breaking of the imaginar y 
relationship can constitute a political goal 1n itself is the 
ultra-leftist fantasy of the surrealists and of much of the avant -
garde work now being undertaken in the cinema' (MacCabe [1976) : 
73) . 
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38. See, for instance, Belsey 1982, 1986; Dollimore 1985; Durant 
1981; Easthope 1983. 
39. The conference papers as a whole are brought together in Fabb 
~i-~L.. 1988. 
40. For discussion of Williams's views on psychoanalysis, see 
Higgins 1990, 1991, 1995. 
41. See especially Williams 1986c. 
42. See Derrida [1965) and (1966) for two fascinating accounts of 
Artaud which in some ways confirm, and in others, contradict, 
Williams's general argument. His general argument is confirmed in 
so far as Derrida uses Artaud for a general attack on the notion 
of representation ([1966]: 343-352}, but Derrida's arguments as a 
whole are considerably more subtle than those attacked by Williams 
here. 
43. To this extent, Pinkney's claims for Williams's interest in 
expres s ionism are partially correct, though his serious 
di st ortions of the evidence remain a problem. 
44. Williams might have sought support here from Bakhtin and 
Me d vedev. As they rightl y note in their discussion of Shk l ovsky's 
conception of poetic language in The_Formal _Method _ in_Literary 
Sch o larship, ' Every word . as such, is involved in intercourse and 
cannot be torn away from it without it ceasing to be a word of · 
language' (Bakhtin and Medvedev [1928]: 94). Many of the 
arguments have resurfaced and been given considerable redefinition 
in recent debate s surrounding the L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E poets and their 
tradition . See, for instance, Perloff 1985 and Perelman 1996. 
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45. He had earlier acknowledged the need for such a correction, 
noting that ' it was impossible for me to write adequately about 
dramatic forms until I fully understood the nature of the 
historical movement of naturalism and realism , which I did not at 
the time' of writing Drama _ from _ Ibsen_to_Eliot (Williams 1979: 
202} 
46. In the spirit of Williams's remarks on Lacan, so central to 
the ~gr~~D-theory approach, in Politics_and _Letters: 'What is 
needed is not a blending of concepts of literature with concepts 
from Lacan. but an introduction of literary practice to the quite 
d i fferent practice of experimental observation. That would be the 
materialist recovery (1979: 341) . And see especially his 
e ndorsem e nt of Timpanaro (Williams 1978b) , particularly on the 
related questions of psychoanalysis and linguistics . 
Notes to Conclusion 
1 . This is certainly true, for instance , of Jonathan Dollimore's 
Radi c al _Traged~: _Religioni_ Ideolog~_and _Power _ in _ the _Drama _of 
Shake s Qe are _ and _hi s_ContemQoraries in whi c h , as David Schalkwyk 
has acut e l y obs e r v ed, there is a ' persistence of a grammar 
throughout [the book ] which signals his own radica l (in the sense 
o f deep-rooted) entrapment in traditional modes of critical 
exposition ' (Schalkwyk 1992: 89) . 
2. It would take another essay - or even book! - to argu e this 
t hrough in any s i gnifi c ant d e tail. But it is worth remark i ng that 
what the studie s by th e se di f ferent author s is a c ommitment to 
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historical and theoretical analysis, as well as the extension 
beyond the boundaries of the usual literary canon. See especially 
Barrell 1980 and 1983; Bryson 19 Heath 1981; Prendergast 1996; 
Shiach 1989, and Willis 1977; Fekete 1977; Simpson 1987; Said 
1983, 1993; Robbins 1993. 
3. Compare Barry's survey, where cultural materialism is 
presented as 'the study of historical materia; (which includes 
literary texts) within a politicized framework, this framework 
including the present which those literary texts have helped to 
shape' (Barry 1995: 182) . This follows Dollimore and Sinfield's 
definition , rather than Williams's. 
4 . See Higgins 1995 for more detailed arguments in this regard. 
5. See, for instance, on psychoanalysis Higgins 1990; on gender, 
Jardine and Swindells 1989, Levy 1989, Watts 1989. Shiach 1995; 
Kaplan 1995; and on colonial discourse, Said 1988, Viswanathan 
1993. Radhakrishnan 1993 . 
6. Many essays do indeed follow or at least intend to follow just 
this route . See, for example, the essays by Shiach, Surin, de 
Bolla , Kaplan. Lloyd and Thomas , all in C . Prendergast (ed.) 1995: 
and by Kruger, Apple , Kohli , Rizvi, Roman, Skurski and Coronil, 
all in Dworkin and Roman (eds.) 1993; and Crowley 1989a and 
1989b. 
7. Though Tony Crowley comes very close in his excellent ess ay 
'Language in History: That Full Field' (1989b). For some sense of 
this . see especially p. 23, where Crowley draws attention 1n 
Williams' s work to ' what was always a central preoccupation with 
language; a preoccupation linked to a commitment to human 
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creativity and the possibilities of gaining a rational, informed 
and just social order.' 
8. See, for instance, Inglis 1982; Dworkin 1993; and the debate 
between Gallagher, Aronowitz and Ross, first in Social_Text 30 
1992 pp. 79-101; and, in a revised form, between Gallagher and 
Aronowitz in C. Prendergast (ed.) 1995: 307-339. For a sense of 
the resonance of Williams's work in cultural studies, see the 
references to Williams in the index of Cultural_Studies eds. 
Grossberg. Nelson and Treichler 1992. Forty-three references are 
noted for Williams, thirty-three for Marx, and fifty-four for 
Stuart Hall. 
9. Since this study is focused on Williams's work in literary and 
dramatic criticism and theory, I am well aware that there has been 
an inevitable marginalisation of Williams's directly political 
writings. Williams's argued scepticism about representative, as 
opposed to participatory democracy is first voiced in Ihg _LQDg 
Revolution (Williams [1961a]: 332-43) and continues throughout his 
work. A useful summary of his position can be found in the 1982 
essay ' Democracy and Parliament' in Williams 1989b: 256-280. See 
also Williams 1983a: 102-27 for a slightly amended formulation and 
argument. And. as always , the entry in Kgy~QrQ~. Williams 1983b: 
93-98. 
10. See Williams [1961a] p. 323: ' it becomes increasingly 
obvious that society is not controlling its economic life, but is 
in part being controlled by it . The weakening of purposive social 
thinking is a direct consequence of this powerful experience , 
which seems to reduce human activity to predictable patterns of 
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demand. If we were not consumers, but users, we might look at 
society very differently, for the concept of use involves general 
human judgements - we need to know how touse things and what we 
are using them for, and also the effects of particular uses on our 
general life - whereas consumption. with its crude hand-to-mouth 
patterns, tends to cancel these questions, replacing them by the 
stimulated and controlled absorption of the products of an 
external and autonomous system. We have not gone all the way with 
this new tendency, and are still in a position to reverse it, but 
its persuasive patterns have much of the power of our society 
be ind them. ' 
11 . In his recent biography, Inglis refers to the project of 
K~~~Q~~§ in disparaging terms (1995: 247-8), relying on Quentin 
Skinner's superficially powerful critique (Skinner 1983). I 
challenge Inglis's characterisation of K~~~Q~d§, and Skinner's 
critique of it, in a paper delivered at the Crossroads _ in _C ultural 
Studies Conference in Tampere, Finland (Higgins 1996b). 
12. The locus classicus of discussion is, of course, Marx's 
statement in The _Eighteenth_Brumaire _of _Louis _BonaEarte: ' Men make 
their own history, but not of their own free will; not under 
cirumstances they themselves have chosen but under the given and 
inherited circumstances with which they are directly confronted' 
(Marx [1851] 1973: 146). 
in Derrida 1994: 107-19. 
See also Derrida's remarkable commentary 
13. See Giddens 1979a. especially pp. 9-48. There is much common 
ground between Williams's work and Giddens's alert and always 
sceptical account of major trends in the history of sociology. 
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For Giddens's own awareness of this, see his two review essays , 
Giddens 1979b and 1981b. 
14. See Said 1983. 
15 . I take the discussion further , and adapt material from,~ 
number of essays dealing with critical literacy, the ' future' of 
English Studies , and questions of the university and academic 
freedom. See Higgins 1990b, 1992, 1995, 1996a, and 1997. 
16 . See , for instance, Journal _ of_Literar~_Studies 8:3-4 1992 ; 
and the recent exchanges in Alternation 3:1 1996 pp. 5-29, between 
Bernth Lindfors , and Judith Lutge Coullie and Trish Gibbon. 
17 . See Williams's final interview for a succinct account of 
these and similar points (Williams [1987d] 1991). 
18 . And, perhaps, as the example of Flaubert shows, ultimately an 
impossible one . Se e Prendergast 1988 for an excellent discussion 
o f the inherent difficulties of such a project. 
19 . Ind e ed , it is striking just how close Giddens's des c ription 
o f some hostile attitudes towards sociology could appl y to 
literary studies with the mere substitution of the key terms . 
' What is i t with sociology?' he asks. ' Why is it so irr i tating to 
so many? Some s o ciologists might answer : ignorance; others: fear. 
Why fear ? We ll , be c ause they like to think of their subject a s a 
dangerous and discomfiting one. Sociology , they are prone to say, 
tends to subvert: it challenges our assumptions about ourselve s as 
individuals and about the wider social contexts in which we live' 
(Giddens 1996 : 1} . 
20 . The nature of this gen e ral threat has been interestingly 
dis c ussed by Wlad Godzich in hi s s tudy Ihe _Culture _ of _Literac~. 
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'As far as faculty and administrators were concerned' he argues, 
'the roots of the problem were sociological and the immediate 
cause was the larger access to university education' (ibid). 
Against this view, Godzich argues for the recognition of a deeper 
malaise, a longer-term opposition between the culture of literacy 
and market forces which has come through in the proliferation of 
new courses in composition: 'The new writing programs, lacking 
either tradition or intellectual legitimation, sought to gain 
acceptance, and thus a legitimacy of sorts, by becoming responsive 
to what their practitioners saw as societal needs, and what were 
in fact the impulses provided by these market forces. In the 
spirit of the 'New Vocationalism', these programs took to defining 
literacy as the mastery of specific codes of linguistic usage 
defined by career objectives of the students .... In effect, the 
teaching of the New Vocationalist literacy meant that the 
educational system was turning its back upon the values of the 
classical literacy, that it renounced the ideal of a sphere of 
communicative interpretation where all the able wielders of the 
language , in their capacity as citizens, would overcome the 
heterogeneity of specialized linguistic practices in order to 
inquire into, and determine, their collective destiny' (12} 
there is much common ground between Williams's idea of the 
connections between literacy and participatory democracy, and 
That 
Godzich's position there can be little doubt. Godzich insist s, in 
terms which echo many of Williams's own arguments. that in the 
culture of literacy: ' the political 
sphere was defined precisely 
by its linguistic status as a sphere of universal access. For it 
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to become specialized and autonomous is tantamount to emptying out 
the meaning of citizenship and to reducing the exercise of its 
rights and privileges to an increasingly meaningless formalism, 
such as a form of voting or poll-taking characteristic of 
plebiscites rather than the democratic determination of policy' 
( 9 ) 
21. See Blade Nzimande's reservations regarding the discourse of 
globalisation in his article 'Neo-liberal ideologues are 
hhijacking the transformation of education' in The_Sunda~ 
Independent February 23 1997 p. 24; but see also his attack on the 
idea of academic freedom as involving institutional autonomy in 
'Academic freedom depends on successful transformation of higher 
education system' in The_Sunda~_ Independent October 6 1996 p. 23. 
It is clear that a great deal of hard thinking and conceptual 
cl arification needs to be done for the renewal and practice of 
academic freedom 1n South Africa. For some debate, see Sisulu 
19 91 , Woolf 1991 , and Said 1991 (all in Pretexts: _Studies _ in 
Writing _and _Culture (1991) 3:1-2, pp. 48-81); and Spivak 1995 , 
Taylor 1995. Muller 1995, Swartz 1995 and Higgins 1995 (all 1n 
Pretexts: _Studies _ in _Writing _and _Culture (1995) 5: 1-2, pp. 117-
190; and Higgins 1997. 
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The Bibliography is divided into two parts: Section A · works by 
Raymond Williams', and Section B ·secondary Sources'. Please note 
that when the year of first publication differs from that of the 
edition referred to, it is given in square brackets. 
A ~_Works _b~ _Ra~mond _Williams 
Williams, Raymond (1947a) 'A Dialogue on Actors', The _Critic. 1:1, 
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